Trade Union Political Funds and Political Party Funding
Debate between Earl of Courtown and Lord Burns
Lord Burns (CB)
My Lords, I am pleased to have the opportunity to open tonight’s debate on the report of the Select Committee on Trade Union Political Funds and Political Party Funding. I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip for scheduling it at very short notice.
Some of your Lordships may have noticed that I voted against the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, to set up the Select Committee. I did so because I thought it would be impossible to conduct a meaningful inquiry in the timescales proposed. I hope that noble Lords will agree that, once again, I have been proved wrong.
In the course of our inquiry, we received oral testimony from 19 witnesses and 40 written submissions.
The Earl of Courtown (Con)
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord. Many noble Lords are very keen to hear what he has to say. Perhaps he could ensure that he is standing underneath the microphone.
Lord Burns
I also hope that the evidence as well as the conclusions of the committee will be of assistance to the House as it considers Clauses 10 and 11 of the Trade Union Bill on Report.
That I have been proved wrong on this is a tribute to my colleagues on the committee, who at very short notice worked intensively and flexibly throughout the inquiry and, more than that, showed a collegiate and constructive spirit which was so necessary if we were to make progress in the very short period that was available. It is somewhat remarkable that there were no votes in the committee and that, after lengthy discussions, the members agreed a report which was unanimous in all but one area—albeit a significant area, as I shall explain in due course.
None of this would have been possible without the outstanding work of the committee staff and Tom Wilson, the clerk to the committee, in particular. They worked against very tight deadlines, organising the written and oral evidence with great skill and preparing evidence for publication very quickly. They also produced a first draft of the report of high quality during the half-term recess. This gave us a firm foundation against which to have the final and decisive deliberations.
I should remind the House of the committee’s remit, which was,
“to consider the impact of clauses 10 and 11 of the Trade Union Bill in relation to the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s report, Political Party Finance: ending the big donor culture, and the necessity of urgent new legislation to balance those provisions with the other recommendations made in the Committee’s Report”.
We took the view that our first task should be to assess what the impact of Clauses 10 and 11 would be on the unions and how that would affect the Labour Party in turn. Both clauses concern the political funds that unions must establish if they wish to spend money on the furtherance of political objects. That includes both donations to political parties and spending on political campaigns. Out of the 163 listed unions in the UK, 25 have political funds; and of those, 15 are affiliated to the Labour Party.
Currently, most members of a union with a political fund pay a political levy into the fund unless they take the active decision to opt out of doing so. It is important to bear in mind that the political levy is a very small amount. The average is just over 9p per week or £4.84 per year. In 2013, 89% of members in unions with a political fund have not opted out and therefore were paying the levy.
Clause 10, as drafted, would require unions to move away from the current opt-out system and introduce an opt-in system. In other words, union members would pay the political levy only if they actively chose to do so. In attempting to assess the likely impact of Clause 10, we looked at the evidence of history, at what has happened in Northern Ireland, and we took evidence from behavioural experts. It may be worth saying a few words on each.
We thought that history might provide some clues because political funds have already been moved once from an opt-out system to an opt-in system, in 1927, and then back again in 1946. Although the available data have to be treated with a pinch of salt, they indicate that the move from an opt-out to an opt-in caused participation rates to fall by about one-third, and then the move back again caused the rates to increase by about 50%. Northern Ireland, which of course has a rather different political context, never restored the opt-out system after 1927 and its current participation rates under an opt-in system are about 28%.
The behavioural experts that we consulted gave us some powerful evidence about the impact of inertia on human behaviour. At the moment, the power of inertia benefits the unions because only 11% of their members make the effort to opt out of the political fund. Under the Government’s proposals, of course inertia would work against the unions. People have busy lives and their political levy is very small, so human nature means that it would be extremely difficult to persuade existing members to make an active choice about whether or not to opt in. Indeed, Dr David Halpern of the Behavioural Insights Team said that analogous situations led him to expect a fall of 20% to 30% in political fund participation rates.
In summary, the truth is that nobody can know what the impact of moving to opt-out would be in Great Britain at this particular time. However, the committee agreed that there could be a sizeable negative effect on participation rates. It is, of course, possible that those members who opt in could be asked to pay more, which might, to some degree, mitigate the financial impact.
The committee also agreed that the negative effect would be exacerbated by the particular details of Clause 10, which gives us a short transition period, does not allow opt-in by electronic means and requires opt-ins to be renewed every five years. Taking all of those factors into account, the unions themselves took a pessimistic view that the clause as currently drafted would result in participation rates being as low as 10% or even 5%. Although the committee was not convinced by those estimates, we did agree that the details of the scheme needed addressing and we were pleased at the Government’s apparent willingness to look again at those points.
The next question is whether the negative effect on political funds will have a knock-on effect in the funding of the Labour Party. We were told that out of the £22 million that Labour Party-affiliated trade unions raised in political funds in 2014, just under half, £10 million, was given to the Labour Party. The committee agreed that there would be an impact but the scale was uncertain. For example, unions might choose to give a larger slice of the political fund to the Labour Party and to spend less on other political campaigns. So there will not necessarily be a direct correlation between the impact on political fund participation rates and the impact on the Labour Party’s finances. But on balance the committee concluded that there would be a significant reduction in union payments to the Labour Party.
Before I talk further about party funding, I shall say a brief word about Clause 11, which would require unions to provide much more detail about their political expenditure to the Certification Officer, who oversees trade union administration. Although this clause was raised far less often than Clause 10 in the evidence we received, the committee agreed that, as presently drafted, it could be disproportionately burdensome on the unions. The clause would require any union that spends more than a total of £2,000 per year from its political fund to declare the recipient, the amount and the nature of every payment, no matter how small. I repeat: there is no de minimis. To take a striking example, it was put to us that in principle this clause, coupled with subsections (1) and (2) of the 1992 Act, will mean that a union will have to declare the reimbursement of a bus fare to one of its members who attends a Labour Party conference. The committee believes that this clause needs to be looked at again, and accordingly we propose that before the Bill completes its passage, the Government should consult the Certification Officer, who will also be significantly affected by the clause, and come back with revised proposals which better balance accountability and proportionality.
I turn now to the part of the committee’s remit dealing with the 2011 report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. The remit raised the possibility of,
“the necessity of urgent new legislation”,
to balance Clauses 10 and 11,
“with the other recommendations made in the committee’s report”.
I must confess that the committee had a little difficulty with that wording even after reading it many times. The CSPL report did not address political funds at all. One of its recommendations concerned union affiliation fees to the Labour Party, but they are different. It is also clear that there is no cross-party agreement on the CSPL report and thus no prospect of urgent legislation.
The committee decided, however, that it would be useful and within the spirit of our remit to consider whether there is a convention or some lesser tradition that reform of political party funding should proceed by consensus. We concluded that while there is no firm convention, history shows that both of the main parties have acted with a degree of constraint and that consensus is desirable. There is a widespread view that no Government should use their majority unilaterally to inflict significant damage on the finances of opposition parties. With this in mind, we commended the CSPL’s general approach of seeking to maintain balance so that any package of reform would affect all major parties in a broadly proportionate and fair manner.
However, we have a dilemma. The Conservative Party made a manifesto commitment,
“to ensure that trade unions use a transparent opt-in process for union subscriptions”.
Yet, as I have explained, Clause 10 will certainly have an impact on the funding of one particular party, the Labour Party, and as it stands it is not part of a balanced package that might command a desirable consensus. This dilemma led us to try to seek a way forward which would allow the Government to fulfil their manifesto commitment while also mitigating the worst of the impact on the unions and the Labour Party.
We were agreed that one way of easing this dilemma would be to distinguish between the requirements for new members and those for existing members of trade unions. For new members, we were agreed that opt-in was the correct way forward. Across many different walks of life, such as financial services, in which I have a great deal of experience, it is increasingly recognised that people should be asked to exercise an active choice and that organisations should not rely on inertia. We have therefore recommended that, after a minimum transition period of 12 months, anyone joining a union with a political fund should pay the political levy only if they have actively chosen to do so.
We were also agreed that for members who are opted in, there should be no requirement to renew that decision at regular intervals, provided that they are reminded every year about their right to opt out. This would also be in line with the requirement of the Financial Conduct Authority for financial services. We have therefore suggested that the Certification Officer should issue a statutory code of practice specifying the minimum communications which unions must have with political fund contributors every year about their right to opt out and to monitor compliance with it. We were also agreed that it should be possible to opt in and opt out electronically, whether by email or on the internet, as well as on paper.
I now turn to the more difficult issue of the treatment of existing members. As I have said, we agreed that we should distinguish between existing members, many of whom have been paying into political funds for years, and new members who can be forced to make an active choice on their union membership form. Human nature means that it would be much harder for unions to persuade existing members to make an active choice as there is no effective trigger point. Large numbers are likely to ignore mailshots asking them to make this choice and repeated prompting is likely to be necessary. The fear is not of existing members choosing to opt out rather than to opt in, it is that they will simply make no choice at all. This raised two questions for the committee: whether and how quickly the opt-in system should be extended to existing political fund contributors as well as to new members, and whether this should be linked to progress on party funding reform.
Our deliberations boiled down to two options. One was that the opt-in system should be extended to existing members, but perhaps on a longer transition period than that for new members. This would recognise the problem of inertia and the likely difficulty of persuading existing members to make a choice, but still set a deadline for that choice to be made. A second option was that existing contributors should be considered as part of future talks on party funding reform and should not be included in this Bill. This was because it was feared that extending the opt-in to existing members would have a significant negative effect on union and Labour Party funding even with an extended transition period. Meanwhile, existing members will also be covered by the proposed statutory code of practice specifying the minimum communications which unions must have with political fund contributors every year about their right to opt out. Of course, the difference between these two approaches depends on the length of the extended transition period on the one hand, and the outcome and timing of talks on party funding on the other. A majority of the committee, including myself, on balance preferred the second option; namely, that extending the opt-in requirement to existing members should be considered only as part of wider cross-party talks on the reform of political party funding.
That brings me to my final point, and in some ways the most important recommendation of the report, as it also has a part to play in resolving our dilemma. The whole committee strongly believes that the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties must give effect to their respective manifesto commitments on party funding reform. Accordingly, we urge the Government to take a lead by convening cross-party talks with a view to making a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement. We cannot hope that this problem is going to go away; it will not. My fear is that until we solve it, the public are going to continue to mistrust political parties and the way that they are funded. I look forward to hearing what noble Lords have to say, and I beg to move.