(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I address Amendment 33 let me go back to the debate on Monday when we were discussing Amendment 18 and new Section 58B(2). I fear that during the discussions I misunderstood something said by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. I understood him to be saying that the Act produced two different ways of approaching the burden of proof. I have reread Hansard and I misunderstood him—it is entirely my fault—and I objected to that. I would go on objecting to it if that was what he said, but it was not. I have studied the Bill and I find on page 83 that he is right and that the burden of proof in relation to any offence created by Section 58B(2) is in fact on the prosecution. I therefore apologise to the noble Earl—I am sorry that I misunderstood him—and to the extent that I misled the House, I apologise to the House. However, I just add that it would be so much more helpful if Acts of Parliament said what they meant, instead of telling us to look at whatever page it is to find the answer.
I want to add a word, in spite of the difference of view expressed here: we have to be careful about this provision. I am not going to take sides in relation to what may be a very serious offence or a very minor offence, but can we just reflect on this? Every citizen is presumed to know the law; every visitor to this country is presumed to know the law that applies in this country. Of course we do not: look at me, I got new Section 58B(2) wrong and I am supposed to know the law. The more serious point is that there is a basis and a quid pro quo for this. The quid pro quo is that the criminal law should be clear. I am expected to know the law and to obey the law: it should, at least, be clear what it is I am expected to obey.
We are all supposed to know the law here; every citizen of every country, applying the same presumption, is presumed to know the law in the country of which he is a citizen or to which he is a visitor. There will be occasions—perhaps I need to be less emphatic: there may be occasions—when something is not unlawful in a different country to our own. We have different rules. Bullfighting is unlawful in this country, but would we prosecute a Spanish toreador coming here for breaking what we would regard as our law which is not unlawful under their law? The Bill risks criminalising a citizen of another country for doing something that is not unlawful in that country.
Of course terrorism is unlawful—it is unlawful everywhere, you do not need a book of law to tell you that—but there may be minor matters, in relative terms, which we criminalise here but are not unlawful by the laws of a different country. We need to be careful not to extend the criminal law further than it should go.
My Lords, as we have heard Clause 6 adds a number of further offences to the existing list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which extends extraterritorial jurisdiction over those offences. This will ensure that UK courts are able to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters who travel to the UK, having joined terrorist groups and become involved in conflicts or other terrorist activity overseas. It will also ensure that we are able to prosecute people who base themselves overseas and seek to radicalise people—the general public or targeted individuals—in the UK. It is this latter category of radicalisers, and propagandists on behalf of terrorist organisations, that the noble Baroness’s amendments deal with.
Section 13(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 contains the offence of displaying in a public place an item of clothing or other article such as a flag, in circumstances which,
“arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.
As a result of Clause 2, it will also contain, at new subsection (1A), the offence of publishing an image of such an article in the same circumstances.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is most relevant to Section 13, and in particular to the offence the Bill will add at new subsection (1A), in a case where a person located overseas publishes images of flags or logos associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation. We have seen in the Syrian conflict that Daesh has run a slick and effective online propaganda operation, which has included exactly this type of activity—publishing images on social media and other online platforms, aimed at promoting the group, its ideology and its methods, to individuals around the world, including in the UK. Other terrorist groups, in other parts of the world, do the same.
It has been a recurring theme of the debates on the Bill that this is a downside of the rapid development of online technologies in recent years. Although people have been connected and brought together in myriad positive ways, and the world has been opened up, those who would do us harm have been equally quick to exploit the opportunities of the digital age. Terrorists are no exception, and we need to update our laws to keep pace with the evolving threat. The online world simply does not respect national boundaries in the traditional sense, nor does it pay heed to geographical distance. Where this gifts radicalisers the opportunity to reach across the world to target vulnerable people in the UK, it is absolutely right that the UK Government respond by ensuring that our courts have the ability to deal with that. There is a clear operational case to justify this measure.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained that her concern is that a person could find themselves prosecuted in the UK, having acted in support of an organisation that is not proscribed in the country where the conduct took place, and therefore having no awareness or expectation that they could be held criminally responsible. I respect the principled stance taken by the noble Baroness but, respectfully, I do not agree that it would be right to either simply remove this provision, as Amendment 31 would do, or limit its application, as Amendment 33 would do. The reality is that there is no universal and internationally agreed list of proscribed organisations, and there is no realistic prospect of one being implemented. Even if there were, the kinds of countries in which terrorist organisations are most likely to be based are those that are the least likely to sign up to and implement such an international rules-based system.
Despite this, terrorists are travelling and communicating across international boundaries, in a way which poses a direct threat to the safety of the public in the UK and elsewhere. Given this, we should not deny our courts the ability to act against such individuals if they return or travel to the UK, pending the adoption of such an international list, and we should ensure that the powers available are flexible and not unduly restricted. To proceed as the noble Baroness advocates would risk sacrificing public safety and justice in the pursuit of a frankly unrealistic ideal.
It is right that we should be able to prosecute those who travel overseas to join terrorist organisations, and who publish propaganda in support of those groups, seeking to radicalise others back in the UK or elsewhere. That is the nub of the matter. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was absolutely spot on in the way that he characterised these provisions. Such crimes are most likely to be committed in areas of conflict and instability, within failed states that may not have functioning systems of government with effective jurisdiction over their own territory, or in countries where there may not be clearly defined or well-developed terrorism laws equivalent to those in the UK, or which may simply take a different approach. Those are not good reasons to ignore the threat posed on UK soil by people who have published propaganda in support of terrorist groups while overseas. Simply put, foreign terrorist fighters should not be able to evade justice because the country that they travelled to, or hail from, does not have a proscription system equivalent to that of the UK.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as we have discussed, the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area, which would be inserted as a new Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000 by Clause 4, is subject to a reasonable excuse defence. We have already debated the circumstances which might give rise to a reasonable excuse and how these should be catered for within the Bill.
Amendment 18 addresses a different aspect of that provision: the question of how much the evidence is required to establish a defence to the new offence. Related to this is the question of whom the evidential burden is placed on. Section 118 of the 2000 Act sets out how the evidential burden applies to a number of defences to criminal offences within the 2000 Act, including the new designated area offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is concerned that the current drafting of new Section 58B(2), which contains the defence to the designated area offence, is out of step with the existing provision in Section 118 of the 2000 Act and will place a greater burden on defendants to make out a reasonable excuse than is envisaged by Section 118.
I understand and respect the noble Lord’s wish to ensure that defendants facing a charge under Section 58B are not placed in a worse position than those charged under other offences with a similar reasonable excuse defence. However, I hope that I can allay that concern and provide a clear assurance that this will not be the case if I explain how Section 118 interacts with the defence to the new Section 58B offence.
The wording used in the defence, which refers to a defendant proving that he or she had a reasonable excuse, is the exact same formulation used elsewhere in various defences to offences contained in the 2000 Act, including the defence to the Section 58 offence amended by Clause 3. It is vital to recognise that this reference in the defence to “prove” should not be read on its own; rather it is subject to the operation of Section 118, which makes further provision on what is required to prove a defence in this context.
Specifically, Section 118 provides that if a defendant,
“adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”—
the matter that has to be proved under the wording of the defence—
“the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.
This, together with relevant case law, has the effect that if a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support a suggestion that he or she has a reasonable excuse, then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that defence, which it must do to the normal criminal standard—beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to do so, then the jury must assume that the defence is made out.
The precise extent and nature of evidence required on the part of the defendant to invoke the defence in the first instance will be a matter for juries to determine in individual cases. Parliament has set a threshold which is not particularly high; all that is needed is,
“evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”.
In practice, a trial judge would be cautious to rule out any proposed defence unless it was plainly incapable of being judged by a jury as a reasonable one. In relation to new Section 58B(2), the evidential burden placed on the defendant will not be any greater than that required in relation to any of the other offences to which Section 118 applies. Furthermore, were Section 118 to continue to apply to new Section 58B(2), the amendment would have no impact in practice. Whether new Section 58B(2) refers to the defendant stating or proving the defence, under Section 118, it will still be for the jury to decide whether the prosecution has disproved the defence beyond reasonable doubt.
I am extremely troubled by the idea that new Section 58B(2) should have a different form of wording from Section 118. It is a recipe for chaos in the court. Can we not simply address the amendment, take out “prove” and use the words in Section 118?
That is exactly how it reads. Any judge looking at this will say, “Good heavens, here is a situation in which, under the counterterrorism Act, the defendant has to prove his defence—not adduce evidence so that the matter can be raised for the prosecution to disprove”. When I read this I thought it must be a typing error, but I knew that that could not be the case.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has helpfully explained, these amendments relate to the legal test for designating an area under Clause 4. That test currently requires that it be necessary for purposes connected with protecting the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict UK nationals or residents from entering or remaining in the area. The noble Lord’s amendments would add a second limb to this test, which would require that a proscribed terrorist organisation is engaging in armed conflict within the area to be designated.
It is clear from the noble Lord’s explanation that the purpose of these amendments is to help ensure that designations are proportionate and that they are made only in circumstances where they are genuinely necessary. As the noble Lord has explained, they would more closely follow the approach taken in Australian and Danish law, where those countries have established similar powers.
I completely understand the sentiment and the intention behind these amendments. Nevertheless, I respectfully disagree that they are necessary to secure this outcome. I also do not consider that the UK is bound to follow the approach taken by other countries, which may have different legal frameworks and may be facing different configurations of terrorist threat, rather than seeking the approach that works best for us. As your Lordships would expect, when drafting Clause 4, we looked carefully at the approaches taken by Australia and Denmark, including the legal test for designating an area. We have concluded that the right approach for the UK, and the one that would provide the greatest flexibility while still providing a proper safeguard for proportionality, is the one currently set out in the Bill.
We have no doubt that in most cases in which it might be appropriate to designate an area in future, it is likely that a proscribed organisation will be engaging in armed conflict. Certainly, that has been the experience with the Syrian conflict, which is the closest analogy we have for the type of scenario in which we might wish to use the power. However, we are keen to ensure that the power is sufficiently flexible to be used in currently unforeseen future scenarios.
It is plausible that in the future, there could be an armed conflict or some other situation in an area which gives rise to a clear terrorism-related risk, on the basis of which it is appropriate to restrict travel by UK nationals or residents, but in which a proscribed terrorist organisation is not currently involved. This might be because a grouping of terrorists operating in the area cannot clearly be defined as an organisation. Or it might be because the situation has evolved rapidly—perhaps with an organisation emerging and quickly becoming involved in fighting—and it is necessary to restrict travel urgently before it has been possible to proscribe the organisation. It is also plausible that we may know from sensitive intelligence about the involvement of a specific proscribed organisation in a conflict, but as such intelligence cannot be revealed in public, it may not be possible to prove the organisation’s involvement on open material alone.
As the noble Lord will be aware, regulations designating an area are subject to the made affirmative procedure. As such, Home Office Ministers will need to come to Parliament to explain the basis for the designation, and it would then be for both Houses to decide whether to approve the regulations based on that explanation. In this regard, I note the recommendation by the Delegated Powers Committee that the Home Secretary should be required to lay before Parliament a Statement setting out the reasons why he considers that the condition for designation is met in the case at hand. We are ready to give that recommendation sympathetic consideration ahead of Report.
Given the considerations I have outlined, and the clear and robust necessity test that is already contained within Clause 4, I hope the noble Lord will be persuaded to withdraw his amendment, at least for the time being.