National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Adebowale

Wednesday 24th April 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adebowale]

My Lords, I will be brief. I have sat through this debate patiently and I understand the impatience of the House to hear the Minister. I should declare my interest. I have listened to the debate very carefully as a non-executive director of NHS England, the chief executive of a not-for-profit provider of health and social care services in partnership with the NHS and as a board member of a small private company that provides services to the NHS.

I just want to say a couple of things. First, I am absolutely committed to the NHS. My mother was a nurse for 30 years. Listening to the views of the House, it would be possible to slip into a pit of despair having heard the descriptions of the dystopian future that awaits us all if either side of the argument is accepted whole-heartedly. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.

However, in reference to the issue of guidance, it might be worth the House hearing that NHS England and Monitor are working in partnership to develop a choice and competition framework. Guidance is important; it is not just the law, but how it is interpreted. The statement that NHS England and Monitor have made points out clearly that: patients and their interest come first and the use of competition must be in patients’ interests; the use of competition must be based on evidence, not ideology, and it is the evidence of what will improve outcomes for patients that matters; commissioners will decide when to introduce competition beyond patients’ rights to choice set out in the NHS constitution—something that not many people have mentioned during the course of this debate, but which has a huge impact on its outcome; where there is poor performance there is an expectation that commissioners will use all the tools available, including competition where that will improve outcomes for patients; and there is a need to strengthen the evidence base further on the potential benefits of introducing competition.

Given that some of the concerns associated with the regulations are about how they will be interpreted and applied in practice, do the Government believe that the regulations are consistent with these principles of how competition should be used in practice and as set out in the agreement between NHS England and Monitor?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, we are debating a set of regulations on which, as we have heard this evening, a great deal of passion and a large quantity of printers’ ink has been expended over recent days and weeks. I would like to begin with three very simple statements, which I hope will be helpful as mental marker posts before I respond to the concerns and questions that have been raised.

First, amid the many changes that the Government have made to NHS commissioning, one area of the law that we have not changed one iota is the law relating to competitive tendering. That law has been in place for a number of years. It has been governed by a European directive, and as regards the rules that govern NHS procurement, these regulations usher in nothing new at all.

Secondly, there is no government agenda to privatise NHS services—quite the contrary. The House may remember that we made it illegal in the Health and Social Care Act for the Secretary of State, Monitor or NHS England to have a policy of deliberately favouring the independent sector.

Thirdly, it is NHS commissioners and no one else who will decide whether, where and how competition in service provision should be introduced. These regulations do not confer any obligation on commissioners to create or promote markets, nor do they require commissioners to unbundle or fragment services against the interests of patients.

I begin with these simple statements because they are key to understanding what the Government are doing and what they are not doing. What we are doing, above all, is having a set of arrangements in place that will protect the interests of patients. The basic purpose of the regulations is to prevent commissioners failing to think about how the needs of their patients can best be met. Equally, their purpose is to ensure that commissioning in the NHS is protected from abuses arising from conflicts of interest or anti-competitive behaviour that works against the interests of patients. There is no encouragement in these regulations, explicit or implicit, to commission services from the independent sector, or indeed any other sector. The regulations enshrine the principle that patients must receive services from the providers, from whichever sector—public, private or voluntary—that are most capable of meeting their needs and improving the quality of services that they receive.

Mechanisms to make sure that this happened were put in place by the previous Administration. These mechanisms consisted of the Principles and Rules for Co-operation and Competition, which were overseen by the Co-operation and Competition Panel. Now that primary care trusts no longer exist, we need to carry over those arrangements so as to apply them to clinical commissioning groups. The Government committed, in their response to the NHS Future Forum report, to maintain the previous rules and place them on a statutory footing in order that they could continue to apply to commissioners. That is exactly what we have done; the panel has been transferred into Monitor, so that there is absolute continuity in how the rules will be applied.

This is a key point for noble Lords to understand. Monitor is now the sector-specific regulator for the NHS. In practice that means that it, not the courts, will be the guardian of patients’ interests and will adjudicate if allegations of anti-competitive conduct arise. In effect, it will act as a firewall between commissioners and the courts. If the House annuls these regulations, that firewall will disappear and I suggest to the House that this could not possibly be in the interests of the health service.

The regulations also make it clear that Monitor has no powers to direct commissioners to go out to tender, which brings me to Regulation 5(1). People who have looked at that regulation have stated that it requires commissioners to go out to tender for just about every NHS service. That is not so. It is not even remotely near the reality. First, the wording of Regulation 5 which refers to “one capable provider” is almost exactly the same as that of the previous Government’s guidance to PCTs. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones was quite right in pointing this out. I shall now read from that guidance. It said that PCT boards “must act transparently” and without discrimination,

“and be able to demonstrate rationale for decisions on whether or not to competitively tender. In particular, where the commissioner decides to procure through single tender the rationale must demonstrate that there is only one capable provider to deliver the services”.

The circumstances in which a commissioner may therefore award a contract without a competition under the regulations are exactly the same as they have been up to now. There is no daylight between them.

It is worth my making a point about that guidance. It was not guidance that PCTs could take or leave but guidance that was declaratory of public procurement law, which applied to PCTs, so those who think that we are replacing a rather loose arrangement with something more stringent are mistaken. The law was binding before and it is binding now. These regulations are declaratory of the existing legal position, just as the previous Government’s guidance was. However, we also need these regulations to ensure that the various protections for patients and commissioners afforded by Monitor, as agreed during the passage of the 2012 Act, are in place.

We have heard concerns this evening from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about what might happen to the unbundling of hospital services. I would like to put that misconception to rest. Elective hospital care is not relevant to these regulations. The previous Government brought in a policy known as “any willing provider” for elective hospital services. We have continued with that policy, which means that patients have a free choice between hospital providers who meet NHS quality standards and contractual terms. There is therefore no question of tendering for those services.

In the main, the services where tendering might be relevant are those delivered in the community and certain more specialised services. Again, the overarching principle to guide commissioners is Regulation 2—to do what is in the best interests of their patients. In some circumstances, tendering may be appropriate, but in many cases it will not: for example, where there is only one provider capable of providing the integrated package or pathway of services which the commissioner wishes to secure for its patients. In another situation, they may judge that only one provider is able to meet the clinical quality and safety standards that they require. They may decide not to tender where they conclude that it is necessary for services to be co-located because of the interdependencies between them—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, once again—in order, for example, to ensure patient safety.

It is worth looking at the actual wording of Regulation 5(1), which says:

“A relevant body may award a new contract … without advertising … where the relevant body is satisfied that the services to which the contract relates are capable of being provided only by that provider”.

The relevant body has to be satisfied. This means that a commissioner needs to go through a process to make sure that it is taking sensible decisions that genuinely address the interests of its patients. In other words, it must have a rationale for what it does and be satisfied that it is doing the most appropriate thing. As long as it has that rationale, that is where the matter ends. I repeat: in those circumstances there is no one who can oblige the commissioner to go out to tender.

Those who maintain that these regulations usher in a lawyers’ charter are not looking at the evidence. The evidence to date tells us that only a tiny handful of cases have been referred to the Co-operation and Competition Panel in the space of several years. I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that none has gone to court. Since the rules on NHS procurement are staying exactly the same, I fail to see why we should expect a sudden avalanche of challenges to commissioning decisions.

As I said during the passage of the Health and Social Care Act, there is no requirement in these regulations or anywhere else to create markets. Nor, as I have said, is there any requirement for commissioners to unbundle or to fragment services to facilitate competition: in other words, to separate out individual services so they could be provided by a larger range of providers. The decision whether and when to create these conditions and the services to which they apply remains entirely with commissioners.

One of the arguments produced by the noble Lord for annulling these regulations is that they lack clarity, particularly Regulation 5(1). I suggest that is a specious argument. First, the law has not changed. Secondly, employees of commissioning support units, whose job it is to support CCGs in commissioning decisions, are very largely the same people who did exactly the same jobs in PCTs and are entirely familiar with this area of the law. Thirdly, there is already guidance out there, produced by the NHS Commissioning Board Authority last year. Fourthly, Monitor will be providing further guidance to support commissioners in understanding the circumstances in which single tender is appropriate, including specific case studies. This guidance will be consulted on shortly. Monitor will continue, as the Co-operation and Competition Panel did before it, to provide informal advice to help commissioners understand the regulations. We really do not have to worry about lack of clarity here.

I turn now to one or two of the specific questions that were posed in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, asked why other countries have not applied these procurement laws. All member states in the European Union have been required to transpose the EU directive on public procurement into their own national legislation. In fact, it has been applied in Wales and Northern Ireland through the Public Contracts Regulations 2006.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, maintained that the OFT’s role in mergers is evidence of the Government’s agenda to marketise the NHS. First, that issue is in no way related to the regulations that we are debating tonight. Perhaps I could remind the noble Lord that the OFT is acting independently under the powers conferred on it under the previous Administration through the Enterprise Act 2002.

With regard to the Competition Commission gagging clinicians in the Bournemouth and Poole merger case, I suggest that that is not relevant either. My understanding is that those arrangements are simply to prevent the merger proceeding further while it is being reviewed. They should not get in the way of providers co-operating with each other in the usual way in the interests of patients. The noble Lord said that Monitor is anti-bundling and that it would be policing the regulations at the same time. That is misleading. Decisions about whether or not to bundle services are not for Monitor to make; they are squarely for commissioners to take in the best interests of their patients, and Monitor is under a duty to enable integrated services.

The noble Lord, Lord Owen, raised concerns about charities. I have seen the brief from National Voices, Marie Curie and others in this regard. Those concerns are helpful in illustrating the point that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the commissioning of services. It is interesting that some stakeholders have raised concerns about unbundling leading to fragmentation, while others are concerned about the effects of bundling too many services together. In practice, it is for clinically led commissioners to take decisions on whether or not services should be bundled in the best interests of patients. That is their job, and these regulations do nothing to require them to bundle or unbundle, as I have said.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked me whether the regulations take into account the financial viability of hospitals and economies of scale. First, I remind the noble Lord that these regulations are not relevant to the vast majority of elective hospital services, so they do not herald the prospect of large numbers of services being hived off. Secondly, it is for commissioners to make decisions about the need for services to be bundled or co-located, as I have said. It is not in their interest to destabilise providers. Thirdly, the NHS tariff is being improved in order to ensure that it is properly reflective of the costs faced by providers. This would mean that profit-making services would no longer need to cross-subsidise other services.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked me why there is no contract value threshold below which commissioners do not have to go out to tender. Where the value of a contract is such that it would be disproportionate for the commissioner to hold a tendering exercise, there is no requirement under the regulations or the law to do so.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, said that Monitor should publish figures relating to the cases that it considers. Paragraph 21 in Schedule 8 to the Health and Social Care Act 2008 requires Monitor to publish an annual report on the exercise of its functions and lay a copy before Parliament, and to provide the Secretary of State with such other reports and information relating to the exercise of its functions as the Secretary of State may require. We would also expect Monitor to publish reports on cases considered by it, as the Co-operation and Competition Panel has to date.

I of course took due note of the criticisms made by your Lordships’ Scrutiny Committee. However, I would say that there was a formal public consultation on the requirements of the original set of regulations between August and October last year. Engagement events were held up and down the country. The response to the consultation demonstrated broad support for the proposals from a wide range of stakeholders. The revised regulations did not substantially change the policy, and for that reason I suggest to the Scrutiny Committee that further consultation was not necessary.

Let me be clear about what we would lose if the regulations were not in place. The main thing that we would lose is the adjudication role of Monitor as an expert health sector regulator with an overarching statutory duty to protect and promote patients’ interests. That would mean that NHS commissioners would be exposed to the full force of public procurement law, as interpreted by the courts. I firmly believe that in that situation we would be more likely to secure the very kind of risk-averse behaviour by commissioners that some have argued today must be avoided. In addition, without the regulations, patients’ right to choice under the NHS constitution would not be protected; commissioning processes would be much less transparent and accountable; we would lose safeguards to protect against and address conflicts of interest, discrimination and anti-competitive conduct that work against the interests of patients; and requirements to ensure that the objective of procurement must always be in pursuit of meeting the needs of patients and improving quality would not be in place.

Although in one sense, the regulations can be seen as unexceptional, because they largely carry forward existing rules and arrangements; but in another sense they are more than that. They are vital for anyone who believes that the central interest that the NHS should have at its heart is that of the patient. With that observation in particular, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the Motion.