(11 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the historical culture of that particular trust has been focused on financial targets, and the tone from the top now needs to focus on improving quality and long-term sustainability. There is a string of issues identified in Sir Bruce’s review, all of them urgent. The good news is that I know that the current management is addressing those issues. I am naturally sorry to hear of the personal experiences of my noble friend’s family.
My Lords, I wonder whether I can assist the noble Earl, and indeed the House, by quoting directly from the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone. The noble Earl referred to it earlier and said that he was not aware of the details. This is a letter to the Prime Minister from the noble Baroness, dated yesterday, in which she says that he has been “misled” in the response that he gave in Prime Minister’s Questions. She says that the CQC, of which she is a former chair,
“was not pressurised by the previous Government to tone down its regulatory judgments or to hide quality failures”.
She goes on to say:
“So I am afraid neither my evidence to the Francis Inquiry nor my current recollection … can be interpreted to support the view that, in the words of your answer at PMQs ‘there was a culture under the previous Government of not revealing problems in the NHS’”.
She finishes the letter by asking:
“How can this misapprehension best be corrected for the record?”.
Perhaps the noble Earl can suggest that.
I am rather sorry that the noble Baroness should have raised that, as I was rather keen to protect the noble Baroness, Lady Young, from any embarrassment, because I think that the whole House respects her. All I can say is that the substance of the letter to which the noble Baroness refers is diametrically opposite in content to the evidence that the noble Baroness, Lady Young, gave to the Mid Staffs public inquiry.
(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord has alighted on an extremely important area. We have been very careful in constructing the outcomes framework to make sure that we define deliverable outcome indicators. The NHS Commissioning Board is satisfied that the indicators are realistic but I have to be candid with him. This represents work in progress as the precise way in which the board will demonstrate that it has made progress against each of the indicators has not been defined in every case. I can assure him that it will be. It will be up to the board, however, to construct a system of local accountability to ensure that the clinical commissioning groups are held to account against realistic demonstrable indicators which match those of the NHS outcomes framework, not least in the area of chronic conditions. The patient pathway is work in progress, too, but much of its quality can be measured by reference to the patient experience. That is one of the central domains of the outcomes framework, on which a lot of work has been done. I would be happy to write to him on that.
My Lords, perhaps I may press the noble Earl a little further on the part about IT in the mandate. My noble friend Lord Warner also referred to it. Would he develop a little the expectation in the mandate about developing the electronic patient record, which I feel is an aspiration rather than a practical reality if it is going to take place within two years? Can he help me by describing the way in which progress can be measured, and how is this to be achieved in a period when the pressure is on local resources and there is a dispersal to local responsibility which earlier he described as being a problem?
There are several objectives around our wish to see more patients having access to their records, not only to enable them to order repeat prescriptions and make appointments with their GPs online, which many practices already enable, but also to access their own personal health records where they wish to do so. This, too, is a work in progress. Noble Lords do not need me to tell them that there are clear confidentiality issues involved in this area. What we cannot have is a system that is open to breaches of security. However, work is going on with the Royal College of General Practitioners and the British Medical Association on that point. We have said that it is our ambition that everyone should be able to access their GP records online by 2015. That is the ambition and we think that it is achievable. However, once again I would be happy to keep the noble Baroness updated as work continues.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Minister has clarified the difficulty that I was in, partly because of the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Lester, but also because of what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said. As I understand it, all their remarks are posited on the basis that the subsequent amendment, Amendment 5, will be accepted by the House. When they refer to the terms of the Bill, they are referring to the Bill as it now stands and not as it will, I hope, be amended in the conclusion of our next debate.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who is of course quite right.
I have been handed a note which says that when I said that there would be no legally enforceable duties on quality improvement, I should have clarified that that would have a follow-on. I should have said, “across the NHS system”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, referred to potential privilege responses from the Commons. My noble friend the Leader of the House made a Written Statement last Thursday about the financial privilege of the House of Commons in which he drew attention to a paper by the Clerk of the Parliaments, available in the Library. I think that questions about procedure may be best directed to my noble friend, but I shall do my best to assist. The Clerk of the Parliaments makes it clear in his paper that,
“until the Commons asserts its privilege, the Lords is fully entitled to debate and agree to amendments with privilege implications”.
That is what we should do. I would much regret it if the House thought that I was trying to restrict its role of revision. The Marshalled List sets out more than 100 amendments in my name, tabled in response to debate in Committee, and if the House agrees to those amendments I can assure noble Lords that the Government will encourage the other place to accept them.
The essence of the noble Baroness’s question is about privilege reasons for the Commons rejecting amendments proposed by this House, and on that I can say two things. First, any amendment with implications for public expenditure might involve privilege, but that is a matter for the Commons alone. Decisions on financial privilege are for the Speaker of the Commons on advice from the Clerks of that House. If the Commons reject a Lords amendment in which the Speaker has determined that privilege is engaged, the only reason that it can send this House is a privilege reason. There is no discretion.
Secondly, this debate is by its nature premature. I hope that our debate and dialogue will lead to this Bill being sent to the Commons in a form that that House will accept. Until we see how Report unfolds, it is too early to speculate on the reaction from the Commons. One cannot have a reply to a question until the question has been asked.
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 5. As noble Lords will be aware, and as I stated during our discussion on the previous group of amendments, a number of concerns were raised in Committee over the clauses relating to the Secretary of State’s accountability for the health service. Since our collective discussion in November to withdraw amendments on this issue, pending a period of discussion and reflection, I have been meeting noble Lords to understand their concerns. Alongside the conversations that I have had with Peers, both individually and in groups, we have held two all-Peers seminars to try to reach consensus on what changes might be made to bring clarity. I am very grateful to all those who invested time and effort in this matter, which I know so many are passionate about.
I would particularly like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and her colleagues on the Constitution Committee, who articulated their concerns about ministerial accountability so coherently in their two reports and proposed amendments. I believe, as had been suggested already, that the process that we have gone through has revealed the House of Lords at its best—working together to improve the Bill and achieve common ground. This amendment deals with the overarching accountability of Ministers for the health service, as set out in Clause 1. At this stage, we are taking this amendment on its own, but there are further amendments on related themes to follow. We should perhaps look at this amendment in that context.
However, I think I am right in saying that Clause 1 has attracted the most attention from Peers, and quite rightly so. It gives the Secretary of State a duty to,
“continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service”,
wording that can be traced back to the original 1946 NHS Act. Amendment 5 makes it clear that the Secretary of State will retain ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the health service. It has been this question of ministerial responsibility that has been such a cause of concern, and I am sincerely grateful to the noble Baroness and the Constitution Committee for drafting this amendment which, I hope, should serve to put everyone’s minds at rest on this issue.
Noble Lords will recall the original suggestion made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, which used “ultimate responsibility to Parliament”. I should explain that we have gone with the formulation “ministerial responsibility to Parliament” because it more clearly refers to the constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility. That is to say: Ministers are responsible, accountable and answerable to Parliament for their policies, decisions and actions—and, indeed, those of their departments. The principle is recognised by Parliament and the courts, and, as the Constitution Committee notes, in the Ministerial Code. The amendment reflects the position that as a result of the principle and the duties and powers imposed by NHS legislation, the Secretary of State for Health is responsible and accountable to Parliament for the health service in England, even if he or his department do not directly provide or manage NHS services. It has never in fact been the Government’s intention to diminish ministerial responsibility to Parliament, so I can offer my wholehearted endorsement of and support for this amendment. I hope that your Lordships will feel able to do so as well.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the way in which he introduced this amendment because, as he graciously expressed, this is not really a government amendment but an amendment by the Constitution Committee, which it invites your Lordships to agree. Of course, with a government Minister at the head of those supporting the amendment, I hope that will in itself be unarguable. It is right that the Constitution Committee’s position should be explained a little more in the context of this first amendment in relation to the Secretary of State's responsibilities, and I am glad that it has been put in a group on its own. It is a very significant amendment, and not just because it alters fundamentally the expression of the Secretary of State's responsibilities from the original Bill. It is also significant because of the process by which it has been reached—the Minister has already alluded to this, and I certainly express my enthusiasm for the process—and in which the House has undertaken this work.
The terms of the amendment are simple but very powerful:
“The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the provision”—
that is always the difficult word—
“of the health service in England”.
It is simple but powerful because, frankly, so is the concept of ministerial responsibility, although we argue about it all the time. It is a basic concept which, as the Minister has said, has been expressed in all NHS legislation, and quite rightly in my view, since the first Act 60 years ago. Without wishing to appear to give a civics lesson to the House, it is worth saying that the Constitution Committee has agreed that, in its terms, individual ministerial responsibility means that Ministers must be accountable and answerable to Parliament for their—and their departments’ and agencies’—policies, decisions and actions. I think that is widely accepted. There is no constitutional distinction between ministerial responsibility, accountability and answerability; they are all aspects of the same constitutional fact.
This Bill was worrying, because it was the first in which there was not an explicit provision on political and legal accountability. The Constitution Committee, as the noble Earl said, raised serious concerns about this in the initial report that we gave to the House before Second Reading. There we said that the Bill, if enacted in its present form, risks,
“diluting the Government's constitutional responsibilities”,
for the NHS. It is worth reminding your Lordships that those responsibilities which the Minister should retain embrace the accountability to Parliament for the vast public expenditure that the NHS undertakes, and the provision of its multitude of services.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord may be surprised to hear me ask this question because, as he kindly said, I have been very determined that the provisions on accountability and parliamentary responsibility et cetera should be strengthened in the Bill. However, I listened to what my noble friend Lord Harris said about what he described as the “increasing tentacles” of these links between the various providers and the Secretary of State. Is the Minister not becoming concerned—as I would in his position—that all this new accountability and these links undermine the basic policy positions of the Bill? That is why, for example, my noble friend Lady Thornton suggested that it would be cleaner—if that is the word—to remove the whole of Clause 4 from the Bill. The complexities that are being set up and strengthened, as the Minister has agreed, make the whole thing so incredibly complicated and bureaucratic that the underlying policy positions are being totally distorted.
I do not share that view at all. I do not think that the autonomy and accountability arrangements are as complex as the noble Baroness seems to suggest. Autonomy and accountability are two sides of the same coin; one confers autonomy in exchange for accountability. That is the model that we have adopted and the one that I would hope that Parliament would wish us to adopt, given that substantial sums of public money will be at the disposal of commissioners throughout the NHS. I therefore do not see that the metaphor of tentacles employed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is actually very appropriate. It implies that there is an organisation holding those in the health service in a grip. That will not be the case. The role of the board is to support local commissioners; it is to be there as a resource to promote guidance, supported by the quality standards that we were debating earlier. It is not—I repeat not—a replica of the kind of line management that the NHS has seen to date.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs I said, there will be full public consultation on the mandate. It would of course be possible for the Health Select Committee or indeed other parliamentarians to scrutinise and challenge the mandate at that point. If changes to the mandate were made in-year as a result of that process—that is not inconceivable—then a revised mandate would be published. It would be laid before Parliament with an explanation. After the mandate comes into force in April 2013, Parliament will have all the usual opportunities to ask questions about the performance of the board against the mandate. The board in addition will include in its annual report an assessment of performance against the mandate, and that will be published and laid before Parliament.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked me how we will know what the board said when it is consulted about the mandate. As I am sure he knows, the Government have a code of practice on consultation that we would follow. That code sets out the expectation for the Government to respond to the consultation and in doing so to provide a summary of the views expressed to each question as well as of what decisions have been taken in the light of them.
The noble Lord, Lord Patel, asked a question that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, also asked me about what would happen if the board disagrees with the mandate. The mandate sets out the objectives that the Secretary of State considers the board should seek to achieve. Those objectives will be developed in close co-operation with the board. It will not be a detached process. Indeed, the Bill requires the Secretary of State to consult the board before setting the mandate. Nevertheless, decisions about the content of the mandate will ultimately rest with the Secretary of State, and I contend that that is entirely appropriate. It is the Secretary of State taking responsibility on behalf of the Government for what he is requiring the board to achieve.
I hope that I have shown that the level of transparency and of public accountability over the mandate will be very great indeed. I do not share noble Lords’ apprehensions that somehow Parliament will have no opportunity to comment on the mandate. Quite the reverse is the case. We will ensure that it does, and it is right that it does. This is an entirely new situation for the NHS. I hope that that is welcome to noble Lords and that I have said enough to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Warner, to withdraw his amendment.
I wonder whether the Minister can help me with a point he made in response to the noble Lord, Lord Owen. He was raising some important points of principle about the Secretary of State’s role and the way in which it, as it were, percolates through so many of the provisions in the Bill, and the Minister referred to Clause 49 as being something that should ease those concerns. I realise that we are not discussing Clause 49 at the moment, but the Minister and the Committee will remember that the Select Committee on the Constitution was concerned that Clause 49 was not an adequate answer to some of these points of principle that were raised by, among others, the noble Lord, Lord Owen. Can the Minister help me this afternoon on that?
(13 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, think this has been a very valuable debate and I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to it. I do mean that. Ministers always like to hear support, and I have had some of that today, but at the same time no self-respecting Minister would wish to brush aside the kinds of concerns that have been voiced this afternoon about the effect of this clause. I certainly do not wish to do that; hence my offer to engage in discussions with those noble Lords whose concerned voices have been heard.
Following the consensus that we reached at last week’s Committee session on that proposal, I express the hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment at the end of this debate and that we will use the time between now and Report to reflect on the concerns that we have heard expressed about Clause 4—and, indeed, on Clause 1 last week. I recall from discussions in the Chamber on 2 November that the Committee had little appetite to hear me dwell on Clause 1 or the amendments to it. I am therefore going to keep my remarks brief. However, I hope that the Committee will find it helpful if I provide a bit of context to this clause.
As I said at Second Reading, our proposals for the NHS involve a fundamental shift in the balance of power away from politicians and on to patients themselves, as well as to doctors and other health professionals. This is not an abdication or divestment of power by politicians but a shift. I think that we all agree that empowering front-line organisations offers enormous potential to unleash innovation and to drive up the efficiency and quality of services. The noble Lord, Lord Darzi, to my mind, said it all. That is why the Bill retains the key powers that the Secretary of State needs in order to remain properly accountable but removes his current sweeping powers to delegate and give directions to other bodies.
Instead, the Bill sets out roles and responsibilities in primary legislation that local commissioning will be carried out by clinical commissioning groups—with their own distinct statutory duties, set by Parliament—rather than by PCTs acting under the direction of the Minister of the day. Ministers will have specific but extensive powers to set requirements for commissioners, in particular through the mandate to the NHS Commissioning Board and through regulations known as standing rules. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, observed, I am sure that we will give some thought to the impact of the autonomy duty when, in future Committee sessions, we debate the clauses that give the Secretary of State these powers.
However, there is a clear need for Ministers to have sufficient flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the health service. Given that, there is very little limit on what or how many objectives or requirements the Secretary of State can impose. That leaves open the risk that a Government—or indeed the board, which has an equivalent duty at Clause 20—could introduce process targets or burdensome rules that inappropriately interfere with front-line clinical decision-making. That is the last thing anyone wants. To my mind, this makes it vital to have some kind of countervailing force to establish the principle that Ministers should use their powers carefully. We believe that the autonomy duty provides this important safeguard, enabling organisations to act in the best interests of patients, free from the risk that Ministers or the board revert to a command-and-control style in order to achieve their objectives. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, put the point very well.
The duty is therefore an important symbol of the shift of power that the Bill seeks to achieve. I agree with my noble friend Lord Marks that the autonomy duty must be subsidiary to the general duties of the Secretary of State, including, in particular, his duties under Clause 1 of the Bill to promote a comprehensive health service and to exercise his functions so as to secure the provision of services. Although we believe that the duty of autonomy would not inhibit the Secretary of State in exercising his overarching powers and duties as set out in Clause 1, I recognise, as I say, that there are concerns about legal clarity. I therefore welcome the prospect of further discussions with my noble friend and other noble Lords outside this Chamber as to how we might put this matter beyond doubt.
My Lords, I apologise for interrupting during the Minister’s conclusion but I hope this will be helpful. I want to explore whether he can just help me by describing what he sees as the scope of these discussions, in terms of the clauses to be discussed. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, pointed out for example in his very helpful intervention when he made passing reference to it, the proposed new Section 13F of the 2006 Act, at Clause 20 in the Bill, is very relevant. It may be helpful to the House to know that the Constitution Committee was invited to look at this again. We have met since the last day of Committee and have agreed to look again at Clauses 1, 4, 10 and 20 precisely because of that interrelated matter. Could the Minister help us on that?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. As she has indicated, there is certainly a read-across from Clause 4 into Clause 20, and I readily accept the suggestion that we should factor in issues that emerge from Clause 10.
I am clear that a successful process will be one that can take account of views from all political parties and the Cross Benches. As well as hearing in full from those Peers, many of whom have put their names to amendments and have become particular experts on this issue, there is also an implicit legal perspective to this and I believe that an important building block will be to engage with the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House and other legal experts in this House on these points. To start that dialogue, I propose to meet next week with a number of noble Lords, if they are willing, to explore the process for going forward. Following that, I will write again to all Peers setting out the proposed process in more detail. I hope that that is helpful.
I have very clear answers for the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Warner, and other noble Lords to the concerns that they have raised. However, for the reasons that I have set out, if they will bear with me, I shall refrain now from providing a detailed commentary on the amendments in this group. I hope that, with the prospect of future discussions that will factor in the valuable points in this debate, the noble Lord will feel able, for the time being, to withdraw his amendment.