Tobacco and Vapes Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd November 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, from whom we will hear later, address the details of a licensing scheme, which could, I believe, be better worked out during consultation and are better put in regulations than on the face of the Bill.

I think there are problems with the suggestion that there should be a joint alcohol and tobacco products licence—as superficially attractive as that may sound. This is for two reasons. The first is practical; there are plenty of retailers who sell both ranges of products, but there are plenty who do not, including some small shops and specialist vaping retailers. Let us not overcomplicate this by having several kinds of licence: joint and single.

The second reason is even more serious, because the objectives of the two schemes are not the same. The objective of the tobacco and vapes licencing scheme should be public health. Indeed, that is the main justification for the generational ban and other restrictive aspects of this Bill. On the other hand, public health was not the objective of the design of the original alcohol licence, and things are set to get worse—which I will come to. Therefore, there are issues about putting the two together.

On Amendment 35, there is a case for restricting the density of tobacco and vapes licensed premises in a local area on public health grounds. Local authorities already have the powers to limit the density of fast-food outlets in certain areas, such as near schools, on the basis that the food they sell is often high in fat, salt and sugars, and is energy dense. Why should local authorities not have the same powers for the density of shops selling tobacco and its various products? Therefore, I oppose Amendment 35. Density is better decided by the local licensing authority, which knows and understands its own area. It is not something that should be on the face of the Bill but something that should be considered in consultation.

I turn now to Amendments 30 and 42. The Government have recently launched a rapid consultation on alcohol licensing, led by an industry task force that would see “growth” incorporated as an objective of the revised scheme, rather than public health. Its recommendations have been warmly welcomed by the Government, but I would advise caution, especially in the light of calls for joint tobacco and alcohol licences today. It is true that hospitality outlets can be important for people’s well-being and community cohesion and often provide economic benefits to local communities. However, many of them rely nowadays more on the sale of meals than on just alcohol and provide an opportunity for family outings. The implication by the industry in the recommendations of the task force is that people cannot enjoy themselves unless they are consuming alcohol. That is, of course, a nonsense suggestion. By the way, each of the three working groups was led by a senior member of the industry and there was no representation on the task force from the Department of Health and Social Care or public health bodies, despite public health acting as the responsible authority for local licensing committees.

The task force report defines the core purpose of licensing as economic enablement and sets out a series of mechanisms to promote that approach. The foreword in the Government’s response, written by the Minister for Services, Small Business and Exports, not only describes licensed hospitality as “foundational” to the UK economy but as selling “happiness, creating lasting memories”, and providing

“the glue that binds us together as a society”.

This is language that, if used in alcohol marketing, would probably breach the industry’s own code of conduct.

The task force’s recommendations would undermine the powers of elected local authorities in several ways: first, by the creation of a quasi-statutory national licensing policy framework to direct local decision-making; secondly, by the automatic addition of off-sales permissions to all on-sales licences; thirdly, by the enhanced powers for unelected licensing officers to override decisions of elected officers on licensing committees; fourthly, through the

“Requirement to link licensing to economic development and culture policies”;


fifthly, by a blanket “amnesty” on licensing conditions deemed to be

“outdated in the modern world”—

deemed by whom, I ask—and, finally, by the imposition of a higher evidential bar for objections to licence applications, with adherence determined solely by licensing officers.

That is why there should be no attempt to link alcohol licences under such a regime with tobacco retail licences. There are other ways of helping the hospitality industry rather than undermining the very foundation of the alcohol sales licensing regime by attacking local democracy in this way.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 35 and 42 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kamall, I will also express my strong support for Amendment 30, moved by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering. All the amendments in this group are guided by an important principle. The success of a new licensing regime will depend not only on the strength of the associated enforcement powers but on the fairness, proportionality and practicality with which those powers are exercised.

Amendment 30 is a sensible and fair proposal. It acknowledges that the vast majority of retailers selling tobacco and vape products do so responsibly and already operate under stringent regulatory regimes. Many of those businesses hold alcohol premises licences and are personal licence holders, and as such as are meticulous in complying with the rules and standards legally in force to prevent under-age sales and the supply of illicit goods.

Clause 16 will impose new licensing obligations, checks and costs. Taken together, for many small independent businesses they will represent a significant administrative and financial burden. My noble friend’s amendment simply asks that the Government recognise the existing history of compliance by allowing a streamlined process for those that have already demonstrated that they meet high licensing standards elsewhere. This would embed efficiency and fairness into the enforcement system and reward good practice. It would save time and cost for retailers and allow enforcement resources to be focused where they are most needed, on those who persistently flout the rules.

Amendment 35 turns to another crucial point of principle: fairness and proportionality in how licensing powers are applied. As drafted, Schedule 1 would allow licensing authorities to impose proximity or density restrictions, in effect preventing a licence being granted simply because a premises happens to fall within a designated zone or is near other retailers that sell similar products. That is an extremely broad and, frankly, concerning power. It risks punishing businesses not because they are non-compliant through choice or negligence but simply because of where they are located.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 35 should stand part of the Bill.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I feel it is appropriate that we should have at least a short debate on Clauses 35, 36, 129 and 130, partly because they raise concerns that are very similar to those I had intended to flag when responding to the group of government amendments that were, in the event, not moved. Our debate on that group of amendments must remain a pleasure in store.

However, these clauses together confer on Ministers the power to take over the enforcement and prosecutions of local authorities or other enforcement authorities, either for individual cases or entire categories of cases. The inclusion of these powers in the Bill needs explaining, first, because they appear to go much further than is necessary or appropriate and, secondly, because they raise a number of important questions about the relationship between central and local enforcement and about accountability.

At present, the Bill rightly places day-to-day enforcement in the hands of local weights and measures authorities, which have the expertise, local knowledge and operational independence needed to make these judgments. Under these clauses, however, the Secretary of State or the devolved Ministers could simply direct that those functions are to be discharged instead by Ministers centrally. There is no statutory test to be met before that happens, no requirement for the local authority to have failed or refused to act, and no mechanism for consultation, appeal or review.

By any standard, that is a very wide power to exercise over democratically elected local authorities. In effect, it allows central government to displace local enforcement at will. Inherent in the exercise of this power is a risk that enforcement decisions become politicised. Local authorities act impartially and are guided by the evidential tests and the public interest. One can imagine a situation in which a future Government—I am not saying this one—choose to intervene and adopt an approach of their own when taking over investigations or prosecutions. How will we safeguard the impartiality of decision-making? How will the basis of any decisions be scrutinised or, indeed, challenged?

There is the added issue of proportionality. If these are intended as reserve powers for exceptional circumstances, the Bill should say so. At the moment, there are no thresholds, no published criteria and no requirement even to lay a Statement before Parliament when such powers are used.

We have tabled these stand part notices to probe the Government on several points, and I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to the following questions. First, why does the Secretary of State need these powers at all, given the enforcement architecture already in existence and set out elsewhere in the Bill? Secondly, in what circumstances does the Minister envisage using them? Is this a genuine power of last resort or something that might be used more routinely? Thirdly, what safeguards will there be for local authorities whose functions are overridden? Will they be consulted, or have the right of challenge? Fourthly, how will accountability work once a Minister takes over enforcement? Will there be a published direction, a report to Parliament or any means of scrutiny? Finally, how do these powers sit with the devolved authorities?

We all want effective enforcement of the law, and there may be rare cases where national co-ordination is required. However, I think we need some further and better particulars from the Minister.

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not support the wish of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to delete Clause 35 and its associated clauses. I do not believe that the backstop, which enables the Secretary of State to take over enforcement from trading standards, is a power grab; it is necessary in case a local authority goes into administration and cannot fund trading standards. Similar measures to protect social services in the case of a local authority going into administration can be found in the Care Act 2014, amended by the Health and Care Act 2022. The Tobacco and Related Products Regulations 2016 recognise that there may be situations where it is more appropriate for the Secretary of State to act rather than local weights and measures authorities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

My Lords, in responding to these comments from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I am grateful for the opportunity to explain further the clauses relating to enforcement powers, which I think is what he is seeking from these amendments, and to look at the opposition from the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, that Clauses 35, 36, 129 and 30 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 provides a power for the Secretary of State in England or Welsh Ministers in Wales to carry out the investigation and enforcement of a particular case or a particular type of case instead of local authority trading standards. Similarly, Clause 36 provides a power for the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to take over the conduct of any legal proceedings relating to an offence under Part 1 or under any regulations made under Clauses 13 or 14 regarding the display of products or prices. Clauses 129 and 130 serve a similar purpose in relation to Part 6, which makes provisions on advertising and sponsorship. Clause 129 provides a power for the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Health in Northern Ireland to make a direction about the enforcement of the Part 6 provisions. Clause 130 provides a power for the appropriate national authority to take over the conduct of any legal proceedings within their respective jurisdictions relating to an offence under this part of the Bill.

These clauses replace and are based on existing legislation. Trading standards operate in all local authorities, and it is standard practice that they would undertake required local enforcement action and pursue legal proceedings. However—this is referring to the comments made by the noble Earl—these powers provide a useful safeguard for the unlikely situation in which a local authority is unable or unwilling to take enforcement in a particular case. These powers reflect the landscape in which tobacco control measures operate. Individual local authority trading standards departments might not have the resources or willingness to take enforcement action and legal proceedings in cases where this action involves or has significant implications for large multinational companies. In instances such as these, these powers may be used to ensure consistent, strong and effective enforcement.

The noble Earl raised the devolved Administrations. Health is a devolved matter and the Bill builds on the existing legal frameworks of all four of the nations. This means that there are some differences in the provisions between each nation. I think we have outlined how the accountability of these powers will be managed through the different existing arrangements.

The noble Earl also raised the specific matter of scrutiny. I hope I have covered the points throughout the comments that I have made.

I hope noble Lords are reassured that these are necessary clauses based on existing legislation. Together they ensure effective enforcement and therefore should stand part of this Bill.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of a clause stand part debate at this stage of the Bill is to ask some questions. There is no implication that the clause should be deleted. I simply wanted to ask those questions and to ensure that some answers are placed on the record, and I am very grateful to the Minister for doing just that.

I welcome her explanatory comments; it is right, in the light of what she said, that Ministers should have the tools they need to ensure effective enforcement where the public interest demands it. However, I remain concerned that the powers set out in these clauses are unqualified, and I would like to think about that further. I recognise that it is possible to conceive of circumstances where ministerial intervention might be justified—for example, where a case raises genuine national issues or where there has been a manifest failure to act for whatever reason. However, that is precisely why I felt some form of conditionality ought to be built into the legislation.

I appreciate that there is precedent for provisions of this kind, and I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. Between now and Report, I will consider whether the Bill could be improved with the addition of some clear thresholds, safeguards or procedural tests. For now, I am content to move to the next group of amendments.

Clause 35 agreed.