Health and Social Care Bill Debate
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Earl Howe
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Health and Social Care Bill
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Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, we had a long debate on this very important issue of the duty of candour before the Recess, and I do not intend to take up very much of the House’s time on this amendment by responding to the issues that we covered then, or by repeating our views on why we are concerned that the Government’s current proposal for a contractual duty will not address the need for the huge cultural change in the NHS that has to take place in order to ensure openness and honesty when things go wrong in the care and treatment of patients.
Nevertheless, I hope that the Minister will accept the case for regulations on including the duty of candour in commissioning contracts. We on these Benches emphasise our commitment to trying to help to make the contractual duty work. I therefore place it on record that we welcome the Minister’s reassurance during the previous debate that he will come back to the House on the outcome and actions resulting from the current government consultation on the contractual duty. I also hope that he will be magnanimous in the victory that he had before the Recess in the vote rejecting statutory requirement by standing by his assurances on a future review of the effectiveness of the contractual duty, after an appropriate period, and whether its effectiveness is being held back by the lack of statutory provision. My third hope is that the NHS Commissioning Board will issue clear and strong guidance to assist CCGs in this matter, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, this has been another very good debate on the duty of candour. As we have discussed previously, the Government’s position is that the NHS contracts are the most appropriate mechanism through which to implement a further requirement for openness. Amendment 38A proposes that the contractual duty of candour should be given a specific reference in primary legislation. I hope that I can satisfy the House on this and that the undertakings I am about to give the noble Baroness from this Dispatch Box will reassure her sufficiently to enable her to withdraw the amendment.
I give an assurance to the House that the Government propose to use the provisions in Clause 19 relating to the standing rules to specify that the contractual duty of candour must be included in the NHS standard contract, developed by the NHS Commissioning Board. If that assurance is accepted, as I hope it will be, a specific reference is not required to ensure that a contractual duty of candour is imposed. The question, therefore, is whether, despite my assurance, it is necessary or appropriate to include a provision in Clause 19. I have given this proposal substantial thought, and I admit that it is one which on the surface has some appeal. I have spent a good deal of time discussing the matter with noble Lords as well as with Professor Sir Bruce Keogh, the NHS Medical Director.
Let me explain where my deliberations have taken me. At present there is a very wide range of issues that we incorporate into the standard contract. These include issues of paramount importance to the quality and safety of healthcare. For example, the contract is used as one of the mechanisms that we are using to drive improvements in prevention of venous thromboembolism, or VTE. It has been estimated that every year 25,000 people in England die from VTE that they have contracted in hospital. We also use the standard contract for driving improvements in cancer treatments and referrals in healthcare-associated infections in issues such as consent and many other areas.
As the Bill stands, it does not contain a list of the requirements which are to be included in the standard contracts, and for good reason. The Bill should not contain unnecessary detail. On top of that—and I think that this is perhaps a more important point—there should be sufficient flexibility for the Secretary of State and the board to consider and draft appropriate terms and conditions and adapt them to changing circumstances.
The question I pose to myself is this: if, through a reference to the duty of candour, we are to start down the road of specifying particular quality and safety contractual requirements in the Bill, then where do we stop? Just including the few issues that I have briefly mentioned, without any others, means that we will almost certainly land up with a cumbersome and unwieldy list. There are many other areas besides those which some might see as having a similarly valid claim to be mentioned. We should not use primary legislation to cherry-pick priorities to the detriment of other equally important areas.
We have further concerns about precisely what the amendment would require the Secretary of State to provide in the standing rules. We are still looking at what the appropriate contractual term should be in the light of the recent consultation that was mentioned. Imposing a duty in the Bill to adopt a specific formulation, as the amendment would have us do, constrains our ability to take proper account of the consultation and the engagement that we have had with stakeholders—it risks forcing us to implement an inappropriate requirement—and from easily improving it in the future, if the evidence supports that.
I was struck by the very powerful speech of my noble friend Lord Faulks during our last debate on this topic, and indeed by his words today, when he challenged the House to consider the difficulties involved in drafting a duty which adequately encapsulates these obligations. The noble Lord, Lord Winston, was very wise in what he said. For example, how would we specify the types of incidents to which any contractual requirement would apply? The contractual duty and provision in the regulations must be neither too wide nor too narrow in order to be effective and proportionate. We need the flexibility to consider this in more detail.
The noble Baroness’s amendment would have us require particular steps to be taken in particular defined circumstances and adopt a particular definition of the incidents to be covered by the duty of candour. I am extremely uncomfortable with that. Apart from anything else, we specifically asked this question in the public consultation, so we would be undermining that process if we were not properly to consider the responses we received. I really think, therefore, that it would be better to let that consultation guide us as to the precise way in which the duty should be framed. It is for those reasons that, after considerable thought, I can tell the noble Baroness that I do not think it would be wise for us to accept Amendment 38A.
The noble Lord, Lord Walton, asked about the duty placed on individual doctors within a trust. Doctors are expected to follow the code of practice laid down by the GMC, as he will know, and failure to do so may lead to action against a doctor by the regulator in the exercise of its statutory powers. I can confirm to the noble Lord that the code is not just words; it is backed up by real regulatory force. Indeed, I have the wording of the code in front of me:
“If a patient under your care has suffered harm or distress, you must act immediately to put matters right, if that is possible. You should offer an apology and explain fully and promptly to the patient what has happened, and the likely short-term and long-term effects”.
There are similar provisions in the Nursing and Midwifery Council code as well.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been a very good debate indeed and I thank noble Lords for the careful consideration that they have given to how CCGs should best manage conflicts of interest. I have listened carefully to the various points raised and it is clear that this is an area of key concern. I hope that the House will therefore forgive me if I start by setting out the position on this issue before I turn to the detail of the amendments before us.
At the heart of the Bill is an intention to balance autonomy with accountability. We are giving freedom to those best placed to take decisions in the interests of patients to do so, but we will also hold them to account, not only for the outcomes they achieve but also for their managing this responsibility effectively, transparently and with integrity.
CCGs will be the guardians of significant amounts of taxpayers’ money, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly pointed out, so it is only right that there are strict requirements in terms of governance, probity and transparency of decision-making. We must balance the benefits of the clinical autonomy of doctors with a robust management of potential or actual conflicts of interest. It is essential to get this right, and that means a proportionate and reasonable approach.
I reinforce the point that the Bill already provides very real safeguards in relation to conflicts of interest. The CCG must make arrangements in its constitution for managing conflicts and ensuring the transparency of its decision-making process. The CCG must have appropriate governance arrangements, including a governing body with lay members and other health professionals. These arrangements will be scrutinised by the NHS Commissioning Board as part of the process of ensuring that a CCG is fit to be established as a commissioner.
Let me be clear that this is not just about declaring conflicts of interests, which of course is vital, but also about putting in effective and appropriate arrangements to manage these conflicts where they arise. There is not, and cannot be, a one-size-fits-all approach to managing conflict, as it depends on the interest itself and where it may become a conflict. However, likely methods may include absenting the person from decisions in that area, or bringing in others—for example, the independent lay members—to oversee the process for decision-making in a particular area. The key factor here is that they cannot avoid the need to manage the conflict and to be clear about how they are going to do so.
The provisions around conflict of interest apply to all aspects of a CCG’s commissioning activity, which means that they would apply to how it worked with a commissioning support organisation. I appreciate that there is apprehension and, in some cases, misunderstanding about the role of commissioning support organisations, so I shall set out the facts about this issue for the benefit of noble Lords today, in particular my noble friend Lady Barker, to whom I was grateful for referencing the brief on this issue provided by Professor Allyson Pollock.
Commissioning support organisations are not intended to act on behalf of a CCG in making decisions. They provide support, which might take the form of analysis of performance or finance data, supporting procurement or the management of a contract, and back-office functions. Let me be clear: at no point can they take decisions for the CCG or assume responsibility for a CCG’s statutory duties. It would be unlawful for a CCG to sub-delegate its commissioning responsibility to another organisation.
I am, however, conscious of the concerns, particularly those raised by my noble friend Lady Barker, about whether members of commissioning support organisations could sit on a CCG governing body. I give noble Lords a commitment today that we will prohibit any representative of a commissioning support organisation sitting on a CCG governing body through our secondary legislation-making powers under new Section 14N.
I should also like to explain some of the other safeguards in the Bill relating to management of conflicts of interest. Under Clause 73, the Secretary of State may make regulations which we intend will impose specific requirements in relation to the management of conflicts of interest. They will also confer on Monitor various powers to investigate the actions of a CCG and take remedial action. Monitor will be required to issue guidance on these regulations.
The NHS Commissioning Board may also provide guidance on conflicts of interest. This renders unnecessary any additional amendment requiring the Secretary of State to issue guidance on conflicts of interest, as Amendments 86 and 93 would do, or to issue a specific code of conduct or financial interest rules, as Amendment 38B requires. I shall return to that point in a moment.
The Bill is also clear on the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process. Schedule 2 provides that the CCG constitution must specify arrangements for securing transparency about the decisions of the CCG and governing body. The NHS Commissioning Board will be able to issue guidance on the publication of minutes and will ensure that the constitution meets these requirements. This meets the intention behind Amendment 92. We cannot accept the amendment because it might not always be appropriate to publish details of all decisions made by a governing body.
Transparency and accountability must not be achieved at the expense of the effectiveness of the commissioner. PCTs are not required to discuss all matters in public now and we should ensure that CCGs are not subject to more onerous requirements. Amendment 91 may well prevent CCG governing bodies discussing potentially commercially sensitive issues relating to contract values or performance without the public being present, which could pose difficulties.
I can fully understand the intention behind Amendment 102, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to ensure that local knowledge informs the work of the CCG. However, we have always maintained that the presence of health professionals on a CCG governing body is not intended to be a means for the CCG to obtain advice to inform its commissioning decisions. The non-GP members of the governing body are there to provide an independent perspective, informed by their expertise and experience, in the body responsible for ensuring that the CCG adheres to the principles of good governance. They must have no conflict of interest in relation to the clinical commissioning group’s responsibilities. Amendment 102 would mean that a CCG could have only local professionals in the governing body. This would obviously limit the CCG in its choice of governing body members and risks a conflict of interests. I urge the House not to accept that amendment.
GPs in CCGs have to meet the ethical standards set by the General Medical Council in good medical practice. That includes provision to avoid conflicts of interest. Anyone may raise a concern that a doctor has failed to meet the conditions of their registration with the regulator. However, a failure to meet the conditions which Amendment 93 would impose would not necessarily mean that a GP had been in breach of their conditions of registration, and the duty which Amendment 110 would place on the board would be disproportionate. I know that there is a real concern among some noble Lords and that it is felt that this is a necessary sanction, but it is far better to ensure the robustness of the approach that CCGs take and that it is appropriately overseen. It is more appropriate for an independent monitor to police the transactional behaviour of CCGs and to be able to take effective remedial action where it discovers evidence that a CCG has not followed regulations in relation to procurement and the management of conflicts of interest, which is the approach taken in the Bill.
I similarly urge that we do not place in legislation an indiscriminate requirement, as Amendments 38B, 93 and 116 would do, that people with an interest withdraw from the relevant decision-making process of the CCG. Clearly, that is often going to be the most appropriate means to manage a conflict of interest, and that is made clear by the NHS Commissioning Board Authority’s guidance, Towards Establishment, which was published recently. However, it should not lead us to impose on CCGs a blanket ban on individuals being involved in a decision-making process or sitting on the governing body in all circumstances in which they have an interest. It ignores the fine line that can be drawn between situations in which withdrawal is absolutely necessary and those in which it would be more effective for the CCG’s exercise of its commissioning function for the conflict to be managed, carefully and with external oversight, in a different way that maintains the integrity of the CCG.
I listened with great care in particular to the speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Walton, on this theme. The best example of the second category that I mentioned is where a CCG is commissioning for local community-based alternatives to hospital services and it determines that the most effective and appropriate way to secure these is from all local GP providers within its geographic area. There are already inherent safeguards in the legislation to help manage conflicts in this scenario. The CCG would have to declare its commissioning intentions as part of its annual commissioning plan, on which it would consult the public, and it would engage with health and well-being boards in developing; and that makes the proposal transparent. It enables the health and well-being board and others to challenge the proposals. CCGs could similarly secure additional involvement in the decision-making process—for instance, by involving members of the health and well-being board or, indeed, other CCGs or members of the CCG’s audit committee. There is a choice. We have not identified one single right way of doing this. We think it is important to allow best practice to evolve rather than trying to pin it down in legislation. If all GP members of the CCG had to withdraw from the decision-making, it would be extremely hard for the CCG to actually make a valid decision, as it could not be delegated to the non-GP members of the governing body or a similar arrangement. It is only in certain circumstances that we would expect individuals with a conflict not to withdraw absolutely, but we have to keep this option open in legislation.
For the same reasons, I cannot support the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, in Amendment 38B, which would either require a CCG not to contract with a provider in which any member of the CCG had an interest, or require them to secure an exemption from this rule from the NHS Commissioning Board. The conflict and financial interests rules, which this amendment references, already require an individual to withdraw from any part of the decision-making process with a provider in which they have an interest. It is hard to see why it would be necessary also to prevent the CCG from contracting with such a provider or undergo a cumbersome—I have to say cumbersome—exemption process. That approach would make the board have to scrutinise individual procurements and generally police the transactional behaviour of CCGs. It would not allow for alternative local arrangements for quality-assuring the openness and transparency of a CCG’s approach. It should not have to be the board only that can ensure the probity of the commissioning decision. As I have suggested, the health and well-being board might provide a suitable external view, as might another CCG.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I am grateful to the noble Earl for giving way so freely. I understand what he is saying about the bureaucratic process. However, will he not accept that the reason for that is that the corporate governance processes around the clinical commissioning group are so weak? For instance, why is there not to be a majority of independently appointed non-execs, as there would be on any other public board?
Earl Howe
I will come to that point in a moment. I do not agree with the noble Lord that the governance arrangements are weak. As I have said, one of the things that the board will have to do when authorising CCGs is to assure itself that there are fit and proper governance procedures in place.
I turn to the question of sanctions, which has been raised by a number of noble Lords. It is essential that patients and clinicians remain confident that members of clinical commissioning groups will always put their duty to patients before any personal financial interest. It is important that CCGs take all possible steps to avoid conflicts of interest. We foresee that the guidance that Amendment 79A requires the board to produce would set out the need for CCGs to make clear in their conflict of interest policy that any member of a CCG found to have failed to declare an interest may face a number of possible sanctions and individuals may also be referred to their professional body, which is a serious matter. The noble Lord, Lord Walton, was quite right in all that he said. I am very drawn to the provision of Amendment 79A, and I will come on to that more fully in a moment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I think that that is a very disappointing response. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, said that clinical commissioning groups will balance autonomy with accountability, and he acknowledged that they will be guardians of billions of pounds of taxpayer’s money. He went on to say that there were three safeguards: the constitution, transparency and the governing bodies. However, he still fails to respond to the fundamental gap, which is the lack of proper corporate governance around clinical commissioning groups. Looking at other public sector bodies—NHS trusts, for instance; not foundation trusts, but NHS trusts—how would we feel if the Government came forward with proposals stating that the board of an NHS trust would consist of executive directors and one or two lay members? It is just possible—but it is not certain—that one of those lay members will be the chairman of the trust, or they could, indeed, be the chief executive. That, in essence, is what the Government are proposing for the governance of clinical commissioning groups. A group of GPs will sit round the table. They will have a couple of lay members who presumably will be appointed by the clinical commissioning group, because the Government consistently fail to say whether there will be an independent appointments process. The noble Earl never responds to me on this point. They will be deciding how billions of pounds should be spent. The noble Earl refuses to acknowledge that these GPs are business people who run businesses which depend mainly on contracts—
Earl Howe
My Lords, I realise that I did not answer the noble Lord and I apologise to him. It may be helpful for him to know that we intend to work with patient and professional groups and with emerging clinical commissioning groups to determine the best arrangements for appointing members of governing bodies. We will be issuing regulations in due course setting out in more detail the requirements for appointing clinical—that is to say, non-GP—members to the governing body.
The report that we had from the NHS Future Forum stated that it would be unhelpful for clinical commissioning groups’ governing bodies to be representative of every group under the sun. We agreed with that. Requiring a bigger group of professionals on the governing body itself, or expanding it in any way at all, would not really mean that a broader range of interests are involved in designing patient services. It would just lead to governing bodies that are too large and slow to do their job well. However, we think that it is important for clinical commissioning groups to be led clinically. That is the point.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl. However, that ultimately means that a majority of the people on the board of a clinical commissioning group will potentially be able to take advantage of the commissioning decisions of that group. That is why the corporate governance is so concerning. I accept that my amendment might be regarded as rather lengthy. However, I am pushing this forward because I am trying to replace the lack of effective corporate governance.
The noble Earl says that sanctions will be contained in guidance, but I do not think that that is sufficient. The potential for conflicts of interest are so great and the amount of public money involved so considerable that we should have in the Bill a clear commitment to sanctions. I do not agree with the noble Earl that this is something that can be left to professional bodies. My noble friend Lord Warner was absolutely right to mention that case. It shows some of the risks of what essentially was, in that person’s case, a managerial issue being pursued by a regulatory body. I do not think that that is the right way of dealing with GPs who, it was alleged, had pursued actions in breach of whatever guidance was issued.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am sure that Monitor will play an extremely useful role, but surely it would be much better to give further and clear guarantees that these matters will be dealt with effectively. I believe that we need more provision in the Bill specifically on sanctions. I should like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I am not going to attempt to answer the noble Baroness’s question. I shall leave that for my noble friend Lord Warner or the noble Lord, Lord Patel. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friends Lord Warner, Lady Pitkeathley and Lord Turnberg made a very good job of introducing these amendments, stressing the importance of joint commissioning, the work of the Health Select Committee in the Commons and its recommendations, and indeed the vital nature of tariff reform. This is a modest but very important amendment that strengthens the Bill.
Every time we meet on Report on this Bill we are in a different world. The world we are in today is not the same one we were in 10 days ago. As we speak, the Royal College of Physicians has decided by a majority of 80 per cent to ballot its members about how they feel about the Health and Social Care Bill. By my counting that leaves only two royal colleges which have not consulted their membership so far. We all know what the results of the consultations have been, but still we plough on with this Bill.
The remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Mawhinney and Lord Newton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, together underline the defects of this Bill. Why are we having a debate about integration at this point in the passage of this Bill? It occurred to me that perhaps those debates should have been had before we had the Bill. However, because you cannot achieve everything does not mean that you should not try to achieve something. That is what these amendments do and that is why we on these Benches are very keen to support them. It seems to me that through all the many definitions of integration that we have discussed in this House, the one that is going to have the most effect on budget and finance is in these amendments here before us today. I hope the Minister will accept these amendments because they will improve this Bill.
Earl Howe
My Lords, integration has been a consistent theme throughout our debates on the Bill and the noble Lord, Lord Warner has made a number of highly informed speeches on this topic, as indeed have many in your Lordships’ House. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, made a powerful case for taking action for further integration. There is no disagreement between us on this. It is why the Government have already taken a number of steps to do precisely what he is asking and I name a selection only. We have put duties on commissioners to promote integration. We are creating health and well-being boards, bringing together health and social care commissioners and their representatives—one of the main manifestations of joined-up thinking in this Bill. We are strengthening the duties in relation to pooled budgets. We are placing specific duties on Monitor to support integration and tabling an amendment prior to Report giving Monitor express power to do that. We are working with the Future Forum, the King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust in a whole range of non-legislative measures. This is not as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, put it, something the Government have put into the “too difficult” box. We are determined that we need to tackle this. I hope no one in your Lordships’ House is left in any doubt about our commitment in this area.
There are numerous examples of the non-legislative things we are already doing. We agreed with the Future Forum’s recommendations that the board should produce commissioning guidance for CCGs that focuses on how to meet the needs of different groups of people who may have multiple problems such as the frail elderly. By April 2012 the department will put in place new metrics that bring together existing data on patients’ experiences at the interface between services. We are working with the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement to identify and spread examples of good practice in local measurement and improvement of pathways of care. Through the NHS operating framework for 2012-13 we are asking all PCTs to work with their local authority partners to look at how integration can be better achieved. I have a whole string of other examples.
As I have said, the commitment of the Government in this area should not be doubted. I was very pleased to see the King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust in their report to the Future Forum recognising that,
“integrated care lies at the heart of”
this Bill,
“to put patients first, improve health outcomes and empower health professionals”.
That is exactly right. While there is clearly work to be done to make this a reality, the Bill will, for the first time, create duties for NHS bodies to promote and encourage the commissioning and provision of integrated services. It is a difficult concept to define. While the noble Lord, Lord Warner, is to be congratulated on the attempt he has made in his amendment, my fear is that the amendment will not actually take us very far. The precise term “integration” is used only in headings in the Bill and the concept of integration is applied in a number of different contexts so a fixed definition of this kind may not be appropriate in every case. It may be too narrow in some cases—some noble Lords have alluded to that point. It is also a somewhat circular definition, referring as it does to integration meaning the delivery of integrated care. That serves to illustrate the real difficulties with this approach.
I am not convinced that it is necessary to try to describe what integration means. Integration is a broad concept. It could encompass a range of measures. As the recent King’s Fund and Nuffield Trust report noted,
“integrated care means different things to different people. At its heart, it can be defined as an approach that seeks to improve the quality of care for individual patients, service users and carers by ensuring that services are well co-ordinated around their needs”.
Yes that is right and the duty on the board in new Section 13M is absolutely consistent with that approach.
We were very grateful to the Future Forum for its recent work on integrated care. We welcome its recommendation that the entire health and social care system should share a clear and common understanding of the value of integration as a means of putting patients at the centre of their care. However, it was also clear that rather than being an end in itself, integration is,
“a means to achieving better outcomes for people”.
That is surely right. There must be the scope for integration to be adaptable to the needs of local communities and individual patients. The noble Lord’s definition holds,
“improving the delivery of integrated care and treatment to individual patients”
as the objective in itself when improving outcomes and reducing inequalities should be the ultimate objectives.
Very recently, I was advised of a paper produced by the World Health Organization in 2008, Integrated Health Services - What and Why? It starts off by stating that integrated health services mean different things to different people. It lists a whole variety of interpretations of what integrated healthcare means and says that it is in essence very difficult to boil these things down to a definition that is going to please everybody. It also casts doubt—I do not want to make too much of it—on the empirical base for claiming that integration is the answer in every set of circumstances. In making that point, I do not want to imply that the Government are anything other than fully committed to integration, because we certainly are, but the paper’s conclusion is:
“‘Integration’ is used by different people to mean different things. Combined with the fact that this is an issue which arouses strong feelings, there is clearly much scope for misunderstanding and fruitless polarization”.
For the World Health Organization to come to that conclusion tells a story. In drafting the various duties and powers in relation to integration, we have consciously avoided a fixed definition to allow for a measure of flexibility and innovative thinking. We have focused on the purpose—the “why” rather than the “how”.
I recently met front-line staff when I visited the NHS on the Isle of Wight to look at how they were delivering an efficient, integrated, urgent care service. I made a point of asking them whether they thought that a definition of integration in the Bill would be helpful. I received a resounding no in response. They felt that something like that would stifle their ability to apply fresh thinking and to come up with inventive solutions of their own as to how best to provide integrated care. We are clear that we should not put clinicians, who know the needs of their patients best, in a straitjacket by defining integration in the Bill.
Clearly, it will be important that the board and CCGs are held to account for delivering against these duties. They are already required to set out in their annual reports how they have exercised their functions, including how they have met the various duties placed on them.
Amendment 38C also makes particular reference to the board and Monitor developing tariffs that will support integration. On that point, I reassure the noble Lord that the duties on the board and Monitor to promote integration would apply in relation to their functions in relation to the tariff. The clauses on the tariff allow a high degree of flexibility for the board to adopt different approaches to tariffs, including “bundles” of services or pathways, and we are committed to extending these. They also allow scope for local flexibility in how the rules are applied where necessary. The noble Baroness, Lady Wall, provided considerable insight into what is needed here. Perhaps it would be helpful if I gave an example of a pathway tariff.
In 2012-13, we are introducing a “year of care” tariff for funding cystic fibrosis services, developed with the support of the Cystic Fibrosis Trust. This includes all the care for cystic fibrosis patients for a whole year. The price is broken down into different “bands”, depending on the complexity of the patient. The tariff will cover the care undertaken by specialist centres and local hospitals, but it will be paid only to the specialist centre thereby promoting better joint working between specialist centres and local hospitals. We are confident that the board, with support from Monitor, will continue to develop and increase the scope of bundled service tariffs where it is clear that tariff design of that kind is appropriate and will deliver benefits to the patient.
Lord Winston
I am sure that the Minister will want to answer my question because it is not aggressive or political; it is really to find out how this Bill will work. When somebody goes to casualty after a month with a broken nose and complains, “Look, my main problem is the pain in my sinuses which I have had for a long time”, and is told by the doctor when they had already waited six hours, “I’m afraid the sinuses are a different department. You’ll have to make another appointment”, that is a problem with integration. How does the Minister think we might accomplish better integration with this Bill?
Earl Howe
It is a very interesting question from the noble Lord. When I visited Oldham a few weeks ago, I saw for myself how they were getting around that problem in the context of musculoskeletal services. Instead of patients being shunted from pillar to post, they had a system whereby the patient could move seamlessly and immediately from one specialist to another. They did not have to be referred; they could ring up the centre and ask to see a particular person. That is the kind of integrated model that we need to see rolled out more generally in other services. I recognise the issue that the noble Lord raises, but it is one that we are seeing inventive solutions arising to address. I hope that the work being done will do that.
Lord Warner
My Lords, there have been some extremely powerful speeches of support for this amendment for which I am extremely grateful. I am grateful in particular to my co-signatories and I noted the powerful speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Owen and Lord Sutherland, and the noble Baroness, Lady Young. They have made the case for an amendment of this kind to the Bill.
I was disappointed by the Minister’s response. That was not just because I got only a B- for my definition—I expected to have my homework marked by officials in the Department of Health and was not expecting to get a high score—but because I think that the definition meets the needs that we have. I find it very difficult to see how the Minister can stand up and say, “Well, we’re going hold people to account; we’re going to monitor their performance”, if we do not have a definition against which we are going to monitor their performance.
The definition proposed by the amendment moves us away from a preoccupation with integration as organisation and process change to delivery of services to the individual. I do not see how the Minister can say, “We’re concerned about outcomes for individuals”, if we do not integrate delivery. You are highly unlikely, I would say as a jobbing ex-public sector manager, to get good outcomes if you have not orchestrated the delivery of the services to the individual that meets their needs.
Earl Howe
I would not want the noble Lord to believe that I was dismissive of the point that he has just made. I recognise that it is important that we somehow give the meaning of integration a clearer explanation, whether that is through the guidance issued by the board or, indeed, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. I am just wary of putting something in the Bill. That is all.
Lord Warner
I guess I am more of a risk taker than the noble Earl and I believe that we could put a definition of this kind in the Bill. It would cause no confusion—indeed, it would remove it—in the minds of many people working day in, day out in the NHS. As to those who have asked, “What is the purpose of some of the other changes?”, the noble Lord, Lord Owen, powerfully made the point that we need to give strong signals to these new players in the game. We want them to start off knowing that they will be held to account in their annual reports for monitoring their progress on integration. We want that: it is deliberate. We want them to know that Parliament put that in the Bill for a purpose. I am not satisfied with the Government’s response and I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
“( ) Subsection (1) does not apply to any function of the Secretary of State of making an order or regulations.”
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I support these amendments, and I do so because I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Patel, that there was a grave omission from the Bill that would allow strategic reconfigurations to take place that are not based on failing institutions. It was certainly not clear to us—and I rest on the authority of my noble friend Lord Warner on this—how, with the abolition of the SHAs from April 2013, strategic reconfiguration of specialist services would take place. Ministers have said, “Oh no—it’s all going to be okay”, but they have not explained how you would reconfigure the stroke services in London, as the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said, after the abolition of the strategic health authority. We support the amendments and hope that the Minister will do so as well.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we have had several lively debates on the importance of redesigning services if the NHS is to become more personalised and productive, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, speaks with great insight and passion on this issue. He has tabled further amendments on this topic, which we will have an opportunity to debate in detail at a later stage.
The Government are clear that, as a basic principle, the reconfiguration of services is a matter for the local NHS and that decisions about service change should be driven by local assessment of need. The reconfiguration of services works best when there is a partnership approach between the NHS, local government and the public. What matters is that strategic decisions are taken at the right level. We believe that our reforms will enable commissioners to make the changes that will deliver real improvements in outcomes for patients and the public. The Bill places clear duties on the Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups, which will underpin a locally driven approach to service redesign, clinically based and framed around the needs of patients. That includes duties to promote the NHS constitution and the involvement of patients as well as duties to secure continuous improvement in the quality of services and to reduce inequalities. These duties set important guiding principles against which the commissioning system will develop and oversee service redesign and reconfiguration. In addition, the NHS will continue to assure reconfiguration proposals against the four clear tests set by the Secretary of State, which are that proposals should have support from clinical commissioners; should be based on robust patient and public engagement; should be underpinned by a clear evidence base; and should be consistent with current and prospective plans for patient choice. The Bill and the four tests will ensure that any proposals for service change are based on a thorough assessment of local need, underpinned by clinical insight and developed through dialogue between commissioners, providers, local authorities, patients and the public. Of course, the board will have an important role in providing support and assurance to local commissioners, but we will not be replicating layers of top-down management.
With the clear legal duties set out in the Bill, the four tests and the support and assurance that will be available, there should be no need for the Secretary of State to prescribe through the mandate how the commissioning system should prioritise and determine the design of services. To do so would cut right across the clinically led local commissioning, which is at the heart of the Bill. Nevertheless, I recognise the importance of getting these arrangements right, and between now and Third Reading I commit to working with the noble Lord with a view to finding a formula designed to address the concerns that he has articulated. We are looking at a range of options. I hope to be able to say more about this when we reach his later amendment on the subject. I hope that for now he will find this rather broad assurance sufficiently strong to enable him to withdraw that part of the amendment.
I hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw the rest of Amendment 42 as well, because it also raises another issue. It is vital, especially in the current economic climate, for the NHS to provide financial support for adult social services where possible in relation to those services at the interface between health and social care. Here, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who has been a tireless advocate of social care at numerous stages of our proceedings, to ensure that this element of the equation—and that part of the Bill’s title—is not overlooked.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, has tabled Amendment 148B with a similar aim in mind. We are all, I think, aware of the impact that such services can have in helping people to live independently in their own homes and in reducing unnecessary hospital admissions—which is, of course, better for the individuals involved and relieves pressures on the NHS. The last spending review included a commitment to provide £648 million in 2011-12, rising to £700 million by 2014-15, for these purposes. Early indications are that this funding has helped to promote integrated working between social care and health commissioners. We want this to continue. I can reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that by virtue of paragraph 130 of Schedule 4 to the Bill the NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs will inherit the powers that primary care trusts currently have under existing legislation to make payments to local authorities towards expenditure on community services.
Generally speaking, our approach in this Bill has been to give NHS commissioners maximum autonomy in how the NHS budget is used. However, I have sympathy for the argument that it is legitimate that the Secretary of State should be able to determine the proportion of NHS funding that is to be transferred to local authority community services in order to secure closer working between the NHS and social services. I am not sure that the mandate is the right vehicle for this. However, I can see very considerable merit in the approach that the noble Baroness has taken with Amendment 148B. This amendment would give the Secretary of State additional powers to direct the board on the minimum amount that it should transfer to local authorities in a given financial year. The Secretary of State would be able to specify in the directions the bodies to which those payments should be made, the amount that should be paid to each body and the functions in respect of which the payments must be made, and to amend these instructions if necessary. It would essentially enable the current arrangements to continue.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked whether the amendment was wide enough to cover adult social care; whether it was within vires; and whether the Treasury is content. The answer to all those questions is yes. Indeed, I am advised that the amendment would enable funding to be transferred to other community services, such as housing, if necessary.
The approach taken is in line with current practice, which is approved by and agreed with the Treasury. Importantly, this would represent only a minimum. The board would retain the power to make additional payments over and above those required by the Secretary of State if it chose. The CCGs would also retain their powers to make such payments. Although I think it makes sense for it to be the NHS Commissioning Board that makes these payments, it would also be vital that there is a dialogue between local authorities and clinical commissioning groups as to how the funding could be best used. Of course, both will be involved, as members of health and well-being boards, in setting the strategic framework for health and social care commissioning through the joint health and well-being strategy. In addition, the existing powers in Section 256 for the Secretary of State to give directions on the conditions that should apply to such payments would apply. This is helpful because it would provide a mechanism for ensuring that the agreement of the health and well-being board is obtained as to how funds are spent.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, has spoken with great conviction about the Bill’s importance, including the tangible duties to act to ensure that integration moves from being just an aim to being a reality—as, indeed, the Future Forum has emphasised that it must. I think that Amendment 148B meets all the criteria to ensure that that will be the case. I shall therefore be happy to support it if the noble Baroness should decide to move it. I hope that my noble friends will join me in supporting the amendment; I would urge them to do so. Given that commitment, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, will be prepared to withdraw Amendment 42.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanations and reassurances. I certainly think that Amendment 148B is a better amendment than my provision on social care in Amendment 42. I am very happy also to accept his broad assurances that we will have a discussion and dialogue to see whether we can move forward on, in effect, a version of a pre-failure regime, while recognising the Government’s commitment to local decision-making on redesigning and reconfiguring services. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I would like to echo my noble friend Lord Rea and noble Lords from the Cross Benches on the importance of this group of amendments. At its best, primary care can be brilliant, but at its worst it can be absolutely appalling. The variation in primary care is probably wider than in any other part of the National Health Service. As the changes take place we can see that this may cause many problems in the future.
We are all agreed about the need for an integrated approach and for a smooth patient pathway. Clearly, primary care potentially has a very important role to play. However, it needs to step up to the plate. If acute hospitals are to reduce the scale of their operations, more will be expected of primary care. Yet acute hospitals are open every hour of the day: primary care is not. Indeed, there are often very big issues about how primary care can be accessed out of working hours. The out of hours services are not always as effective as they might be, and there are some practices where patients know that it is very difficult to get attention unless they turn up at the convenience of the doctor, and so they then end up at the accident and emergency department. As I read where the NHS is going, this is no longer going to be acceptable. If money is being taken away from acute care and more money is being spent on primary care, which must be the logical outcome of clinical commissioning groups, unless those clinical commissioning groups can ensure that GPs do what is necessary to ensure that primary care takes up the responsibility, we are going to end in great difficulty, where acute care services will continue to be demanded by patients and money is being spent on primary care but it is not doing the necessary job. Therefore issues around the monitoring and performance management of primary care become very important indeed.
The Government have decided not to place the contracts of GPs within clinical commissioning groups. I understand that because clearly there is another potential conflict of interest. They are to be held at the local offices of the national Commissioning Board. However, there are real questions to be asked about how bureaucrats, as the Government seek to call them—I like to think of them as managers—are going to handle those contracts. What will happen within a particular clinical commissioning group if there is a group of GPs who simply will not do what is required of them to make a contract work with a local hospital? For instance, there may be a risk-share arrangement with a local hospital, where essentially agreement is made on the contract price, but part of it is very much about demand management, where there is a risk share between the clinical commissioning group and the acute trust. That will depend on all the GPs within a clinical commissioning group doing what is necessary, playing their part and contributing to demand management measures. Frankly, there are a lot of GPs who will not have anything to do with that. We know that at the moment. It is happening everywhere, up and down the country, with GPs who do not give a damn about anything to do with demand management. What will happen? Who will be able to intervene in those circumstances? Clinical commissioning groups do not have many levers when it comes to poor performance among general practitioners. I suspect that the national Commissioning Board will not have the expertise either. That is why this group of amendments is so important. We all know that primary care can make a huge contribution to a good NHS in the future, but we have to admit that, of all parts of the NHS, we can probably also find the poorest quality of service as well. That is why we are looking for reassurance from the noble Earl that this new system will be able to deal with those poor performers.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Patel, for their contributions to this debate and, indeed, to other noble Lords who have spoken. We have heard some very powerful and persuasive arguments. I have listened very carefully to them.
Amendments 43A and 43B highlight the concerns that I expect all of us in this Chamber share in relation to the need to ensure high-quality primary care for all patients. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made some very telling points in that regard. Of course, there can be no doubt that good primary care contributes to good healthcare outcomes overall. I fully agree that the NHS Commissioning Board should be held to account properly for its performance in commissioning primary care. I do not think, however, that the right way to achieve that is to prescribe that this must be part of the mandate. Our aim is that the mandate should have at its heart the NHS outcomes framework, which covers the range of care that the NHS provides. I make the simple point that good primary care will be essential to improvement against the NHS outcomes framework.
More widely, the department will be keeping under review the performance of the board and the way that it carries out its functions, including its direct commissioning. What matters here are the accountability mechanisms and how those in the system are monitored and held to account. Just as the board will have a commissioning outcomes framework to hold CCGs to account for the quality of their commissioning, it will be important to have robust and transparent information to assess the quality of what the board commissions itself.
We come back to what the Bill already says: it places duties of quality on the Secretary of State, on the board and on CCGs, requiring each of them to exercise functions with a view to securing continuous improvement in the quality of services provided to patients. The Bill also sets out robust arrangements for holding those bodies to account for delivering quality improvement. As noble Lords will be aware, the Bill already requires the board to submit a business plan setting out how it proposes to exercise its functions, and a report setting how it has exercised its functions, to the Secretary of State on an annual basis. In turn, CCGs must also submit their commissioning plans and annual reports to the board. Both the board, in reporting to the Secretary of State, and CCGs, in reporting to the board, will be expected to demonstrate how they have fulfilled their quality improvement duty, including in relation to primary care. Consequently we expect, for example, that both the board and CCGs will wish to monitor the standard of care and services provided by all primary medical services providers in fulfilling their duties.
It is possible that we will need a dedicated objective relating to primary care in the mandate—I am not ruling that out. It would be better, though, not to prescribe that in primary legislation. What matters is that there are clear and effective accountability arrangements, and the Bill as it stands provides flexibility to ensure just that.
The noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Rea, asked about the QOF. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that the QOF is a separate issue, but I can say that the whole of the QOF is kept under review in consultation with the profession to ensure that it reflects the best available evidence and supports continuous improvement in the quality of care for patients. Over the coming months we will continue to discuss with the profession and its representatives how to focus the QOF on securing better healthcare outcomes and what that means for existing GP contractual arrangements.
I turn to the final amendment in this group, Amendment 95A. The Bill already ensures that the board has the information that it needs to demonstrate how it has fulfilled its duties. CCGs are required to provide information to the board in the form of the annual commissioning plan and annual report. In addition, the board and CCGs are under a duty to co-operate. In the normal course of business we expect this to involve the sharing of information as necessary but, in the event that a CCG might have failed, be failing or fail to discharge any of its functions, the board’s powers enable it to require any information or documents that it considers necessary from CCGs.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, posited the situation that there might be reluctant GPs who did not fulfil their part of the bargain, whatever that was, with the acute sector. There needs to be a way of investigating allegations that actions by GPs in their practices are adversely affecting a clinical commissioning group. Where a general practice is operating in such a way that it is a barrier to a clinical commissioning group meeting its functions, it will be for the commissioning group to work with the members of that general practice to support it to improve and contribute to the work of the commissioning group as a whole. Ultimately, if it is unable to do so, a clinical commissioning group may need to refer such cases to the NHS Commissioning Board, along with the evidence of the failure of the practice and details of any support that the commissioning group has provided to the practice to help it overcome any perceived difficulties.
Among other matters, the board may wish to consider if the practice’s actions are in breach of the practice’s primary medical services contract. Separately, the NHS Commissioning Board will have the power to investigate the suitability of individual GPs under the medical performers list provisions. As the noble Lord will know, this power is currently with primary care trusts.
In a nutshell, therefore, the Bill already imposes a duty on CCGs in respect of the mandate and allows the board to ensure that CCGs fulfil it. Further specific requirements in relation to providing information to the board are therefore unnecessary, so I hope that what I have said reassures the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Patel, sufficiently to enable them to withdraw their amendment.
Lord Kakkar
My Lords, I thank the Minister for, as always, his thoughtful response and consideration of the amendments. I remain somewhat anxious about whether there is going to be sufficient attention and opportunity to deal with the question of performance in primary care and the management of that performance to ensure that the very best clinical outcomes are achievable for all patients across the country.
I welcome much of what the Minister has said with regard to potential further consideration of how mechanisms other than a specification in the mandate on the question of primary care performance might work. I wonder whether it might be possible for him to enter into further dialogue on this matter so that there can be clarity. It would be unhelpful for the future if a great emphasis were placed—in fact, if there were a momentum—on moving practice from the secondary care environment, where there is a relentless evaluation of clinical outcomes and which has done so much to improve clinical outcomes for our patients because of the attention paid to those matters, into a primary care environment where an objective assessment of outcomes was not always possible and where, as a result, what we all hope will be achieved through the Bill—a health gain for patients and population—might therefore inadvertently be lost. With the opportunity to have a further conversation with the Minister prior to Third Reading, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) Requirements included in the mandate have effect only if regulations so provide.”
“( ) Revisions to the mandate which consist of adding, omitting or modifying requirements have effect only if regulations so provide.”