European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill

Earl Cathcart Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 4th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Cathcart (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken today, but I will try to be brief. I do not think that I can support this Bill, for the following reasons. We are told that this business is an emergency, but of course it is not. We have had nearly three years to prepare for it and the Government have assured us that they are ready to leave without an agreement if necessary. Indeed, more than half the public now thinks that it is the right thing to do. I am rather nervous about using YouGov, but it did a study and asked voters:

“If Britain has not agreed a deal by April 12th, what do you think should happen?”.


I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lords, Lord Hannay, Lord Adonis and Lord Bilimoria, but every English and Welsh region outside the M25 would be happy to leave the EU without a deal if no agreement has been reached by the end of next week.

[Lord Bilimoria]

The overall result for the whole country, if you include Scotland and Northern Ireland, was 44% to 42%—a very narrow margin. It was not as stark as the noble Lord said.

[Earl Cathcart]

The result was still in favour of leaving with no deal. We are told that emergency legislation is necessary, but the reality is that the Prime Minister has already said that she will seek an extension beyond 12 April—so where is the emergency? The convention is that emergency legislation passed in one day has the consent of both Houses before being brought forward: in other words, it is not contentious. This clearly is not the case with this Bill, as could be seen in the voting last night in another place.

Not only is this Bill not an emergency but: it is not necessary. As I said, the Prime Minister has already agreed to seek a further extension, which is what this Bill seeks to achieve. If passed, it will become UK law. When the Prime Minister recently sought an extension to 30 June, the EU came back with the two dates of 12 April and 22 May. The withdrawal agreement said that extensions could be made if passed by a statutory instrument in both Houses. However, the Prime Minister circumvented that by getting Sir Tim Barrow, our man in Brussels, to write to Brussels accepting their offer. Hey presto—we were told that that was sufficient to be an international agreement, and that international agreements trumped UK law, so the SI was just a tidying-up exercise. So what is to stop the Prime Minister seeking another extension by getting our man in Brussels to write another letter? Then, hey presto, we would have another international agreement that would trump this Bill if passed.

I have another point: traditionally, only a Minister may move a money resolution in support of legislation that requires expenditure of public funds. There is a very good reason for that: it is because the Government have responsibility for the Budget. If they want to spend more, they have to raise more money through taxes or borrowing. This Bill could have very significant financial consequences indeed. Staying in the EU for any length of time would be an extremely expensive thing to do and I believe that it would need a money resolution, which must be moved by a Minister of the Crown in the other place. I understand that a report from the other place says that, if we extended our stay in the EU for two more years, it would cost the UK taxpayer some £36 billion—a huge sum of money.

I was quite taken by something that my noble friend the Leader of the House said in her remarks earlier today. She said:

“Because of the speed at which this legislation is being considered, we have genuine concerns that this Bill could tie the hands of government and, in fact, be contrary to its stated objectives”,


and could lock us into leaving without a deal. My noble friend then gave the example of the Prime Minister going to Brussels next Wednesday. She might ask for a further extension to, say, Friday 31 May. Brussels might say no but, late at night—as it has done previously—come back with a counter offer of, say, Monday 22 May. All the leaders of the 27 would then go home. This Bill would then allow Sir Oliver Letwin and his friends in the Labour Party to consider this offer on the Thursday and either agree it or not. That would leave the EU 27 only until Friday 12 April to agree the date or, indeed, a new date chosen by the Commons. We know that, if all the 27 have not agreed by 11pm on the 12th, we will leave with no deal. That, presumably, is not something that the movers of this Bill would want.

I do not think that that will happen. I do not believe that this Bill will have any teeth if it is passed. If the Prime Minister wants to accept the offer of a new date from the EU, she will just get her man in Brussels to write another letter. This will again create an international agreement, which will trump anything that the Commons proposes through this Bill.

EU Withdrawal

Earl Cathcart Excerpts

Wednesday 13th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Cathcart (Con)]

My Lords, I have not spoken in a Brexit debate until now because I did not think there was any point. What I might have said would have been said dozens of times before, and I do not suppose that whatever I say here today will have the slightest effect on the outcome. However, on this occasion, I wish to ask my noble friend the Minister a question.

Before I start, I should say that I voted to leave in the referendum. Indeed, I voted to leave in 1975 as well. Before we joined the Common Market, Britain had 100% control over its destiny and its laws, rules and regulations. The reason I voted to leave in 1975 was that I thought there would be a loss of sovereignty and, like the vast majority of Brexiteers, the reason I voted to leave in 2016 was to regain that sovereignty. I know that remainers cannot understand why Brexiteers voted to leave, just as Brexiteers cannot understand why remainers voted to stay, but we are where we are. What we need to do now is find a way through this quagmire that is in the best interests of the United Kingdom.

We are told that if we do not vote for Theresa May’s deal, there is a danger of us crashing out with no deal—falling off the cliff edge, which we have heard again today. I am not sure that we need to fall off a cliff edge if there is no deal, because under Article XXIV of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United Kingdom and Europe would be allowed to continue with the zero-tariff, zero-quota trading arrangements after 29 March. As the EU enjoys a £95 billion surplus with the UK, I cannot see why it would not welcome such an arrangement.

However, there are conditions. First, both parties have to agree to this standstill arrangement covering all goods trade, but could then negotiate at a later date a more comprehensive free trade agreement covering services and so on. This might not solve everything, but it should ease some of the fears about a cliff edge. Secondly, both parties must be in negotiations for a free trade agreement. It is on this point that I can see the Minister saying why we cannot invoke Article XXVI. He might say, “We have tried to negotiate a deal. Negotiations have failed, they have broken down, and because they have, we will not be able to invoke Article XXIV; hence, we are leaving without a deal”. I disagree. Just because the first deal put on the table is unacceptable does not mean that the second one will be—if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again. That is exactly the point of Article XXIV: to reduce the disruption while negotiations continue.

I understand that the Department for International Trade is investigating the possibility of invoking Article XXIV. I also understand that the Malthouse compromise envisages as plan B, in the absence of a formal withdrawal agreement, a basic interim agreement with the EU using Article XXIV. However, it is disappointing that the Department for Exiting the European Union is silent on Article XXIV. I can understand the political reasons why No. 10—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl, but I draw his attention to a briefing by the House of Commons Library from last week, No-deal Brexit and WTO: Article 24 Explained. Briefly, it makes it clear that if you have no deal, you cannot invoke Article XXIV. It is about interim application with a view to a full trade agreement. If you crash out with no deal, you are not negotiating a full trade agreement. Anyway, apparently no interim agreements have been registered with the WTO since 1995, because they can be objected to.

[Earl Cathcart]

I think I have just explained exactly that point. Just because the first deal is unacceptable, does not mean that the next deal will be. Negotiations will continue.

I was saying that I can understand the political reasons why No. 10 would want to keep Article XXIV under wraps, because talking about its possibility in public would reduce MPs’—and, indeed, noble Lords’—fears about no deal. This would make no deal considerably less frightening and therefore lessen the chances of the Prime Minister’s deal being passed. I ask the Minister: what discussions have the Government had with Brussels, and indeed the World Trade Organization, about the possibility of invoking Article XXIV, to ensure that we meet all the necessary conditions? Where there is a will, there is a way.