Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Williams of Trafford's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 33A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has considerable merit. It proposes the collection of this data, including what is set out in subsection (3) of the amendment, and laying a report before Parliament detailing the exercise of the considerable powers under Schedule 3 to the Bill and Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act during the year in question. I will be interested to hear the Government’s response. If they are not minded to accept the amendment, I hope they will give a full explanation of why this is not deemed necessary or acceptable.
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their points. I agree with the sentiment of what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said about the role of communities. They are important in assisting the police and security services in countering not only terrorism but extremism. Amendment 33A would require the Home Secretary to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament each year setting out how the ports powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to this Bill have been exercised.
Reiterating some of what I said earlier, the Government agree with the sentiment behind the amendment, but I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is unnecessary. We entirely agree that transparency and accountability are appropriate in governing the exercise of the new hostile activity ports powers, as is the case with the existing counterterrorism powers. I reiterate, however, that such mechanisms are already in place through the work of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation with respect to Schedule 7, and the future role of the IPC for Schedule 3. Part 6 of Schedule 3 already requires the IPC to review the use of the powers by making an annual report. We envisage this working in a very similar way to the role of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who reports annually on the use of counterterrorism powers under the Terrorism Act, including those in Schedule 7.
Noble Lords should be reassured that the commissioner, like the independent reviewer, will be afforded full access to any Schedule 3 record on request and information on how the powers have been exercised. The scope and content of these reports will be at the discretion of the commissioner, as they have been for a number of years regarding Schedule 7. The annual reports by the independent reviewer are augmented by the quarterly statistical bulletins, published by the Home Office, on the operation in Great Britain of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000. The latest bulletin was published on 6 December and, incidentally, recorded a further 25% decrease in the number of Schedule 7 examinations compared with the previous year. The number of Schedule 7 examinations has now fallen by 79% since the data was first collected in the year ending 30 September 2012. The published data already includes information about the ethnicity of examinees and the number of detentions.
As I said earlier, we are considering with the Home Office chief statistician the appropriate arrangements for publishing statistics on the exercise of the Schedule 3 powers, but we would expect to publish equivalent statistics to Schedule 7. The statistical reports in respect of Schedule 7 do not currently identify the religion of examinees, but we are ready to explore this with the Home Office chief statistician, the police and others. I hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord feels happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. What comes across to me in her response to this and other amendments is that there is a degree of transparency and accountability, in that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation will look at the Schedule 7 powers and the IPC, presumably, will examine those under Schedule 3. It is all very well for the Government, the independent reviewer or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be satisfied that these powers are being used appropriately, but they are not the people who need to be convinced that they are being used fairly: it is the communities—particularly the Muslim community—that need to be convinced. Publishing the religion of people being subjected to these powers is crucial if we are to get the Muslim community to work with us to defeat terrorism.
As I said when I introduced the amendment, people, or groups, can switch almost overnight. For example, the attempted bombings on 21 July 2005 were a carbon copy of those on 7 July, which did not go according to plan. They were supposed to involve four bombs on the Underground, and the copycat attacks on 21 July involved three on the Underground and one on a bus because of what happened on the 7th. That is how quickly the first attack was copy-catted by another group. It is the friends, neighbours and close associates of these lone wolves and groups of friends who will pick up on the changes in their behaviour that show they are moving from being radical to being violent and potentially deadly. It is therefore absolutely essential that we do everything we possibly can to win the trust and confidence of the communities from which these people come.
I am encouraged by the Minister saying that the Home Office statistician will be looking at the issue.
The Minister said that the Government will be looking at this with the chief statistician and the police. Can she give a timeframe for that? If she cannot do so now, can she come back to the House before too long with an idea of when we might expect some further information on this work?
My Lords, Amendment 34A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, raises the same issue that the noble Lord led on in Committee. The noble Lord quite rightly raised the issue of the words “hostile act”. The words are far too wide and give a disproportionate power to the relevant authorities. The noble Lord spoke in Committee about these strong coercive powers.
To their credit, the Government have listened to that debate and I know that they have been in discussion with a number of noble Lords around the House, as have government officials. I have found those discussions very helpful and I am persuaded that the amendments put forward by the Government in this group address the concerns raised previously, so I am content to support the Government and their amendments in this group.
My Lords, with this group of amendments we return to the question of the proper scope of the powers in Schedule 3. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has again argued that police powers of this kind should only be available to the police to tackle criminal behaviour. As I highlighted in Committee, and would like to stress again, these new powers to examine persons at ports and the border area are specifically designed to mitigate the threat from all forms of hostile state activity. Limiting the scope of these powers would limit the range of threats that we would be able to detect, disrupt and deter, thereby leaving the country vulnerable.
The noble Lord is correct that many of the activities we are concerned about may be criminal in nature, including offences under the Official Secrets Act 1911. However, not only is this legislation generally recognised to be outdated and not fit for the modern age, but not all hostile activity would fall within scope. The noble Lord is right that we need to consider modernising the law in this area, and the House is aware that the Law Commission is undertaking a review of criminal law surrounding the protection of official data, which includes all the Official Secrets Acts, but this work will necessarily take some time to come to fruition and, until we know the outcome, it would be wrong to narrow the scope of the provisions in Schedule 3. To do so would necessarily inhibit our ability to counter hostile activity, as the police would naturally err on the side of caution when conducting stops, given the risk of challenge about whether the stop or subsequent questioning was clearly for the purpose of determining whether the examinee is, or has been, involved in serious crime.
I recognise the noble Lord’s concerns that the breadth of the power could encompass activities which are not considered crimes. If such activity threatens the safety of our citizens, our democracy and our national security, it is only right that we afford the police the powers to investigate, prevent and discourage these acts in order to protect us. Some hostile activity would not be considered criminal activity under the law as is stands—for example, the proliferation of disinformation. We know that certain states routinely use disinformation as a foreign policy tool and have seen evidence of this happening elsewhere.
In recent years, some states have attempted to influence opinions online by using human and automated troll farms to establish fake social media profiles or spread disinformation. One can imagine a scenario in which a member of one such troll farm, controlled by a foreign power that has been observed attempting to influence public debate in the UK, travels to the UK. The act of sowing discord through proliferation of disinformation is not a crime in the UK, but you can imagine a scenario in which it would threaten our national security. Under the noble Lord’s proposed amendment, police officers at ports would be rightly unwilling to ask about these activities, as they are not illegal.
Interference operations are not restricted to the online space. Suppose an individual with suspected links to a hostile foreign intelligence agency travels to the UK, with the intention of meeting parliamentarians under a benign pretext, but with the real intention of influencing them to support a particular position which would be of benefit to that state. This type of activity is not illegal in the UK; the individual is not obliged to disclose that they have an ulterior motive of seeking to influence parliamentarians, but noble Lords understand that this activity is a threat to our national security and risks undermining our parliamentary democracy. Under the noble Lord’s amendment, as this type of activity would not be classified as a crime in the UK, police officers at ports would be unable to ask questions of a sufficiently detailed nature to provide the level of insight necessary to properly understand, assess, further investigate or disrupt the threat that this activity would present.
Some individuals may not even be aware that they are acting on behalf of a hostile actor. They may think they are working for a charity or a friend. Many of the serious crimes that we would consider linking to Schedule 3 require an intention element on the part of the individual.
We have reflected carefully on comments made, including by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the scope of the “threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom” limb of the definition of a hostile act. There were concerns that legitimate business ventures would fall within scope of the power. This limb of the definition is intended to ensure that these powers can be used to mitigate hostile acts such as damaging the country’s national infrastructure or disrupting energy supplies to the UK. It is not our intention that these powers are available to examine those travelling only to conduct legitimate business.
To address these concerns, I have tabled Amendment 34C, which narrows the scope of the “economic well-being” limb. This amendment will provide that an act is a hostile act under this limb only if it threatens the economic well-being of the UK,
“in a way relevant to the interests of national security”.
The other government amendments in this group make consequential changes to other references to the economic well-being of the UK in Schedule 3.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked whether the IPC will have the resources needed to review the use of Schedule 3. The Government are committed to ensuring the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has the resources that he or she needs to fulfil all their functions, including Schedule 3 when these provisions come into force. However, I should emphasise that we expect the use of Schedule 3 powers to be very low, certainly far below the number of Schedule 7 examinations conducted in 2017.
At this point, perhaps I may remind noble Lords that the Home Office is reviewing whether there is a need for new counter hostile state activity legislation. I have already mentioned the Law Commission review of the Official Secrets Acts, but our work is not confined solely to that area of criminal law. Of course, any reforms to the Official Secrets Acts or any other new offences will require further primary legislation and, in taking this work forward, I can assure the noble Lord that we will examine as part of the work whether there are any changes that we ought to make to Schedule 3.
In taking this wider work forward, we will also have the benefit of the annual reports on the exercise of Schedule 3 powers by the IPC. I am confident that in reviewing this, having all the resources he needs in place, the commissioner will adopt the same robust approach as did the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, when he was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. He will not hold back from making recommendations if he considers that, in the light of the experience of operating these powers, changes should be made to Schedule 3. Moreover, the provisions of the Bill will be subject to the normal five-year post-legislative review.
I hope that, given this explanation, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment. I have explained the need to maintain the current scope of the power subject to the narrowing of the “economic well-being” limb.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, raises important issues with these two amendments, and I am happy to give my support in principle. As the noble Baroness said herself, I am not convinced that these amendments, as written, are correct, though they certainly raise issues the Government should look at and support. All of us here would, I hope, support journalists, and a free and responsible press.
The issues raised by the amendments need looking at; I hope that the Minister will do so when she responds. Perhaps we can find a way forward, possibly at Third Reading, to address the concerns here. It is about getting the balance right between protecting our country, protecting the rights of journalists and keeping ourselves safe and secure. We need to get those issues right in the Bill. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I agree totally with noble Lords that there is a balance to be struck between the freedom of the press and getting material that is not conducive to this country’s well-being. The amendments reflect concerns about how Schedule 3 ports powers apply to journalistic material and sources. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, spoke passionately about that issue in Committee; I hope to assure her that Schedule 3 includes a number of safeguards to protect confidential material, including confidential journalistic material.
Schedule 3 is a counter-hostile state activity power. With that in mind, it is vital that ports officers are equipped to deal with the means and methods of those engaged in such activity. I spoke in Committee about the very real threat we face from foreign intelligence officers and their agents who actively use the cover of certain professions including journalism, the law and others. That is why Schedule 3 introduces new powers to allow for action to be taken where an article that may include confidential material could be used in connection with a hostile act, presents a threat to life or could lead to significant injury.
Amendment 34E would undermine the ability of ports officers to detect, disrupt and deter hostile actors as it would allow a person simply to refuse a request for documents or information, including sources, where they claim that it consists of journalistic material, as defined by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Investigatory Powers Act, or is subject to legal privilege. That would prohibit the examining officer verifying that the material in question is confidential or journalistic and would require the officer to take the examinee at their word.
I have spoken before about why that would be problematic when faced with trained hostile actors who will seek to exploit any possible loophole in our legislation, yet the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, are precisely why the new retention powers in respect of confidential information require the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who must be satisfied that certain conditions are met before granting that authorisation. This approach protects the work of legitimate journalists and lawyers and is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Schedule 7 case of Miranda, to which the noble Baroness referred. In that case, the court said that,
“independent and impartial oversight … is the natural and obvious adequate safeguard”,
in examination cases involving journalistic freedom.
Amendment 34F would extend the statutory bar—which prohibits answers or information given orally by a person during an examination being used in criminal proceedings—to any information or documents given where the material is considered journalistic. Noble Lords will know that the purpose of this important safeguard, as recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is to protect an examinee against self-incrimination where they must respond to questioning under compulsion and so do not have a right to silence. The amendment would extend the statutory bar into territory it was not designed or intended to cover. It could prevent evidence of a hostile act from being used in criminal proceedings where it had been acquired through the legitimate examination of confidential material on the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Accepting this amendment would undermine the ability of the police and the CPS to prosecute hostile actors, either those who have used journalistic cover to disguise their criminal activities or those whose activities might be evidenced by confidential material in the hands of a third party.
Although I do not agree with the amendments, for the reasons I have explained, I recognise the force of the noble Baroness’s arguments on the need for strong protections for journalistic material that is not confidential. I will therefore ask my officials to consider if any additional protections may be introduced through the Schedule 3 codes of practice. I can undertake to keep the noble Baroness informed of progress with this work, and of course a revised version of the draft code of practice will need to come back to this House to be approved before those provisions come into force. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving the House another opportunity to debate the appropriate safeguards for journalistic and legally privileged material under Schedule 3. In light of my undertaking to do this additional work, I hope she will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, the House will recall that on the first day on Report, a new clause was added to the Bill to strengthen the rights of persons detained under Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to consult a solicitor in private. Amendment 45 is consequential upon that new clause. The amendment will provide that the new clause will be commenced by regulations, rather than automatically coming into force two months after Royal Assent. This will allow time to update the code of practice under the Terrorism Act 2000 before these provisions are brought into force. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Stunell, for their points. All I can say on the back of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, is: thank God we do not live in the 17th century.
I start by making it clear that when the Government refer in the various documents mentioned by the noble Baroness to Prevent applying to “all forms of extremism”, that means that Prevent applies to far-right extremism as much as it does to Islamist extremism—and, indeed, to Sikh-related extremism, Northern Ireland-related extremism, et cetera. This is a relatively new change, as the Prevent strategy pre-2011 applied only to Islamist extremism. This was clearly inequitable and not reflective of the threat, so it was changed. What is not meant by that expression is that Prevent should apply to all degrees of extremism. All our guidance has tried to be clear that Prevent is of relevance only where the extremism is such that there is a risk of people being drawn into terrorism. That is how the duties are framed in statute, and the point is made many times throughout the two pieces of statutory guidance: the Prevent duty guidance and the Channel duty guidance. I accept that there are occasions in those documents when the full formulation is not used for the sake of brevity and style. However, we believe that, when read as a whole, and in conjunction with the 2015 Act, the true meaning is clear.
I also emphasise that we have not seen any evidence to suggest that practitioners are misinterpreting the guidance documents to try to apply them to those forms of extremism which do not risk drawing people into terrorism, but I appreciate the example provided by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I would be grateful if he would forward it to me. Certainly, the rigorous assessment within the Channel process ensures that no one is likely to be offered support unless that connection to being drawn into terrorism is there. We must not forget that, in any event, Channel support is entirely voluntary.
All guidance reaches a point where it needs to be updated, and we are committed to doing so when the time is right. Since the Prevent and Channel duties were introduced, there has been much good practice and many case studies which a new version would look to contain. Noble Lords may also be aware that just last week the Court of Appeal heard a case relevant to this matter and the Government eagerly await its judgment, which may well have implications for how a future revision of the guidance is drafted. But we do not know how long it will be before the judgment is handed down and it would be a mistake to attempt to revise the guidance beforehand. In addition, the drafting process, collecting good practice and going out to public consultation is likely to take several months.
The process of revising guidance is not a quick one if we are to get it right. The Government accept that it will become necessary to do so at some point in the not too distant future, but it would be damaging to what we are trying to achieve with Clause 19 should implementation of that clause be delayed while new guidance is drafted. The almost inevitable outcome, should such an amendment become law, is that the production of new guidance would be rushed so as to limit that damage, resulting in an inferior product, with much-reduced consultation and input from practitioners. Given that the guidance must be approved by Parliament before being issued, your Lordships’ House would be required to debate an inferior product that I would not wish to lay before it.
While I would not wish to commit the Government to a specific timeframe for producing new guidance, I can say that in any event the guidance will need to be reviewed as part of the post-legislative review process that takes place five years after enactment. The fact that the Act in question received Royal Assent in 2015 means that a review and revision of the guidance will happen no later than 2020. When we revise the guidance, we will be sure to take on board the comments that the noble Baroness has made and make it clear exactly what kind of extremism is covered by the Prevent duty and the guidance, and what is not. Prevent is not and never has been any form of thought police, nor has it been about suppressing dissent. It is of course, as I said earlier, about safeguarding vulnerable people.
I hope I have been able to allay the noble Baroness’s concerns and that she will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for what she has said. I thought when I was speaking that I got an indication that there would be some action within 12 months, but as she spoke I became rather more worried by the time that everything is going to take.
I thank the noble Baroness for allowing me to intervene. Twelve months from now brings us virtually into 2020.
All right. That is reassuring—to everyone, I hope.
I thank everyone who has taken part in the debate, and I thank the Minister herself for what she has said to us all. I certainly hope that the nature of the problems that we have highlighted during this debate is such that rather more detailed consideration might be given to bringing the whole timetable forward. That would certainly be a great help. The sooner it is done, the better, even if the timetable is really around the 12-month timing. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.