Baroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Williams of Trafford's debates with the Home Office
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be brief. These amendments cover a serious and disturbing issue that has received considerable publicity in recent months. The purpose of the amendments, as I understand it, is to tighten and extend the reach and scope of the law in respect of disclosure of private sexual photographs and films without consent and with malicious intent. They include new clauses on compensation and anonymity for victims. At this stage we will listen with interest to the Government’s response, including the extent to which they consider that the law as it stands is sufficient—or, alternatively, needed—to deal with any or all of the issues addressed in the amendments.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has explained, this group of amendments all relate to what is commonly referred to as revenge porn, as provided for in Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Amendments 216 and 217 seek to extend significantly the scope of the offence, but the Government consider that the offence is working well. I am pleased to see my noble friend Lord Faulks in his seat; as he said, there have been more than 60 convictions for the offence since it came into force in April last year.
The offence is deliberately tightly drafted to target those individuals who have disclosed private and sexual images without consent, and with the intention of causing distress to the individual depicted. We are not persuaded that a sufficiently strong case has been made for broadening the scope of the offence, as proposed by the two amendments.
The general effect of Amendment 216 would be to significantly extend the range of material that could be considered private and sexual for the purpose of the offence. Currently, the offence is drafted to capture material that is sufficiently sexually explicit that its dissemination would be likely to cause real distress to those depicted. The offence also provides that images that are photoshopped—for example, so that a non-sexual image of an individual becomes sexual—should not be covered by the offence. This is because the disclosure of such an image, though still distressing, does not have the potential to cause the same degree of harm as the disclosure of an undoctored photograph showing images of the kind referred to in Section 35(3) of the 2015 Act. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made some interesting observations to that end. To alter the definition of “sexual” as proposed in Amendment 216 would, in our view, unjustifiably extend the scope of the offence.
Regarding the extension of the offence proposed by Amendment 217, we see no need to capture those who threaten to post such images. The offence, rightly, deals only with the act of actually disclosing private and sexual images, as it is the disclosure of the images that causes the harm which criminalising this behaviour seeks to prevent. As my noble friend Lord Faulks says, threats to disclose could, depending on the circumstances, be captured by existing offences that tackle harassment, malicious communications or, of course, blackmail. It is also difficult to see what would be gained by including an intention to cause fear or alarm to the victim, as distress is sufficiently broad a term for these purposes. Amendment 217 also seeks to make it possible for the offence to be committed recklessly as well as intentionally. The offence is targeted at those who deliberately seek to cause distress to victims through the dissemination of private and sexual material. This malicious intent—the revenge element of revenge porn, so to speak—is a key feature of the offence and we believe it would be wrong to dilute this by applying the offence to conduct that is the result of recklessness rather than a deliberately malicious act. Similarly, the proposal to extend the offence to those who,
“knowingly promote, solicit or profit”,
in relation to revenge porn material would shift the emphasis from those who disclose the relevant images with malicious intent, the mischief which this offence is intended to address.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. The variety of views on this subject speak to me of just how difficult an issue it is. I also particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the only woman apart from myself to speak in the debate. This is a very sensitive issue, and many noble Lords have talked about getting the balance right. We think that the Government have got the balance right, and I will explain why.
I shall start with the report by Richard Henriques on the Metropolitan Police Service’s handing of its investigations into allegations of sexual offences by persons of public prominence. That is a further element contributing to the debate. In answer to the point made by my noble friend Lord Attlee, I have been fully briefed on that report. It was commissioned by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and as I said to this House the other day, the report—including its publication—is a matter for him and for the force. The commissioner has made a public apology to Lord Bramall, to Lady Brittan and to Harvey Proctor for the impact that Operation Midland had on their lives.
At the outset, let me say that the Government fully understand the anguish felt by those who have had their reputation traduced in the media following unfounded allegations made against them. The notion that someone is innocent until proven guilty is central to our justice system and to the rule of law, so the Government have every sympathy for the underlying aim behind the amendment. I will not go into what should be redrafted, but will talk about the amendment as it stands.
The Government also start from the position that there should, in general, be a presumption of anonymity before the point of charge. I believe that there is also a general acceptance that there will none the less be exceptional circumstances in which the public interest means that a suspect should be named. If there is a divide between noble Lords and myself on this issue, it is not therefore one of principle but is about how best to give effect to the shared policy position. For the Government’s part, we are not persuaded that legislation is the right way forward at this time.
One of the principal arguments put forward in support of retaining the public interest exception is that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there will be circumstances in which the police need to publicise a person’s identity to allow further witnesses to a known offence to come forward, or further unknown offences by the same person to come to light. As he also said, witnesses can come forward at a trial only if there is, in fact, a trial. He also made the further point that the accused could themselves create their own publicity around an event.
As the current Prime Minister said in response to the previous Home Affairs Select Committee on this issue,
“While we are clear that transparency and consistency should be at the heart of the criminal justice system, … we recognise that there is a difficult balance to strike in some criminal investigations between the operational advantages of naming suspects and respecting suspects’ right to privacy”.
As noble Lords will know, the issue of anonymity in relation to sexual offences has been debated in this House over many years. Anonymity for complainants in rape cases was introduced in 1976. It was subsequently extended to sexual offences generally. Anonymity for defendants who have been charged with an offence was introduced at the same time, but abolished in 1988. Defendant anonymity was subject to exhaustive consideration before and during the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, in 2010 the then coalition Government published independent research relevant to defendant anonymity in rape cases, which found,
“insufficient reliable empirical evidence on which to base an informed decision on the value of providing anonymity to rape defendants. Evidence is lacking in a number of key areas, in particular, whether the inability to publicise a person’s identity will prevent further witnesses to a known offence from coming forward, or further unknown offences by the same person from coming to light”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/11/10; col. 27WS].
The coalition Government declined to proceed with introducing defendant anonymity in rape cases unless the evidence justifying it was “clear and sound”. In the absence of any finding to that effect, they reached the conclusion that the proposal did not stand on its merits and would not be proceeded with further.
While the amendment before us would confer anonymity on suspects rather than defendants, I note the preceding history to highlight the challenges we face in coming to an equitable view on this sensitive issue. There are powerful arguments against conferring anonymity on either suspects or defendants of sexual offences simply as a quid pro quo for that enjoyed by complainants. However, I also recognise that those whose identity is made public, be they persons of public prominence or not, may suffer unjustifiable reputational damage. Noble Lords have given many examples of those individuals. While we may personally empathise in individual cases, this should not blind us to the bigger picture and the very significant reasons that underpin the current regime.
As I have said, it is a fundamental tenet of our justice system that everyone is innocent until proven guilty. There must never be an assumption that being charged or arrested for an offence indicates that a person is guilty of a crime. Introducing a statutory scheme for pre-charge anonymity for sexual offences could be seen to undermine that principle. Indeed, while it is true that a suspect who is not further proceeded against in respect of a sexual offence may nevertheless suffer reputational damage, the same may be true of any other serious offence, such as murder, theft or fraud, as noble Lords have said. As with these other offences, it is absolutely right and proper for the police to have operational independence in deciding whether to name a suspect.
The police are guided in making such decisions by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice material Guidance on Relationships with the Media. The current guidance makes clear that decisions should be made only on a case-by-case basis and the police should not release the names of those who are arrested or suspected of a crime unless there are clearly identified circumstances to justify it. These would include incidences, for example, where there is a threat to life or to assist the police in the detection or prevention of crime.
The College of Policing is currently developing new authorised professional practice on media relations and has recently undertaken a consultation as part of its development. The consultation closed in July and the college expects to publish its response to the consultation in the new year. It would not be right, therefore, for the Government to pre-empt the outcome and we will await the conclusion of the college’s review. However, the Government firmly believe that non-statutory guidance, rather than primary legislation, is the appropriate vehicle for guiding the police in these operational decisions. It is vital that the police are able to exercise their own judgment and act swiftly in the circumstances where releasing the name of a suspect may prevent further harm, for example.
I must emphasise that public reporting of a suspect’s name is unusual, but in certain circumstances the police authorise release so that any other potential victims of a suspect are encouraged to come forward. The introduction of a statutory scheme would hamper the police’s ability to act in this way. We know that such identification can help other victims to recognise that they are not the only ones who have suffered sexual abuse—as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly articulated—and this might encourage them to overcome their reluctance to come forward. Victims must feel that they are able to come forward and report abuse to the police as well as get the support that they need. We have seen recently an increase in the number of offences recorded. That is thought to be the result of increased willingness to report among victims and action taken by police forces to improve their approach to investigating sexual abuse. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, convictions for this offence are still woefully low.
In March this year, the chief executive of the College of Policing, Alex Marshall, wrote to all chief officers and PCCs following a number of high-profile cases concerning non-recent child abuse which had focused public attention on the police approach to victims, both at the point of reporting and in investigating the crime. Mr Marshall’s letter put on record that:
“In cases involving sexual offences, substantial efforts have been made to improve the confidence of victims to come forward and report crimes to the police. It is important that progress is not lost”.
I cannot emphasise this point enough. We must not undermine victims’ confidence in our response to sexual offences. Agreeing this amendment could send a message to sexual offence victims that they are less likely to be believed than victims of any other crime. This would be an undeniably retrograde step.
As has been highlighted in the debate we have had today, there are two issues in relation to this matter. The first is the right of the police to name individuals and the second relates to cases in the media where those being investigated, but who have not been charged, have been named. A number of these cases highlighted in the media have been as a result of information being provided not by the police but from other sources. The guidance from the college to the police does not interfere with the rights of the media to publish information obtained from another source, for example, where such information is provided by a victim of crime or a witness to the crime. The press is self-regulated and develops its own codes of practice. Any reporting which breaches an individual’s right to privacy would need to be demonstrably in the public interest. The Government are committed to an independent press, free from government interference. The majority of the press are members of the Independent Press Standards Organisation and are held to account via the Editors’ Code of Practice. The code stipulates:
“Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life, home, health and correspondence, including digital communications”.
As noble Lords will be aware, we already have a number of remedies in our justice system to redress the balance where individuals feel they have been treated unfairly—
May I ask the Minister a simple question? She used the phrase,
“demonstrably in the public interest”.
What was demonstrably in the public interest in the naming of Sir Cliff Richard for an offence he did not commit, and Leon Brittan, Ted Heath and Paul Gambaccini? What was demonstrably in the public interest in those cases?
My Lords, I will not talk about individual cases, and noble Lords would not expect me to do so. I am talking about the code of practice for the press. I have also just talked about the guidance from the College of Policing. We are committed to an independent press. Noble Lords will already be aware that we have a number of remedies in our justice system to redress the balance where individuals feel they have been treated unfairly by the media and others. This includes resolution through the courts.
In conclusion, and for the reasons I have outlined, I am satisfied that there is an operational need for the police to be able to determine whether to name an individual ahead of charge and that adequate provisions already exist in current legislation and practice to safeguard those accused of a crime without the need for legislating for pre-charge anonymity. I hope that at the end of this rather long debate the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for raising the important issue of the protection of complainants of rape and sexual offences from being questioned about their sexual history. It is vital that victims have confidence to report crimes as terrible as rape and in the criminal justice system’s process of bringing offenders to justice. Our message to those who are willing, but currently worried about reporting such offences, is that they are encouraged to do so. As my noble friend Lord Hailsham says, Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 provides that questions about a complainant’s sexual history are not allowed in rape and sexual offences trials. This is except where a strict set of criteria are met, so they are rare. The legislative bar on adducing evidence of a complainant’s sexual history is high and decided by judges on a case-by-case basis. The case that has prompted concerns about how the protective bar is operating has made no change to that.
We are aware of the recent concern about the admissibility of a complainant’s previous sexual history, and wider perceptions about the law. We accept that the concern should be looked at and we intend to deal with it. We have committed to looking at how the law is working in practice and will do so as expeditiously as possible, to understand whether any further action needs to be taken.
The noble Lord also asked whether anything has followed on from the 2006 Home Office study. The evaluation in 2006 made recommendations to ensure that the intention of the legislation would be fulfilled. There was no finding of a need to change the legislation substantially at that point.
With that brief explanation, I hope the noble Lord feels happy to withdraw his amendment.
Can the Minister be clear from the Dispatch Box as to whether she has announced the review?
My Lords, we have carefully considered the concerns that have been raised about the provision and we will then determine how best to look at how it is working in practice before deciding whether any further action needs to be taken. We are going to do it as soon as possible.
My Lords, the noble Lord ought to be cross-examining himself because he has just secured a concession by excellent advocacy, which I failed to do—or I did, but not in such clear terms. In view of that, I will withdraw the amendment.
I disagree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, on only one point, which was his assertion that I disagreed with him because I said, when speaking to this amendment, that there may be those rare cases where a dispassionate observer might think the exclusion of a relevant account could lead to injustice and unfair convictions. The point here, and the point we seek to have reviewed, is whether, as a result of the Ched Evans case, there might be cases where the restrictive nature of Section 41 has been or may be watered down. We need to look at how it is operating. It is very important that rape gets reported and that the legislation in place is certainly as restrictive as we always thought Section 41 was and as the textbooks say it is. The public concern is that this case seems to have weakened that protection; I am sure the review will take that point on board. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for bringing this forward and drawing attention to what is a very important issue. Exploitation of, and offences against, children, whether online or offline, are appalling and this Government are committed to tackling such criminality very robustly. The internet has opened up a wealth of opportunities for young people, but it has also exposed them to new dangers.
The Government are committed to improving the safety of children online and have a strong track record of working with the internet industry and the charitable sector to achieve it. However, we also recognise that our understanding of the scale and nature of the problem is far from complete, and in many ways we almost feel that we are running to stand still.
Our starting principle is that what is illegal offline is illegal online and criminal offences typically apply in both environments. However, recognising that the picture is less clear in relation to offending online, the annual data requirement on forces includes a requirement to flag offences where the reporting officer believes, on the balance of probability, that the offence was committed, in full or in part, through a computer, computer network or computer-enabled device. This online flag has been mandatory since April 2015, and all 43 forces in England and Wales have provided data since then.
The NCA’s annual strategic assessment of child sexual exploitation and abuse, published in August, found that the visibility of the threat was improving, but that there remained significant intelligence gaps in relation to the overall scale and prevalence of the threat. The NCA works continually to improve our understanding of the threat. I reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that our response to the threat is rightly robust and includes law enforcement agencies taking action against online offenders, developing new capabilities to find and safeguard victims and working with the internet industry to remove illegal images.
For example, all UK police forces and the NCA are now connected to the Child Abuse Image Database—otherwise known as CAID—which reduces the time taken to undertake investigations and identify the victims. A new victim identification suite has been established by the NCA with access to CAID. In 2015-16, UK authorities identified over 450 victims from abuse images, more than double the number of any previous year and, in a recent case, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection command of the NCA was able to use CAID to review one of its largest ever seizures within six weeks. Based on the case size, before CAID this would have taken a minimum of six months to review.
In 2015-16, the NCA received £10 million of additional investment for further specialist teams to tackle online sexual exploitation. This enabled a near doubling of its investigative capacity to tackle child sexual exploitation. An NCA and GCHQ joint operational cell has also been established to target the most technologically sophisticated offenders. In 2015, 2,861 individuals were prosecuted for offences involving indecent images of children—a 27% increase on the previous year.
I hope I have persuaded the noble Lord that we are working to improve our understanding and our response to the threat and that he will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, to add to what I said before, I think that there is a very important role for the Home Office, working in conjunction with the police and many others, on the consistency of the data, to which this amendment refers but perhaps a bit obliquely. It seems to be an issue that comes up time and time again. Yesterday a report was published by ECPAT and Missing People on young people going missing from care and one of the recommendations was about achieving consistency of data.
It might please the noble Baroness to know that I have become the Minister for data and therefore anything that she can feed into the job that I will be doing will be most appreciated.
My Lords, I can sum up my comments really as, “as above”. The points I made on the previous amendments are relevant, although the report I have just mentioned called Heading Back to Harm is particularly relevant here. There are so many associated issues that I would prefer the focus to be on practice—I will add it to my point about data—including trust in authority. In some situations, lack of trust in authority is a big component in young people who have been rescued going missing again. I do not underestimate the importance of the issues at the heart of this. Can the Minister give the Committee any information about the success of child abduction warning notices, where they apply, now, before we seek an extension?
My Lords, Amendment 220 would create a new offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17. The offence would be in addition to the existing offence in Section 49 of the Children Act 1989, which already makes it an offence to abduct a child in care, including those aged 16 and 17. The new offence would also be in addition to Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, which makes it an offence to abduct any child under the age of 16. The new offence would extend only to children aged 16 and 17 who are considered to be vulnerable and therefore in need of additional protection.
The criteria for being considered vulnerable are set out in subsection (2) of the new clause and cover a range of circumstances defined in the Children Act 1989 and Housing Act 1996. These criteria potentially encompass a wide range of individuals and raise concerns that they would have very wide effect. For example, as drafted, the offence would cover all disabled young people of that age. The children it extends to are often in need of services such as housing and education but are not necessarily in need of special protection, as opposed to others of that age.
The Government completely share the objective of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness of ensuring that young people are protected from sexual exploitation and other abuse. That is why, in March last year, we introduced new civil orders to protect the vulnerable and disrupt offending at the earliest opportunity. We believe that providing the right powers to the police is the way forward. Our priority is to prevent offending, so making better use of these orders is a more precisely targeted response than creating a new criminal offence.
As noble Lords will be aware, a similar new clause was tabled in the House of Commons and there have been amendments to previous Bills on this issue. We remain unpersuaded that the proposed new abduction offence is the way forward. Young people aged 16 and 17 are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents and of exercising their free will, notably on sexual matters. As noble Lords have said, we therefore need to achieve the right balance between additional protection for young people in this age group and recognition of relevant rights and responsibilities. Creating a new offence would raise difficult issues about where we draw the line, and it would not help young people who are older than this age group but are also very vulnerable.
That is why we believe that sexual risk orders provide appropriate powers for the police. I do not have the figures or any information on how the child abduction warning list is working; it might be in my pack. I apologise—I am getting quite tired at this stage of the day. I will write to the noble Baroness. The preventive civil orders are relatively new and we will therefore keep under review whether they fully address the kind of predatory behaviour to which the amendment refers.
Turning to Amendment 222, it is very important that we get the right balance in national reporting of data. This Government have already introduced a new mandatory requirement for all forces to collect data on child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation offences as part of the police annual data requirement, and from next April we will be expanding that requirement to include non-crime incidents related to CSE as well. This means that for the first time, we will have all child sexual abuse and exploitation-related crimes and incidents recorded by the police. This will allow for all sexual offences against children to be identified; for example, it was previously not possible to identify obscene publication offences that are specifically related to victims aged under 18.
We are working closely with the police to monitor and review the use of the new sexual risk orders, as well as child abduction warning notices, in order to ensure they are effective in protecting children who are at risk of sexual harm. I think that is precisely the noble Baroness’s point. As child abduction warning notices are part of an administrative process, the police do not regularly record the number issued. This means that, in practice, this amendment would place a significant and disproportionate new burden on the police manually to interrogate their systems.
We agree on the need to do all we can to disrupt predatory behaviour before it causes lasting harm to children and young people. The Government remain unpersuaded that the approach proposed in these amendments is the right way forward. In order better to understand the issues raised and to create an evidence base for the use of existing powers—that is the important thing here—we have set up a working group that will monitor the use of sexual risk orders so that we can fully evaluate whether there are gaps in police powers to disrupt at the earliest opportunity. I expect this group to report to Ministers in the autumn of next year, and we will consider its findings very carefully.
I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, one of the major concerns is that stalking is not used as a charge often enough. It is still too easy to charge with the offence of harassment, rather than stalking. We really need to make sure that the criminal justice system recognises and understands stalking—that was the law reform in 2012 that we worked hard to achieve. However, it is also important to recognise that some cases of stalking are consistently appalling and are also coercive behaviour.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, referred to the case of Emily Maitlis’s stalker who had previous convictions, including breaches of restraining orders in 2008, 2010, 2013, 2014 and earlier this year. I am sorry to say that that is not uncommon behaviour with stalkers and there needs to be the facility for the courts to apply for more serious custodial sentences where orders are consistently breached—not least the way that the stalking and coercive behaviour continues. One of the problems we have heard time and again from victims of domestic violence, stalking and coercive behaviour is the way other courts are used—the civil courts or family courts that do not recognise restraining orders that have been held elsewhere. We heard of information, which had not been passed to the family courts, of one former stalker who had been trying to get in front of his ex-partner through the family courts. It is very necessary to have this limited use but essential tool available for the judiciary.
My Lords, the Government recognise and agree with the noble Lord’s desire to see the unduly lenient sentence scheme extended to enable reviews of sentences for a wider range of offences. The scheme is a valuable way of ensuring that sentences for serious crimes can be challenged when they are considered to be unduly lenient. The Government have a manifesto commitment to extend the scope of the scheme and on 4 October my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced an extension to cover many terrorism offences—including those under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000—that are covered by the noble Lord’s amendment. The extension can be done very straightforwardly by order.
The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to use primary legislation to require the Lord Chancellor to exercise the order-making power she has under Section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to add offences to the scheme. This would add additional complexity to the legislative framework around the scheme and would curtail the Lord Chancellor’s discretion to amend the scheme as provided by the 1988 Act. Under the current provisions, the Lord Chancellor can amend the scope of the scheme by order and the Government can consider more broadly what offences or types of offences are most appropriate for inclusion at any time, as we have announced we will do with terrorism offences. With the reassurance that the Government intend to honour their manifesto commitment, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that response and the recognition that there is a need to act on this. I ask for her confirmation that the statutory instrument system available to the Minister to take the action I referred to is applicable in all the cases listed in the amendment. If she wants to intervene, she can by all means do so.
I was just going to ask whether I could confirm that in writing, because I would not want to give misinformation at the Dispatch Box.
That is fair enough. I accept that. I do not expect any Minister necessarily to carry all the details on their fingertips, but it would be helpful if we had a response on that before Report so that, if it is necessary to take this matter further on Report, there is an opportunity to do so.
The Minister heard the comments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe of Idlicote and Lady Brinton, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on this matter. The feeling is generally shared that there needs to be action, and it is shared by the Government. The question is how it can be done and, perhaps more importantly, when it will be done. If these order-making facilities are available to the Minister, why have they not been used? If they are to be used, when will they be used? If there was a definitive statement in those terms we would be a little happier in withdrawing the amendment. There is an opportunity to come back on Report. I hope that between now and then these angles will be covered, either in correspondence or by other means, so we can be assured that action is not only promised but will be taken in a short timescale to put this right. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for his explanation of these amendments, which call for a review of the criminal law in relation to digital crime. The Government of course share the noble Lord’s concern about online crime, especially where new technologies, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby referred to, are used to abuse, harass or intimidate people.
Amendment 230 seeks to codify the existing criminal law in relation to digital and cybercrime into a single statute. I share the noble Lord’s concerns about online crime, but I do not believe a single statute for digital and cybercrime would be helpful or a good use of resources. Indeed, I am not persuaded that the existing criminal law in this area is defective. As the Committee will be aware, any action that is illegal when committed offline is also illegal if committed online. Current legislation, some of which was passed before the digital age, has shown itself to be flexible and capable of catching and punishing offenders whether their crimes are committed by digital means or otherwise. The majority of the statutes and offences listed in Amendment 230 relate to offences that can be carried out by non-digital and digital means.
Producing a single statute, containing,
“powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime”,
as Amendment 230 suggests, would add further complications to the criminal law by creating new overlapping offences, reproducing and duplicating many existing laws. Furthermore, many existing offences would need to be retained for non-digital offending, so we would end up with parallel offences for crimes committed online and offline.
However, while I am not convinced of the need for a review as suggested here, I assure the noble Lord that where specific gaps in legislation are identified, or where new behaviours that should be criminalised are brought to light, we will continue to take action. The Government’s record has shown that we will and do legislate when we need to, such as passing the Serious Crime Act 2016, which further strengthened the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
Amendment 231 would require the Home Office to ensure funding is made available to every police force to train their officers in how to investigate digital crime and abuse. Mainstream cybercrime training is already available to police officers and while I have sympathy with the underlying objective of the noble Lord’s amendment, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to require police forces to provide such training. Furthermore, subsection (2) of the proposed new clause, requiring all police forces to record complaints of digital crime and abuse and their outcomes, is unnecessary as I can assure the noble Lord that work in this area is already under way.
From 2015, police-recorded crime data collection also includes a mandatory online flag that allows police forces to record online instances of crimes, including stalking and harassment, whether the crime took place wholly online or just had an online element to it. The Office for National Statistics published these data, for the first time, as experimental statistics in July. We welcome the continuing improvement in the statistics on reported fraud and cybercrime that better reflect the extent of the problem. Having an accurate picture is vital to informing the most appropriate response to these crimes. It is important that police forces be able to respond to changing technologies, and we recognise the need to support forces to invest in the capabilities they need. However, the training of police officers is an operational matter and critically, it is the police themselves who can best determine what their training needs are.
Amendment 231A seeks to create an array of new offences relating to digital surveillance and monitoring, presumably to address issues such as online harassment and stalking. The Government are absolutely clear that abusive and threatening behaviour is totally unacceptable in any form, online or offline. Existing legislation in the form of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 includes the offences of stalking, harassment and putting people in fear of violence, and applies to offences committed online.
In 2015-16, almost 13,000 prosecutions were commenced for harassment and stalking offences—a rise of 864 offences from 2014-15 and the highest volume ever recorded. The Government have strengthened the law on stalking: an insidious crime that can involve a wide range of behaviours, which may include the misuse of digital equipment, spyware and social media. There is no exhaustive list of behaviours relating to stalking, but recognising the ongoing pattern of fixated, obsessive behaviour is really important in tackling stalking.
New stalking offences were introduced in 2012. They are stopping people living in fear and preventing escalation to more serious violence. In 2015-16, more than 1,100 prosecutions were commenced under the new stalking legislation. Our recent consultation on the introduction of a new civil stalking protection order demonstrates our determination to support victims of stalking at an earlier stage and address the behaviour of perpetrators before it becomes entrenched. This draws on our successful roll-out of other civil orders, such as FGM protection orders, domestic violence protection orders and sexual risk orders.
I am sorry to have gone on somewhat, but I hope the noble Lord recognises that the Government keep the criminal law in this area under review and that police forces are alive to the need to have the capabilities to tackle such crime. I hope the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his support. I know the interest that the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, has taken in these matters. She had to leave before this debate but she has been one of the leading people in questions of cybercrime and associated matters.
At this time of night, I hate to be fractious with the Minister but I am afraid that what came over was complacency. There is an avalanche of cybercrime and associated dangers flooding the country. The police and other authorities do not have adequate resources, training or back-up to handle it. Unless action is taken to a much greater extent than it is now, this will overwhelm us. I urge the Minister, although she cannot agree with my amendment, to take back to the department the very serious worry that is represented by these amendments, to see what can be done to speed up action and provide more resources to enable those who have the responsibility of bringing perpetrators to justice to do that and not feel that they are fighting a losing battle. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.