Deregulation Bill

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Oppenheim-Barnes (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly in support of Amendment 53. I am holding in my hand a piece of paper received by somebody very close to me regarding a parking contravention on 30 December 2014. It was received for the first time this morning. It says that the notice was issued on 15 January and that the penalty needs to be paid. However, it had been sent in the post and was not received, and neither was the first notice received. As a result, the fine is now £200.

It would be quite wrong for me to use the Floor of your Lordships’ House to make a complaint on my own behalf were it not for the fact that so many people have complained about this sort of thing happening and because I happen to know, and have heard the Secretary of State say, that this is an important issue of human rights as far as photography of people or cars in relation to parking contraventions is concerned. It is already the law, certainly in the state of California in the United States, that such photography is a breach of human rights. I hope that my noble friend will be able to reassure me on this point. Incidentally, the person concerned was me.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as regards the use of CCTV generally in parking enforcement, it is clear that the operational guidance on parking issued by the previous Government in 2004—that is, that CCTV should be used only where parking warden enforcement is impractical—has been largely ignored. It is now used on an industrial scale. For people such as my noble friend Lady Oppenheim-Barnes to be issued with a penalty charge way after the event is simply unfair. Independent parking adjudicators have also agreed that it is unfair. Such practices also undermine the revitalisation of high streets and shops and cross the line of public acceptability. If parking is too expensive or prohibitive, shoppers will drive to out-of-town supermarkets or simply shop online, leading to ghost-town high streets.

The point was raised about exempting the zig-zag lines on a pedestrian crossing as opposed to those outside a school. High streets, where pedestrian crossings are generally situated, are well patrolled by both police and enforcement officers. In any event, parking on a zig-zag line is not just a breach of parking regulations but incurs three points on your licence. That is why, in terms of differentiating between schools and high streets, the safety issue outside schools led the Government to think that the latter case was a suitable exception.

The first amendment in this group concerns the serving of parking tickets. There may be occasions where it is impossible for a civil enforcement officer to physically stick a ticket on to a vehicle or serve a notice at the scene of the incident. The Government are aware of this and have made provision in draft regulations to ensure that service by post is possible in such circumstances. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw that amendment.

Noble Lords are also seeking to increase the number of areas where local authorities can continue to use CCTV to enable the issuing of tickets by post. I have given a couple of examples of where the Government have made exemptions, or indeed where they have not. I think that noble Lords and all interested parties will have their own views on where CCTV should or should not be used. The Government accept that sole reliance on CCTV evidence to enforce on-street parking regulations is suitable in certain circumstances. However, if we accepted every argument for increasing the exemptions, we would be back where we started. We have given careful consideration to the list of exemptions and based our decisions on the views of those who responded to the consultation, one being on the issue of the safety of children outside schools.

The noble Lord also offers a new definition of the term “around schools”. This definition would be neither appropriate nor practical. The 100 metres specified in the amendment, or any specified distance, would be arbitrary. Within that distance, it is likely that roads will bend or side roads will branch off the school road. It is unclear how this will be dealt with. Any definition needs to be practical as well as reflect policy concerns.

Amendment 56 would make these powers subject to impact assessments before they were brought into force, which is both unnecessary and undesirable. The Government are proud of the stance they have taken to reduce the impact of rules and regulations on businesses and policymakers. Government guidance published in 2013 clearly states that impact assessments are required only for measures that regulate or deregulate business or concern the regulation of business. This clause applies only to local authorities that carry out parking enforcement, and no impact assessments are therefore required.

This whole issue is a matter of principle for the Government, not of balancing impacts. Drivers often receive a parking ticket through the post several weeks after the alleged contravention. They are given no opportunity to examine the parking location at the time the incident is alleged to have taken place, thereby making it difficult to challenge the alleged contravention. That is fundamentally unfair, and the Government strongly believe it should be remedied. I urge noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply and thank other noble Lords who have participated in this debate. Given the hour, I shall not prolong the matter, except to say that I am still unclear as to which of proposed paragraphs (a) to (g) in Amendment 54 the Government support and which they do not. I acknowledge that my description regarding the inclusion of CCTV around schools perhaps needs to be refined, but the principle holds.

The impact assessment was not the issue. It was that parking enforcement may be a responsibility of local authorities but in many instances it is contracted to the private sector—hence the list that the noble Lord, Lord Tope, referred to. I thought that the Minister said that the issue of whether there should be an equalities impact assessment was a matter of principle for the Government. I am not sure that I heard her correctly, but it would be a rather strange explanation if she did so. I remain unclear as to why an equalities impact assessment is not to be forthcoming. However, given the hour, perhaps we should read the record and follow up in correspondence. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we must all be aware of the dangers and inconvenience of parking on pavements and the risk that this can pose for pedestrians. These risks can be especially acute for those with a sight impairment or those who have a mobility difficulty and rely on using wheelchairs or buggies. The problems are compounded, too, for those who have responsibility for children and who try to navigate the pavements with prams. The consequence is that all too often pedestrians are forced to navigate busy and dangerous roads instead. For some, of course, pavement parking can restrict their right of way completely. As the noble Lord, Lord Low, said, we need to be mindful that pavements are not generally constructed to carry the weight of heavy vehicles and pavement parking can cause the break-up of the surface, adding further hazards, even when the offending vehicles are not present. This amendment seeks to address those concerns outside London by making it an offence to park wholly or partly on a verge, footway or any other part of an urban road. But this blanket ban can be overridden by resolution of the highway authority or by the Secretary of State.

We acknowledge the weight of opinion and the power of the argument which supports this approach. We share the need to address inconsiderate and dangerous parking and to seek to restore to pedestrians their right to proceed unimpeded. But at the same time, we have to recognise that there are some streets where some pavement parking may be inevitable—to maintain the free flow of traffic, to allow loading and unloading, or to allow for vulnerable passengers to be disembarked. Moreover, the premise of the amendment is that all people who park their car on the pavement are doing the wrong thing and should be made guilty of a civil offence. We do not accept that.

If we are to redress the balance and tackle the problem of inconsiderate pavement parking, how is this best achieved? We need to work through how it can be delivered in practice. We are keen to empower councils to tackle problem parking. If there are any barriers or bureaucracy preventing this we would be keen to look at ways we can change the legislation so that that is not the case. We do not think that the blanket ban is the best way to go. We consider that individual authorities, which know their areas best, are better able to determine the extent and timing of any ban. For some, an initial blanket ban may be the immediate answer, but others may want something more selective which addresses the most urgent problems first. In some cases, there will need to be liaison between authorities so that approaches are co-ordinated. We support the thrust of what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve, but we think there is another approach so, with regret, we are not able to support him today.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on the amendment. It demonstrates that there is no perfect system to allow traffic and pedestrians to move around entirely satisfactorily.

I shall start with the points made about London. Pavement parking in London is banned but people still do it. Enforcement of properly targeted local bans outside London would be more effective than a blanket ban that does not reflect local circumstances. On the more general points, local authorities already have the power to introduce footway parking restrictions where they consider it appropriate. They are in the best position to decide on local parking restrictions and need to consider all road users when taking such decisions. A national ban of the type proposed would require local authorities to remove all existing restrictions, then renew their urban areas where footway parking should nevertheless still be permitted, consult the community and erect new signage and markings. There could be a significant burden on local government.

The amendment proposes banning footway parking but would allow authorities to permit it where it is desired by simple resolution. Circumvention of the traffic regulation order—TRO—process would take away important protection for the public. The statutory TRO process requires authorities to undertake consultation and advertise their proposals before councils take final decisions. A noble Lord made the point about the TRO process being expensive and cumbersome. It is not true to say that the process is a barrier. Some local authorities make up to 200 orders a year for a variety of traffic management purposes with an average authority making between 50 and 60 orders per year.

The Department for Transport’s guidance to local authorities makes it clear that during the appraisal of their parking policies an authority should consider whether pavement parking is problematic in any part of that area. If it is, and it is not covered by an existing traffic regulation order, the authority should consider amending the existing order or making a new one. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, wrote to all English traffic authorities on 27 June to remind them of their existing wide-ranging powers to prevent people parking on the pavement where it is a problem.

The noble Lord, Lord Low, made a point about damage to pavements. The Government are committed to investing in our local highways, including the footways. We are providing local authorities in England with more than £3 billion over four years from 2011-15 for the roads and footways for which they are responsible. In addition, in June 2014, the Government announced that they were committed to providing just under £6 billion for local highways maintenance over the six-year period from April 2015 to March 2021. This equates to £976 million per year to local authorities for highway maintenance.

In conclusion, the Government have concerns about the burden on local authorities of managing a change of this scale, a point to which the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, alluded, especially when those authorities have comprehensive powers to ban footway parking. I have undertaken to have a discussion with the noble Lord, Lord Low, before Third Reading but I would at this stage ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her reply and to all noble Lords who have spoken, in some cases with very telling illustrations of the workability of the amendment. It certainly is not the belief of those who support this amendment that all pavement parkers are behaving anti-socially. The amendment’s inclusion of scope for local discretion to exempt specific areas from the general ban recognises that. I am sure that with good will we can find a formula which caters for the concerns both of those putting forward the amendment and the concerns which have been expressed about the erosion of local discretion. In response to the Minister’s indication that she is happy to have a discussion before Third Reading, at which I hope we can work together to find that formula, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we support this amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I should make it clear right from the outset that the measure in this Bill is about on-street parking, which is the preserve of local authorities. The issue of ANPR is totally separate and the Government are not going to regulate companies in a Bill that seeks to deregulate.

The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to introduce a new clause which would ensure that measures in the Traffic Management Act 2004 do not prevent local authorities from using an approved device in their off-street car parks. The amendment would apply to the entire Traffic Management Act. The Traffic Management Act sets out the framework for local traffic authorities to manage all aspects of their parking policies. To disapply the entire Act in relation to car parks would create an impossible situation where the legislation that prescribes how local authorities should operate is undermined by itself.

I think that the noble Lord may in fact be concerned about the specific measures in Clause 39 and is apprehensive that these will be extended to local authority off-street car parks. I can assure him again that the measures in this Bill apply only to on-street parking. The Government are not seeking to extend these provisions to off-street parking and have no plans to do so. It would be unnecessary to set out in primary legislation policy areas that the law should not apply to.

Permitting local authorities to manage their off-street car parks with camera technology is something that I know some organisations are keen to see happen. However, the Government have not set out their position on this. We have brought forward a range of parking measures designed to help local shops, support drivers and give communities a greater say on parking policies. These proposals have been established for 18 months and have been consulted on. At no point have we indicated any intention to legislate on off-street car parks.

To bring into the Bill at this late stage measures on a different aspect of parking policy would not give sufficient opportunity for people to consider their implications or to offer an opinion. We believe that this is something on which we should consult before any changes are made to the law, and I would urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Tope]

Well, my Lords, I take it that that is a no. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his support, and who knows, in the months to come he may have an opportunity to indicate that.

I am rather disappointed with the reply from the Minister, who perhaps in part through her briefing has not wholly understood the points being made here. I note her point about the impact on businesses, but that did not seem to matter on the previous amendment when we actually had a letter from 11 businesses talking about the impact it would have on them. However, I will of course beg leave to withdraw the amendment and I will consider the issue further.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, it is my responsibility to respond for the Opposition Front Bench on this issue. In order to save time, I carefully studied the debate in Committee. Having listened to my noble friend Lord Prescott, we continue to support his position.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, for his enormous patience here this evening. He had to listen to several debates on parking before we came to his issue. I think that the Minister who should have responded to him might have been a woman—

[Lord Prescott]

It was not.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It was not—okay, I stand corrected. I hope he will not be too disappointed by my response.

The purpose of this clause is very straightforward. It is to give the Secretary of State discretion in whether to reopen a formal investigation into a marine accident when new and important evidence that was not available at the time of the original investigation becomes known. Given the wide-ranging discussion that we have had, perhaps it is worth setting the clause in its broader context to dispel any fears that it will adversely affect maritime safety. That is obviously the prime concern of the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, as he said at the beginning of his speech.

Prior to 1989, if there was a marine accident, the Secretary of State could choose to order a preliminary inquiry and, whether or not a preliminary inquiry was held, to order a formal investigation. The latter was a kind of public inquiry, and as well as seeking to identify why an accident had occurred and how to improve safety at sea, it could also apportion liability and blame, and impose penalties on those at fault. Whereas the Secretary of State had the discretion to decide whether to order a formal investigation, he was obliged to reopen a formal investigation if either of the following was the case: if new and important evidence that was not available at the time of the original investigation became known; or if there appeared to be grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice.

These arrangements had been in place under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 and were largely re-enacted in the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. However, by the time of the 1995 Act, the normal arrangements for investigating marine accidents had changed considerably. In July 1989, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch was established. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch is functionally independent of the Department for Transport. This removes the conflict of interest identified in the “Herald of Free Enterprise” formal investigation, which was that the department had been both the regulator and investigator for the maritime industry.

All marine accidents must be reported to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch and although it must investigate the most serious of these, the chief inspector has the discretion to investigate others too. Virtually all shipping accidents investigated since 1989 have had only a Marine Accident Investigation Branch safety investigation. The entirely separate formal investigation process remains available should it be deemed necessary. Since 1989, it has been used only twice, once being the formal investigation into the “Marchioness” disaster, called by the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, in February 2000, as he has told us. Because of the near-universal reliance on the highly regarded Marine Accident Investigation Branch investigation process, when the need to reopen a formal investigation has arisen, the accidents concerned have been increasingly historic.

Three reopened formal investigations have been called since 1997. The first concerned the “Derbyshire”. Twenty years had elapsed since the loss of the ship when its report was published. In the most recent case, that of the “Trident”, 35 years had passed. As there have been so few formal investigations in recent years, any reopened now would be about an accident that occurred at least a quarter of a century ago. In fact, the likelihood is that that any new and important evidence that might be found today would relate to an accident of 50 years ago or more.

Over that time, the design of ships and their equipment, and industry crewing and operating practices, are likely to have changed significantly. The chances of there being any relevant lessons to learn for the benefit of today’s seafarer would be much reduced. Again, considering the reopened formal investigations since 1997, the “Derbyshire” report made 24 safety recommendations and the “Trident” just one. Given the changes that have taken place in how we investigate marine accidents, the duty to reopen a formal investigation when new and important evidence is found is simply much less relevant to maritime safety than it was when it was on the statute book in 1894. For the vast majority of accidents, the exemplary work of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch—identifying the causes of accidents and issuing recommendations without fear or favour—ensures the future safety of mariners and the protection of the marine environment.

Clause 41 has absolutely no bearing on these Marine Accident Investigation Branch safety investigations or whether their findings should be reviewed if new evidence is found. For exceptional cases, where a thorough public airing and examination of the facts is needed, it is right that the public inquiry-style process provided by formal investigations and reopened formal investigations remains available for Secretaries of State to use. It will remain available under Clause 41. Indeed, I reiterate the position of Her Majesty’s Government that if similar circumstances as applied in the case of the “Derbyshire” arose again, we would strongly expect to reopen the investigation. Clause 41 simply enables the Secretary of State to take a considered view on the likely benefits of reopening a formal investigation in circumstances where new evidence comes to light, just as she has discretion in whether to open a formal investigation in the first place. On that note, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.