Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Williams of Crosby and Lord Faulks

Monday 10th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Crosby (LD)]

My Lords, I will make a brief intervention. I very much commend the amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. Quite simply, the position of 17 year-olds has changed radically since 1984. The proportion of young people staying on in education to 18 or beyond has almost doubled in that time, and many young people continue within their family structures until the age of 18, which was not so much the case in 1984. So it is important that the Government look at this. Schools continue to have responsibility for young people who are at school until the age of 18. It would therefore be rather bitter if that responsibility was recognised as continuing while people are at school, but then ending when they cease to be at school.

There is some very disturbing information about the number of young people who commit self-harm when in detention, as a result, for example, of very serious mental health problems. Without detaining the House of Lords further, it is worth looking at whether the age of 18 is not a more natural bridge to a young person becoming a fully responsible adult than the present age of 17. It might do something to reduce the suffering that some of these young people undergo in detention.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, both in Committee and on Report, there was agreement around the House that this amendment had a great deal to recommend it. It follows the tragic cases of three 17 year-olds who committed suicide following their encounters with the police, to which the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has referred this afternoon. Their families are determined that no other parents should suffer such a loss, and want to see a change in the law so that 17 year-olds are treated as children. I pay particular tribute to the noble Earl for his continued commitment to improving the welfare of young people, and for helping to keep this important issue at the top of the Government’s agenda.

Despite recognising the merit of this amendment, the Government resisted it both in Committee and on Report as they were still reviewing all the remaining pieces of primary legislation which treat 17 year-olds as adults. That review was proactively launched following the High Court’s decision in the case of Hughes Cousins-Chang. That the review was launched is testament to the commitment of the Government to ensuring that young people are protected and treated appropriately while in police custody, ensuring that 17 year-olds have the protection to which they are entitled. My noble friend Lady Williams makes an important point about how 17 year-olds have changed in many ways.

Seventeen year-olds who come into contact with the police are afforded important safeguards by Section 11 of the Children Act 2004. This places the police under an obligation to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when exercising their functions, and means that the police have to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of 17 year-olds. Additionally, following the amendments to PACE codes of practice C and H as a result of the Hughes Cousins-Chang ruling, children aged under 18 have access to appropriate adults at the police station, whose function is to support them throughout interviews and during procedures such as the taking of fingerprints and samples. A parent or legal guardian must also be informed of their detention. Indeed, it is common for a parent to perform the role of appropriate adult for their child.

On Report, the noble Earl welcomed the news of the internal review. He directly asked the Government if something could be done in this area by Third Reading, although he caveated that by saying, effectively, that he realised that such a change would be unlikely. However I am pleased to inform the House that the Government have listened to his plea and the passionate collective voice of the families of loved ones who are tragically no longer with us. The Government have now concluded their review and have arrived at a very clear conclusion: the provisions in PACE that relate to the treatment of 17 year-olds should be amended as soon as possible so that they are treated as children.

I must point out that this is a very complex area and the Home Office review was very wide-ranging—more so than the amendment that has been tabled today. This means that the amendment only partially affects the change in relation to the treatment of 17 year-olds. However, in the limited time available, this amendment makes the most substantial change, that relating to the overnight detention of children charged and denied bail. The effect of the amendment would be that 17 year-olds, as with 12 to 16 year-old children, must be transferred to suitable local authority accommodation overnight in these circumstances. The amendment has the full backing of the police. The Home Office will work with forces to help them prepare for implementation.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked a question that is perhaps not entirely related to this amendment but he was kind enough to give the Government notice of it. As I understand it, it concerns those acquitted after a trial, whereas the focus of the amendment to which he referred is victims and witnesses. Indeed, a number of statutory protections within the criminal justice system are applicable only to victims and witnesses. The position with an acquitted defendant is that the court retains its inherent powers to order reporting restrictions in the case of defendants where that is necessary to ensure that the administration of justice would not be seriously affected. It has that right. Of course, up to the age of 18 defendants will continue to be subject to the youth reporting restrictions that apply automatically in the youth court and may be applied in other court proceedings. That is the position.

Returning to this amendment and in conclusion, this Government share all noble Lords’ desire to ensure that children are always treated appropriately, including where they are suspected of wrongdoing. If how we treat our prisoners is a measure of how civilised a society is, this must surely apply to how we treat our children when they are in trouble and at their most vulnerable. Therefore, I trust that I have noble Lords’ support in the Government’s decision to seize the opportunity afforded by the Bill and accept the noble Earl’s amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Williams of Crosby and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Nobody knows more directly and more at first hand than he exactly of what he is speaking, given his long and distinguished service in Northern Ireland in several capacities.

A second example that I know about, because I was living there at the time, was that the dreadful atrocity of 9/11 produced a great wave of attempts to introduce more security legislation in the United States. After a while this included a certain disregard for some of the crucial rights of human beings there. American citizens found time and again, understandably given the terrible effects of 9/11, that their fundamental rights began to be disregarded in the interests of security. It was an extraordinarily difficult balance that to this day United States jurists feel strongly has gone against the basic liberties of the human being.

The third example is ourselves. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, spoke movingly about his son and the dog across the street from No. 10 Downing Street. I might add that the Olympics are getting almost completely out of hand in the interests of what one might describe as an obsessive view about security. We go back to rather a trivial example. Yesterday I was in Trafalgar Square with my grandson. We went to see the famous Olympic clock that shows how many hours, minutes and seconds are left before the opening of the Olympic proceedings. However, in order to see the clock, which was approximately 40 yards into the square on a gloomy, wet evening, we had to pass no fewer than six security guards, and no fewer than three detailed and closely networked railings, which were impossible to pass, so we had to go round them in several directions to get anywhere. It took us about 20 minutes to cross Trafalgar Square, being asked all the way whether we had passports, what we were doing there and why, and other things like that. I am a great believer in creating job opportunities for young people, but I cannot help thinking that maybe a job working on, let us say, the refurbishment of older housing might be more constructive than sitting in Trafalgar Square stopping ordinary citizens like me from crossing it.

I am sorry to put it so strongly, but we are becoming obsessive on this issue. We are getting the balance badly wrong. This Bill is critical for the future of our liberties in this country and for the attitudes to justice of ordinary people whose support for that justice is critical in a democracy; there is no substitute for civic support for the rule of law. I plead with my noble friends on the Front Bench that they look closely at Amendments 58 and 59, which at least enable the judges in this country to restore a reasonable balance to the clear needs of national security, which I do not deny and which the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has put extremely well in this debate, recognising that there are two things to be balanced and not one thing to sweep away. I plead with my noble friend to consider accepting these amendments, because they are a crucial safeguard for the liberties of this country and which this Bill ought to include.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Baroness and I am sorry to bring an end to this welcome interval from lawyers and to return briefly to the dry legalities of the Bill. The question in this Bill of who decides national security has troubled me. Clause 6 seems to suggest that the judge has some role in deciding it. Amendment 59 suggests that an exercise should be performed by the judge in which he or she can assess, by balancing the various processes—presumably roughly in accordance with the ex parte Wiley approach—which should come first, the interests of justice or national security.