Renters’ Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Thornhill and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I make a number of observations. First, I sympathise with the observations made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, about the conduct of those she identifies as criminal landlords. But before someone should be stigmatised and identified as a criminal, they should be guilty of an offence that leads to them being stigmatised as a criminal. That should not be done on a balance of probabilities.

The relevant standard of proof in regard to criminality is “beyond reasonable doubt”. Indeed, where there is uncertainty about whether conduct is civil or criminal—a point brought up by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell—it is important to ensure either that you can make that clear distinction, or that you understand that the relevant standard of proof must be that which is fair to both parties.

I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, when she suggests that, where it is difficult to prove a case, you should reduce the burden of proof. The consequences of that, if developed, are very wide-ranging indeed. We know that there are many areas of criminal prosecution where it is extremely difficult to secure a conviction, but no one would suggest that it is appropriate in these circumstances simply to reduce the burden of proof.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

Given that we are not talking about criminal offences—we are talking about civil offences—and given the power imbalance between a landlord and a tenant, will the noble and learned Lord at least accept that by lowering the burden of proof we would allow the tenant to feel that they might have a voice and could possibly bring something? Otherwise, his amendment is, in effect, saying, “Well, just don’t bother. The burden of proof is too high, so please carry on with your poor behaviour”. This is civil conduct and behaviour.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I do not accept the proposition advanced by the noble Baroness at all. In circumstances where you are going to stigmatise somebody’s conduct as criminal, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, pointed out, it is appropriate that there should be a relevant standard of proof. You are not taking away anyone’s voice in that context.

I come on briefly to deal with the helpful contributions from the Minister and in particular welcome her observation that inconsistency in legislation undermines a regime’s credibility. That is very much in point here, because I cannot accept as accurate her suggestion that you can distinguish the provisions in Clauses 41 and 58 from later provisions of the Bill on the basis that the latter lead to greater jeopardy and, as she put it, could result in a criminal offence. I merely remind noble Lords of what Clauses 67 and 92 actually say. Clause 67 says:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has … breached regulations under section 65(1)”—


that is not a criminal offence; it is a breach of civil regulations. Clause 92 says:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has … breached a requirement imposed by section 83(1), (2) or (3)”.


That is not a criminal offence. Again, what is being underlined here is the very point that the Minister wanted to avoid: the inconsistency in the legislation which is liable to undermine the regime’s credibility. It appears to me that there is a need, if nothing else, for consistency with regard to the obligations imposed by this series of provisions and regulations. I would therefore move to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 87.