(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI shall speak to Amendment 281C. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, for her introduction and support for that amendment. It is one of two amendments which I have tabled to give effect to recommendations by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, seeking to promote the principle of legal certainty. The problem which concerned the committee in this case relates to the width of the power in the new Section 196E, introduced by Clause 113.
The Explanatory Notes say that the position at the moment about decisions
“to take enforcement action in response to breaches of planning control is at the discretion of the local planning authority”.
New Section 196E seeks to give power to the Secretary of State to provide relief from enforcement and planning conditions in a particular way, by providing that a local planning authority
“may not take … relevant enforcement measures”
or is subject to particular restrictions as to whether it should take that step.
The reason given in the Explanatory Notes is really a bit of history. In the difficult circumstances that arose as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, with a later acute shortage of heavy goods vehicles,
“local planning authorities have been encouraged to be flexible in terms of enforcement action of non-compliance with conditions imposed on grants of planning permission which govern construction working hours and delivery hours”.
Those are the kind of conditions put forward to protect the environment of local residents, and so on—and, obviously, when they are imposed, they are imposed for a very good reason. But the Covid-19 situation, with the acute shortage of heavy goods vehicles, made it desirable that these hours should be extended, instead of being restricted to hours that would not interfere with people’s sleep, or whatever else it would be. There was a good reason for being more flexible and allowing the hours to be extended.
That is the background to the step being taken here, but the Constitution Committee’s concern was about the width of the power being sought under new Section 196E. The section is carefully drafted, because it says that what the Secretary of State may do by regulations is to give direct attention to
“relevant enforcement measures in relation to any actual or apparent failure to comply with a relevant planning condition”.
Those expressions, “relevant enforcement measures” and “relevant planning condition”, are carefully defined in this new section and are wide in their scope. “Enforcement measures” includes all the powers that one might expect—the powers to apply for enforcement orders, injunctions and entry without a warrant, and so on, to see what is going on, and to deal with issues about planning contravention notices, temporary stop notices, enforcement notices, warning notices and so on.
The new section is very carefully drafted. What it does not do is contain any kind of limit on the extent to which the power might be used, which is why the Constitution Committee, in its report, said that it was concerned by the breadth of the power and recommended that the clause should be amended to ensure that the power was limited to
“emergency situations or other forms of serious disruption”,
following the example set out in the Explanatory Notes. My amendment provides simply that the power may be exercised only
“in the event of an emergency or other form of serious disruption which makes it necessary for the local planning authority to be provided with this relief”.
As I said, the background is that, in any case at the moment, the local authority has a discretion as to how far it should go in dealing with breaches of planning conditions, but the power is actually giving directions. Therefore it is necessary, in the interests of legal certainty, that the scope of the power should be limited along the lines that my amendment suggests.
My Lords, this is a really interesting group of amendments and clearly very technical and detailed. The Minister may be relieved that I shall keep my comments quite simple, to address certain principles.
Clause 107 represents a radical change. There is quite a difference between four years and 10 years, which will apply to all forms of unauthorised development. As has already been said by the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, the Explanatory Notes do not actually give any rationale for the actual number of years. Is it a proposal following consultation of some sort, or just a figure between four and 10—in which case, may I suggest six? I would be interested to know how it was arrived at.
I am also interested in the Minister’s response to the noble Earl’s Amendments 278 and 279 on transition and consultation, which both seem reasonable and sensible, given that this is a significant time change, with consequences following from the scale of the change.
I agree that there is definitely some sense in bringing about a single limitation period, beyond which all such development is lawful, to put an end to the fraught arguments and confusion of what applies to which and when and why. Such confusions, in my experience, come from all parties—council officers, definitely residents and even on occasion legal representatives. It is not straightforward. When is a garage not a garage? What is a garage? I remember that one vividly.
Amendment 276 in the name of the noble Earls seeks to retain the four-year rule where a breach—I am choosing my words very carefully—involves a place where people live. From my urban experience, I have seen too many “beds in sheds” where, at worst, people are living in conditions not fit for animals and at best, they are massively overcrowded with inadequate facilities. Nobody should get away with exploiting vulnerable people, who are living in those conditions because they are desperate, just because the breach was reported only after four years and one day.
On Amendments 275 and 277 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, I seek clarification from the Minister and I accept that I may have got this wrong. Given that I agree with many of the noble Baroness’s amendments and her way of thinking about the Bill, I am, in a sense, sense checking. As I read it, the Government’s intention in this clause is to give local planning authorities a considerably longer timeframe—some might say too long—to intervene in a breach of unlawful planning that has been brought to their attention. I would say that was a good thing from the point of view of the local authority, affected residents and communities. Therefore, would her two amendments, if passed, mean that despite the breach having
“a significant impact on the local environment”,
the noble Baroness is seeking to reduce the time that residents have to notice it and their council to respond? It is the time to enforce and not the time to comply with enforcement: that is my understanding. Perhaps the Minister can clarify that and put me right.
Amendments 281 and 281A in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Taylor and Lady Hayman, deal with council finances. The situation was described well, so I do not need to repeat that, but what I will say is that enforcement is a very important service. We all want and need more effective enforcement. Poor enforcement across a whole council can undermine all our efforts to improve the place we live in. Enforcement is a big signal to residents that their council cares about what goes on in their areas and will do something about it. Over the years, I found it was a trust issue with residents, about “Whose side are you on?” Helpless cries of, “Well, it’s outside the four-year period” cut no ice.
The harsh reality, particularly in district councils, is that, increasingly, councils are responding only to breaches that are brought to their attention, rather than proactively going out looking for them, which I think is something we all think they should do and which should cut across a wide range of council functions. The reality is that, due to the reduction of available funding and a decline in the number of skilled staff over many years, that is not happening. Capacity and capability is an issue here too. The real skill in enforcement work is to bring about compliance without the need to serve notices and go to court, with all the additional cost and time that that incurs, in order to perhaps get a paltry fine. In my experience, most council officers will seek not to do the sorts of things that the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, mentioned; they actually work very hard to take proportionate and flexible actions with minor infringements.
On Amendment 281B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, about social housing, we all know that of all the current Section 106 obligations that developers try to wheedle out of, social housing is their number one target. Reducing the wriggle room and strengthening this obligation is surely a good thing. We have several ex-council leaders in the Chamber who will all have experienced occasions when a developer has found it more cost effective to breach the rules and pay the fine. Chopping down trees covered by tree preservation orders is a regular example that springs to mind. We are all battle scarred, hence our cynicism regarding some developers and the desire to recover full costs, as in our earlier debate.