(9 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberIndeed. It is an incredibly malign force, but we are not prepared to describe it as such, not only because of the historic reason that at one stage we thought Russia could become a partner, but because we now feel there is nothing we can do owing to its size and perceived power. Our debate about the 2%, what it means and how we respond has to go much deeper and address the roots of the issue.
In idle moments over the past few weeks I have been reading a biography of George I. Interestingly, it says that when George I took the throne 300 years ago the Great Britain of which he became ruler was one of the great European powers and intimately involved with the continent, and its island position rendered it immune to invasion. It was assertive and knew that it could strike its own bargains in Europe—it did not need anybody else’s permission. There was also a big divide whereby the Tories advocated concentration on seaward expansion to the West Indians, while the Whigs thought that we should go into mainland Europe.
It is so good to have a second Lib Dem here so that we can get some commitment for a nuclear deterrent, although the hon. Gentleman is not going to be here for much longer.
Essentially, we were able, even at that stage, to define what we thought Britain’s role in the world was. We had a strategy that allowed us to say what our foreign expansion and defence should be like.
How will the Great Britain that the next Prime Minister takes over on 8 May be described in 300 years? I think the answer will be that it was a country that had more seats than any other country at international tables and that is was a member of the P5 at the UN, and of the European Community and the Commonwealth, but that it did not know what to do. It kind of still wanted to project power, but it could not make up its mind whether it was a greater Denmark or still a serious member of the P5. It was singularly incapable of defining which threats it was meant to meet. It could not make up its mind whether its foreign policy was a 19th-century-type mercantile protecting of trade routes, or whether it should at times be a necessarily aggressive force for good. It took its allies for granted, particularly the United States of America, and it would host huge summits in which it would lecture other countries and the rest of the NATO members that they should not drop the 2% target.
What are we doing now? The Government sit here complacently and Ministers feel not the slightest bit ashamed that they do not stand at the Dispatch Box and say, “We are still complying with our commitment to 2%, as we said we would in Wales and as we urged other countries to do.”
Americans once referred to Great Britain as “no good, crummy allies.” It is absolutely right that the arbitrary figure of 2% not only says to the rest of the world, Putin and any other putative Putin that we are serious, but tells our allies, “We are reliable. We will stick to what we have said we will do and we expect exactly the same from you.” We cannot go on criticising the United States of America and telling them, “You guys just keep trotting around the world being its policeman,” but then, when they are no longer there, say, “Where are they?” If we want to be the grown-up country we have been for a very long time—a country that sits with a veto at the P5 and a nuclear power—we have to be absolutely clear about the role we wish to play in the world.
When the Prime Minister elected on 8 May—I hope it will be my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband)—commissions the strategic defence review, it will have to start by addressing our role, what we wish to do and what the financial commitments will be. One thing is for sure: the 2% will be the absolute minimum. It will probably not be enough, but it would be shameful if this House did not continue to press for us to stick to our commitments and to those we expect of others. Rather than being a no good, crummy ally, we should be reliable, effective and clear in our purpose.