(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to say it is beyond argument that this is an important Bill. In my professional career, I dealt with many cases of child abuse. I practised at the criminal Bar, not the family Bar. Fortunately, sitting as a recorder, I did not have to try or sentence anyone convicted of child abuse.
It is important to get the legislation right. At my first reading, I thought the Bill was sufficiently comprehensive to deal with any wrongdoing. The steps in the ladder are clear: first, the relationship is set out in Clause 1(2); then we go on to the type of relationship, supplemented in subsections (3) and (4); then subsection (5) deals with indirect behaviour. The amendment’s supporters seek to redefine this, by adding words to give an example of behaviour which is reprehensible. I understand the aims of the proposers and their real concerns. We have listened to the passionate speeches made today. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has added his name to the amendment. From long experience, I would listen to his words, and the House always does with very great respect.
My fear is that this amendment is over-prescriptive. Putting this into the Bill might limit the generality of the encompassing nature of subsection (5). At the moment, I have serious doubts about whether the amendment is needed at all, as such particularising may limit the thrust of the subsection so far as other conduct is concerned. In these circumstances, having heard all the arguments, I would recommend its rejection by your Lordships.
My Lords, I commend my noble friend Lady Meyer on her courage and resilience in tabling this amendment again today. I first had the privilege of meeting her and hearing her story many years ago, and since then she has been a tireless campaigner on this issue despite, as we have seen both today and in Committee, often intense and personal challenge.
As we have heard, parental alienation is a devastating form of abuse that can extend for decades and have deeply traumatic effects on both the children and the excluded parent. There has, however, been strong resistance to recognising this as a form of abuse. Those who oppose it argue that abusive parents may themselves use the defence of parental alienation to continue their abuse. Surely, though, this is precisely why we have judges. We must have confidence in our courts and our police to make these judgments, just as they have to make countless others every day of the week.
The amendment seeks insert into the legislation the line
“such as a parent’s behaviour deliberately designed to damage the relationship between a child of the parent and the other parent”.
I am hopeful that the Government should be able to confirm that this is indeed included in the definition of coercion, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and my noble friend Lady Meyer have requested. This addition would specifically draw attention to parental alienation while simultaneously giving the family courts a sound basis on which to better distinguish between genuine and false allegations of parental alienation. The amendment identifies parental alienation and protects those who are vulnerable from exploitation of the law.
The dynamics expressed in the amendment are important for a number of reasons. Alienation adversely affects the psychological development of a child in that it prevents a natural, healthy bond and relationship with a parent. A child needs to be nurtured and protected by its mother. Erica Komisar, a leading expert in attachment theory and the neuroscience of motherhood, highlights that children are at a higher risk of social, emotional and developmental issues when the essential presence of a mother is missing. But it is equally important that the child should have a relationship with their father. In a major study by the Journal of Applied Economics entitled The Impact of Income and Family Structure on Delinquency, it was found that when the interactions between a parent and a child diminish, such as in the case of parental alienation, the child perceives a decline in that parent’s benevolence. If the decline is sufficient, the child will accept its implications and move to feelings of abandonment, alienation and a lack of trust. Both the parent and the child are worse off.
Research from the Institute for Family Studies has also found that, controlling for race and parental income, boys raised without their father are much more likely to use drugs, engage in violent or criminal activity and drop out of school, while girls are more likely to engage in early sexual activity or have a child out of wedlock. The consequences of parental alienation can be deep and severe on the next generation.
There can be no doubt that judicial decisions in cases involving children must take account of all aspects of the family dynamic, including all types of abuse. There is a need for qualified professionals to assist the court in assessing whether there is abuse and, if so, its severity and how it should affect child/parent residence and contact arrangements. But the need for expertise in handling these delicate situations should not dissuade us from addressing this often hidden but deeply damaging form of abuse.
The Bill is strengthened if it captures all forms of domestic abuse and improves outcomes for those who are vulnerable to experiencing it, and we look to the Minister today to confirm that the concept of alienation is included within the definition of domestic abuse.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to speak in support of Amendments 10 and 14 tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. It seems there is significant agreement on the need for these amendments, so I will keep my remarks relatively brief.
Amendments 10 and 14 are reasonable amendments that seek to clarify the wide variety of domestic situations in which abuse can occur. Numbers of people up and down the country are now accustomed to doing things such as renting out spare rooms and having people not related to them living in their household. Amendment 10 rightly recognises that when a perpetrator and victim live together in a domestic situation, the abuse should be considered domestic whether or not they are biologically related or in a romantic relationship.
Amendment 14 recognises that it should be considered domestic abuse when the perpetrator has regular contact with the home or lives in the home despite not having legal guardianship or a biological relationship with the child, as we have heard. Both amendments are about ensuring that the Bill is thorough in recognising what constitutes domestic abuse and in identifying the victims and perpetrators, to ensure that we can identify and intervene in the wide range of domestic abuse scenarios.
Amendment 10 relates to the legal definition of “personally connected” when assessing the relationship between a perpetrator and victim. The suggested insertion of the line,
“they are ordinarily resident in the same household”,
recognises that “personally connected” should capture those living in domestic situations who may not otherwise be in a romantic relationship or biologically related. As the definition of domestic abuse is set out in Clause 1, abusive behaviours, such as
“physical or sexual abuse … violent or threatening behaviour … controlling or coercive behaviour … economic abuse … psychological, emotional or other abuse”,
are all able to and do occur in domestic situations where the perpetrator and victim live in the same household, but are not in a romantic relationship. As such, I argue that those who live together should be considered personally connected, in the context of the Bill.
Amendment 14 relates to how we define abuse as domestic in relation to a child and recognises that children can be victims of domestic abuse where their perpetrator is not the legal parent, the guardian or biologically related. The suggested insertion of the line,
“the person lives in the same household as the child or regularly visits the household”,
broadens the scope of the different environments in which a child can be personally related to their abuser.
Children can be and are victims of domestic abuse, even where there is no legal guardianship or relation to the perpetrator, as this amendment suggests, when the perpetrator lives in the same domestic situation or is a regular visitor to the home. An obvious example, and why this amendment is necessary, is the case of a new partner to the parent or the child who regularly comes into contact with the child and may spend prolonged or regular contact in the home, or even live in the home, without legal guardianship. Abuse in this situation is self-evidently domestic, despite the abuser not having legal guardianship of the child. Child abuse is 40 times more likely when single parents find new partners. According to a study of children living in homes with unrelated adults, children are nearly 50 times as likely to die of inflicted injuries, compared with children living with two biological parents.
In conclusion, both Amendments 10 and 14 are sensible and reasonable, and strengthen the Bill in its aims to promote awareness, and better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children. I hope that we find a way to take these amendments forward.
My Lords, I speak briefly on Amendments 6 and 7, which I support. Unfortunately, I was cut off from making further comments at Second Reading as I would have exceeded the time limit. I seek clarification on Clause 2(1), which I would have mentioned then. On the face of it, it appears to cover most, I hope all, the eventualities of which we can conceive. But I must express concern when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—who knows more about these matters than anyone else in your Lordships’ House—seeks to amend the Bill, and I endorse the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. They seek to add to the definition of “personally connected” in the Clause, with the words “guardian of the other” and
“lives in the same household as the child”.
An amendment that goes in the same direction adds the definition that one person is a “provider of care” for the other.
In my Second Reading speech, I would have referred to my recollection, as a very young man, a long time ago, of occasionally appearing in undefended divorce cases. To claim a divorce for your client, one had to satisfy the judge of, first, the grounds for the divorce, which did not usually take up much judicial time, and, secondly, the arrangements for the “child of the family”. That was taken seriously. The child of the family did not need a blood relationship. I found no difficulty with this extended relationship from the make-up of my own family.
Of course divorce law has changed considerably since that time, but on the face of it, if you couple the definition in Clause 2 and the words “parental responsibility”, having the same meaning as in Section 3 of the Children Act 1989, which I have reconsidered, it should be sufficiently all-embracing. Obviously the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is concerned, and the Minister should dwell deeply and give us clarification.
The mischief we are trying to cover adequately is the definition of parent and child and the words “parental responsibility”. My short point is, having regard to the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is the Minister satisfied that Clause 2 is sufficiently all-embracing? I would be surprised if it is not, but I am not a family lawyer. I have been only a criminal lawyer for most of the past 40 years. I hope the Minister will give the Committee the assurances which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and all of us would like to have.