Red Sea Telecommunication Cables

Debate between Baroness Rawlings and Earl of Minto

Thursday 14th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Rawlings]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what support they are providing to help protect telecommunication cables in the Red Sea.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (The Earl of Minto) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government take the security of the UK’s critical national infrastructure extremely seriously. We are working closely with private commercial interests to better understand the ongoing situation in the Red Sea and the resilience of telecoms networks. In recent months, Defence has acted decisively to protect international shipping in the Red Sea from the Houthi’s dangerous and illegal attacks, while continuing to apply diplomatic pressure.

[Baroness Rawlings (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Answer. The Red Sea is particularly vulnerable to attack because of its narrow and shallow proximity to Iran’s naval bases. Digital data is not in the cloud but depends 97% on seabed cables, and trillions get transferred yearly. Unlike ships, there are no flags, and they are not legally registered to any country. They are easily cut, causing major disruption in the world. Their location is freely available, with scope for plausible deniability. Does the Minister agree that there have been two very good reports, one by our Prime Minister in 2017 and one this year, stressing that China, with its undersea great wall, and Russia, with its sensors and unmanned vehicles, pose a severe threat? What is the UK’s strategic doctrine guiding our seabed policy? With Russia’s aggressive behaviour in the European Atlantic, what is the UK doing to support NATO’s defence system?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I will cut to the chase. We take all this extremely seriously, but it is important to contextualise the risk. The most likely cause by far of damage to subsea cables comes from accidental damage by industrial fishing and shipping and from underwater geological events. That is not to say that undersea cables are not prone to attack but it is extremely rare, and the commercial organisations can divert very quickly to alternative routes. Having said that, the Ministry of Defence has capabilities to monitor the seabed and has invested in a multi-role ocean surveillance programme which enhances our joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability. We work collegiately with allies, including NATO, to ensure that subsea infrastructure is resilient.