Trade Union Bill

Debate between Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve and Lord Flight

Thursday 25th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

I will dig myself in deeper and say that, to my mind, a great deal of the mis-selling issue is unjustified. First, if you go out and buy a new or second-hand car, you buy what you see. Individuals have some personal responsibility for determining what they buy. Secondly, and more specific to the whole area of mortgages, it was largely about inflation reducing dramatically and returns differing substantially. The simple point is that financial services are at one end of the spectrum and, arguably, trade unions are at the other. It is unreasonable not to accept that the behaviour of trade unions can be extremely inconvenient, if not damaging, to the public at large. Therefore, there is a public interest here.

This group of amendments is about cancelling or dumbing down some parts of the Certification Officer’s modest new powers. It seems to me that the powers in question are really not of the substantial importance that the noble Lord suggested. Specifically, the amendments are to remove the new investigatory powers in the Bill and remove the power to investigate in the absence of a complaint by a member. Surely the public have some right to complain if they feel that they have a complaint, and surely a regulator—even a modest regulator—ought to be there to investigate. To say that the trade union itself can investigate does not comply with the government standards of our times, which require some degree of individual investigation.

As we are all aware, the Bill provides the Certification Officer with additional powers he can use proactively to investigate breaches of trade union statutory requirements in relation to political funds, union mergers, internal leadership elections and appointing to, or failing to remove from, a union a person convicted of certain financial offences. It does not seem unreasonable that a very modest regulator should have the power to look at those territories. The Certification Officer ought to be able to investigate formal complaints, not just when lodged by a member but in response to information raised by third parties. Again, his powers beyond investigating are not that great. I do not see why the trade union sector should not be as transparent as any other.

There is a key addition in principle behind what is in the Bill, which is regulation on behalf of the public. The wider public has an interest in trade union conduct where, as I said, unions can by industrial action and in other ways inconvenience the public and damage the economy. Likewise, the investigatory powers cover areas relating to statutory requirements that are of relevance to the public as well as to trade union members.

I note that the Electoral Commission, which is somewhat, if not entirely, analogous to the trade union movement, can impose larger financial penalties. While the Certification Officer has only the discipline of civil penalties, the Electoral Commission can escalate an issue to a criminal offence. I do not propose that that should be the case in trade union regulation, but it illustrates that these measures are pretty modest. On the issue of bearing the costs, again, the industries affected invariably bear the cost of regulation, but I cannot see that what is envisaged here will cost very much at all. I repeat the key point: at present, what exists is purely to protect the interests of members and what is proposed is to protect the interests of the public. That is not an unreasonable change.

I close by saying that I cannot see that there is much in these provisions that is at all inherently damaging to trade unions if they are conducting their affairs in a proper manner. I would have thought, therefore, that it would be a wise strategy to accept the measures, comply with them and make them as unonerous as possible.

[Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve (CB)]

I declare an interest as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I return to a point that I made at Second Reading, which is that we are talking here about restrictions on Article 11 rights—the right to freedom of assembly. That is a right that I believe all parties are committed to.

The European Convention on Human Rights sets out the permissible purposes for which a restriction may be placed on the right. It is only those permissible purposes that count. They include, for example, the protection of public health, the protection of other liberty rights and the protection of privacy. But the idea that they include general protection of the public and consumer rights, as the noble Lord, Lord Flight, has suggested—not merely today but on earlier occasions—is mistaken. Consumer rights are extremely important, but they are the creature of statute; they are not fundamental rights. I do not believe—and from letters that the Minister has written, that she believes—that those would constitute a sufficient reason for restricting freedom of assembly.

Freedom of assembly is very precious not just for trade unions but for many other groups, including, as I suggested at Second Reading, churches and other faith groups. We must be extremely careful that, when we start thinking about what is proportionate, we remember that it has to be necessary and proportionate for a permitted purpose and not for any old purpose. As the Minister has already said, administrative convenience would not be a sufficient purpose. I suggest that consumer protection and some generic idea about the public are also not sufficient purposes.