Combating Atrocity Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide

Baroness Nye Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Nye (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for securing this timely and important debate and I thank the House of Lords Library for its extremely helpful briefing. It is also a privilege to follow the noble Baroness and to acknowledge all the great work she does in this area. I refer the House to my registered interests as a trustee of Burma Campaign UK and an officer of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Burma.

Instances of mass atrocity violence—crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing—are not only persisting but in many cases spiralling. The United Kingdom has long accepted a responsibility to help protect populations from atrocity crimes through early warning, prevention, accountability and co-ordinated international action. Yet the persistence of such crimes raises profound questions about whether those mechanisms are being used effectively and, crucially, early enough. Nowhere are those questions more urgent than in Burma.

Burma’s history demonstrates how atrocity crimes follow a recognisable trajectory. Discrimination becomes institutionalised, legal protections are stripped away, persecution intensifies and violence escalates into mass atrocity. Following the 1962 coup, Burma entered decades of authoritarian rule, in which political dissent was violently suppressed and minority groups marginalised. By the 1970s, this had already translated into mass displacement, including the expulsion of around 200,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. The 1982 citizenship law then rendered the Rohingya effectively stateless, removing any legal protection and exposing them to systemic abuse.

The Tatmadaw has used extreme violence against civilian populations. During the 1988 uprising, thousands were killed in the suppression of pro-democracy protests, entrenching a pattern of impunity that has defined Myanmar ever since. That pattern culminated in the atrocities against the Rohingya, with mass killings, widespread sexual violence and the destruction of communities, forcing 1 million into exile into Bangladesh. These acts are widely recognised as genocide, alongside crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

The lesson is clear: these outcomes are not inevitable. They occur when warning signs are not acted upon, where diplomatic caution replaces decisive action and where accountability is deferred rather than enforced. This is not simply a matter of history; it is a matter of present policy. Since the 2021 coup, the same patterns have continued, yet the military adapted—not to reform, but to survive. It changes names, reshapes its institutions and offers limited concessions, but the underlying reality does not change: military control, impunity and the preservation of power. That is not reform. It is just rebranding.

We see this in the so-called elections of last year, which have entrenched military control rather than loosened it. We see it in attempts to regain international legitimacy, whether through engagement with ASEAN or high-level diplomatic outreach, such as the leader of the Tatmadaw’s visit to India this week as the rebranded “President”. We see it too in gestures such as the transfer of Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest, designed to encourage re-engagement. We have seen this before. After the 2010 elections, a similar pattern of engagement and eased pressure contributed to an environment in which grave atrocities, including genocide, were allowed to occur. We must not repeat that mistake.

If we are serious about prevention, we must also be serious about pressure. That means working with our allies to target not only individuals but the military as an institution and its sources of power. It means expanding co-ordinated action with the United States, the European Union and others to restrict the military’s core revenue streams, including oil and gas, which finance its operations. It means strengthening action on aviation fuel and supply chains, which sustain the air strikes devastating civilian populations. It means tightening restrictions on financial services and military-linked entities. Crucially, it means ensuring that sanctions follow the reality of military control, not the changing names of its institutions. It also means recognising the UK’s particular responsibility as the UN Security Council penholder on Myanmar. In that role, we are not simply a participant in international efforts; we help shape them. That comes with a duty to lead, by co-ordinating action, maintaining pressure and ensuring that the Council does not drift into inertia at precisely the moment when sustained action is needed.

At the same time, it is essential that we recognise what is happening beyond military-controlled areas. Across Burma, local communities are building democratic systems from the ground up, developing governance structures, consulting citizens and creating new institutions despite ongoing air strikes. This reflects a central principle of atrocity prevention: that protecting populations means supporting resilient, inclusive and democratic alternatives before the violence escalates further. The people of Burma have not given up on democracy, but they cannot succeed alone.

Following the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I also have three questions for the Minister. First, on prevention, how are the Government strengthening their early warning and response mechanisms to ensure that indicators of mass atrocity crimes, such as those in Burma, trigger timely and concrete action? Secondly, on legitimacy, what steps will the Government take to ensure that UK engagement does not confer legitimacy on what remains, in substance, a military regime operating under what it hopes is a civilian guise? Thirdly, on sanctions and co-ordination, will the Government commit to working with the United States and international partners to expand co-ordinated sanctions in three areas: oil and gas revenues, aviation fuel supply chains and financial measures against military-linked entities? Finally, in her role as UN penholder, can the Minister say how the UK is using its position to advance stronger and more consistent Security Council action on Myanmar?

The lesson from Burma is clear. Atrocity crimes do not emerge without warning. They develop through patterns that are visible, identifiable and preventable. The question is not whether we understand those patterns but whether we act on them. That means sustained pressure, refusing legitimacy to a regime built on violence and standing firmly with the people of Burma in their pursuit of a democratic future.