Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Northover and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 29th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, just as my noble friend Lord McNally and I opposed Clause 35 standing part of the Bill, so we oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. Of course, this is in many ways a more dangerous clause. While, under Clause 35, we might find ourselves not imposing sanctions which other countries—say, within the EU—were imposing, in this case the Government are apparently happy to secure carte blanche powers for imposing sanctions.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said,

“an appropriate Minister, may by regulations”,

amend this part of the Bill to,

“impose prohibitions or requirements of kinds additional to those for the time being authorised in Chapter 1”.

The Constitution Committee states:

“We do not consider it appropriate for Ministers to have powers as broad as those conferred by Clause 39. In particular, we consider it constitutionally inappropriate for Ministers to have the power, by regulations, to create new forms of sanctions”.


The Delegated Powers Committee states that,

“we do not consider the powers conferred by Clause 39 to be appropriate”.

They explain:

“We do not consider that the FCO’s reasons are sufficient to justify the powers conferred by Clause 39, particularly having regard to the potential width of the powers and the very significant effects on individual rights that amendments made under these powers would be capable of having”.


They also point out, in relation to UN sanctions, that,

“this power is unnecessary for enabling additional sanctions measures to be imposed for the purposes of complying with UN obligations since Clause 7 already has this effect”.

From right across this Chamber and from the Constitution Committee and Delegated Powers Committee comes a clear message, so we join others in opposing that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The width of this power seems extraordinary and constitutionally offensive. As I understand the drafting of the Bill, it is open to a Minister to pass regulations which allow him to identify individuals on whom he can impose a sanction or prohibition that he has invented. What is more, the only restriction on him is that it must be for the purposes set out in Clause 2(1). If the Minister honestly believes that the invention of a new sanction or prohibition is justified by “a foreign policy objective” of the Government—for example, gaining support from one country by attacking its nationals in this country—the power given by Clause 39 would entitle them to invent a new prohibition and impose it by regulations. Furthermore, should any primary legislation stand in the way of a Minister inventing such a new prohibition that he or she believes is designed to promote a foreign policy objective, that primary legislation can be amended to get rid of an objection by the very same regulations under Clause 44(2). That a Minister could do by secondary legislation such a thing—for example, restrict somebody’s spending their own money, prevent them leaving their home, take away their car or stop certain sorts of bank account being used—without primary legislation strikes me as well beyond what any responsible Government would think should be done by secondary legislation. Can the Minister confirm that my analysis of what could theoretically be done is right, and explain why it is appropriate that that be done by secondary legislation?

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Baroness Northover and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

This provision introduces civil sanctions in relation to criminal offences set out in Schedule 9. As I understand it, the criminal offences, of which there are 12 in paragraph 8, are designed to ensure that either permitted participants or authorised—

Sorry, there is not much point me asking a question if you are chattering away.

[Baroness Northover]

I have got two ears.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

She has got two ears. I agree with that. I will go on. I am sure that the fact that she has two ears has some significance to the story.

There are 12 offences identified in paragraph 8. The purpose of the offences, as I understand it—though I stand to be corrected by the Minister—is that the only people who should be spending money in relation to the referendum are either permitted participants or authorised participants. Therefore the purpose of the criminal offences is to prevent expenditure by anyone other than those people. The way that this is dealt with, as a matter of the criminal law, is to say that if there is a transaction where in effect somebody else’s money is spent, either directly or through a permitted participant or an authorised participant, it is made a criminal offence by paragraph 8 of Schedule 9.

The essence of each of the criminal offences, as I read them—again, I stand to be corrected—is that you have to know if you are committing a criminal offence that either as an authorised or a permitted participant you are using somebody else’s money or as an individual providing the money you know that you should not be spending it on the referendum. Know or ought to know, I should say. What I am interested to know, and that seems a perfectly sensible structure, is what the circumstances are in which it will be decided to bring criminal proceedings and what the circumstances are in which it will be decided to employ a civil sanction. Obviously it will depend on the facts in every case but if know or ought to know is part of it, what distinctions will people rely on in order to determine whether it is civil or criminal? This will be important, because paragraph 8 is obviously intended to be a deterrent to people from breaking the law in relation to the limits that apply—