(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I spoke about the freedom of information aspects of these two amendments in Committee, and I repeat that I think it is reasonable to exclude ARIA from the freedom of information requirements.
I do not regard the Freedom of Information Act as malign, and I am sure my noble friend does not either. It is appropriate in many cases that our public bodies are opened up, but it is true that it is burdensome. That has been a constant complaint, and certain kinds of organisations attract lots of fishing expeditions which increase the burden, and this goes beyond what would be regarded as being reasonable.
In Committee, I quoted both Tony Blair—who, having introduced the Freedom of Information Act, had a Damascene conversion and did not regard it as a helpful thing in the end—and Professor Philip Bond, the Professor of Creativity and Innovation at the University of Manchester. Both of them highlighted the fundamental reason why ARIA should be free from the Freedom of Information Act: because the last thing our scientists need when looking at the next internet, or whatever it is, is to be overcome with excessive caution because they are worried about what would happen if their conversations had to be revealed through Freedom of Information Act requests. Creativity thrives in an environment where it is not subject to ex-post analysis.
The other reason why I wanted to speak this evening is that I do not understand why Amendments 6 and 7 have been positioned as they are in Clause 2. They seem to set up a conflict with the provisions of Schedule 3, which is introduced by Clause 9. I have not followed through the detailed drafting in respect of freedom of information, but I have followed it through in respect of the Public Contracts Regulations. Basically, Amendment 7 says that the regulations will apply to ARIA, while paragraph 17 of Schedule 3 says that the requirements do not apply to ARIA.
So, the effect of these amendments—and I believe the same is true of the freedom of information amendment, but I have not completely followed that through—is that one part of the Bill would say that the requirements do not apply, but the next part would say that they do apply. That does not seem to me a very clever way to write amendments or legislation, so I suggest that the amendments themselves are defective. Also, I think they are defective in drafting terms—in particular, the public contracts amendment does not mention the separate Scottish regulations, which are included in paragraph 17 of Schedule 3. Paragraphs 13 to 15 are much more complex than Amendment 6, so that may well not be as effective as noble Lords seem to suggest.
My Lords, Labour tabled a combined version of Amendments 6 and 7 in Committee, and we welcome the re-tabling of the text by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. We debated FoI extensively at Second Reading, in Grand Committee and in private meetings with the Minister and his officials. Despite the strong feelings expressed, the Government have offered us absolutely nothing—not just on FoI but on transparency more generally.
The Government’s determination to keep ARIA’s projects and decision-making secret is worrying. This is a matter of principle: do they believe in transparency, or not? If they do, such a measure should be put in the Bill. If they do not, they have not really given us a sufficiently good explanation for their reluctance to do this. We believe that it is in ARIA’s best interests to have the benefit of engagement of the public through the use of FoI. Failing to do that is not going to stop ARIA’s activities becoming known; it will just happen in a less controlled manner and create more suspicion.
My Lords, we will all be relieved that we are on the final amendment of this Report stage.
Amendment 20 would have the effect of requiring the consent of the Secretary of State if ARIA seeks to use the powers in paragraph 17(2) of Schedule 1. These powers allow ARIA to borrow money, to acquire and dispose of land, to accept gifts, to form and participate in partnerships and joint ventures, and to form companies. I have no problem with these powers existing; they are useful techniques which are commonly used in research and development activities and scale-ups. I am, however, against public bodies taking on liabilities which are counted as public sector liabilities and which will end up being footed by taxpayers if they go wrong, without any controls. I am also wary of private sector counterparties, who may well be queuing up for a free ride on the public sector’s credit lines, knowing that they will be rewarded for success and may not have to pick up the tab for failure.
My noble friend the Minister replied to my amendment in Committee, saying that conditions would be attached to grant funding given under Clause 4 of the Bill, and that borrowing would have to meet stringent requirements set out in Managing Public Money. The Minister also said that any borrowing would have to be agreed with HM Treasury in advance. I accept that it is possible that this will work perfectly well, with ARIA agreeing to abide completely by whatever the Treasury and BEIS say. It is certainly likely to toe the line all the time that it is dependent on grant funding from BEIS.
My question to the Minister is based on a different scenario. Let us assume that BEIS has handed over the £500 million committed for this Parliament and that the Chancellor has said that there is no more money. We know that the power to wind up ARIA will kick in only after 10 years, so what does the Minister think will happen in the years between, say, 2024 and 2032, with no more grant money arriving? My guess is that borrowing money would become irresistible. Moreover, the value-for-money test in Managing Public Money will be very easy to satisfy, because the counterfactual of using public money will not exist. Complex structures that look like partnerships or joint ventures could actually be borrowing by another name—I have seen that all before.
That is why I believe it would be safer if this Bill embedded a consent requirement. A consent requirement might look rather heavy-handed at first sight, but it could easily be tempered by delegation arrangements which did not require all transactions to have to be sent to the Secretary of State for approval.
I look forward to hearing how the Government think they can keep control of an organisation which has unconstrained statutory powers once the Government have lost the lever of grant payments. If they are not certain that they can deal with all eventualities, I respectfully suggest to my noble friend that an amendment such as this one, or something similar, is needed. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is a very interesting discussion initiated by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. At first, I thought she was suddenly getting into big state interference, but that is obviously not the case. It is curious why ARIA would need to be able to borrow money when it is being given a budget from the Government. Presumably the intention is not to give it the Government’s credit card also, because we will be underwriting the borrowing that takes place—I think. I am not quite sure on this; perhaps the Minister could explain some circumstances in which the borrowing of money would be needed and how that would be beneficial to ARIA.
On gifts, we are not quite clear what that is about. If the noble Baroness wanted to test the will of the House—I suspect that she does not want to, this evening—we would be interested in supporting that.
We really need to get some assurance from the Government, particularly on this issue of borrowing money.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, at the request of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and with the agreement of the Committee, I will move her amendment. My noble friend had hoped we would have a third Committee day and would go slowly today so that she could move it herself on Wednesday. However, she realised earlier this afternoon that that was not going to be the case, so I agreed to move it. I will be as brief as possible, because this is a relatively small point. The intention of the amendment is to underline the Government’s commitment to the independence of ARIA, and it requires the Secretary of State to protect the independence of ARIA.
My noble friend tabled the amendment because she heard the discussions on our first day in Committee about the purpose of ARIA and its mission, including whether it should be directed to act only in certain areas, particularly in relation to climate change. She was very concerned to ensure that the spirit of ARIA—that it should be unencumbered and able to think the unthinkable wherever it wants to pursue its issues—should be preserved.
Obviously, huge amounts of money are spent on research and development overall by the Government and by other organisations in the economy, all of which are subject to lots of different kinds of checks and balances, and controls and directions. But ARIA is supposed to be very different, and it would be easy to start altering the way in which it worked: for example, by attaching conditions to grants that are made to it, and by constraining or confining what it did, using the powers in the Bill. But ARIA is going to be a success only if it is genuinely independent of government, if it is not dancing to the Government’s tune in any sense, and if it is allowed to go wherever it wants in seeking new areas for research and innovation. I think the Committee understands that ARIA’s independence from government should be preserved.
So this very small amendment underlines the concepts that we believe underlie the creation of ARIA, and I hope that it will be helpful to the Government in enshrining its independence from government. I beg to move.
I just want to make a quick observation about this. Obviously, we have argued to have climate as ARIA’s overriding priority, and we stand by that—but should that not be the case, this amendment would not cause any problems were it not for the fact that the Government were declining amendments on oversight and scrutiny. I do not think that the two are incompatible. You can have an independent agency, and we would not wish to have government interference, but there is no compromising of independence by allowing for freedom of information or some of the other measures that we have suggested.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I beg to move Amendment 17 and shall speak also to Amendment 20 in this group. These are probing amendments designed to explore the extent of the powers given to ARIA by virtue of paragraph 17 of Schedule 1. Sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 17 says that ARIA can pretty well do what it likes, and this is expanded by some particular powers in sub-paragraph (2). The two I have focused on in my amendment are sub-paragraph (2)(a), which says that ARIA may borrow money, and sub-paragraph (2)(d), which allows ARIA to form and participate in partnerships and joint ventures.
My concern is that these powers will be used to create liabilities for the state and hence, ultimately, for taxpayers, beyond the resources that we were led to believe would be devoted to ARIA. As I remarked on Second Reading, there is a world of difference between placing a bet of £500 million or £800 million and underwriting someone else’s credit card. In the former case, there is the hope of winning very much more than the initial £500 million or £800 million, although, obviously, the possibility of losing the lot. In the latter case, there is the possibility of an unlimited amount of additional money being needed if the funds raised by the borrower failed to produce any return.
ARIA will be a public sector body in every sense of the term. It gets its money from the Treasury, it is subject to public sector audit and accountability arrangements and its key personnel are appointed by and paid in accordance with the directions of the Secretary of State. It is always accepted that the state stands behind public sector bodies. That has been the case for as long as I can remember. If they fail, their liabilities are underwritten by the state. That is why there is usually a raft of controls placed on those bodies, including restrictions on the power to borrow money. The Treasury has an obvious interest in ensuring that public sector bodies do not create uncontrolled demands on public finances and, as a public sector body, ARIA’s borrowing will, I believe, automatically score as public sector borrowing. Will the Treasury really allow that to happen without controls?
I have focused on the borrowing power in sub-paragraph (2)(a), but my comments apply also to the ability to participate in partnerships and joint ventures, which are often structured in a way that means liabilities can be left with one of the parties to the venture. Private-sector counterparties would be queueing up to enter into arrangements which could possibly leave the state with the requirement to pick up the bill for failure. Similar dangers also apply in relation to companies which are allowed to be formed under sub-paragraph (2)(e), but I failed to table its deletion for today’s debate. I am not against partnerships, companies or joint ventures; they all have a part to play in working with private sector organisations. What I am against is the ability of ARIA to enter into arrangements that impose potential financial burdens on government finances without any controls or consents being required.
As it stands, Schedule 1 might allow some ex post interventions once the Secretary of State became aware of things that cause financial concerns beyond the initial amounts of money committed to ARIA—£500 million by the end of this Parliament—but the main tool he has is an extremely blunt instrument because it is related to replacing the members of the board. Even here he is restricted, as under paragraph 6(3) he can sack non-executive members of the board on any grounds he “considers appropriate” but, to get rid of an executive member, his power under paragraph 5(2) is restricted to grounds of “national security”. The real villains are more likely to be the executives than the non-executives, but the Secretary of State’s powers to deal with those individuals are, perversely, concentrated on the non-executives.
The notes given to noble Lords on this side of the Committee for today’s groupings said that my amendments would limit ARIA’s novel funding mechanisms. That gives an insight into what these powers are about. They are positively designed to allow ARIA to go beyond the resource envelope that has been announced for it. Calling funding “novel” might sound progressive, innovative and all those good things that ARIA is said to be focused on, but to those of us who have been around financing for rather a long time, it just sounds like another way of doing things to get around rules and restrictions. That would be okay if there were not ultimately recourse to public funds, but the Bill does not require borrowing to be on a non-recourse basis. It leaves public finances at risk to an unspecified degree.
I look forward to hearing from my noble friend how she thinks this very real risk will be managed in practice and how the Government have concluded that ARIA’s powers are compatible with sound public finances. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I had not had the pleasure of hearing from her at such length as we have today, and I am very impressed by her contributions. The issue of borrowing money is a concern. There is clearly the potential for financial risk but also significant reputational risk when a level of borrowing might emerge that may seem unduly risky. I am concerned about that and interested in what the Minister will say to prevent that concern doing any damage to ARIA.