Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government share the views of many in this debate, particularly on the importance of ensuring that the secondary growth and competitiveness objectives are comprehensively embedded in the work of the regulators. That is why the Bill legislates to extend the requirement for the regulators to produce annual reports on their actions to advance competitiveness and growth objectives.

Amendment 99 would amend the secondary objective so that when carrying it out the regulators would need only to consider international standards, rather than to align with them. I recognise the desire to ensure that there are no unnecessary constraints on the secondary objective. However, the Government cannot accept this amendment. Aligning with international standards is central to the Government’s approach to supporting the international competitiveness of the UK as a global financial centre. These international standards underpin global financial resilience and support international trade. Stability, predictability and high regulatory standards are the cornerstone of the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre. Weakening the requirement to align would risk undermining the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business.

However, it is worth noting that the UK is no passive recipient of international standards: we help to shape them. The Governor of the Bank of England is the current chair of the Financial Stability Board, and the UK authorities play leading roles in international bodies. I reassure noble Lords that international standards generally operate on a comply-or-explain basis. No standard trumps the objectives of the FCA or the PRA. Where it is right for the UK to go further, or where the nuances of our market require a different approach, the FCA and the PRA retain full flexibility to do so.

Amendments 100 and 101 would require the growth and competitiveness reports to be laid in Parliament and would prescribe their contents. These amendments clearly demonstrate the importance this House places on the growth and competitiveness reports. The Government absolutely agree about that. Since they were introduced in FSMA 2023, their value to stakeholders in Parliament and industry has been clearly demonstrated, which is why the Bill extends the original temporary requirement and will require the regulators to keep producing the reports on an annual basis. However, these amendments are not necessary: they are overly prescriptive and overlap with existing reporting mechanisms. For example, the regulators already provide ample public reporting on their authorisation metrics, which are published regularly and allow for year-on-year comparisons, and they already publish metrics along with their competitiveness and growth reports.

Amendment 102 would give the Bank of England a secondary objective to facilitate international competitiveness and growth in its regulation of central counterparties and central securities depositories. The Government recognise the importance of a dynamic and competitive UK clearing and settlement market. However, CCPs and CSDs have a unique role in managing risk at the centre of global financial markets and the value they provide is based on reliability and sound risk management. The UK’s success as a global centre for financial market infrastructure depends on its reputation for resilience, and regulation must reflect the roles of CCPs and CSDs as critical, globally shared infrastructure. The Government therefore do not believe that it would be appropriate for the regulatory framework for these firms to focus on international competitiveness or growth in the same way as other firms, or that the secondary objective for the Bank to facilitate innovation is the right one. However, the Chancellor made it clear in her remit letter to the Bank last year that it should consider how it can best support the Government’s growth mission when pursuing its objectives.

Lastly, Amendment 104A seeks to introduce new secondary objectives for the Bank of England in relation to payment systems. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue. The Government recognise that, where appropriate, secondary objectives can help the regulator to advance its primary objective in a balanced way. Payment systems are critical economic infrastructure and the Government agree that, alongside security and resilience, regulation in this area should support competition, innovation and growth.

However, the Government consider that the Bill already provides a framework that supports the aims of the amendment. Following the FCA taking on the responsibilities of payment systems regulations, it will retain the substance of the PSR’s objectives. This means that it will be responsible for promoting competition and innovation in payment systems and for protecting the interests of service users. The Bill also applies the FCA’s secondary competitive and growth objective to its general payment system functions and it includes provision to ensure that the Bank and the FCA co-ordinate effectively. I therefore ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today and the previous day. These amendments all relate to the secondary competitive and growth objective. I think that we share the same desire to have an effective secondary competitive and growth objective, which my lead amendment, in particular, was designed to ensure. The Minister says that the regulators have flexibility to do what is right, whatever the international standards. I do not think that that is captured by forcing alignment with standards, but I will think again about that before Report. I was also disappointed by the Minister’s other replies, because it seems that the Government are not taking opportunities to ram home the importance of growth and competitiveness, which is something that we fully support. I will withdraw my amendment now and consider what I shall bring back on Report.

Amendment 99 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 118 in this group. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, noted, it is aimed at the same target as her Amendment 117. Both of us are focusing on the regulators needing to have some specific and serious concerns about regulatory breaches before triggering a Section 166 review. I have had some experience of being on the receiving end of Section 166 notices from my time on the board of a major bank. They are genuinely very burdensome: they cost a lot of money, and they divert a huge amount of staff resources and, more importantly, senior management time. They are not something to be undertaken lightly.

The consulting firms absolutely love them. The fees are set by the regulator, so they do not have to do anything awful, such as negotiating with a client around the fees. They often have some perverse incentives, and quite often are structured as phase 1 and phase 2. Phase 1 is where you see whether there is a bit of a problem, then you move on to phase 2. Phase 2 is where the real money usually is, so the consultants leave no stone unturned in their efforts to trigger phase 2, and they can end up creating more work than might perhaps have been needed. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am not saying that Section 166 reviews should not exist, but the use of them should probably revert to the use that existed before. That is why it is important to put a higher hurdle than is currently in the statute for the use of Section 166, so that the burdens are imposed only when there is genuine cause.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lady Noakes for bringing forward these amendments. I declare my interest as a director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA.

The amendments in this group focus principally on Sections 165 and 166 of FSMA. It is worth recalling that the very expression “Section 166” has become part of the language of financial regulation. When the history of financial regulation is written, it will be the most famous item of regulation for this period. It is part of the common language, because there are dozens and dozens of these regulatory interventions.

Section 166 gives the regulators the power to require a firm to appoint or to pay for a skilled person—often a very expensive law firm—to produce a report on specified matters. These reviews can be burdensome, expensive and disruptive for the firms concerned. The concern we have heard from industry is that Section 166 notices have become more and more common in recent years. They were, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, initially quite scarce and quite important—and quite quiet, incidentally. Now, they are talked about all the time, because they are as common as anything. The serious issue is that they can, in effect, be used by the regulator as a demonstration of the exercise of its supervisory function.

These notices are supposedly for an inquiry, but they look quite threatening: they can be written in bold and in caps and in different sized fonts. They arrive at the firm with a variety of different names—often the firm has not actually heard of the regulator—and the tone of the notices can be unintentionally discourteous. This, of course, touches on other amendments which reference the right profile for the UK in regulating international firms that may operate in this country.

A Section 166 review is not cost-free regulation; it can require substantial external expenditure, internal management time, legal advice, data gathering, citizens’ work and follow-on remediation. The direct cost of the skilled person report may be only one part of the total burden. This means that there is inevitably a presumption of guilt in these inquiries, without a balanced challenge to which the firm can fully respond. We must bear in mind that firms often do not even know what the inquiry is looking for, so the ability to seek legal protection or a balance in the inquiry is made impossible by this approach to regulation.

In the general insurance and protection sector, an FOI-based report suggested that firms paid around £2.7 million for FCA-mandated Section 166 reviews in the year to 31 March 2024. It noted that internal costs and remediation costs can exceed the external review cost itself. That illustrates the point clearly that the financial and operational impact on firms can be significant. There is also the problem that some firms are not clear on why they are being subject to Section 166 in the first place. The regulator may go on a “fishing trip”, as described by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which really is a good expression for how these inquiries proceed—to find fault without disclosing precisely what they are looking for.

That is why these powers need guardrails. As my noble Friend Lady Noakes has argued, Section 166 notices should be reserved for serious circumstances. They should not become a routine supervisory practice; they should not be used where the same information could reasonably be obtained through less burdensome means; and they should not be imposed without proper consideration of proportionality.

Amendment 117, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the regulator to be satisfied that there is a material risk of serious detriment to regulatory outcomes, and that using a skilled person report is a proportionate response. It would require the regulator to consider the scale and nature of the suspected issue, the burden on the firm and whether the matter could reasonably be addressed through existing supervisory tools.

That seems to be a sensible framework, as does that set out in Amendment 118, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. It would restrict Section 166 reports to circumstances where the regulator considers that there is likely to have been a significant contravention of a relevant requirement, and where the information or documents could not reasonably be obtained without the report. These amendments speak to the same underlying principle: Section 166 should be an exceptional tool for serious cases, not a default mechanism.

I welcome Amendment 123, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, which deals with Section 165 information-gathering powers and seeks to set sensible thresholds on access to information. If a regulator asks a firm for information or documents, it should be able to explain why that material is reasonably necessary, why the request is proportionate and why the information cannot be obtained from another source. Requests should not be duplicative and they should not be broader than necessary. Firms should not be left trying to satisfy vague or excessive demands without a clear understanding of the purpose behind them. That is a basic principle of good regulation, and it particularly matters for smaller firms.

The broader issue here is one we have returned to throughout the Committee: regulatory power must be matched by accountability and proportionality. The FCA and the PRA have significant supervisory tools at their disposal. Where those tools impose real costs on firms, there must be proper discipline in their use. These amendments raise important questions about the balance between effective supervision and regulatory burden. We will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for these amendments, and I have listened carefully to the points made today. The principle of ensuring that the regulators take a proportionate approach to their work—in the case of these amendments, to skilled person reviews and regulatory information collecting—is one that the Government strongly agree with. We have previously debated that principle and how it applies more broadly to the work of the financial services regulators.

Amendments 117 and 118 relate to skilled person reviews under Section 166 of FSMA. It is an important supervisory tool, and the Government agree that it should be deployed proportionately. However, the Government are not persuaded that there is an issue here that requires us to further constrain the regulators’ ability to require these reviews when they consider it appropriate to effectively safeguard the markets and consumers. The regulators have existing procedures to ensure proportionality when considering whether to initiate a skilled person review. The FCA handbook sets out that it will first consider the circumstances of the firm, the costs involved and the availability of other supervisory tools to tackle the issue. The PRA has similar processes in place.

Layering additional statutory requirements on top of this risks creating burdensome delays over supervisory decisions. Skilled person reviews are often used precisely in circumstances where the regulator needs independent expert analysis. For example, requiring the regulator to satisfy a threshold test before commissioning a review could limit the regulator’s ability to direct a skilled person to investigate a potential consumer harm and implement a mitigation strategy.

The data does not suggest that the use of skilled person reviews has grown over time. I reassure noble Lords that the FCA’s use of them has been broadly consistent over the past 10 years, with an average of 48.5 commissioned a year. However, in 2025-26, only 31 were commissioned, down from a high of 83 in 2023-24. This increase reflected the FCA’s strengthened oversight in key areas, including financial crime and appointed representatives and, despite the increase in volume, overall costs to firms remained flat.

Amendment 117 would create statutory disclosure requirements relating to Section 166 skilled person reviews. The FCA and the PRA already provide transparency by publishing data on the reviews they have commissioned in their annual reports.

Amendment 123 seeks to raise the bar for regulators requesting information for the firms they oversee. The Government recognise the impact that regulation and supervision can have on firms, and agree that regulators’ supervisory activities, including information requests, must not create disproportionate burdens on firms. That is why the Government have committed to cutting the administrative burden of regulation by 25% by the end of this Parliament. The financial services regulators are activity contributing to this agenda. For example, the PRA is deleting redundant and duplicative data collections—its future banking data programme has reduced costs to firms by around £26 million annually so far—and the FCA has stripped out data requests for 36,000 firms. All this has been done without detracting from consumer protections or systemwide resilience.

Through the Bill, the Government are taking action to reduce the burden of regulation on businesses. This includes reforms to the senior managers and certification regime, which will enable the regulators to reduce the regulatory burden of the regime by 50% while maintaining its strong and effective framework for individual accountability. Imposing prescriptive statutory requirements on how the regulators gather information risks undermining effective supervision, which might bring serious risks. Regulators must be able to respond quickly to emerging risks, and sometimes that means requesting information in ways that cannot be neatly anticipated by legislation.

The Government agree that proportionality is hugely important, that unnecessary burdens should be avoided and that the regulators must be held properly to account for how they exercise the significant powers given to them by Parliament. But there is no evidence that these amendments are needed to ensure proportionality. They would risk constraining the regulators’ ability to do their jobs effectively, which would introduce risks into our financial system. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The Minister made great play of the importance of proportionality, on which I think there would be considerable agreement. The Bill removes the requirements to have regard to the regulatory principles, including, importantly, the proportionality paragraphs, for anything other than the five-year plan. It is therefore incumbent on the Government to look at all other areas of the Bill to ensure that proportionality, where it is needed, is correctly referenced in the Bill. By taking it away at the outset from the requirement to have regard in areas other than the five-year plan, the Government are leaving the Bill wide open to the non-proportional use of powers by the regulator. This area has not been fully developed by the Government in their thinking on this.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her last intervention; I presume that the Minister had finished speaking. Perhaps we need 200 amendments on Report saying, “This has to be done proportionately”. That is literally where we are. Anybody who has been near a Section 166 review will know that an awful lot about it seems awfully unfair. For instance, the regulator may not have its own expertise, so it makes you pay to hire it in. Some of these things should be done under the regulators’ ordinary duties. This needs to be looked at and, as the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said, some kind of proper discipline must be put around it. That is what we are asking for.

I am glad to hear that there is a target of cutting the administrative burden by 25%. We will see how that goes, but I do not think that everything can be left as open as it is now, which is the much-repeated message that we have been delivering. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Noakes]

119: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Cost benefit panels(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (4) of section 138IA, insert after paragraph (a)— “(aa) keep under review the cumulative impact of rules issued by the FCA including those covered by subsection (3); and”(3) In subsection (4) of section 138JA insert after paragraph (a)—“(aa) keep under review the cumulative impact of rules issued by the PRA including those covered by subsection (3); and”(4) In subsection (5) of section 139A, omit “(e)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Cost Benefit Panels of the FCA and the PRA to keep the cumulative impact of regulation, including those rules which are not consulted on, under review. It also requires the FCA to prepare cost benefit analysis for guidance and for the Cost Benefit Panel to review it.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name. Unfortunately, he is not able to be in Committee today. The amendments in this group concern cost benefit panels, which were created by the 2023 Act to underpin the existing FSMA requirement for cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken and published when rules are consulted on by the PRA and the FCA. The panels were created a little under two years ago and they are doing good work, as their annual reports show. The Financial Services Regulation Committee had a private briefing session with the chairs of the two panels, and we were impressed by the progress that they have made.

My amendment has two elements. The first requires the panels to keep under review the cumulative impact of rules, including those for which a cost-benefit analysis was not required because the impact was expected to be less than the £10 million threshold used by both regulators in their cost-benefit analysis policy statements. Keeping track of the cumulative burden of regulation was a recommendation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in its Growing Pains report on the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. It was also one of the provisional recommendations of the FCA’s panel in its first report for the period to the end of March 2025. The 2025-26 report is not out until next week, but I would be surprised if it did not feature again.

Ideally, FSMA should be changed so that the existing statutory requirement on the regulators, which is confined to cost-benefit analysis on the proposed new rules, is widened so that it will be the responsibility of the FCA and the PRA to keep the cumulative burden on regulatory activity under review. I have taken the slightly easier drafting route in my amendments by putting a narrower requirement for the role of the panels.

The second element of my amendment concerns guidance by the FCA, which was covered last time in Committee, and the PRA. I confess that proposed new subsection (4) of my amendment captures only one part of what I was trying to achieve. I realised that when I was preparing my speaking notes, but it was too late to do anything about it, so I will speak to what I intended to cover in my amendment rather than what it does cover. This is Committee, after all.

At present, the FCA and the PRA are required to issue guidance under Sections 1K and 3I of FSMA and the FCA has power to issue guidance under Section 139A. If the FCA issues guidance under Section 139A, it has to be consulted on, but no cost-benefit analysis is required to be done or published. Proposed new subsection (4) of my proposed new clause in Amendment 119 seeks to require cost-benefit analysis for Section 139A guidance. I intended, but failed, to require cost-benefit analysis for all guidance issued by both regulators—that is a difference not reflected in the amendments.

I am well aware of the Government’s plan in Clause 18 to remove all the guidance obligations from the regulators, as well as the requirement for consultation on the FSA’s guidance under Section 139A. This part of my amendment is predicated on the Government realising the folly of their ways in Clause 18 for the purposes of today’s debate.

One of the findings of the FCA’s cost-benefit panel last year was the minimalist approach taken to cost-benefit analyses by the FCA: they are undertaken only when required by statute rather than being seen as good regulatory practice underpinning the detailed actions of regulation. The Financial Services Regulation Committee, as part of our inquiry into the FCA’s naming and shaming provisions, which had a potentially very significant impact on certain firms, called for a cost-benefit analysis. However, the FCA refused, saying that it was not required to do it by law. Therefore, I believe that attaching cost-benefit analysis to pretty much everything that the regulators do is necessary. Guidance would have been a good start, but the changes required are even broader than I have tried to achieve in my amendment.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s Amendment 132 seeks to widen the work of the CBA panels, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friends on the Front Bench have to say on that. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Noakes. I congratulate her on her purposive, rather than literal, interpretation of her amendment. I support her amendment and everything she said, as well as the other amendments in this group. I will speak to my Amendment 129.

Many noble Lords here today were in the Grand Committee debates for the then FSM Bill 2023. As my noble friend Lady Noakes rightly identified, the CBA panels have done very good work in their first couple of years of existence. My Amendment 129 seeks to give them further clarity to assist them in doing that good work, to ensure that they have the materials they need to do it, and to bring an additional element around public awareness of the panels’ work. That speaks to greater transparency, awareness and engagement, which can help not only the work of the CBA panels but the wider work of the regulators themselves. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Can the Minister explain what the FCA and the PRA are doing about cumulative burden? Are they focusing on the cumulative burdens of the rules that they have assessed using a cost-benefit analysis, or is it for all of their activities? It is my understanding that they are both pretty clear that they will use cost-benefit analysis in the way the statute has prescribed—that is, they use materiality thresholds, so quite a lot of them are not required at all to be looked at—so the whole range of their activities, which covers anything that is not rule-making, does not get assessed for cost-benefit at all. Can I be clear on what the Minister thinks the regulators are doing?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will have to write to the noble Baroness, because that is a very detailed question.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

To be clear, it is the question.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

We are trying to be balanced and proportionate here. I recognise that these are important issues but, at the same time, it is about ensuring that the regulator has the flexibility to make those decisions. We are definitely making inroads on this, although I imagine that there is a lot more discussion to be had between now and Report. I want to make sure that I give the noble Baroness the right response.

Amendment 132 seeks to extend the CBA obligations to general guidance and supervisory practices—I take that to mean all guidance. The Government recognise the concern that regulatory burdens can be imposed on firms through guidance and supervisory practice, as well as through formal rules. Where guidance is about rules that have already been made, in most cases the underlying policy would have already been subject to CBA through the rule-making process, so requiring CBA for such guidance would be duplicative. In these cases, the guidance is to help firms understand what the rules require and how they operate. Where guidance may result in significant costs being incurred, the Government note and welcome the regulators’ work to voluntarily prepare CBA for guidance—for example, the FCA’s guidance on fair treatment for vulnerable customers.

Most guidance issued by the regulators does not impose material incremental costs on firms. Obligating the regulators to undertake CBA on guidance would impose heavyweight analysis where it is least meaningful. It would introduce delays for guidance being issued, undermining the regulators’ ability to respond quickly to market developments, risks or firm failures.

The CBA panels are a hugely valuable and still-developing part of our regulatory architecture. The right approach is to allow them to mature and to hold regulators publicly accountable for how they respond to input from the panels, rather than embedding a detailed operational rulebook in primary legislation that will be inflexible in the face of ever-evolving circumstances. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply, but I do not think that it dealt comprehensively with the nature of the problem. I do not think that any of our amendments deal comprehensively with the nature of the problem, actually, because the answer is not loading on extra things for the CBA panels to do; it is about looking again at the obligations of the regulators. That is not what we have put down in these amendments, although we have had a debate on the issue.

I was pleased to hear the Minister say that he was prepared to have discussions between now and Report. This is an area where a number of us would like to get together with the Minister to try to work out how we can make some improvements, because the law as it stands is narrowly drawn. I do not think we can assume that the regulators will voluntarily expand that into the areas that some of us think should be covered, so it is right that we look at the legal provisions—but perhaps not necessarily the ones covered by these amendments. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 119 withdrawn.

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Ultimately, this amendment is about improving accountability to Parliament. In Parliament, we have entrusted regulators and supervisors with more powers, so surely it is right to have the institutional capacity to hold them properly to account. My amendments seek to do that, and I hope that they will be given careful consideration.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley’s amendments creating OFRA. I also support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which would use a panel to look at how the regulators are performing. The key thing is that we need more external heavyweight oversight of what the regulators are doing. As noble Lords have identified throughout this Committee, accountability is the key issue that we are focusing on, in particular because of the way in which the Bill weakens the current accountability constructs.

My noble friend Lord Bridges referred to the previous time that we were debating the same amendments, when we were sitting on the other side of the Room—I remember it very well. At that time, as my noble friend knows, I did not support his amendments because I was dead set on trying to get either a House of Lords Select Committee or a Joint Committee of both Houses involved. The original version of what is now FSMA 2023 had the involvement of only the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and we were clear that this House had far more expertise in financial services, and that it was important to leverage that either through the use of a dedicated Select Committee in your Lordships’ House or a Joint Committee. There was no appetite for a Joint Committee from the other place. We ended up with a committee, but it took an amendment to the then Bill in 2023, on which I focused all my effort last time. Also, as I said to my noble friend at the time, I did not think that we needed yet another unaccountable public body.

The Financial Services Regulation Committee has been in operation for about two and a half years, and I am now clear that the scale of the task is very large and very hard to execute without the kind of independent analysis that we would get from having something such as OFRA or a panel to assist in the task. It is just too big a task for one Select Committee in your Lordships’ House to handle. We meet weekly, as is customary for all Select Committees, but we have limited staff resources, in common with all other Select Committees of your Lordships’ House. We do pretty good work on that basis, but we cannot cover the whole area, nor can we look at as many things as we would like; we have to be selective about what we look at. We cannot take a comprehensive look at the accountability of the regulators; that is the missing piece now. We need something that is resourced and able to look at it in the round.

I support all the amendments in this group because anything would be a big improvement on what we have to date. I bring good news for the Minister: I have, today, tabled another idea for improving accountability, based on discussions with some people in the industry, which some Members of the Committee already know about. I tabled that this afternoon so I hope that we will be able to debate that on Monday.

The only point I am trying to make is that we are looking for options to improve accountability, which was already under pressure, but we now have huge new consumer credit legislation coming in that will mean lots of regulations and rules being issued over the next couple of years. There is quite a big task coming down the line, and we have to do something about it in the Bill.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 133 and 135, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bridges, and I shall say a few words about them. I have also tabled Amendment 135A, which amends Amendment 135.

Two of the questions raised by the Bill are how will the regulators operate, make, impose and judge the rules and how will Parliament’s proper role in the legislative process be ensured? In some cases, not only do we not know what we are supposed to be legislating on, as the Committee has discussed, but we do not know the basis on which the regulators will, in practice, be held to account. Indeed, as matters stand, the arrangements and the deployment of powers is not known, or not entirely, in many cases.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Bridges and supported by my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name, would establish an office for financial regulatory accountability, which would have the specific duty of examining and reporting on the performance of the FCA and the PRA and how they perform on specific measures, would provide some of the essential answers. The office would assess how far the regulators meet their statutory objectives and principles under FSMA 2000 and, importantly, the effect of specific pieces of regulation. We need to know the impact of these regulations on the domestic development of the financial services and the market, as well as the impact internationally, and we need to know the costs and burdens of compliance. Amendment 135 contains very specific duties, and I think they have been very well thought out. I hope the Minister will take them into account and consider why we need this office, which will be independent of the process of regulation. It will be independent of Parliament, not just of the regulators, and it will help Parliament to do what it ought to do as the legislature.

My Amendment 135A would include in these independent reports examples of how the rules have been implemented and applied to different firms, including similar firms doing the same kind of activity, because we do not have an independent analysis of those rules and regulations, the process or the compliance. Very often, small businesses are at sea; they cannot look to Parliament because we do not have the basis for assessing them, they cannot look to our reports, and they cannot necessarily look to the regulators. They tell me about this and quite often explain that they are not sure. They want to take a step to grow their business, perhaps to develop some new instrument or to expand their market, but they are not quite sure how the regulators will treat it. They have no example of how these things have been seen in the past or of how the rules have been applied.

Requiring an independent office for financial regulatory accountability to provide some examples will help not only Parliament but businesses in being competitive and growing their businesses. They will see the precedents and be able to predict much more easily how the system operates. It is not an expensive way in which to make judgments. They do not have to get in expensive consultants or do little trials here and there and pilots. They would give security in knowing where the boundaries are set and judged and whether they are consistent with the opportunities they need to seize if they are to make their businesses grow.

Above all, such an office reporting and assessing these duties would encourage the regulators to be consistent and predictable and to focus on their statutory objects. As the Bill aims to focus on the competitiveness and growth objective—we have talked a lot about reporting requirements and the overall strategic plan—there is a problematic lack of transparency and accountability by the regulators, other than to the Treasury, and that relationship sometimes seems a little too cosy.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Bridges would promote an affective mechanism to ensure that we have objective, transparent and impartial evidence externally provided by an independent body. I support them for that reason but add my small amendment so we have greater transparency in how they are applied.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I think that the Committee would like to hear from the noble Baroness.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

As I said at the start of this session, when it comes to withdrawing an amendment, noble Lords need to be brief. We do not want them to rehash the whole debate. They have to be respectful to the Committee because we have other amendments to discuss.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

We are a self-regulating House, and this is such an important area that I would like to hear the end of the noble Baroness’s remarks.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right that this is a self-regulating House, but the other side of the coin is self-discipline.