Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Baroness Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas

Committee stage
Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I think the safeguards were in relation to the clause as a whole, but I will certainly write to the noble Baroness. This has been an important discussion, but for now I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are taking huge powers in the Bill to abolish EU legislation and are asking us to believe the promises they have made; for instance, on environmental law, that they will not decrease environmental protection. I entirely accept those promises. This is a well-run Government who are capable of controlling what they do and living up to their promises. In that case, what is the problem with just saying, “And we’re not going to increase the regulatory burden”? We would say, “Okay, we believe you; we don’t need you to have a power to stop yourselves doing that”. What kind of Government need to legislate to stop themselves behaving well?

Skills and Post-16 Education Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas

Thursday 21st October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, we had a fair old ding- dong last time we met on this Bill, with the Government proposing that we should destroy an entire suite of examinations in order to improve access to T-levels. Yet here they are refusing to make minor changes to the sight that children are given of T-levels—which have many other benefits—as an option.

I do not see how the Government are being consistent on this. If they want T-levels to be fully appreciated as an option by young people, they need them to be put in front of those young people, clearly and frequently. That is what my noble friend Lord Baker’s amendment would do, and the Government’s amendment would not. I am thoroughly with those noble Lords who have spoken in saying that my noble friend’s amendment is a better way forward than the Government are yet proposing.

I also encourage the Government to look at a couple of old chestnuts to do with performance tables. If you want head teachers to say to children that they will be better off in an FE college and encourage them to go to it, you ought to give them credit for the results that they achieve there. It ought to be something that appears in the performance tables, credited to the school that has made that decision; otherwise, the incentive is just to hang on to pupils for the money. If schools are risking a blip in the performance tables because the A-level results will be bad and it would have been much better if they had gone to a technical college, there will be a real incentive for schools to encourage children to take that option.

The other aspect is to provide much better data on where children end up after school. At the moment, the information provided on what happens to those who do not go to university is very thin, uninspiring and not the sort of thing that encourages a parent to say, “Oh, that looks interesting; why don’t we look at that?” The provision of data and information is really important in helping parents to help their children make decisions, and the Government are falling a long way short on that. They have the information; it is just a question of deciding that they will publish it or make it available to others who will publish it. I really encourage them to go down that road.

My noble friend the Minister said that she hoped children would be making fully informed choices. I totally agree with her. If we can bring universities up to that standard, I should be delighted as well.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I share the sentiments of my noble friend Lord Baker about the way that my noble friend the Minister has taken a grip of this Bill, and I thank her for that. I have to say, therefore, that it is with some trepidation, and with the benefit of my business and bureaucratic experience, that I rise to throw a bit of cold water on the detail of both amendments.

As noble Lords will know from earlier discussions, I am very keen to see vocational careers education, training and, above all, apprenticeships advocated in schools—and, in fact, by employers themselves. We clearly have a problem. However, I worry about the bureaucracy that will be created by this provision; it is a concern with either version. To comply with the provisions, a lot of detailed work would have to be done by teachers, who work so hard; by providers—including UTCs, which I agree should be involved—of post-16 education; and by employers, if they join providers in schools, which is something that I think can often work well. They will have to do a lot of form-filling and more recording, health and safety-style. Then, as has been said, there will be extra guidance, but we do not know exactly what will be in that; it could make it easier or it could make it worse.

I worry that this will deter exactly the people and institutions that you want to get into schools to encourage youngsters to think about their futures and choose the right educational option. Too many people, in my view, now go to university and not enough go into good vocational routes. I have experience in Germany and Switzerland and elsewhere. To pick up on something that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said, in those countries, they often move at 14 or 16, which can be extremely helpful with the vocational route.

My worry is that the beneficiary of these micro-rules will be, yet again, the consultants who will have to help with process and compliance. I am obviously very sympathetic to the objective of these amendments, but I would like some reassurance from the Minister on how we make this system simple and efficient and how we enforce it sensibly—before we go through the Lobbies. As the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, was saying, there are costs and resource requirements in doing all these things in schools, and they have to come from somewhere else. So if we are going to make a change of this kind, we need to understand how it will be done and how it will be enforced, and that it will be done in a sensible and effective way, not adding needlessly to the weight of burden on our teachers.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I rise to support the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones, and some of the amendments in this group on this, the final day in Committee. I congratulate my noble friends Lord Ashton and Lady Chisholm of Owlpen as well as the indefatigable Bill team for taking this gargantuan Bill through so rapidly.

The problem caused by criminalising re-identification was brought to my attention by one of our most distinguished universities and research bodies, Imperial College London. I thought that this was a research issue, which troubled me but which I thought might be easy to deal with. However, talking to the professor in the computational privacy group today, I found, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, that it goes wider and could cause problems for companies as well. That leads me to think that I should probably draw attention to my relevant interests in the House of Lords register of interests.

The computational privacy group explained that the curious addition of Clause 162—which is different in character and language from other parts of the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said—draws on Australian experience, but risks halving the work of the privacy group, which is an academic body, and possibly creating costs and problems for other organisations and companies. I am not yet convinced that we should proceed with this clause at all, for two reasons. First, it will not address the real risk of unethical practice by people outside the UK. As the provision is not in the GDPR or equivalent frameworks in most other countries, only UK and Australian bodies or companies will be affected, which could lead to the migration of research teams and data entrepreneurs to Harvard, Paris and other sunny and sultry climes. Secondly, because it will become criminal in the UK to re-identify de-identified data—it is like saying “seashells on the seashore”—the clause could perversely increase the risk of data being re-identified and misused. It will limit the ability of researchers to show up the vulnerability of published datasets, which will make life easier for hackers and fraudsters—another perversity. For that reason, it may be wise to recognise the scope and value of modern privacy-enhancing technologies in ensuring the anonymous use of data somewhere in the Bill, which could perhaps be looked at.

I acknowledge that there are defences in Clause 162 —so, if a person faces prosecution, they have a defence. However, in my experience, responsible organisations do not much like to rely on defences when they are criminal prohibitions, as they can be open to dispute. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson— I am so sorry about his voice, although it seems to be getting a bit better—for proposing an exemption in cases where re-identification relates to demonstrating how personal data can be re-identified or is vulnerable to attack. However, I am not sure that the clause and its wider ramifications have been thought through. I am a strong supporter of regulation to deal with proven harm, especially in the data and digital area, where we are still learning about the externalities. But it needs to be reasonable, balanced, costed, careful and thought through—and time needs to be taken for that purpose.

I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister can find a way through these problems but, if that is not possible, I believe that the Government should consider withdrawing the clause.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

I very much support what my noble friend has just said. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has tried to give an exemption for researchers, but a lot of these things will happen in the course of other research. You are not spending your time solely trying to break some system; you are trying to understand what you can get from it, and suddenly you see someone you know, or you can see a single person there. It is something that you can discover as a result of using the data; you can get to the point where you understand that this is a single person, and you could find out more about them if you wanted to. If it is a criminal offence, of course, you will then tell nobody, which rather defeats the point. You ought to be going back to the data controller and saying that it is not quite right.

There are enormous uses in learning how to make a city work better by following people around with mobile phone data, for instance, but how do you anonymise it? Given greater computational power and more datasets becoming available, what can you show and use which does not have the danger of identifying people? This is ongoing technology—there will be new ways of breaking it and of maintaining privacy, and we have to have that as an active area of research and conversation. To my mind, this clause as it presently is just gets in the way.

Intellectual Property (Unjustified Threats) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas

Wednesday 9th November 2016 Other Business

[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Baroness Neville-Rolfe) (Con)]

My Lords, on interests, I am the Intellectual Property Minister, and I have the pleasure today of speaking on behalf of the Government.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for her comprehensive introduction to this large group of amendments. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Wilcox for her support for the Bill as whole and for the good work done by the Law Commission.

It is common ground, I think, that Section 70A and its equivalents set out the definition of an actionable threat. The sections replicate the existing exception whereby a threats action cannot be brought if the threat refers to a primary act of infringement. The existing statutory definitions of what is an infringing act lie at the heart of the threats provisions.

The amendments in this group would mean that threats to someone “commissioning” another person to carry out a specified primary act cannot trigger a threats action. Commissioning infringing goods is not an infringing act within the meaning of any of the existing statutory definitions. This is a key point. Treating commissioning as if it were infringement, for the purposes of the threats provisions, would be a highly significant change to the law. It would introduce a novel concept and create confusion in the law of threats and more generally.

Unjustified threats are those threats which are made in respect of invalid rights, or where there has been no infringement. Amendment 1 and its equivalents would remove any protection from unjustified threats for a particular class of people who are not actually infringers at all—that could easily include the SMEs we are concerned about, on which I will come back to my noble friend’s comments at the end—and, to me, that cannot be right.

The amendment would also have other unwelcome consequences. For example, there is the defence which is available to the threatener, if they can show that the infringement did in fact occur. That defence is made unworkable in these circumstances.

I am concerned that, as with Amendment 3, there is a risk that the amendment would have unintended consequences on the interpretation of IP provisions more widely—specifically, the provisions which define infringement. Furthermore, the meaning of what amounts to “commissioning” a primary act would only become clear after a substantial body of case law had been built up. I do not think that that would be acceptable or welcome to business.

I shall now move on to Amendment 20—with many thanks to the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, for his explanation—which relates to use of trade marks in an online environment. I do not agree that there is an inconsistency in the threats regime. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested that infringement law could be aligned better for the rights, but that is a wider question, as we discussed, that relates not just to threats or this particular Bill. If the amendment is intended to ensure that “applying” a trade mark in an online environment is covered more explicitly as a primary act, then in my view this is unnecessary when the threats provisions are read in the wider context of the parent Act.

This Bill will insert the individual threats provisions into the existing framework for the relevant rights. While the provisions appear in isolation in this Bill, they must be read—as I have just said—in their wider context.

The relevant sections of the Trade Marks Act 1994 do not expressly require a sign to be in physical form. It is accepted that services may be offered online under a sign in electronic form, and this applies whether the sign is included in a listing or as an AdWord. Nor do they require that the sign must be physically applied to physical goods or their physical packaging. Where goods themselves are electronic, then it follows that the sign applied must also be electronic.

That is a long way of saying that changing the provisions in the Bill to set out expressly that the online application of a sign is covered is unnecessary and, as we discussed in some of the hearings, could cast doubt on an already settled view.

I turn finally to the position of small businesses, which was so well expounded by my noble friend Lady Wilcox. I do not think that a champion is a matter for this Law Commission Bill, although she and I had a good discussion about it. I believe, as I have said several times, that this will benefit smaller-sized businesses by helping them to gain access to justice at reasonable cost in order to enforce and make best use of their IP in the sort of circumstances that she was talking about.

I hope noble Lords will allow me to enlarge a little on the measures that government has taken to help SMEs, as I think that might help my noble friend. We heard in the evidence sessions from Mr Justice Birss about the benefits to SMEs of using the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court. Recent reforms made to the IPEC—in particular, the small claims track—help to level the IP playing field for SMEs that previously struggled with cost. The Government are fully supportive of the IP pro bono initiative, launched last month, which is designed to help small businesses and individuals who are involved in a dispute about IP. The IPO also undertakes a wide range of activities that are aimed at SMEs—partly as a legacy of the time when my noble friend was Minister—and geared to promote understanding, such as: the government-funded IP audit programme; the IP for business tools; and the IP finance toolkit. I make no apology for taking this opportunity to explain that.

Regarding the guidance on the Bill, the IPO has committed to publish business guidance 12 weeks before the new provisions come into effect. In addition, the IPO will implement a full communications plan, update the online tools, make presentations at outreach events—many of which are aimed at SMEs—update stakeholders who have signed up to receive updates and use social media channels to try and ensure that we take this opportunity to raise awareness of the changes. Actually, this is a good opportunity to expound the importance of IP. The IPO works tirelessly to increase awareness of IP and to provide guidance and education at every level. I am happy to commit the IPO to communicating to SMEs in a helpful way about the changes and benefits that will be brought by the Bill.

An important point is that we will ensure, as we did for the Consumer Rights Act, that the material is pitched at the right level. I have asked the IPO to road-test the guidance in draft with small business representatives. So we will have material suitably targeted for SMEs, but also communicate to the people who provide advice and support to these businesses, such as the patent library network, growth hubs and professional IP advisers. As IP Minister, I have tried to make sure that people understand IP a bit more and, with my noble friend’s assistance, I think that this Bill is an opportunity to do a bit more of that.

Coming back to the amendments, I believe that they would in fact complicate what is currently, as drafted, a clear and consistent definition, developed by the Law Commission, of what is and is not an infringing act. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I apologise for being backward when it comes to IP law, but I am surprised that the “commissioner” is not committing anything actionable. In this internet world, if I commission a product that infringes a patent, it is easy to get it made somewhere that is hard for the patent owner to get at and then arrange to sell it over the internet so that the importer is actually the final customer, rather than anyone who can be got at. That leaves the patent owner with no sensible place to go to enforce their patent. Is it really the case that “commissioning” a manufacturer to infringe a patent is not in itself actionable, or did I misunderstand the Minister?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

These are quite fine points of law, but that is a fair question. Are there any other points, while we try to ensure that we answer your question accurately?

[Lord Lucas]

I thought that the Minister was saying to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that she was seeking to introduce something new by saying that “commissioning” was not an infringement and, therefore, one could not make a justified threat to someone who was not doing anything that was actionable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

New Section 70C and equivalents set out remedies in the case of a successful threats action and the defences available to those who have a threats action brought against them. Subsection (4) sets out a defence if it has not been possible for the threatener to identify the primary actor.

As has been said, the first amendment would amend the subsection to reflect a drafting preference by moving the location of the reference letter T. That may relate to the person who made the threat, which begins with T, but I will discuss the wording with parliamentary counsel in the light of the Digital Economy Bill to see whether we feel that it is right. I do not think that anybody thinks that it is a material point.

The second group of amendments under discussion relate to the defences available for someone who is faced with a threats action. The 2004 patents reform introduced a defence for a person making a threat to a retailer or the like. The defence applies if their efforts to find the trade source of the infringing patented goods were unsuccessful. The Bill extends this limited but useful defence to trade marks and designs. The provisions clarify that the person making the threat must have used “all reasonable steps” to find the importer or manufacturer of the product in question before they are safe to approach the retailer.

The phrase “all reasonable steps” was carefully chosen in response to stakeholder feedback, discussions with the Law Society and the Law Commission’s working group. Stakeholders thought that the previous phrasing used in the patents defence, “best endeavours”, carried too much legal baggage, as it has a special meaning in commercial contract law. In addition, it was felt that this could require disproportionate efforts by a rights holder attempting to identify a primary infringer. “All reasonable steps” therefore strikes the right level. It requires the person making the threat not just to do something which is reasonable but to do everything which is reasonable. The wording is fair; it does not require the person making the threat to go beyond what is reasonable.

Amendments 18 and 19 and equivalents seek to deal with pending rights. It is well established that threats to sue for infringement of an IP right, when an application for that right is still pending, are nevertheless subject to the threats provisions. New Section 70E for patents, and equivalents for other rights, ensure that there is no change to this principle—the threat will be interpreted as a threat to bring infringement proceedings once the right has been granted.

The effect of the amendment is to state explicitly that the issue of whether there has been an infringement will be determined on the basis of the granted right. It would add words in respect of the justification defence at new Section 70C(3) to state that a reference to the word “patent” means, in the case of an application, “patent as granted”. It would also make similar changes in relation to the other rights. The amendment is unnecessary. The threatener has a defence that the acts were in fact infringing ones. It is already the case in law that he must be able to show that the acts are infringing at the point of trial. If, at that time, there is not yet a granted IP right, there is no valid right to infringe and so the defence is not available to the threatener. That is the right outcome.

It is only where an IP right has been granted by the time of the trial that the defence is available. The new threats provisions do not change this legal principle. They fit into the relevant Acts, which themselves make clear at what point and in what way infringement of an IP right can occur. Let us take patents as an example: to understand references to infringement of a pending patent, it is necessary to refer to Section 69 of the Patents Act 1977. This makes it clear that you will not infringe a patent until it is granted and explains how infringement works for pending patents.

I have tried to explain why the provisions are drafted in this way. I will look again at our friend T. I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I would be grateful if, between now and Report, the Minister could write to me with some examples of cases decided on the basis of “all reasonable efforts”, so that I can get a real grip on what that means. It is a very uncertain phrase in English. If I wrote to Tesco asking, “Who made the cornflakes?”, and it said, “It’s not our policy to divulge that information”, would that be “all reasonable efforts”, or should I ask five or six times? If I cannot find a way on the website to communicate with somebody who appears to be selling products off a platform, are no efforts “reasonable efforts”? Particularly in the context of being asked to give way on Amendment 11 or whatever comes back on Report, knowing that, for example, the things that we are asking the BBC to do in defence of “Doctor Who” are actually reasonable and are not a ridiculous burden in defence of a 20p commission on a Doctor Who birthday card is something that we as a House should do. I would be grateful for an opportunity to see the sort of evidence that a court will see, against which it will judge whether a particular course of action involves all reasonable actions rather than just reasonable actions.