Covid-19 Inquiry

Baroness Neville-Rolfe Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and all who have spoken. It has been a timely and extremely interesting debate. I think we all feel for the grief of those who lost family and friends during Covid, for those who are still suffering from long Covid, for those who lost loved ones from other diseases because the health system could not cope, and for children and students who missed out on a proper education.

The wonderful Covid wall on the other side of the Thames is, to me, a regular reminder of that dreadful time and today’s debate has rightly been touched with emotion. I was particularly struck by the speech from my noble friend Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie on the appalling experience of those with cerebral palsy. There is a lot to learn from such examples.

However, I would emphasise the point my noble friend Lord Evans of Rainow made in his opening remarks that most countries and the World Health Organization itself were ill-prepared for the devastation of Covid-19. I know that is something that my noble friend Lord Kamall would have said had he not been absent—assailed, I have to tell the House, by the prickles of a vicious sea urchin in the Indian Ocean, which means that he is not with us today for this important debate.

I will try to focus on the report but, first, I was sorry that in her critical introduction the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, did not give any credit for what the Government did right; for example, the success of the Vaccine Taskforce, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. The Government also delivered £400 billion of support—more than almost any other country—which protected jobs, businesses, livelihoods and our cultural and sports institutions. The legacy of this expenditure has been an economic challenge for Governments ever since and we need to learn lessons from that for the future.

I think we need to be open to challenging ourselves. I think that has been the spirit of this debate from all quarters, including from my noble friend Lord Hannan about Sweden and its positive comparative mortality figures and the need to be proportionate.

I am therefore glad that the report stresses the importance of learning lessons from experience and suggests, rightly, that government and the Civil Service do not always do this well. I was struck by the failure to follow through on the Korean and Taiwanese experience of MERS—that is in paragraph 5.27—following Exercise Alice in 2016. Their work on border restrictions, contact tracing and quarantining might have prepared us better. My noble friend Lord Lansley made a similar point and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, also referred, rightly, to that useful experience.

A chord was also struck with me by the inquiry’s comments on the deleterious effect of the Civil Service’s bureaucracy—that is in chapter 5, page 129. I very much recognise this problem of bureaucracy from my own experience as a Minister.

However, I want to demur from one term used in the inquiry’s summary. It states in terms on page 2 of the report:

“The UK prepared for the wrong pandemic”.


That statement gives an unfortunate and misleading impression, because readers will assume that the efforts made to prepare for an influenza epidemic were mistaken. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the experience of 1919 showed, influenza can be a terrible disease which leads to a substantial number of deaths, including among young people—unlike Covid—so let me offer a maxim: deaths of young people are even more devastating than those of old people. Hence preparing for an influenza epidemic was not wrong, as the inquiry suggests. It was right and it was supported by government and most of the scientists. However, it was not sufficient, as the inquiry reasonably goes on to suggest. More should have been done to prepare for different diseases by building, I would argue, on what had been done in Asia.

I was also concerned by some of the omissions in the report. In particular, there is very little on cost-benefit and its role in making the right choices in emergencies. Some of us on these Benches suggested during the epidemic that much more could and should have been done to make proper use of economic tools to determine policy, and to involve economists in the many expert groups. I was therefore impressed by the thoughtful speech of my noble friend Lord Frost, with the benefit of his inside view as a Minister at the centre of government. I hope that it will be studied by the inquiry. I particularly share the concern he expressed that we might not get a proper report on the cost and benefits of all the measures that were taken during the crisis. I hope that the new Government will think about that and respond positively.

There is also less than I expected in the report on the local aspects. I agree with the Minister in her admiration for the many volunteers who put communities ahead of themselves. This was my own experience in my home village of Chilmark. There were many heroes and a terrific role was played by local people, volunteers and local and health authorities of various kinds. Faith groups, mentioned by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London, were also important, although personally I was very saddened by the closure of churches during the first lockdown. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, also made some useful points about the importance of such different bodies, both in a responsive and preventive capacity, in preparing for future pandemics. My conclusion from reading the report, and from that discussion, is that the inquiry model proposed for the future is too centralised.

This feeds on to some messages for the inquiry as it moves forward with at least eight—yes, eight—more modules. Let us take its new approach: while I agree with the need for better use of experts, feeding back to them properly on the use of their advice and having less groupthink, it is wrong to try to construct a system with so little ministerial input. The inquiry appears to have a degree of distaste for the political process. My own experience is that Ministers—and spads, who are barely mentioned in the report—must work closely with experts. Ministers have to make trade-offs; you cannot expect them easily to accept what are possibly very costly recommendations from an independent statutory body, as proposed by the inquiry. This is especially the case since all experience shows that it is Ministers who bear the brunt of any criticisms. Ministers must be accountable and in control. I also agree with those who have underlined the importance of accountability to Parliament, including the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, the noble Lord, Lord Reid, and others. In my own experience as a Back-Bencher during Covid, it was very difficult to get Parliamentary Answers and replies out of our Ministers, so I obviously need to take some lessons from the noble Lord, Lord Winston.

On devolution, I agree that there should be a unified system for dealing with serious emergencies, but the UK Government have to take the lead. I am afraid that the inquiry is rather naive here; it assumes that relations between the four Governments ought to and can proceed smoothly, with no indication of how such a happy state of affairs might be brought about. In particular, it ignores the political grandstanding that was evident during Covid in certain parts of our country. I hope that the inquiry and the Government will pick up what has been said in the debate today in this important area.

The inquiry also needs to be more aware of the cost it has run up. The Library’s best estimate is £162 million so far, with £108 million of that by the inquiry itself. There is also the opportunity cost of the top civil servants involved. This needs tackling—budgets need to be spent on solutions. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, might agree with that.

I was pleased to see the readiness of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to build on what has already been done by the previous Government. We did many things right if you compare our management of Covid-19 with that of some other countries. I think this is because of the strategic decision taken by Ministers to press ahead aggressively with the investment in and the rollout of vaccines—and, indeed, to bring lockdown to an end, in the teeth of opposition from the party opposite.

Since then, as a Government we developed the 2022 resilience framework and the 2023 UK Biological Security Strategy, both of which were widely welcomed. In the wake of Covid we made improvements to data handling and cyber risk in research, and to our assessment of pharma and non-pharma interventions. We established a national situation centre in the Cabinet Office, and strengthened our resilience directorate and training operations. We undertook emergency exercises involving all the key players, learning from the military and business. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, made a good point about detailed preparation on kit, testing and so on. The lead department approach is vital in answering that important question.

It is vital that all of this is carried forward. Is that the Government’s intention, or does the review of our national resilience that the CDL has announced presage a completely different approach? That is my first question to the Minister this evening. Secondly, what does the Minister think about the inquiry’s proposal for a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience? I am, frankly, wary of this, because it could undermine essential ministerial accountability.

The report brings out well the sheer complexity of the multilateral system of providing advice to government on health, science, resilience and preparedness for emergencies. It contrasts with large international companies of the kind I have worked in. It is wasteful and inefficient, and it reduces the productivity of the public sector—a concern which I look forward to debating in the House next month. The report rightly calls the institutions and structures responsible for emergency planning “labyrinthine” in their complexity. This carries huge risks. Thirdly, then, what is the Government’s plan to tackle this spaghetti junction of complexity—so well-illustrated in the report’s complicated government department maps?

If the Minister is not able to answer my three questions, I hope she will agree either to write or to a meeting. She will know from discussions we have had before that I am keen to get things right for the future before the next pandemic arrives. Like the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, I have dealt with several, both in the agricultural area and in the medical human area, in my business career. It is really important to learn and implement the lessons of the past so that the future is better. Those who have lost loved ones deserve resolution and to know that we have learned lessons for the future from this devastating pandemic. We need to be challenging and open-minded with ourselves. This report and this debate today have made a very useful start.