Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Baroness Neville-Rolfe Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting : House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

I think the original question was around the consultation we are going to do on this. This will be resolved in the consultation.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I think this shows that it is important that we understand what the statutory instruments in this area are going to look like. It will obviously lead to a clearer conversation if the Government are able to move on that. The second thing is that, in my experience, things do not necessarily go the way you expect. When I sought my pension estimate before I retired, I ended up a year later getting a less generous pension than I had anticipated, perhaps because things had changed on the underlying demographics—health or whatever. We have to be quite careful to take account of the complexity of these things in the sorts of SIs that we make. Clearly, we need to consult on them for that very reason.

[Baroness Sherlock]

On a final point of clarification, if I have heard the Minister correctly—and I will read the record—I think she is trying to reassure us that she will consult and that this will be dealt with in regulations. The problem is that Clause 14(4)(b) states that regulations may include provision,

“specifying requirements to be met by the scheme relating to its financing, such as requirements,”

et cetera. All this amendment does is insert the words, “or by an employer”, because of the concern that the Bill may allow regulations to be made requiring the scheme to put money in. We want to be sure that the Bill will require the employer, rather than the scheme, to provide the money. That is why the amendment is written as it is, accepting that the Government will have to work out what is in the regulations and then what the regulator actually did as a result. Are the Government confident that the wording of the Bill will allow them to place a requirement on the sponsoring employer to do what the Minister has described?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, this important group of amendments deals with the definitions of new criminal offences and new regulatory fines, and with the defences to the criminal offences. I will also speak to my Amendments 18 and 22 as well as to Amendments 23 to 26 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton.

Amendments 17 and 22 are probing amendments. They would require that, for the criminal offences of avoidance of employer debt and risking accrued scheme benefits, the person has to have behaved wilfully, recklessly or unscrupulously. I want to say a few words about each of those terms, which is where the probing comes in.

I do not think that “wilfully” changes much in the sense of the clauses because later, in subsection (2)(b) of the respective new sections, it is stated that the person intended the actual course of conduct to have such an effect. It could be argued that the wording of the subsections further highlights the necessity for a greater understanding of the consequences but, in my view, the insertion of “wilfully” would make those subsections redundant. My Amendment 18 and Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton—to which I have put my name—would delete those subsections.

It gets a little more complicated when it comes to considering “recklessly” but it is important to consider that term because, as several noble Lords pointed out at Second Reading, the Government consulted on “wilfully” and “recklessly”. As I see it, “recklessly” does not require the same degree of intent as to outcome, so it broadens the scope. It implies a lack of due diligence or a high degree of negligence. One could perhaps express it almost as wilfully negligent—that is, not bothering to have proper checks in place and caring even less.

These are egregious matters we are considering, when pensions are put at risk either deliberately, without caring or for ulterior motives. To my mind, it would be unthinkable to allow unscrupulous individuals to get off the hook of criminal charges with the defence of “I didn’t know” because they had not made, and had no intention of making, the right kind of checks. “Recklessly” is not the same as “accidentally” or “incidentally”; “recklessly” is “I don’t care” and it should be covered. It should not require that the precise end effect was intended, which is why both subsections (2)(b) in the offences, which say that the person intended the actual course of conduct to have such an effect, need to be deleted because they would negate recklessness as an offence.

Of course, having appropriate checks and procedures in place would be an obvious defence, just as they are in the various “failure to prevent” types of offences that have come into being, such as for bribery and money laundering.

Now I come to probing the third term: “unscrupulously”. This may not be a normal legal term, but everyone knows what it means. It is used in describing the objectives of those whom it is wished to catch. It is used about the new offences—starting at the bottom of page 7 of the Explanatory Notes, which state:

“They will provide additional deterrents for unscrupulous behaviours and will enable the Regulator to punish abuse and wrongdoing within the occupational pensions industry appropriately.”


That is exactly what we want to be able to do: punish unscrupulous behaviours.

Compared with some of our Commonwealth colleagues, we in this country are rather a soft touch. Australia has an offence of unconscionable conduct in commerce. It works under common law and shows that expressions describing bad behaviour do not need to be shunned in legislation. Yes, it is a catch-all phrase, but we should be starting to give it serious thought when it accurately describes the underlying behaviour.

As a little thought experiment, what happens if we apply the three words “wilfully”, “recklessly” and “unscrupulously” to driving fast in a 30mph zone? What would we get? “Wilfully” means that there was an intention to drive faster. “Recklessly” might mean not bothering to look or have regard to surroundings or missing the sign. What might be “unscrupulous”? I have had some fun thinking about this. Here are a few possibilities: blanking out your number plate with a fancy gizmo or having false number plates; getting a friend to remove the 30mph sign; or perhaps making someone else the fall guy, saying that you were not the one driving. These may be wilful acts but while it is questionable whether they are specifically wilful at the time of the actual offence or what the precise intended effect was, they are certainly unscrupulous.

I turn briefly to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I apologise for going ahead of the mover but there are words in common. In his amendments, “wilfully” and “recklessly” are used in a slightly different place but what I have said about their meaning also applies. There is also the consequence of needing to delete the subsection reciting intent.

Amendments 23 and 25 are applied to deal with the criminal offence and civil fine relating to putting accrued scheme benefits at risk. The wording

“detrimentally affects in a material way”

appears and has caused some concerns, which were referenced at Second Reading. I think that the positioning of the wording works well and support the addition of those words to the fine offence. Obviously, it is possible to merge the noble Lord’s proposal and my own with regard to the criminal offence of risking the accrued scheme benefits.

More broadly, it seems that “wilfully” or “recklessly” could be usefully incorporated into the financial penalty on avoidance of employer debt, so that it was in all four of the new offences, including the two criminal ones and the new fines. Then there would be no playing off about different meanings. But I will listen carefully to the Committee, particularly to see whether the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, has a different nuance to mine.

The other amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Sherlock, relate to defences and call for guidance. I sympathise with the general intent but have some reservations; however, I will speak to them later when we have heard from the movers, as their wording is not interconnected like my amendments and those of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I beg to move.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests and shall speak to Amendments 19 to 21, which are grouped with those of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. My amendments are also in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, who sadly cannot be in her place today. We are concerned that the powers in Clause 107 may be drawn too widely. This is a concern shared by a number of those involved in the pensions sector—indeed, it was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, a great expert in pensions matters, at Second Reading.

In the same debate my noble friend the Minister helpfully said that the intention of the clause was,

“to punish those who wilfully or recklessly harm their pension scheme”.—[Official Report, 28/1/20; col. 1353.]

In the light of that, it seems that the criminal offence is really aimed at parties whose conduct is extreme and lies outside the range of ordinary reasonable conduct. If so, we believe that the thought could be captured better by applying the offence only where,

“no reasonable person having regard to all of their duties and all relevant circumstances”,

would have acted as they did. The change from “reasonable excuse” to “no reasonable person”, as in Amendment 19, may not sound like much of a change; however, I assure noble Lords that it is important. I am advised that a substantial body of case law makes it clear that the two are very different. The former potentially creates a fine objective judgment, while the latter recognises that there is a range of conduct that can be seen as reasonable. Our Amendment 20 proposes for consideration today a list of factors that could be taken into account by the courts.

Finally, Amendment 21 proposes an exemption, drawing on an idea in the Pensions Act 2004. It would provide a system of binding comfort that could be given by the regulator or the Pension Protection Fund. Given the gravity of the criminal offences those involved in the pension world will potentially face as a result of the Bill, there seems to be a strong case for examining this. We want good, honest people to be involved in the sector and not deterred from any involvement. These amendments deal with new Section 58A of the Pensions Act 2004, but obviously if the argument were accepted by the Government, a similar change would be needed to new Section 58B.

In responding to these amendments, would the Minister —I think it will be the deputy Leader—give more detail and further examples of the harms we are trying to remedy in this part of the Bill? Much mention was made at Second Reading of BHS and Carillion, but these companies had unique factors that went way beyond pensions. The impact assessment assumes up to five cases every year. Is there other evidence in recent years that justifies criminal penalties and these estimates?

In closing, I shall make a wider point. We need to get this legislation right, and we have been trying to do that today, because the costs of getting it wrong, and the inevitable legal costs, will fall on pension schemes and therefore leave less for the very pensioners we are trying to help with the Bill. The new criminal offences appear to cover not only the employer but trustees, advisers, third parties and possibly the regulator. They could embrace routine debt funding necessary for a viable business, or changes to investment strategy designed by trustees to improve their fund. The perverse effect of getting the arrangements wrong—this is a theme I always return to—could be cost and delay, which might be problematic in a tight financial situation and push more businesses into the Pension Protection Fund, which is exactly what we all want to avoid. It could also deter trustees from taking on the responsibility for pension funds. My noble friend Lord Eccles, who I am sorry to see is not in his place, made this point in relation to the wider regulation-making power in Clause 51, although I very much understand the difficulties that my noble friend faces in this area.