Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Wednesday 21st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I fear that I may disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Morgan—but I hope not. I have no difficulty at all with Amendments 37 and 40, which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I have some difficulties with Amendments 34 and 35, which we are going to come to in a later group. Those are the amendments that would substitute the word “may” for “must”. They are the basic amendments that would give the judge a discretion rather than imposing on him a duty in certain circumstances.

Amendment 36, which has been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spells out how that discretion is to be exercised. It states that the judge must balance,

“the degree of harm to the interests of national security”,

on the one hand, against,

“the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice”.

It is now many years since I heard a PII application. It was never an easy balancing operation, but at least with a PII application one was balancing a particular piece of evidence and how much harm it would do to the national interest, on the one side, and how much good it would do to the case of one party or the other, on the other side. It was difficult but it was a fairly specific balancing operation. I find much greater difficulty with the judge being required to take account of,

“the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice”.

I cannot see how he can possibly evaluate that in the abstract. In one sense, it might be said to overwhelm everything else, of course; but on the other hand, how much weight can be given to that? Amendment 36 is very different from the operation that one used to, and still does, carry out in an ordinary PII application. I am not happy with Amendment 36 and that sort of discretion being given to a judge.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the focus of the Bill is to enable this country to find a means of dispensing justice while protecting national security. National security has not had much of a hearing so far this afternoon. I shall explain why I do not think that public interest immunity is any longer an adequate safeguard in respect of national security. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that, at the moment, the PII regime prevents justice being dispensed consistent with security. Pace the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I do not think that this is an impossible goal.

When national security-sensitive evidence which may be important to the claimant’s case—we all agree about that—is excluded from the courtroom by a PII certificate and the judge may not take it into account in coming to a judgment, there are two consequences: the claimant is unable to prove his case and the Government cannot defend themselves properly. To protect national security evidence from disclosure in open court the Government are being forced to agree substantial settlements, with unjustified reputational damage ensuing. The inability of our legal system to provide adequate recourse to parties in civil dispute brings no credit to it and we need to do something to mend it.

Amendment 40 would insert PII as a first stage in the legal process. This would undoubtedly greatly increase the length of proceedings and costs without necessarily guaranteeing that evidence would be heard. I cannot help feeling that this is pointless. Moreover—and this is a real problem—PII impinges adversely on the claimant’s rights and, contrary to the assertion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, since the case concerning Binyam Mohamed, PII has also proved to be a less than total protection for national security sensitive information. We do not now have a safeguard in PII to protect national security. It has really changed the ground. In that case, the court ordering disclosure of American material despite the Government’s PII certificate has damaged our intelligence relationship with the allies, especially, although not only, with the United States. We have this judgment from the independent reviewer of terrorism, David Anderson QC, who I know has been quoted by other noble Lords. However, I know that, on this point, he is right. It is a very serious matter if our allies can no longer trust our ability to keep secret intelligence passed to us secret.

The fact that we have not had a major terrorist incident in this country since 7/7 is not the result of the conversion of the enemy but of the successful diligence of our intelligence and security services in protecting us. They depend on vital—and I mean vital—sharing of intelligence with allies. The effect of recent cases in civil courts, and the numbers of these are growing, has now spread into the core security interests of the UK. Some noble Lords talked about the core security interests of this country in justice, and I entirely agree. However, we also have another interest to protect which is important to us. We are now damaging the core security interests of the UK. If we do not find a way, as part of a responsible national security policy, of restoring credibility to our promise to protect information given to us, we will find our intelligence relationships further eroded over time and our national security eroded with them.

It is not just the control principle that is at issue, it is UK national security. This cannot be subjected to balancing tests of the kind set out in Amendment 47 —and Amendment 46, for that matter—as if it were somehow exchangeable with other goods. Lives are not at stake in civil proceedings but they are—they can be—in national security.

Closed material proceedings are of course second-best to completely open court proceedings. There is nothing that divides anybody in this House on that point; we all agree. The problem, however, is that we are not in an ideal world. Only the court can decide to allow closed material proceedings under the Bill, and presumably the judge would not permit that if they did not think that there was a substantial national security interest to be protected and they had not been convinced by the submission of the Secretary of State. In that case, this issue would not arise. However, if it does arise and the court agrees that there should be CMP, it will permit a full testing of the claimant’s case. The Government will be able to defend themselves in a manner that protects sensitive national security information.

The Bill also provides for gisting to the claimant. This is much better than the absence of justice and the potential prejudice to national security at the same time. Amendments 48, 49 and 50 would destroy the balance that the Bill would bring about.

Much has been made already of the Government’s proposals being “a radical departure” from our traditional norms. However, the closed material procedure is drawn from the procedure created by the previous Labour Government for the special immigration appeals courts which, I might say, Liberty was very influential in setting up, and which have been tested and accepted as compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The reality of justice there is demonstrated by the fact that the Government lose cases. Amendment 44 would bring some SIAC procedures into question, as well as rendering this Bill null and void.

I hope that this House will accept that this Bill is a balanced response to a difficult issue. I take seriously, along with other Lords, the need for safeguards, but I believe that many of the proposals on the Marshalled List go too far. I hope that this House will reject amendments which, far from improving the Bill, either remove or render ineffectual the purpose of closed material proceedings. To use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, I believe that this Bill passes the smell test.

Sex Offenders Register

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Thursday 17th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure for us on the Cross Benches when the pot calls the kettle black. No doubt the Minister will recall that it was a Labour Home Secretary, Mr Blunkett, who wrote in the Evening Standard that he would not give in to the judges. Would the Minister therefore suggest to her right honourable friend that she would do better to follow the line taken by another Labour Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, who, when asked to comment on an adverse court decision, of which there were a great many, would only ever say that he was disappointed?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, it is not a question of giving in to the courts; it is undoubtedly a question of the proper implementation of court judgments and the role of Parliament in making legislation.

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in Force of Sections 1 to 9) Order 2011

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, the purpose of the order before the House today is to renew Sections 1 to 9 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 pending their repeal and replacement with an alternative regime. These sections expire after one year unless renewed by order subject to the affirmative resolution of both Houses. The effect of this order will be to maintain the control orders powers until 31 December 2011, and I emphasise that this is a limited and temporary renewal. As the Home Secretary said on 26 January in another place, this allows us to bring forward the legislation introducing a replacement system. In due course the House will obviously be able to debate the new legislation in detail.

By way of a preliminary I should like to set out the context for the proposal before the House. Sadly, I have to say that the threat to the United Kingdom from terrorism is as serious as we have faced at any time, and it remains assessed by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre as “severe”. Since the beginning of the year, there have been a number of major terrorist attacks that have resulted in the deaths of many innocent people. These attacks have occurred in different countries from Russia to Afghanistan to Yemen and to the Philippines, and they show that a large number of fatalities still result from terrorist attacks. This country has been well protected, but nevertheless in the UK we have witnessed a number of significant terrorist plots that have been uncovered over the past year, and recent investigations and trials show that terrorist networks are continuing to plan and to attempt to carry out attacks. The threat we face continues to evolve, and I do not think that it is going to diminish or change to any material extent in the near future. That is the background against which we have to look at the temporary legislation and the new regime.

The coalition’s commitment to redress the balance in our counterterrorism powers was made in the run-up to the election and we therefore conducted a review of the counterterrorism and security powers. That review included consideration of the necessity, effectiveness and proportionality of control orders. On behalf of the Government I thank the independent oversight given to that review by the noble Lord, and now my noble friend Lord Macdonald. The review underlined that the Government’s absolute priority is to prosecute suspected terrorists in open court and that imposing restrictions on suspected terrorists who have not been convicted in open court should be the last resort. I want to emphasise that prosecution is our objective. Where restrictions are required they should, as far as possible but given the need to protect the public, continue to support the primary objective of prosecution.

The review concluded that for the foreseeable future there is likely to continue to be a small number of people in the United Kingdom who pose a real threat to our security but who, despite our best efforts, cannot be prosecuted or, in the case of foreign nationals, deported. Our reluctant conclusion is that there will therefore continue to be a need for a mechanism to protect the public from the threat of such individuals.

Noble Lords may be aware that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, reached the same conclusion in his most recent and, indeed, his last independent report on control orders, and the other statutory consultees support the proposal to renew the control order powers. I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I am sure that other noble Lords will want to join me in this, that the Government thank him for his very thorough work over the past 10 years on the review process. His reports have been a model of clarity and succinctness and a great aid towards everyone’s understanding of what was at issue.

I am aware that a number of Members of this House and members of committees have said that they would have liked to have been able to see, at the time of the renewal of this order, the legislation that we are going to bring forward. I have to say that we will bring forward that legislation as soon as we can. We regard it as extremely important to get it right. We do not want to get ourselves into a position where subsequently we are reviewed and changed in our intentions through court action.

However, it is only right, as we have already done, to give the highlights of the provisions that we intend to bring forward, which mark real changes in the regime. It will provide, among other things, a two-year maximum time limit on the measures, which will clearly demonstrate that these are targeted and temporary. It will be possible to impose a further measure on an individual only if there is evidence of new terrorism-related activity after the original measure was imposed, which of course is different from the current situation. Measures will have to meet the evidential test of reasonable belief that a person is or has been involved in terrorist-related activity, and this of course is a higher threshold than the test of reasonable suspicion of such involvement, which of course exists under the current control order regime.

The police will be under a strengthened legal duty to inform the Home Secretary about their ongoing review of a person’s conduct with a view to bringing a prosecution. A more flexible overnight residence requirement will replace the current curfew arrangements. Forcible relocation to other parts of the country will be ended. Geographical boundaries will be replaced with a power to impose much more tightly defined exclusion from particular places only. There will be no power to exclude someone, for instance, from the totality of, say, a London borough. Individuals will have greater freedom of communication, which will include access to a mobile phone and to a home computer with internet access, subject to certain conditions such as providing passwords. They will have greater freedom to associate. For example, there will be no blanket restrictions on visitors or meetings. They will be prohibited only from associating with people who may facilitate terrorism-related activity. And of course they will be free to work and to study, subject again to any restrictions necessary to protect the public.

These changes will allow individuals to continue to lead a normal life as far as possible, subject only to the restrictions necessary to prevent or disrupt involvement in terrorism-related activity. We are clear that the more limited restrictions that may be imposed may indeed facilitate further investigation as well as prevent terrorism-related activities. The new regime will be accompanied by an increase in funding for the police and the Security Service to enhance their investigative capabilities. That is an absolutely key part of the new measures. We intend to bring forward legislation to this effect shortly and, as I have said, it must be properly prepared so that it may be properly scrutinised by this House. We welcome the support given by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to these measures and, indeed, the comments that have been made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent reports. The committee has expressed some welcome, even if perhaps only cautious, to the new system. The Government will of course reply formally to the detailed recommendations that have been made in those reports.

In the mean time, the Government are clear that it would be irresponsible to allow the current regime to lapse in the absence of alternative measures and while the investigative capabilities of the law enforcement and security agencies remain to be developed. As I say, that is a key part of the new regime. It is therefore important to underline that, for the time being, control orders should remain legally viable. While they may be imperfect, they have had some success in protecting the public and they are fully compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

It is sometimes asserted that controlled individuals do not know why they are subject to a control order. I remind the House that, as a result of the Law Lords judgment of June 2009 in AF and others, this is no longer the case. That judgment specified that controlled individuals must be given sufficient information about the case against them to enable them to give effective instructions to the special advocate.

Pending the introduction of the replacement to control orders, we believe that it is right, proper, proportionate and essential that these powers continue to be available in order to protect the public. As I have said, we are currently preparing the legislation to introduce the replacement system, which we will bring forward in the coming weeks. I have no doubt that noble Lords will want to give the new measures thorough scrutiny and we must have time to do that. While that process is under way, it would not be responsible for us to leave a gap in public protection. Therefore, we believe that it is right to ask the House to renew the powers for this temporary period, the alternative being a situation in which those who pose a threat to our safety could go about their activities with far too great freedom.

This is the last occasion on which the House will be asked to renew these powers. Before transition to the new regime is complete, the risk to the public would be grave indeed were the control order powers not to be renewed. I therefore ask the House to approve the renewal of the powers for the transitional period. I commend the order to the House.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, as all your Lordships know, control orders were introduced in March 2005 as an emergency measure. We in this House, after an all-night sitting which I shall never forget, insisted that the Government should have to come back after 12 months in order to justify the extraordinary powers which had been conferred on the then Home Secretary. They were indeed extraordinary powers, because they enabled him, on suspicion, to impose what amounted in effect to house arrest on an individual who had never been charged with any offence. Yet here we are, six years later, being asked to renew those very same powers yet again.

In a powerful briefing note which I am sure the Minister has read with care, Liberty describes the control order regime as being “completely discredited”. It would be difficult indeed to disagree with that view. However, Liberty is equally critical of what is now proposed in place of the control order regime, the so-called terrorism prevention and investigation measures —TPIM for short. We do not, of course, know what the Bill will contain, and it is the greatest pity that we do not have a draft of the Bill before us today. When we do get it, I hope that it will be subject to pre-legislative review.

The present indications are that the Bill will contain many of the objectionable features of the existing control order regime. Indeed, Liberty describes the new regime in its briefing note as simply control orders under a different name. Whether or not that is right is not a question for discussion today; that will be a matter for great debate when we see the Bill. No doubt the Government will then argue—as the Minister has indicated already—that there is a real difference between the Home Secretary being required to believe that a person is a terrorist and the Home Secretary being required to suspect that he is. Similarly, the Government will no doubt argue that the overnight residence requirement is much less restrictive than the curfew, which is to be abolished, and no doubt they will argue that the TPIM will allow access to the internet and much greater freedom to communicate and associate with others.

Counterterrorism Review

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I have two questions for the noble Baroness: one on control orders and one on 28 days, and that is all. I congratulate the coalition Government on getting rid of control orders at long last, if that is what they have done. We shall see how this works out. No one can say how much damage control orders have done to community relations over the past six years. Only one thing is clear; control orders have done great damage to our reputation as a country that values freedom and the rule of law.

Does the noble Baroness agree—I think she does from what she has said—that if credit is due to anyone in this whole unhappy affair, it is due not to us in Parliament, I am sorry to say, but to the judiciary? In particular, it is due to the judges sitting in the administrative court in keeping control orders within reasonable limits so far as they could and forcing the Government on so many occasions to think again.

On the 28 days, I opposed the increase from seven days to 14 days as long ago as 2003 when ACPO was asking for 14 days and got it. I opposed any increase in 2005 when ACPO asked for 28 days and got it. I opposed any increase in 2006 when it asked for, but happily did not get, 90 days. Has ACPO now accepted that it never needed 90 days or anything like it, despite the advice that it gave the Government at the time? Does ACPO accept that it was never, as it put it in 2007, “up against the buffers” with only 28 days? If so, how much faith can we put in the advice of ACPO in these affairs?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, one reason why the Government were determined to deal with control orders before they even came into office was precisely because of our perception that they were damaging to community relations. In the evidence and the responses to questionnaires and surveys, stop and search comes up quite as often as a source of grievance, if not more so, than control orders, but the Government accept that they were harmful. The Government respect the role of the judiciary, which is one reason why we are bringing this regime into line with what we believe is legally acceptable.

On the question of the number of days needed to bring a successful prosecution, I have not asked ACPO the specific question posed by the noble and learned Lord. However, like the rest of us, ACPO has learnt from experience about the time needed in practice to bring successful charges, and made it absolutely clear to the Home Secretary—as indeed have the intelligence and security services—that it is content with the proposals.

Counterterrorism and Security

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Tuesday 13th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I welcome every word of this important Statement, especially the appointment of my noble friend Lord Macdonald to oversee the review. Am I right that independent oversight by such a person is a novel idea for a Home Office review? Whether I am right or not, I welcome the idea most warmly.

Among the six matters which are to be reviewed we will each have our own pecking order. The most harmful in my view have been control orders, 28 days’ detention without trial and Section 44, in that order.

Does the Minister recall the pledge given by the previous Government after an all-night sitting in March 2005 that they would bring back control orders for a comprehensive review within a year? I remind the noble Lord, Lord Brett, that although there was a degree of consensus in relation to the 2006 Act which he mentioned, there was certainly no consensus in relation to the 2005 Act. If there had been, there would have been no need for an all-night sitting.

Does the Minister share my relief that that pledge given back in 2005 is now being redeemed? Does she also recall another pledge that the whole mass of terrorist legislation which now disfigures our statute book would be consolidated? This is of course nothing like as urgent as the other matters which have been mentioned, but I hope the Minister can say that this idea has not been forgotten either.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I do not know the answer to the question of whether this is a novel idea. I certainly think it is a very good one, and obviously the object of having the involvement of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is to ensure, and also to be able to give assurance to the outside world, that the review has been thorough and looked at all the options, and that it has been impartial and provides the best balance between our security needs and our rights as citizens as we can provide.

I share the noble and learned Lord’s relief that we are able now to redeem the pledge on the review of control orders. This has been overdue and that is why we regard it as an urgent thing to get on with.

On the question of consolidation of terrorism legislation, that is one of the things we would like to do. Noble Lords will be aware of the volume of urgent things that need to be on the statute book so I cannot promise that it is going to be an early piece of legislation. What is more, if we are going to do it we should do it thoroughly and well. In that area, haste will be the enemy of good work. I would rather produce a decent piece of legislation in due course than hurry at it. Finally, I hope that over time we are going to be able to reduce this panoply of emergency legislation. In a sense, it is no part of a democracy to have to continue with this sort of legislation for a moment longer than we need.

We still face a persistent and serious threat—and I failed to answer the noble Lord’s question about terrorist plots. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for being unable to answer it today. I will be in a better position to do so next week when we debate the legislation on pre-charge detention. Indeed, I will be happy to do so then.

Terrorism Act 2000

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Thursday 8th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement in so far as it goes, but I deplore the fact that there is yet another interim measure from the Government to meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. This has happened too often before and it is time that we met these problems in advance, instead of by having interim measures such as this put before us. The Statement says:

“We have always been clear in our concerns about these powers”.

This is a government Statement, so that presumably refers to the Conservative Opposition as was. Is that the right view? That leads me to ask whether the decision in Gillan and Quinton came as a surprise to what is now the Government or whether they are simply being wise after the event and after they have been forced to take this view. If the Conservative Opposition were always so concerned about these powers, why did they not do more to limit them when they had the chance, instead of being “critical”—I think that that was the word that the noble Baroness used—on the sidelines?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I would not say that this situation is tidy; it is not tidy. I entirely accept that it is unfortunate that we get into a situation in which we have to give some interim guidance. The Government take no satisfaction in the present situation. I say to the noble and learned Lord that there are limits to what you can do in opposition. We made our position fairly clear on the desirability of the way in which these powers were drawn and their use at the time. We have always made clear our intention to look at this legislation with a view to amending it in the context of the review that we are undertaking of counterterrorism powers. What happened is that the judgment intercepted the work that we were in any case undertaking.