Daesh in Syria and Iraq

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Baroness Anelay of St Johns

Wednesday 16th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

Yes, extreme caution is indeed exercised. The noble Lord was right to return to that theme. We were able to provide extra technical help with the Reaper that we provided so that there is surveillance overhead. The noble Lord is absolutely right: it is not effective to get intelligence on the ground—it puts people at too much risk. Intelligence is sought from surveillance overhead. We are also able to provide technical help from weaponry that can target very closely. The target was described to me, when the firing takes place, as being the size of a small dining table.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

Can my noble friend the Minister say a little more about the extremely welcome news that the UK has set up a coalition communications cell and, in particular, about who else might be participating? Given that the activities and communications of Daesh are particularly professional, can she say whether, on our side, we are employing professional broadcasters? In particular, are we getting local voices to participate in spreading the messages that we need to put across?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

With my noble friend’s distinguished background in the field of cyber and intelligence generally, I know that she will not expect me to give information even if I had it. I certainly would not wish to do so and have it in Hansard. I can assure her that, when looking at the work we do in the communications cell across the field, we are engaging the brightest and the best across all ages and backgrounds. She is right to say that Daesh has proved itself extremely smart in the sphere of communications. We can be smarter, it is true, but we also need to be committed to continuing the fight for a long period and that is something that this Government are prepared to do.

Iran: Nuclear Deal

Debate between Baroness Neville-Jones and Baroness Anelay of St Johns

Wednesday 15th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, as I think I explained in the Statement, the number of centrifuges is dramatically reduced, as is fissile material. What we have aimed at in this agreement is that Iran should still be able to have a civil need for use of reactors but not a military one. That is what we believe has been achieved. As for whether Iran can break out quickly, and the time between it being noticed and reported that something is going wrong and action being taken—how long it would take between a request from the IAEA to get access and being able to insist on access—it would typically take about 21 days between demand and access. There is, then, a very clear process that has to be followed, which I am happy to discuss with the noble Baroness in detail outside the Chamber, given the time available. Of course, the breakout period cannot be achieved except in a period of over a year. We have time to prevent breakout into a future with Iran having a nuclear weapon. It will not happen.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the agreement, which is obviously the fruit of a great deal of extremely hard work and hard negotiation. I think that most noble Lords will agree with me that the proof of its adequacy will be in implementation. This is one of those agreements where the words are fine but it is the actions that follow that will really matter. I hope that all parties to it, particularly the European parties, will be robust in checking any backsliding. One worry of those who would like to see this agreement succeed is that somehow Iran will be allowed to get away with things along the line and the robust reaction will not take place because it is all too difficult and unpalatable. I seek some reassurance on robustness.

My other point, alluded to by the noble Baroness who spoke previously, is on verification. Surely, this agreement depends crucially on adequate verification, and I worry that there seems to be an ability on Iran’s part not only to challenge but to block verification proceedings. There seems to be a road through which they will be able to prevent the IAEA providing us with the necessary reassurances. How can we ensure that this joint commission, to which I gather such issues will be referred, can cut through something like that? How can we get round Iran blocking something by language and words, and get it to fall into line?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

We get round language and words by having the ability to have a snap-back on sanctions within the United Nations at any time, and the EU and the United States can do so themselves with their sanctions. My noble friend is right, however, to ask about the process. The joint commission makes its decision by consensus. Obviously, it can do it by majority. What I can say, of course, is that it is important that Iran is on that joint commission so that it can engage with and respond to any suspected issues of non-performance. It can represent its interests in the same way as all other members of the joint commission. But the fact is that if there is a disagreement over whether something is a serious breach, or if Iran were unwise enough to block the IAEA access to which my noble friend refers, it is still possible for the sanctions to be snapped back. That is the prize that Iran has sought: that there should be an end to sanctions. The prize that we have sought has been to make sure that this world does not face a nuclear weapon-holding state in Iran. I think that the prize for Iran and the prize for the rest of the world has been achieved.