Health and Care Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Lansley

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Thursday 3rd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will not go on at great length because noble Lords have heard more than sufficient from me today, but this group brings us to what is known in the trade as the provider selection regime: that is, how the NHS goes about the process of commissioning services from a range of providers and the relationship between that and the choice that is available to patients. I am going to refer to my amendments, Amendments 98 and 99, and, without going on about it, I commend Amendment 80 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. Finding out whether people have actually experienced choice and whether that is helpful to them is a useful thing to do, and I am not sure whether it features in the current electronic referral system. It would be useful to add it in.

The words of Amendment 98 are in fact already in the regulations that the NHS currently lives by because, born of the previous experience when there were discriminatory payment arrangements for private sector providers relative to public sector providers—ie, more advantageous payment arrangements for the private sector than the public sector—in the 2012 legislation we legislated to prevent that happening in the future. The current Bill removes said prohibition on discrimination on the basis of the ownership, public or private ownership, of a provider.

Noble Lords might think, “Ah, this is trying to avoid us discriminating against the private sector.” This was actually included in order to prevent the Government or the NHS discriminating in favour of the private sector. There may be arguments for it in certain circumstances because NHS bodies often have, as it were, fully depreciated assets and to create additional capacity the private sector very often has to invest capital and has to meet the costs of capital as well as the revenue costs of providing services. None the less, we addressed all that and took the view that we did not want any discrimination: we wanted no competition on price, but we wanted competition on quality. That is why, to be perfectly frank, I am testing the Government’s intentions in omitting something that was a central plank of policy for the 2012 legislation.

On Amendment 99, if I recall there is language in the original White Paper from last year, which set the provisions for the Bill, which referred to “any qualified provider” and made it clear that it was the Government’s intention to maintain the existing choice arrangements and access to any qualified provider. Indeed, I think it said that it would “bolster” the system, although I am not sure whether that is happening anywhere. The amendment is really intended to test a particular issue that arose. I am a very sad person, and I was looking at the service conditions for the NHS standard contract; the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, will know them intimately. There is a point at which commissioners who are presented with people who wish to access other providers, who have a contract with another commissioner, are not required to extend that service to them. The way in which it was written in the standard contract was to talk about circumstances where the originating contract does not refer to the address—I think it said the postal address—included in the originating contract. My point to the Government is that this is absurd. There can be geographic limitations, but we should aim not to make them as limiting as the reference to a postal address in the originating contract would have made them.

The wider point is that, if one looks at the new provider selection regime, one sees that there is a process by which commissioners—the decision-making bodies commissioning services—go through a process of saying, “What are the circumstances of commissioning providers?” They ask whether it is circumstance 1, extending the existing arrangement; circumstance 2, going to a different provider; or circumstance 3, going to competition. The language of circumstance 2 is:

“where the decision-making body wants to use a different provider and the decision-making body considers it can identify a suitable provider without running a competitive procurement process”.

This is something that it will be readily able to do in many cases. A commissioner can say, “This is the circumstance. We want to go to a different provider and we know who we want to go to—that’s fine, we’ll give them the contract.”

Circumstance 3 is

“where the decision-making body cannot identify a single provider or group of providers that is most suitable without running a competitive process; or to test the market”.

The body could choose to test the market, but of course more than subtly. Whereas, in the past, the NHS tended to think that it needed to test the market in circumstances in which the legislation did not actually require it to, there is no such thing as compulsory competitive tendering in the 2012 legislation, or the regulations made under it. But now it has shifted completely the other way, and NHS bodies will be able broadly speaking to choose not to use competition at all. The question is whether that will really be sustainable. In the short run, access to the private sector may well be quite widespread, and there may well be a significant element of choice available to patients through the electronic referral service, but that may be closed down in years ahead, if these provisions are implemented in the way in which they are set out.

I issue a further warning to my noble friends. If you are a provider of services to the NHS and you believe that a decision has been made unfairly or inappropriately by the NHS, there is a standstill on the contract, you have 30 days, and you can send in a complaint, in effect, to the decision-making body, which then decides whether it has done the right thing. There is no independent process whatever, so it seems that the chances of providers resorting to law to challenge what they regard as unfair decisions on the part of decision-making bodies in the NHS rise dramatically with the implementation of these processes.

All that said, I hope what I can hear from my noble friends on the Front Bench is that what they said in the White Paper a year ago in February 2021 remains true: that they are going to sustain patient choice, that they will use the resources of NHS providers and beyond to enable us to fulfil our very demanding recovery programme, that they will think hard about whether the precise language in some of the respects that I have outlined is fair to providers, and that commissioners in the NHS will use their procurement capabilities to deliver best value for patients. I beg to move Amendment 98.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is contributing remotely.

Professional Qualifications Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Wednesday 9th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Purvis of Tweed. I call the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, not having participated in this group, I am prompted by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, on the regulation of healthcare professionals, to which I do not think my noble friend responded. I have here the Law Commission report of April 2014—my noble friend will be aware of it—on the issues referred to by the noble Lord, which included the recommendation that Section 60 of the Health Act 1999, and indeed the powers of the Privy Council, should be substantially removed from the regulation of healthcare professions. What is the Government’s intention on the regulation of healthcare professionals? Do they intend to implement the Law Commission report seven years later, or do they now intend to proceed without any reference to it?

Fisheries Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Lansley

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords & Ping Pong (Minutes of Proceedings): House of Lords
Thursday 12th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I call the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, to ask the next short question of the Minister.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am a member of the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee of your Lordships’ House. We are spending a lot of time not only looking at the content of treaties, but also understanding how these are implemented into domestic legislation. I am confused. Can my noble friend explain how the 1999 treaty to which this refers was implemented into domestic legislation? Why did this not lead directly to its continuation or amendment? This is the second time we have looked at this Bill; in the first draft, licensing of fishing boats in our EEZ was considered.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Lansley

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th October 2020 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the next speaker was to have been the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. I am afraid we have not been able to establish a connection with her, so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I want specifically to refer to Amendment 16 in this group, which is in my name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The purpose of that was prompted by looking at subsection (2)(c), and this question of attractiveness, or

“the attractiveness of the relevant part of the United Kingdom as a place in which to conduct clinical trials or supply human medicines.”

In this particular instance, we concluded that while one might think that the United Kingdom was, or was not, an attractive place to supply human medicines and derive certain conclusions from that, the process of medical innovation is not well captured by a simple reference to clinical trials. The process of medical innovation is a wider set of factors than clinical trials alone. In particular, I think that in our minds, in looking at the United Kingdom, one of the underlying strengths of the United Kingdom as a place in which to develop medicines is because of our strengths in discovery.

For example, I remember as a resident of and former Member of Parliament for South Cambridgeshire that my constituency included the Laboratory of Molecular Biology which, among its other attributes, is the single research institute with the largest number of Nobel prizes in the world. The strength of discovery is an absolutely central aspect of the fact that AstraZeneca, Cancer Research UK and Addenbrooke’s and Papworth hospitals are close by and the biomedical campus at Cambridge is bidding to become Europe’s single strongest location for life sciences. If you delved back over the last 50 years and asked what the distinguishing characteristic of that was, you might well say Cambridge University—and people would well understand that—but you might equally say the Medical Research Council’s Laboratory of Molecular Biology and all that went with it. This is not because the LMB does clinical trials; it is because it does discovery. I think our intention was to say that, if the medicines regulator is having regard to these factors, maybe it should have regard to discovery as well.

I entirely take the point that perhaps, where the medicines regulator is concerned, discovery is something that happens before it really gets involved. However, if it is thinking about the environment for life sciences, I find it very hard for it to think about it in parts, and not as a whole. That is what Amendment 16 is intended to explore.

There is another question conveyed by a number of these amendments, which, as my noble friend the Minister has quite rightly highlighted, is this interesting use of the word “attractiveness”. I may well have regard to the attractiveness of many things, but that does not necessarily mean I do anything about it. That the Minister has brought forward his own amendment to point to

“the likelihood of the relevant part … being seen as an attractive”


place is very interesting and takes us much closer to where we want to be. However, it still begs the question of what the medicines regulations should require the regulator to do about it, having had regard to this thing. There are other amendments which, I think, perfectly properly raise the question of whether the regulator should seek to enhance the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a relevant place, et cetera. I think it raises a very interesting question. I get the impression that the Minister is trying very hard to move to the right place; I am just raising the question of whether we are quite there yet without something like the word “enhancing”.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I call the next speaker, I should just inform the Committee that we now know that the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, is unwell, and will therefore be unable to take part in the remainder of today’s proceedings. In due course, no doubt, we will know who will take her place in subsequent groups. I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.