Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Baroness Massey of Darwen and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Committee stage & Lords Hansard
Tuesday 9th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, again I am speaking as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the amendments are again based on the views of expert witnesses who contributed to its report. I shall speak to Amendments 4, 7 and 8. They relate to Clause 3 and would delete the requirement to give “particular weight” in any prosecution decision after five years to a person having an impaired ability to exercise self-control or to exercise sound judgment while being deployed on operations overseas. The amendments would omit Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). Their concern is similar to concerns in Clause 11 in relation to limitations on bringing proceedings under the Human Rights Act.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights report on the Bill explains in chapter 3 that:

“In domestic law the prosecution would take into account a person’s mental health as part of the decision as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest—and this is a factor that would currently already apply to prosecutions of members of the Armed Forces. Moreover, a person who is not fit to plead at the time of trial would not be assessed for the … mental element … of an offence. A defendant could raise a plea of insanity as a defence if at the time of the offence their mental condition was so impaired that they were unable to understand the act they were doing or that it was wrong.”


Paragraph 77 of the report states:

“The MoD should not be sending Armed Forces personnel on deployment who are unable to make ‘sound judgements’, who cannot ‘exercise self-control’ or whose mental health is so severely affected that the MoD does not consider that they should be responsible for their criminal actions. Moreover, if a member of the Armed Forces becomes unable to make ‘sound judgements’, can no longer ‘exercise self-control’ or where there are significant concerns about their mental health, then there should be adequate systems in place to relieve that person of their operational duties, remove them from the conflict situation (where appropriate) and give them the support that they need.”


The Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concern at paragraph 76 that,

“the Bill does not provide any incentives for the military hierarchy to ensure that members of the Armed Forces who are mentally unfit to be deployed get removed from operational duties and given the support that they need. Instead it includes an impediment to prosecuting a person whose judgement may be impaired, who lacks adequate self-control or whose mental health may have been affected”.

Service personnel are trained to deal with complex situations, and there are undoubtedly high-stress situations in combat. Due account must be taken of these complexities as part of any decision on whether to bring a prosecution. However, it should not be part of a statutory barrier to bringing prosecutions when they are in the public interest.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not consider that there is any solid basis for including additional requirements that could risk granting de facto impunity to those who have committed crimes on the grounds that the perpetrator lacked sound judgment or could not exercise self-control beyond the threshold already established in criminal law. For that reason, the committee recommends deleting Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the question is when this condition intervenes. It would be one thing to send a person over to a foreign assignment with that condition at that time, but there must be a risk that the impetus of foreign work in certain conditions would bring about these conditions in the person in question. There is therefore a real question as to whether or not the matter of the investigation discloses that the person in question became subject to that condition as a result of his being in the operation abroad. It does not necessarily mean that a person is sent into the work with that kind of condition. I would have thought that that distinction was quite important since the idea of the clause seems to be that they look to see whether or not the conditions under which the military man or woman has been working have produced these results, so far as their mental health is concerned.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Baroness Massey of Darwen and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My name was down due to a fault of mine; I apologise for interrupting.

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

I have reservations about some of the issues the Minister raised in summing up this excellent debate—most of them have been addressed by noble Lords. I thank all noble Lords for their varied and incisive comments and useful examples in this valuable, interesting and important debate.

I am particularly delighted that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, immediately followed me in this debate; he raised many issues and provided excellent analysis and clarifications. I accept his comments and am delighted that he feels he can support what he has called an imperfect amendment. He is also right in saying, as did the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and others, that great weight must be given to the issue of torture, which should never be authorised.

Other noble Lords have contributed varied arguments on my amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, made a useful contribution from the point of view of Scotland, where, interestingly, the Bill was found to be inadequate, as he said. That has been a theme throughout the debate, especially when discussing the Human Rights Act as an inadequate safeguard to prevent criminal offences. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, among many others, raised this issue, saying that we cannot legislate in such broad terms; it is not all right to do so.

In thanking noble Lords for participating in this debate, I note that, although I understand what the Minister is saying, the consensus is that there are too many inadequacies. Given those inadequacies, I beg to test the opinion of the House.

Abortion (Disability Equality) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Massey of Darwen and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 27th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab)]

My Lords, my amendment is very simple. It simply seeks a review of the impact of the Bill on disabled children and their families and carers, and it seeks to ensure that support services are appropriate. I think it is a very sensible amendment; we should be reviewing what we do and taking great care to ensure that disabled people have the support they need. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, for giving us the opportunity to discuss his Bill. I am aware of the complexities and sometimes the anguish that surrounds prospective parents making a decision about abortion. I am also aware that the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, has very sensibly consulted on the Bill. I shall not go into disability rights. I have huge respect for people with disabilities and their families, who often achieve brilliantly. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, for meeting me this morning to talk about my amendment.

This past week I was at Strasbourg, at the Council of Europe. We discussed new technologies to prevent abnormality in the foetus, often from genetic problems. One of those present supporting further research described the dilemma of parents. He and his wife discovered that she was carrying a child with Down’s syndrome. They decided to allow the pregnancy to continue. My position on abortion is very simple: the final decision is the woman’s choice. I realise that such women now often discuss such a crisis with their partner; sometimes not. That should remain their prerogative. Abortion is not, of course, always linked to disability. The Bill would remove Section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967, which allows for an abortion when,

“two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion … that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”.

If the Bill were to become law, parents would no longer have the option to end a pregnancy after 24 weeks when faced with a serious antenatal diagnosis, including in those cases where there is no realistic possibility of a pregnancy resulting in the baby surviving after birth. I think that is a real problem.

The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, a very learned body, has addressed the issue of foetal abnormality. Its report provides information to assist doctors and other health professionals in supporting women and their families when an abnormality is diagnosed. Since the last guidance was issued in 1996 there have, as we all know, been great advances in the detection of congenital abnormalities, resulting in early diagnosis and clearer indications for the offer of termination of pregnancy. The law relating to termination of pregnancy has not changed since 1990, although it has been tested in a number of specific cases. The 1967 Act, as amended, sets out the grounds and time limits for termination of pregnancy for foetal abnormality. Interestingly, there is no legal definition of “substantial risk”, or of “serious handicap”. An assessment of the seriousness of a foetal abnormality is considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all available clinical information.

Bodies have discussed this issue of foetal abnormality endlessly and it is now time to review what has been going on in relation to disabled people. Some may say that I am adopting a very clinical position. I am not. As I said earlier, I recognise that decisions on abortion may cause emotional stress, strain and anguish. My ethical stance, as I said, is that it is a woman’s right to choose. Therefore, I cannot accept many of the precepts of the Bill, much as I respect the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin. My amendment simply seeks rational and objective evidence of the impact on disabled children to allow us to discuss such impact in a more analytical and considered way. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the idea of having a review of the effect of legislation strikes me as a very good proposition in general, and in particular in relation to this Bill. Obviously, as the noble Baroness has explained, the precise consequences of the Bill, which I congratulate my noble friend on bringing forward, are not very easy to see, because there are overlapping provisions in the Abortion Act which might deal with some aspects at least of the particular circumstances that the noble Baroness referred to. In my judgment, this is a useful amendment and a similar principle might well apply in other legislation as well.