Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Ludford and Lord Bates

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

On the point just raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, we have been very mindful of the fact that we need to work, not in isolation but in partnership with other countries. The level of co-operation and working across Europe in particular with our European colleagues, not least because of the events in Paris, has increased dramatically. We want to learn what works best. To answer my noble friend’s point, these orders will not exclude somebody from the UK per se. Through them we are saying that if you have been abroad and we believe that there is evidence that you have been engaged in terrorist activities we are not simply going to allow you to drift in and out of this country with impunity. That would need to be managed and supervised. We want that to happen—it is the purpose of the temporary exclusion orders.

My noble friend Lady Ludford—it now seems like a little while ago—was the first to speak about this. She raised a point about the tests and the phrase “obviously flawed”. Here, we are seeking to introduce a permission-stage model and a statutory judicial review mechanism similar to those already in place for the TPIM and asset-freezing regimes, which will consider both the decision to impose the TEO in general terms and for the in-country elements. Having considered these suggestions, we tabled these amendments in line with the recommendation. It is, as was said, simply consistent with those other elements to which we are referring. I hope that that has been helpful.

[Baroness Ludford]

I apologise for prolonging this, but I forgot to ask my noble friend something earlier. I am trying to understand the architecture of all this. Under the new clause relating to prior permission of the court, in Amendment 52, proposed new subsection (9) says:

“Only the Secretary of State may appeal against a determination of the court under … this section”,

and the urgency provision. I wonder whether that is a bit unfair on the person. Why would the individual not have a comparable right of appeal? Is there a clear reason why that is the case?

[Lord Bates]

Again, I will write if necessary, but I think the answer is simply that in that example, it is the Secretary of State who has made her decision and then subjected that decision to scrutiny by the courts. The courts will obviously make their judgment, and therefore the appeal is in connection with that particular part of the process. The individual concerned with that has access, through different routes, to judicial review of the temporary exclusion order. On the point about the Secretary of State, the individual is not involved in that stage, but will have the chance to challenge the substance. We are basically talking about two not quite parallel but different parts of the process. Therefore, the rights of appeal apply to different entities or individuals, as appropriate to those elements.

With those comments, I commend the amendments standing in my name in this group and invite noble Lords to consider not pressing theirs.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Ludford and Lord Bates

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing forward these amendments, which provide an opportunity to put further information on the record as to how temporary exclusion orders will work in practice. Amendment 57 seeks to provide that a temporary exclusion order ceases to be in force immediately when revoked, not when notice of revocation is given. We believe it is important that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the order ceases to be in force. It is right that the individual concerned is made aware that the restrictions and obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place.

Similarly, Amendment 64 seeks to ensure that any variation or revocation of the in-country obligations placed on an individual come into effect immediately rather than once notice has been given to that individual. In the same way, we believe that it is right that notice of revocation is given and that this is the point at which the obligations cease to be in force. It is important that the individual concerned is made aware that the obligations imposed on them will no longer be in place. More importantly, it is vital that the individual is informed of any variation to the obligations before these variations take effect to avoid an unintentional breach, which could lead to prosecution.

Amendment 63 seeks to provide that notice of any in-country obligations comes into force when an individual is actually given the notice. As the individual will have returned to the UK under the terms of the temporary exclusion order, we will usually know the whereabouts of the individual and, in practice, should always be able to serve the notice on them in person. But it may be expedient for an individual as well as for the authorities for notice of a variation, for example, to be posted to the individual rather than served in person. In addition, there may be circumstances in which an individual absconds and is therefore no longer at the contact address. In all those circumstances, it is right that notice can be deemed to have been given, provided proper procedures are followed. Parliament will be able to review those procedures, but I can assure your Lordships that they will be based on well established practice in relation to immigration decisions.

Finally, Amendment 62 seeks to allow the Secretary of State to impose the in-country obligations of a temporary exclusion order on an individual who is about to return to the UK, as well as on those who have already returned to the UK. The in-country elements of a temporary exclusion order cannot be imposed until the individual has returned to the United Kingdom, a point on which my noble friend sought clarification. This will allow law enforcement partners to assess the most appropriate measures to manage the risk posed by the individual at that time, which may be a matter of years after the decision to impose the order was originally taken. It may even be appropriate to arrest and prosecute the individual, rather than impose any in-country measures on them. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply the in-country measures to someone who is about to return. It is better to wait until the individual is in the UK and form an assessment about the in-country measures at that stage.

In terms of the obligations and when they come into effect before return to the UK, the obligations made against the individual will apply only when the individual returns to the UK. Before that point, the individual will be subject to the temporary exclusion order in that their return will be disrupted and controlled, and they may be subject to conditions under the permit to return. But they will not be subject to in-country measures until they return for the reasons that I have outlined. I trust that that is a helpful reply to my noble friend and I invite her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise that I did not come in before my noble friend spoke but something he said has prompted me. In resisting Amendment 63 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to require an actual giving of notice, he referred to cases where it could be deemed to have been given. I think that that would refer to Clause 10, under which the Secretary of State may make regulations about the giving of notice under Clause 3. The Clause 10 states:

“The regulations may, in particular, make provision about cases in which notice is to be deemed to have been given”.

My noble friend referred to immigration case law. First, will he give us an idea of what circumstances qualify as “deemed”? Secondly, how much would be included in those regulations under Clause 10 about the criteria or circumstances, or what would qualify in substance as deeming to give notice?

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[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, I recall a point I made at Second Reading. The human rights memo notes at paragraph 13 that the Secretary of State proposed to adopt a practice on TEOs equivalent to her,

“practice of not depriving individuals of British citizenship”,

if that would expose them to a real risk of treatment that would be contrary to Articles 2 or 3 of the human rights convention. The Government do not believe that the convention applies if those persons are not within the UK’s jurisdiction, so it is adopted as a practice. However, I asked at Second Reading whether it would be possible to incorporate in the Bill—it is a point worth focusing on even if it said only in a code or regulations—that it is the practice of the Secretary of State not to impose a TEO if that would expose an individual to a real risk of treatment under Article 2 of the convention on risk to life or Article 3 on risk of torture or inhuman treatment. Perhaps there is some way to incorporate that as rather more than a practice.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, it has been helpful to go through the Bill as the result of the amendments, trying to tease out as much as possible about the workings of the system. Certainly a good many questions have been raised; I will try to respond to as many of them as possible. As regards those that I do not get round to responding to, I will read the Official Report and write in the correct way and then we can return to it on Report should the noble Baroness wish to do that.

It is worth making a few contextual comments. Upwards of 600 people from this country have travelled to the Middle East. Everybody knows that; there is a certain flinching and the reaction is, “Don’t say that again”. However, if that was not the nature of the threat, we would not be bringing forward this measure. About half of those people have returned to the UK. Some might say that that poses quite a risk. We know—it is not an unreasonable thought—that a number of terrorist organisations would seek to advance their warped and perverted cause by seeking to bring down an airliner or blow it up; that is not manufactured but is a real threat to us. Therefore, when the authorities have produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable belief that someone has been involved in terrorist activities, and that that has been tested through a court, if we simply said that they should be able to board a flight on the way home back to the UK, some might say that we were failing in our duty of care to the people in the country and to those on the airliner. As my noble friend Lady Warsi rightly said, none of us would like to think about our children, let alone us, travelling on a flight that may contain people who have been engaged in that activity.

Terrorist Attack in Paris

Debate between Baroness Ludford and Lord Bates

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I shall have to write on the latter point. On the former point, the Community Security Trust, which has responsibility for security at Jewish schools and synagogues, has been working closely with the Metropolitan Police and other forces to continue to take appropriate operational response measures to protect the Jewish community from terrorism, hate crime and the impact of public order protests. Police forces continue to work closely with the CST and other Jewish community organisations. I am deeply conscious of the sense of unease and fear which is felt within the Jewish community at this time. My honourable friend the Security Minister is meeting the CST today. I hope that in future I will be able to report back more. If not, I will write on it at the same time as I write on the other matter.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, in the short time that I have been back in this House, I have learnt to have the highest regard for my noble friend. However, I was slightly surprised that, speaking on behalf of the Government, he stressed the importance of trying to press forward with the communications data Bill because, as it is acknowledged, there is not agreement within the Government on this matter. Is it not the case that—as came out in the debate yesterday on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill—that we really need to wait to review and possibly strengthen the legal framework before collecting more data? This also applies at the European level because the Government are pressing for the passenger name record EU directive but are resisting the strengthening of the EU data protection laws, on both consumer data and data that are used for law enforcement purposes. Do not the two need to go together so that people can be reassured that their data are secured before more are collected?

[Lord Bates]

Again, the thoughts are mutual in terms of respect but also in terms of disagreement. This is just part of the disagreement and people can express their views. The Home Secretary has been very clear that we think that this Bill is absolutely necessary and the security services are very clear that they think this is necessary. The current head of MI5 thinks that this power is absolutely necessary. We want to give it to him. We might disagree with our coalition colleagues about that. I am perfectly able, as a Minister and part of the Government, to say that, as the Deputy Prime Minister was able to offer a different view in the media this morning.

EU: Justice Opt-ins

Debate between Baroness Ludford and Lord Bates

Wednesday 10th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I disagree with the presumption that the Question was ideological. This is a matter of practical steps, case by case. That is why we think there is a case, in terms of securing our borders, for the European arrest warrant. We would be part of that. We would also be part of measures to tackle modern-day slavery and of cross-border legislation against cyberattack, but we will not be part of other things. I think that is very practical and pragmatic.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords—

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[Baroness Ludford]

Can the Minister confirm that the famous corpus juris was in fact purely an academic research report, not a European Commission proposal? Its only product has been the idea of a European public prosecutor, in which the UK is not participating. Can he further confirm that all other EU action against crime is firmly founded on mutual recognition, as promoted by the UK, and that there is no European jurisdiction or European criminal code?

[Lord Bates]

That is absolutely right. The noble Baroness has great expertise in the workings of Europe, and the report to which we are referring is just an academic report, not a Commission proposal.