Court Reporting Data

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the Courtsdesk court reporting data has been a great success in providing access to data from our courts. It has been reported that about 1,500 journalists have used the platform. It has proved particularly important in collating information about grooming gangs and in properly investigating that terrible issue. It would be extremely damaging to the transparency of our justice system if that service was to be extinguished.

Various excuses have been advanced by the Minister in the other place, despite her having announced in July of last year that the agreement with Courtsdesk would be continued. I highlight two of the excuses put forward. First, there is the allegation of a data breach. We now know that the Ministry of Justice data protection officer concluded, following investigation of that report, that there was no basis for a report to the Information Commissioner. Does the Minister agree with her department’s data protection officer? Secondly, there was an allegation of the sharing of data with a third-party AI company—I use the term “third party” advisedly. The data platform had contracted with an AI firm to carry out sub-processing in terms of an agreement. Does the Minister agree that, under Article 4(10) of the general data protection regulation, someone carrying out processing in terms of such an agreement is not to be regarded as a third party for the purposes of data protection?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt)]

My Lords, I am in the happy position of being able to reassure your Lordships’ House that there is no cover-up or conspiracy. The facts are as follows. Courtsdesk, a commercial company, was given copies of the data held in magistrates’ courts’ registers for one purpose only: to share it with bona fide journalists. However, Courtsdesk then shared it with a third-party company without asking or even telling the Ministry of Justice. This data contained sensitive information about both defendants and victims.

When the Ministry of Justice found out that Courtsdesk had done this, it was less than transparent with us, at which point the Government did what any responsible Government would have done: we stopped sending copies of the data to Courtsdesk and required it to remove the copies it still had from its platform. I reassure your Lordships’ House that the original data has always been retained by the Ministry of Justice, and no records have been deleted or lost.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords—

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.

Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.

Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.

However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.

However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.

Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.

There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.

For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate, and indeed the observations with regard to the timing of any extension of these powers.

I would observe, with respect to the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that if these provisions help victims in the Crown Court, it is not clear why they would not help victims in magistrates’ courts.

The Minister talked at length of the difficulty of implementation with regard to these provisions, but that would apply equally in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. Indeed, the appearance of serious offenders in the magistrates’ courts will of course be an immediate development with the changes under the Sentencing Act, which extend the sentencing powers of magistrates to three years.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by reassuring your Lordships’ House that an attendance order can be made in respect of all offenders, including children. Most children are not tried in the Crown Court; they are tried in the youth court, even for serious offences. It is very rare for children of this age to appear in the Crown Court. If they do, an attendance order for their sentencing hearing can be made. The only difference is that force will not be used to get those children to court. The reason is that current operational policy, informed by the Taylor review of 2020, restricts the use of force on children. Domestic policy is also informed by the UK Government’s signatory status to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We have committed to complying with its duties under the convention. During the debate a week ago in your Lordships’ House on the age of criminal responsibility, I said that this Government recognise that children in the youth justice system can be some of our most vulnerable citizens. Many of them are themselves victims of neglect and abuse, at the very least, and there is a disproportionate occurrence of special educational needs and neurodivergence in this cohort.

While we acknowledge that some children have committed very serious crimes for which they must be punished, this Government do not treat them merely as small adults. We have devised a separate but related regime for them. Where a child fails to attend court, or is disruptive once there, that may be treated as a contempt of court, but the maximum penalty is a fine, with the court taking into account limited means and making relevant arrangements for younger children. Lowering the threshold from 18 to 16 would cut across that safeguarding architecture. The Government’s view is that the strongest coercive path should be reserved for adults, where the legal, operational and ethical framework properly supports their use. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their measured observations on these proposed amendments. There is broad agreement across the House that attendance at sentencing is about accountability, about dignity for victims and about respect for the court. Refusal to attend sentencing has rightly been described by Ministers as a final insult to victims and families. The question before the House, then, is not whether the principle is right but to whom it should be applied.

These provisions are about ensuring that offenders confront the consequences of their actions, allowing victims to see justice done and hear sentencing remarks. They also uphold the authority and integrity of the court.

We are dealing with a situation in which 16 and 17 year-olds find themselves prosecuted in the Crown Court for serious offences, including murder, in respect of which they receive long custodial sentences. A 16 year-old can be convicted of murder or serious violence; that same 16 year-old would face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing. Accountability cannot logically begin at conviction, however, and then disappear at sentencing. From a victim’s perspective, the same harm emerges regardless of whether an offender is 16, 17 or 18 years of age. The distress caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing does not diminish by virtue of their age.

There is also the wider policy context that I mentioned before, which is that we now treat 16 year-olds, in essence, as adults in respect both of the proposal that they should be able to vote and of the fact that they can marry and can join the Armed Forces, and in respect of their wider social and political autonomy.

These amendments do not impact on the youth justice system. They do not remove judicial discretion. The courts will always retain discretion and take account of the welfare, capacity and safeguarding of 16 year-olds. In these circumstances, it respectfully appears to us that this proposal does not undermine Clauses 1 and 2, but rather seeks to strengthen them for the benefit of victims: someone whose conduct is serious enough to warrant Crown Court sentencing should not be shielded from accountability at the point of sentencing. But, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I shall begin with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in his amendments, which seek to clarify what is meant by, for example, the “relevant local authority” in this Bill, as well as to put extra provisions in place concerning parental responsibility. We support the aim behind Amendment 17 that others with parental responsibility for the child in question are properly and, indeed, promptly informed if a prohibited steps order is made against an offender. These are clearly well-intentioned amendments that highlight that certain aspects of the Bill need to be thought through a little more carefully and clarified. I hope that the Minister will provide assurances about how that can be achieved.

I also thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing forward his amendments, which would allow the Crime Court to take into account not only the interests of justice but the best interests of the child when deciding whether to make a prohibited steps order. On these amendments, we are not at this stage able to adopt a settled position. That is not because the underlying principle is unsound, but because further clarification is required from the Minister. As drafted, one of the exemptions to the making of a prohibited steps order is where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, but that, as has been observed, is a broad and somewhat opaque formulation. We would be grateful if the Minister could explain what circumstances the Government envisage falling within that exemption. In particular, can the Minister offer examples of cases in which it would genuinely be in the interests of justice for a child to remain under the parental responsibility of an individual convicted of a serious sexual offence and sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment?

These amendments would add an explicit reference to the best interests of the child. That is a familiar concept in family law, but its interaction with the existing exemption is not at all clear. I invite the Minister to clarify whether the Government consider that the child’s best interests are already subsumed within the interests of justice, or whether this amendment would materially alter the test applied by the court.

Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in my name reflect our concerns about the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. As drafted, both clauses state that a prohibited steps order against an offender that restricts their parental responsibility will not immediately cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal. Instead, both clauses include sections that set out a review process whereby the relevant local authority must make an application to the court for the acquitted offender. That is hardly consistent with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to as a short, speedy and summary order in circumstances where there is a successful appeal.

The clauses as drafted unnecessarily complicate and confuse the issue. The law should be clear that an acquittal brings the prohibited steps order to an end. People who are found to be not guilty of an offence should not have their parental responsibility, or indeed any other rights, restricted, even on a temporary basis. That principle is straightforward and our amendments seek only to ensure that the legislation reflects that clarity. I hope that will have the support of the House, and I urge the Minister to reconsider and simplify the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. There is no compelling reason why these review orders should be left in place for innocent citizens and then be the subject of applications by a local authority on their behalf to another division of the court.

Amendment 18 is tabled to affirm our support for the provision of Clause 3 that, where an offender only has their sentence reduced, a prohibited steps order should continue to apply. We on these Benches already have reservations over why an offender’s length of imprisonment or detention must be four years or more for parental responsibility to be restricted. I note that the amendment made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, refers to a period of six months rather than four years. Clearly, there is scope for consideration as to where the line might be drawn as a matter of policy. If a sentence of four years is reduced on appeal, we do not believe that this should result in a prohibited steps order ceasing to have effect. It is quite unlike the situation where there is an acquittal on appeal. Such an outcome could create significant uncertainty for the child for whom the offender previously had parental responsibility. Crucially, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the offender remains guilty of a serious sexual offence against the child regardless of any adjustment in the sentence. An increased risk to the child’s safety or well-being could well emerge from such a situation.

There is also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about what happens in circumstances where a sentence is increased under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. I invite the Government to address that point because clearly it has not been considered in the context of the present drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. For these reasons, I hope the Government will take all these amendments very seriously and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.

Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.

Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.

Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.

Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.

We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.

In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this wide-ranging and thoughtful debate on the operation of the victim contact scheme and the wider support network for victims. The debate has demonstrated broad consensus on the principle that victims’ rights and access to information must keep pace with changes in sentencing policy and criminal justice practice. The question is not whether victim engagement matters but whether our current structures are fit for purpose in the systems we now operate.

Several amendments in the group had common concerns: gaps in coverage within the victims’ code and the victim contact scheme; lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in how information is provided; the risk that victims fall through the cracks; and the technical thresholds or institutional boundaries that exist. Taken together, these amendments seek to ensure that victim support is timely, trauma-informed, consistent and capable of scrutiny. The amendments also recognise that, among others, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it assumes a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to support victims. Victim engagement must be strengthened not weakened in a non-custodial sentencing landscape. I therefore urge the Government to consider carefully how victims are to be protected and informed under current policy. In the meantime, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.

Age of Criminal Responsibility

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 21st January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the right reverend Prelate. I think it is from 15 to 13.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, as has already been noted, until just a few years ago, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland was eight. In the last three or four years, it has been raised from eight to 12. Does the Minister agree that before we take any further steps with regard to the age of responsibility in England, it would be appropriate to examine and analyse the impact of the changes on policing, crime prevention and public safety in Scotland which have emerged since the change in the age of criminal responsibility there almost four years ago?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I say to the noble and learned Lord that the Government keep all these matters under review.

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I have tried very hard to keep this non-partisan, but I have to say very gently to the noble Lord that it is a bit rich to hear from a member of the party opposite about what has happened to the criminal Bar, when pretty much everybody who was working there at the time—that includes me—knows it was the considerable cuts made to legal aid under the previous Administration that put the criminal Bar into the parlous state it is now in. But I say no more about that contentious subject, because this is not an opportunity for us to fall out. The noble Lord and I can debate the respective merits of barristers, solicitors and CILEX lawyers in due course.

I agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about the importance of private prosecutions and entirely understand her concerns. I hope she is aware that the Government intend to look at some of the issues, for example, that surround disclosure in private prosecutions. We all know the cases to which I refer. She said she has reservations about corporate private prosecutions. I was about to say something, then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, rather made the point for me that some very important commercial organisations have brought private prosecutions in relation to quite big frauds—sometimes very big frauds indeed. Economic crime is one of the scourges of our society. The investigation and prosecution of those crimes consumes a huge amount of public resource. The Government are certainly of the view that there is a place for private prosecution to help to ensure that economic crime is prosecuted successfully.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, drew my attention to the Explanatory Notes—again—as did the noble Lord, Lord Meston. If we have got them wrong, we will correct them by Report.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I was not suggesting for a moment that the Explanatory Notes are wrong; they just happen to contradict the Minister.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I would, of course, always say that I am right, would I not? In that sense, they are wrong.

The noble and learned Lord made the point about needing to invest in people. I will give another gentle reminder about who was in power for the past 14 years.

Turning to the question of the unduly lenient scheme, I entirely agree with noble Lords that there is no point in having a right that nobody knows they have, and we plainly are not getting this right in terms of information. It needs to be more broadly known about. The question of whether 28 days is the appropriate period is one to which the Government are giving urgent consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that it should be made the same as for defendants. It is: they have 28 days. That is where the period came from: there is parity between the two. But that does not necessarily mean it must remain.

Restriction of Jury Trials

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the Secretary of State for Justice recently stated, in the context of rape prosecution delays, that 60% of victims pull out of their cases because

“the trauma of waiting is too hard”—

a claim that was repeated in government briefings. The overwhelming response from experienced criminal lawyers is that this figure is misleading and that, as one leading King’s Counsel commented, the Justice Secretary’s remarks were “cynical or staggeringly gullible”. Given that the Crown Prosecution Service’s own figure for those who drop out of rape complaints due to delay is 8%, will the Minister ask the Secretary of State for Justice to correct Hansard and remove his inaccurate statement from the record?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an enormous pleasure to face the noble and learned Lord again, after such a short time, on pretty much exactly the same topic. The statistic given by my right honourable and learned friend the Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State refers to, if you like, the journey taken by a victim from the moment of the decision being made to report an offence to the police to the ultimate disposal of the case in the Crown Court. The statistic that over 60%, or roughly around 60%, drop out at that stage is entirely correct. During that process, pre-charge adult rape victim attrition is 58% and post-charge adult rape attrition is 10%. So the statistic is correct, and it is a terrible indictment upon the system that this is happening. Every single one of those figures is a person who did not see justice for what they say happened to them.

Criminal Court Reform

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for the points they made on these reforms. I have a great deal of respect for the insight that both bring and their observations about the Statement.

I begin with the remarks of the noble and learned Lord. Many people may think that it a bit rich of the party opposite to complain about this, when everybody knows that this is a situation created by them due to the consistent cuts in the criminal justice system over many years. Victims are now reaping what the party opposite sowed. We on these Benches have to try to put this right.

Many matters were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks; I hope he will forgive me if I do not respond to them all in my short response now. However, there are answers to almost all of them. For example, he asked how we estimate the likely sentence. That it is done using the sentencing guidelines. It is done all the time at the moment; magistrates do it day in, day out in the magistrates’ courts, when they decide where someone should be tried. It is a task that can be undertaken.

One of the things I want to say from the Dispatch Box is that I have changed my mind. I have been a criminal barrister for many decades. When I practised as a criminal barrister, I too felt that any attempt to touch what happens with jury trials was fundamentally wrong. However, I then became a judge in the Crown Court and saw what was actually happening. Every judge in the Crown Court up and down this country will have experienced sitting with other judges at lunchtime and saying, “I cannot believe that this case I am trying here and now is actually in the Crown Court. It shouldn’t be here”.

We are not sacrificing jury trials—of course we are not. It has never been that every criminal case was tried by a jury; 90% are currently tried in the magistrates’ courts. The question is, where do we draw the line? That is why this Government asked Sir Brian Leveson to conduct an independent review, and we will accept his conclusions. It would be frankly irresponsible not to do so; we cannot ignore what he is saying. We are not going far further, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, implied; we are doing exactly what Sir Brian suggested: having a Crown Court Bench Division to deal with cases where the likely sentence is three years or less.

This is a package to deal with the problems we face with the criminal justice system; it is not about cutting jury trials. There are three limbs to it. The first is about investment: record investment is being made in the criminal justice system in sitting days and legal aid payments to the criminal Bar and criminal solicitors, whose fees went down for ages. The second is about structural reform, which is what we are discussing now; that includes the removal of the right to elect, the reform of appeals in the magistrates’ courts, the Crown Court Bench Division and some reforms to fraud trials. The third is about efficiency, and that is what Sir Brian is considering in the second part of his report.

Gaming the system is a real problem. I am afraid that there are rumours out there that some people are less than scrupulous once they get arrested by the police. Some of those people know that the delays are such in the Crown Court that, if they elect trial by jury and decide to sit around and wait, particularly if they are on bail, they will have not just one Christmas at home, but at least two or maybe three. They will probably be tagged, and when they come back to the Crown Court when their trial date finally arrives, many of them plead guilty there and then. That means that the time they spent on the tag then has to be taken into account and offset against any available sentence, so they walk away with time served. I have seen that, and that is gaming the system. We cannot have it. It cannot be right that victims of serious offences wait for years for their cases to be heard—possibly dropping out—meaning that unscrupulous defendants can do that. These are real people’s real lives. If tradition is going to survive, it has to adapt.

Timeliness is an essential ingredient of fairness. Sir Brian estimates that juryless trials would be at least 20% faster than those conducted with a jury. It makes sense—of course it does—because you do not have to swear in a jury; such things take time.

Governments must make sure that public services are able to meet the demands of the day and to deliver for the public and the most vulnerable. This means that every generation may well face the prospect of significant reform in order to make things better.

One of the things that the Crown Court is having to contend with is that trials have become more complicated. There is good news: the police are arresting more people, and more of them are coming through the courts. That is what we want to see. But things such as advances in science, such as DNA, advances in techniques, such as the prevalence of CCTV evidence, and social media make proving a case, and, indeed, defending a case, much more complicated than it was. That is why we simply have to move the line to a slightly different place.

For the courts, there is no single thing government can do to resolve this crisis that would not require the system to deal with some change. The delays to justice faced by thousands of victims across the country are unacceptable. They cannot be allowed to grow unchecked. There is no quick fix. The changes we are proposing to make will require legislation. We are intending to fix the system so that it is good for the next generation. That is why we are not intending to impose a sunset clause here. These are meant to be lasting reforms, not an unstable system where nobody is quite sure what is happening. These are lasting reforms to make the system fit for purpose.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, would she kindly answer the question: is it intended that these proposals will be retrospective? If not, how on earth are they going to impact upon the present backlog?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

At present, there are no plans to make them retrospective, but that is why it is going to take time. That is why it will take time to work its way through. But if we do not do this, not only would we not be tackling the current backlog, we would be letting it grow. That is why it cannot continue.

Child Grooming Victims: Compensation Awards

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 20th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises a number of points in that question. Many of those will be for the national inquiry to deal with, so I will simply deal very quickly with the question of convictions and their effect on compensation. It is right to say that it is a condition of applying to the criminal injuries compensation scheme that the applicant does not have unspent criminal convictions. The difficulty with waiving that for one group is that it undermines the universality of the system. We are very anxious not to create a hierarchy of victims where some are seen as more worthy of belief or compensation than others, and we will do everything we can to avoid that.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, it has been widely reported that four victims of the grooming scandal have resigned from the liaison panel of the national grooming gangs inquiry, describing a “toxic, fearful environment” and accusing the process of being manipulated away from the central issue of the grooming gangs. Will the Minister commit to publishing a proper timeline, including a fixed timescale for the appointment of a chair, and a clear start date for this important inquiry?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The Government were extremely saddened by the resignation of those victims, and they are always welcome to rejoin and re-engage with the process—we very much hope that they will. The process of appointing the chair is well under way. As I have already said, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, is assisting with this. It would not be helpful to give a running commentary on what is happening, but it is important to the Government to get on with this.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 (Extension of Operative Period) Regulations 2025

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 21st October 2025 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of the instrument before your Lordships is to extend the powers to make regulations to implement private international law agreements for a further five years from 13 December 2025. This instrument may not have a very snappy title, but it is an important one because, if these powers are not extended, they will permanently lapse.

As your Lordships are doubtless aware, private international law rules are applied by courts and parties involved in legal disputes that raise cross-border issues. They generally apply in the context of civil and family law. In other words, private international law agreements help govern how we live, work and trade across borders. In the past, the domestic implementation of new private international law agreements generally required primary legislation, but most domestic provisions implementing private international law agreements concern technical matters and are limited in scope: therefore, implementation can appropriately be handled via secondary legislation. This is because policy issues are often settled when the private international law agreement is negotiated, so the implementation process focuses largely on the procedural changes needed to give effect to the policy decisions reached during negotiations.

The Committee will be interested to know that the Government have carried out a consultation with experts from across the UK. The vast majority of respondents considered that these powers have been used properly to date; that the safeguards are effective; and that the continued use of the powers is in the public interest because they provide a single, clear means of implementing private international law agreements and make proportionate use of parliamentary time.

The purpose of this instrument is to extend the powers to make regulations under Section 2 of and Schedule 6 to the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020. Section 2 allows the “appropriate national authority” to make regulations for the purpose of implementing international private international law agreements; to apply those regulations to the UK’s different jurisdictions; and to extend these regulation-making powers for a further five years. The Scottish and Northern Irish national authorities can grant permission to the Secretary of State to make regulations on their behalf, including regulations extending the five-year operative period in their jurisdictions, as they have done in this case.

I very much thank those noble Lords who sit on the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for their review of this instrument and for their clear, concise summary in their 36th report, which I commend to the Committee.

I turn now to the reasons for extending the powers. We suggest that these powers provide a single, clear method for implementing private international law agreements. They protect the public interest by ensuring that parliamentary time is used effectively, and they retain the effective safeguards and limits on the powers provided by the Act. The powers are vital in ensuring the UK’s credibility with its international partners by reassuring them that private international law agreements can be implemented in a timely way.

By way of example, the powers were used to implement the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019. Without the powers granted by the Act, primary legislation would have been needed, thereby delaying implementation. Our ratification of Hague 2019 was warmly welcomed by the legal sector—and, indeed, by Members of your Lordships’ House—as an important step for international, civil and commercial co-operation.

The Government are now proposing that the powers would be used, for example, to implement the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which would allow cross-border commercial mediation settlements to be recognised and enforced more easily before the UK courts. Furthermore, in July 2023, the Government confirmed their intention to implement two model laws that had been adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law—UNCITRAL—of which the UK is a member state.

I will say a brief word about the consultation. The Act imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to consult such persons as he or she considers appropriate before using the powers. As your Lordships will be aware from the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government consulted targeted experts on whether to extend the powers for a further five years. These experts included academics, lawyers and professional bodies, some with very large memberships, from all parts of the UK; the vast majority agreed with the extension of the powers, for the reasons I outlined earlier.

On safeguards, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, doubtless remembers from his involvement in the passage of the Act, several noble and learned Lords raised concerns about the extent of the powers, which led to amendments introducing various safeguards. These include the prohibition on granting legislative powers, the banning of the creation of imprisonable offences and the establishment of a five-year extendable time limit, which is the subject of the instrument before your Lordships today.

In addition, most regulations made using the powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure or equivalent processes in the devolved legislatures. Therefore, Parliament and, where appropriate, the devolved legislatures retain the ultimate say regarding the use of the powers. I would like to take this opportunity to reassure noble Lords that this instrument does not affect those safeguards. I should also add that several consultees noted the proportionate use of powers to date, as well as the effectiveness of the safeguards, and judged that the benefits outweighed the concerns raised during the passage of the Act.

I thank the noble and learned Lord in advance for his contribution, as I cannot see anybody else present who looks as though they want to say something; I very much look forward to working with him. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction of the regulations, which extend the powers conferred by the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 in order that Ministers may implement private international law provisions contained in international agreements in accordance with our dualist system of law.

Private international law is, of course, a vital extension of our domestic legal framework. It enables businesses, individuals and families to operate confidently and lawfully across borders. That is why the previous Conservative Government championed the 2020 Act. It expands the sphere in which reciprocal legal treatment can be upheld, with flexibility and indeed a degree of agility, as indicated by the Minister.

The Act is also one of several measures introduced to address the legal and legislative gaps following our departure from the European Union, filling the gaps in a way that minimised the burden on parliamentary time while continuing to promote the UK’s commitment to international legal co-operation. At the time, concerns were raised, as the Minister indicated, by the then Opposition about the potential for executive overreach. In practice, however, the power has been used very sparingly—only twice, I understand, since 2020—and the requirement for parliamentary renewal every five years provides an important check on its use. Far from becoming a tool of unchecked executive authority, it has functioned within very clear and indeed limited boundaries.

If the instrument is to continue serving our interests, we must be confident that it is both effective and proportionate. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government will consider undertaking a formal impact assessment to provide clarity on how they see the instrument being used in the coming years. Clearly, we must ensure that the instrument becomes neither a dormant provision nor a vehicle for unchecked executive action. I thank the Minister for her introduction.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his contribution to this debate. He is a lawyer of great distinction, and his comments were listened to carefully by me.

He made an important point about the necessity of ensuring that all legislation of this sort does not succumb to overreach or indeed become dormant but must remain both effective and proportionate. He asked whether we would consider an impact assessment. I may have to come back to him on that and write when there has been an opportunity to consider this. I will take it away and think about it carefully, because it seems that the points made are important.

As I set out, these powers are an important tool that will support a clear and effective implementation mechanism for private international law agreements. In turn, these agreements will provide greater clarity and confidence for UK businesses, families and citizens who work and live across international borders.