(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it has been an unusual experience to have had a debate with two sides to it on the Bill; the Minister must be pleased about that. I am afraid that I sit firmly on the fence—indeed, on the ring-fence. I am in two minds on this issue. Ring-fencing requirements were put in place after the financial crisis for very good reasons. You can argue that they went too far and that, to some extent, they have been overtaken by other regulations and that they perhaps overburden and create some restrictions on the banks. But, in the Bill, the Government recognise that.
On the other side of the equation, the economy and the banking system are currently facing a whole range of threats, which are arguably greater than have been faced at any time since the financial crisis in 2008. We have the private credit situation and the impacts of AI, to name just a few. Is it really the right time to remove ring-fencing entirely?
I am also not entirely convinced by the argument that removing ring-fencing would have that much impact on domestic lending. Domestic lending is inside the ring-fence. In fact, you could argue that it would have the opposite effect, as banks could then use deposits for more risky non-lending activities. Therefore, I confess that I find that argument unconvincing.
I am open-minded, but I am more minded to support the government proposals to loosen the ring-fencing rules and introduce some flexibility to them. I do not think I am ready to support complete removal at this stage. However, I am drawn to Amendment 159, which requires a consultation and assessment to take place before the proposed changes can be made.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to have the debate, and I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, for raising questions which have encouraged debate, but I support my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s opposition to Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I also support her Amendment 160A about ring-fencing.
Clause 39 gives the Treasury powers to loosen the ring-fencing scheme. It has been anticipated, as others have said in this debate, by a number of announcements and reports, not least the Skeoch report—I hope I have pronounced it rightly, in the Celtic way—and the announcements this year by the Treasury itself. All of these point to and address a real problem. The question before us today is whether the Government’s solution in their Clauses 39 and 40 is sufficient to deal with the problems raised by reviews and announcements going back to the 1 March 2022 independent review of the working of the scheme.
I have a concern. The clause may seem to be the answer to some of the serious questions raised in that review and other concerns, and allow for the mitigation of problems arising from the ring-fencing regime—to allow for “proportionate” changes, to use a word which continues to recur throughout the assessments of how the scheme is working. However, in essence, it protracts the dominance of the regime and the regulators in what should be business decisions under good law, which is the spirit of the common law. It is a law which is permissive of risk-taking rather than prohibitive of the spirit of enterprise, or looking over the shoulder to the precautionary principle.
Officials and regulators can be very intelligent, competent and talented people, but it is not part of their skill set to drive through an entrepreneurial idea from the drawing board to production, sale, expanding their markets, developing a business, taking risk, and hiring and training people—which is an additional cost—while all the time keeping on top of the services sector, one of the fastest growing sectors in the UK and a jewel in the crown. Enabling officials to decide which activities should or should not be prohibited, and under which circumstances, does not tackle the fundamental problem to which the ring-fenced regime has given rise: the artificial and contrived structure. We are dealing with a structural problem—an artificially separated structure.
This structure inhibits the financial services sector from functioning in the best possible way, as an enabling hub for the whole UK economy, to allow small businesses, in particular, to grow and credit to flow. It is unlikely to remedy what we are dealing with, the fundamental problem of risk aversion imposed by ring-fencing law on businesses and the endemic risk aversion in the operation of the law.
(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I will be very brief. I am sympathetic to ensuring that the overseas recognition regulations are as pragmatic and seamless as they can be to enable easier international competition. But I have quite a lot of sympathy with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about giving these powers exclusively to the Treasury.
I want to ask one question of the Minister. New Section 408A(2) sets out a list of areas that
“the Treasury must have regard to the importance of”
when making regulations. As an aside, that is quite odd wording; normally it is “have regard to”. I am still not sure I understand what difference
“must have regard to the importance of”
makes to the meaning. Maybe the Minister might explain that. New Section 408(1) does something similar but in a slightly different way. It seems that one area is missing from the lists of “have regards”: the question of economic crime, particularly anti-money laundering and the transparency of ownership in the relevant jurisdictions. Can the Minister say whether he agrees that those are important and explain why they might be missing from the list?
I will just finish with something I should have said earlier today, given that I think we are finishing early and the Minister is going to get some of his evening back: I wish him a happy birthday.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I endorse the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the political pressure that the Treasury will be under to recognise certain countries. Without adequate scrutiny, wider advice and deep analysis, the problem of overleveraging in some banking systems, despite them appearing perfectly respectable, would expose the UK and its financial sector to the dangers of debt and contamination.
I therefore have doubts about the economic implications of the Treasury making these calls on account of political reasons. We see this all the time, whether on international agreements—I sit on that committee—or on European affairs, whose committee I previously sat on. There is constant pressure by Governments to sign treaties that are rather bad for the UK and its various sectors, including financial services. I would have concerns if there were no adequate scrutiny and no proper advice taken on whether such recognition is a good thing for our systems.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, after a number of days in Committee and at Second Reading, it is clear that the major theme of scrutiny of the regulators has emerged and that we have an extraordinary level of cross-party agreement on the Bill—almost unprecedented, as the Minister will see if she turns around and looks behind her.
This is so important because, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, just said, the Bill transfers huge amounts of power to the regulators but does very little to provide Parliament with the means to scrutinise what they do. This has been raised by a number of parliamentary committees, including the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, of which I was a member before it was wound up, and the European Union Committee, among others. The Bill does give strong oversight, scrutiny and direction rights to the Treasury but that is not the same as parliamentary scrutiny.
The Minister said this at Second Reading:
“It is also imperative that the regulators’ new responsibilities are balanced with clear accountability to the Government and Parliament. I assure noble Lords that the Government recognise the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of the work of the Treasury and the regulators.”—[Official Report, 10/1/23; col. 1332.]
However, nothing in the Bill does that. All the Bill does at the moment is make requirements for the regulators to notify the Treasury Select Committee of the consultation and for the regulators to respond in writing to responses to any statutory consultations from any parliamentary committee.
I am sorry, but that is not the same as providing for genuine parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the regulators. Are the regulators meeting their objectives? Are they protecting consumers from excessive risk and fraud? Are they ensuring stability? Are they carrying out their activities efficiently? Are they encouraging growth and competitiveness? Are they acting in accordance with the climate change rules? Are they horizon scanning for future risks and so on? Nothing in the Bill, as currently drafted, provides for real parliamentary scrutiny as I would understand it.
I am afraid that the noble Baroness has form in this respect. Perhaps I could take her back a few months to the discussions we had around the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill when we queried her reference to parliamentary scrutiny of various documents within that. To paraphrase, she suggested that the more informal parliamentary scrutiny, such as the ability to ask Oral Questions and such like, was sufficient. We seem to be heading down the same way with this Bill. It is not acceptable.
The other day, the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, set out with his usual clarity the three things required for effective scrutiny of the regulators. To paraphrase, they were reporting, independent analysis and parliamentary accountability. There are various amendments in this group and the next group dealing with the third of those: parliamentary accountability. I have added my name to those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which aim—as she has explained—to create a bicameral committee that will focus specifically on scrutiny of the financial regulators.
I have long argued that financial regulation is such a large subject, so complex, and dealing with such an important sector of our economy, that it deserves a committee dedicated to it. It is just too big to be able to be meaningfully scrutinised by a committee that covers a wider subject area, such as the Treasury Select Committee of the Commons, the Economic Affairs Committee or the Industry and Regulators Committee, as we heard a minute ago. I strongly support the idea of creating a new bicameral committee that will focus specifically on this subject.
Importantly, Amendment 87 from the noble Baroness tries to widen the scope of parliamentary scrutiny. It says that:
“The FSRC—
the new committee—
“may examine or otherwise oversee the administration, policy and operations of”
the various regulators and may examine any consultations and reports issued by them. I am slightly nervous about the word “oversee” as I worry that might imply interference in the independence of the regulators. More importantly, I also want to add that the new committee should consider the impact of the regulators, in addition to administration, policy and operations. As I have said before, it is really important that the scrutiny is forward-looking, that we are horizon scanning for future risks, so I would widen the amendment further rather than it just being backward-looking. As I say, I wholeheartedly support the principle of a new, properly resourced bicameral committee with a much wider remit than the narrow focus that the Bill currently provides to the Treasury Select Committee. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, the involvement of this House is incredibly important. There is enormous expertise throughout the House.
I recognise that there are other ways of achieving proper parliamentary scrutiny, as we can see from the various other amendments in this and the next group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. I am not going to get too religious about this. It is clear that there appears to be near-unanimity on the importance of strengthening the arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators and of the Treasury, as the Minister said at Second Reading, given the greater responsibility this Bill pushes on to the regulators.
In the interests of time, I am not going to speak on the next group. It would just be repeating what I am saying now. But I hope the Minister will take it as read that I support the theme and concept in the next group. just as I do within this one. What I hope will now happen is that the Minister and all interested Peers can get together between now and Report to try to come up with something mutually acceptable that we can all get behind. Is that something the Minister can facilitate?
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and I support the amendments in this grouping proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Bowles, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and others, for the reasons which have been explained. I have an indirect interest in this subject, which I declare. As a founder and research director of Politeia, I have been involved in publishing some analysis on the question of regulation and, indeed, contributed myself on a problem which is very great in Britain now, that of accountability, and more generally this regulatory state into which we have slipped.
My Amendment 175 should be seen as complementary to this grouping. Its aim is slightly different but complementary; it is designed to focus scrutiny ex ante on the rules proposed. The focus is on new, adapted or maintained regulations that are due to come into operation and to consider how consistent, predictable and transparent they will be, as well as how much they will be in accord with the law. Given the fast pace of how the sector works and the speed with which, by necessity, regulators must act and decide things, it is important that we have this external check before rules come into operation. The regulators will have the power to intervene and make new rules within the broad terms of the law, if they judge that they should, without the searching analysis and testing that are needed beforehand. The sector will in most senses be a guinea pig for this process.