(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is an important piece of legislation, and I very much welcome it. I think that this House, along with the rest of the country, was shocked at the manipulation of LIBOR. It may have had the silver lining of at last persuading the banks that they had to take reform seriously, but certainly it was a stain on the reputation of the City and it put further in danger the economic recovery and the financial services industry in this country; so it was significant.
I think that in this House generally, and certainly among my colleagues, we very much welcome the Wheatley review. I was able to be at the launch of that document in the City. There were many present who were from outside the UK, and the consensus in the room was, “He has basically cracked it”; that Wheatley had found the mechanism and a series of reforms that could give us a LIBOR measurement that was clean, that would be respected and that could contribute to the purpose that LIBOR has served in rate-setting for many documents, instruments, investments and loans across the globe. I think that the attempts to put the necessary legislative pieces in place are well reflected in the document that we have in front of us today.
I have just a few questions for the Minister. Like others, I am somewhat concerned about the breadth of the general statement on benchmarks. LIBOR is not mentioned specifically anywhere in these amendments, so in breadth and scope it has about it a certain air of ambiguity. We suffer, of course, because this comes late in the process of legislation and therefore is not accompanied by the notes that would have been available and would have provided much further discussion had this been part of the original document. There are many issues. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, some people will look at the manipulation of the gas market and wonder whether that can be encompassed by this legislation; others will wonder whether the FTSE 100, which is an index used in a number of investments, could be encompassed. One could go through a fairly long list. Would the Minister be willing to put in the Library, through a letter or a note, some record that gives us a grasp of the scope of the use of benchmarks in the context of this document? That would be extremely helpful for everybody, and there would be something in the official record that we could turn to.
Unintended consequences are a feature of legislation, and in this area I think that we have had too many unintended consequences of various people’s actions. So it is important that it does not happen in the context of this piece of legislation.
I am very glad that we have language in here that gives the FCA the power to deal with, in effect, the freeloaders—those who benefit from the setting of the LIBOR rate but who, because they wish to keep their own particular credit standing secret, do not participate in the rate-setting process. I wonder whether there is any further guidance or if the Minister can help us understand what he would see as the scope for the FCA to identify those potential freeloaders. Are we continuing to look only at major institutions? Perhaps there might be some reassurance to minor institutions that would be a little nervous of being caught within this net.
Another issue that has been raised is how we cope with European legislation or directives coming down the track. We are all aware that Monsieur Barnier is looking at these matters, but I did not quite understand—and perhaps the Minister could clarify—whether or not secondary legislation will be delayed until there is some clarity on the issues that Barnier is raising, or whether we will proceed with secondary legislation with the idea that it can then be amended if there turns out to be a significant gulf between the secondary legislation that we put forward and the rules emerging from the European Union. In this context, LIBOR is a significant international benchmark which needs international respect. It should not become a football or subject of a battle between the UK and the EU that is driven by other issues. It is important that it serves the broad purposes of the financial services industry, and I therefore see no shame in encompassing the concerns and thoughts of those outside the UK in shaping LIBOR as we go forward.
All of us in this House will be absolutely delighted that there is finally an offence for which people can be investigated, prosecuted and serve time, as well as be fined. There was shock throughout the House that the manipulation of LIBOR was not subject to prosecution under existing statutes on fraud and the consequent penalties. I congratulate the Government on making sure that that part of the Wheatley review has been well incorporated into this process.
I wish to make a couple of comments to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I, too, am interested in the tender process that will lead to an administrator for the LIBOR-setting process, but he asked why it should not be a public body. I remind him that Barclays noticeably prayed in aid its conversations with the Bank of England in the attempt to justify the LIBOR manipulation. It is important that whichever body is involved in rate setting should be very clearly at a distance from the regulator and from any political body in order that we avoid a repetition of that attempted contamination. I have therefore been supportive of the idea that this will be a tender to a private entity. The noble Lord is quite right to say that we have to understand whether or not there are conflicts of interest because there is the thought that the most likely parties to tender for such a process might also be very involved in producing financial instruments on the other side, but not necessarily so. I also understand the need for flexibility in this issue. The complexity of making sure that the use of LIBOR in many existing documents is not disrupted by the changes we make is absolutely crucial. That is surely a level of granularity that cannot possibly be dealt with in primary legislation and has to be left to the flexibility of both the rule-maker and secondary legislation.
I very much welcome the legislation in front of us. Let us hope that this is the beginning of the end of a very unfortunate experience in the history of financial services in the UK.
My Lords, this debate began with the clear statement that we should abide by Committee-stage rules. I am sure that noble Lords will be as surprised as I am at the definition of Committee-stage rules in this debate. I thought we were debating a Second Reading, but forgive me if I misunderstood. I, like my noble friend Lord Eatwell, very much agree with the Government on wanting to introduce Wheatley. That review was excellent and well deserved our support. What I am worried about is the way that the Government have decided to implement it.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in a way, although the amendment would add even more confusion to the Bill than is already there. My noble friend Lord Peston referred to the fact that it is about shocks. I hope it is not an urgent shock, because the amendment would give time for draft orders to be laid for a period of up to 60 days or before the end of a period of 12 weeks. Then there must be orders in both Houses. I assume that both Houses would also take advice from their Select Committees. All that will be going on while urgency is required. I find the whole thing as confusing as my noble friend does. We are told at the end of the amendment that if this shock arises when the House is not sitting, all kinds of other things happen. As my noble friend said, if the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, cannot clarify the whole thing for us in asking for the amendment to be withdrawn, we should be glad if he would take it away to think about it further and let us know what he or someone else thinks about it.
My Lords, I am very much in favour of scrutiny by this House. I cannot pretend to be an expert either on the different varieties of orders or on the different measurements and tools that the FPC might introduce, but I would be concerned about a mechanism in this House that enabled tools to be amended. Although we have some experts, the capacity to understand the internal workings of a tool with sufficient precision to be able to introduce an amendment to a ratio strikes me as not the particular skill of a legislature or this House. We can raise questions about it or require that it be dismissed because the Government have not sufficiently made their case, but to amend it is not a skill with which we are particularly equipped.
For that reason, and with great respect to the House, it seems to me that the capacity for amendment is inappropriate in this case. The capacity to force the Government to make their case and to judge on that case is entirely appropriate, but not the capacity to substitute; that worries me.