Financial Services: Mansion House Speech

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Thursday 21st November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, the Chancellor’s speech at the Mansion House covered a wide range of very important topics which we will need to discuss over the coming months. I can touch on only a few of them today. However, perhaps first we should note that very recent developments include an unexpected reduction in the rate of economic growth and an increase in the rate of inflation; and, today, an increase in monthly borrowing to £17.4 billion—the highest level ever outside the pandemic.

The reduction in the growth rate in the fourth quarter was brought about in part by the unwise and inaccurate remarks on the state of the British economy that have been made frequently by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor since taking office. Taken alongside the problems of the Budget, it has not been an auspicious beginning for the Government. Some of the effects on hard-working citizens, small businesses and farmers were brought to our attention outside this very building only this week. Furthermore, the UK gilt market has taken a hit, meaning that the cost of servicing our debt has risen. The last time yields on 10-year gilts were this high, Labour promised it would ensure that it never happened again; and, of course, higher bond yields mean higher debt-servicing costs. How do the Government intend to square this particular circle?

One major sector covered by the Chancellor’s very comprehensive speech was pensions, which are important for almost everyone. We share the Chancellor’s aims of securing greater returns for pension savers while at the same time enabling pension funds to contribute to funding increased infrastructure spending here in the UK. These objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but it will be difficult to bring about both. We on these Benches will take a keen interest in how this initiative is taken forward in the forthcoming pensions Bill and elsewhere. When can we expect more details?

We are also keen to know more about how, precisely, the proposed pension megafunds will work and, in particular, what rules they will need to follow as regards UK and foreign investments. We all know about the massive investment that Australian and Canadian funds have made in UK infrastructure. Will the proposed UK funds be able to invest in a similar fashion overseas? The Government have proposed consolidating 86 local authority pension funds into eight. When will this occur and on what criteria? How will the interests of those in well-run funds be protected from the ravages of the less successful ones?

Lastly, I return to the Government’s stated first aim of improving the rate of economic growth. We want them to succeed; really, we do. Per capita growth is the right measure of success. All economic policies should have growth as one of their aims, so I note with particular satisfaction that the Chancellor has recently impressed on several economic regulators that this should be their objective also. Otherwise, unfortunately, the Government have made a poor start on achieving growth and managing inflation. When we left government, we had the fastest-growing economy in the G7. Now that has greatly diminished. Let us hope, for the sake of our citizens, that the Government will do better in future.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my party is determined to see growth in the UK economy and to use tools such as reform of the financial services sector to drive that growth, though we would put much more emphasis on a revival of community banking and financing for SMEs. High risk, however, is not for all. For people with small pensions, safety—not a jackpot—is the goal. Will the Minister assure this House that, in all the various changes, small pensions will in some way be backstopped from losses generated through higher risk, including illiquid investments? In Canada, which seems to be a template for the Government, public sector pension funds are, in effect, wholly backstopped by the state.

Members on these Benches remember the financial crisis of 2007, which destroyed growth for a generation. It was enabled by gullibility and naivety in dealing with the financial sector, both by Conservative and Labour Governments and by the regulators. The Bank of England is re-looking at the regulation of CCPs to allow greater derivates risk; the PRA now allows insurance companies to hold illiquid assets without relevant reserves; the bank ring-fence is being undermined, and the FCA plans to gut the clawback on bankers’ bonuses and downgrade the certification of senior managers. We are back to jobs for the boys.

Much more—if I understand the Chancellor correctly in the Mansion House speech—is to come. I sat for two years on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, listening to the pernicious incompetence of masters of the universe who were turning a deliberate blind eye to market manipulation, mis-selling and money laundering, with no acceptance of responsibility. Will the Minster read the reports of the PCBS before he proceeds with any further weakening of regulation? If this is not done with extraordinary care, we risk seeing the reseeding the next financial crisis.

Collective Investment Schemes (Temporary Recognition) and Central Counterparties (Transitional Provision) (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Monday 18th November 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be relatively brief because these are highly technical instruments, but there are some comments that I would like to make.

I shall start with the collective investment schemes and central counterparties order and begin with collective investments schemes. I ran this one by my noble friend Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, who is the ultimate guru in our party on collective investments schemes and, I suspect, one of the experts on them within the House, and her report was “It’s absolutely fine, let it go”, so I will happily take that position on the necessary tidy-up of the changes in the language for collective investment schemes.

However, the second part of that order is far more interesting and raises some questions, about not the language but the broader issue of central counterparties and the hint that this regulation may contain. Everyone in this Room understands that central counterparties became an instrument for countering the fallout of the 2008 financial crash when liquidity seized up across the financial services sector because, within that huge area of derivatives—I think derivatives outstanding typically exceed something like $60 trillion at any one time—the outside world did not know who owed what to whom and therefore who was at risk from which failure and whether there would be domino effect. Indeed, liquidity then seized up and we went from a contained financial crisis into a wholesale financial crisis. Now, vanilla transactions and derivative arrangements that go beyond the vanilla pass through central counterparties so that there is a middleman, if you like, that can hold the risk so that if one party fails, the counterparty takes the risk, not the person who holds the mirror transaction on the opposite side.

I think everyone has always recognised—I could quote Andy Haldane, but I have done it too often before—that, in a sense, the central counterparty is an accumulation of risk. One could almost think of it as an unexploded bomb. Serious levels of risk are contained with the central counterparty and, if anything goes awry, the shock to the financial system would be global. The Committee will know that many of the counterparties share common ownership. They may look like completely separate organisations, but they feed back and the same parties, in a sense, make up their various memberships and ownerships. Cross-contamination is always a huge risk when dealing with central counterparties.

It is obviously sensible now that, sadly, we have left the EU, that regulation which tied into EU directives should drop away, but I am concerned that this does not become an excuse for playing the game of regulatory arbitrage. We hear constantly about the significance of growth. I do not deny that, but I am concerned about the gradual understating of risk that sits alongside loosening and changing regulation to create the animal spirits that will create growth.

The potential to play a regulatory arbitrage game around central counterparties must be raised in this context. When we required recognition by more than one regulator—ESMA as well as its UK equivalent—we had the constraint of two sets of significant eyes looking at a particular situation. Now there is one set of eyes only. While we always acclaim the importance and, as I often hear, the great superiority of the British regulators in this area, I would very much like some assurances that there is at least some degree of oversight and monitoring in recognising the potential of trying to loosen up regulation around the central counterparties.

Both prior to our exit from the EU and today, the dominant European clearing house—one might say the dominant global one—was LCH. It is no longer called the London Clearing House and its party in Paris is now known as LCH Paris. It is still dependent for about a third of its clientele on recognition from ESMA. ESMA has given it temporary equivalence, but that could be adjusted or changed in future and there could be limitations on European institutions from doing more than a certain percentage of their clearing through LCH or other UK clearing houses. Can the Minister update us on that issue? Is there any sense that the steps we are taking could trigger a more adverse decision from ESMA in reference to UK-based CCPs?

I will very briefly deal with the insurance distribution regulations. Some in this Committee will know that I hate the concept of a regulatory perimeter whereby we regulate activities on one side but not on the other. I gather from the Explanatory Memorandum that some companies which were outside the regulatory perimeter will now be drawn inside it. That can be only a good thing, but there has always been a tendency for companies in the UK to game the regulatory perimeter. They grow to a size that puts them just outside sight of the regulation. Will a significant number of companies be affected by this adjustment in denominating the assets from euros to sterling? Will we see a cluster around the regulatory perimeter and have any concerns been triggered in looking at this set of changes?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I take great pleasure in returning to the Front Bench to debate Treasury matters, albeit now in a shadow capacity. Although I do not have current interests to declare, I hope that my past experience as Commercial Secretary to the Treasury and as a member of the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee will stand me in good stead. Until 2022 I served as a non-executive director of a challenger bank and, of course, I have served in business more generally. I thank the Minister for her clear explanation of these two instruments and their obvious complexities. I am glad of the opportunity to work with her across the House and I look forward to hearing the answers to the observations made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, especially about risk.

Our investment schemes and central counterparties are without question the backbone of the United Kingdom’s financial services industry. They enable our country to attract global capital, support pensions and, ultimately, benefit people and businesses up and down the country. As the Minister said, it is important that the rules and regulations are not needlessly bureaucratic. The removal of EU recognition is welcome. We now have domestic arrangements for oversight and I believe we should not be double-banking, so I am in a slightly different place to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on that.

I wish to make two wider points. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for including a de minimis impact assessment with the first SI. I note that it has also been through the better regulation unit. I have always been a huge supporter of impact assessment and wider cost-benefit analysis of all legislation, but I have two questions. Can the Minister confirm that it is the policy of the new Government to require de minimis assessments of this kind on all SIs—unless the impact is negligible, as with the insurance distribution SI? She can perhaps answer for the Treasury today. I note from GOV.UK that her ministerial role also relates to business regulation more widely. Although she may need to write, I would appreciate a wider answer, as such a requirement would help deliver value for money across government and limit the negative effect on growth of new regulation.

My other concern is the glacial pace at which we are leaving the EU financial services regime behind. The collective investment SI provides for a year’s extension of a temporary regime. Although this may be well and good for the reasons the Minister has clearly explained, I have no idea when the UK will have completed the task of replacing EU financial services law with our own. I was trying to advance this process in 2017 when I was at the Treasury so that we would be ready when Brexit day arrived; as it happened, it did not arrive until January 2020. I believe the transition was well debated during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, but I have two other related questions. Do the Government, with the help of the regulators, have a plan for completing it and taking advantage of any new freedoms and simplifications that are now possible? Will the Minister agree to send me a list of the missing regulations and a timetable?

Although it is a demand, I mean that as a constructive question. Our financial services sector is so important to UK growth, and we need to make sure that these changes are completed, take effect and help our financial services sector, which has so much to contribute to UK growth, productivity and prosperity. Having said that, I am very happy to support the two sets of regulations.