Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Kennedy of Shaws and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I rise in response to a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who referred to an article in today’s Times written by a Member of the other place, Joanna Cherry. She is, of course, the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I sit. I attended the same meetings as she did with members of the LGBT community in Rwanda and with the chairman of the Legal Aid Forum. I must tell your Lordships that I do not agree with the views that she expressed in the Times. She obviously comes from a political party that disagrees with this policy, and I am afraid that that has coloured her judgment in this regard. I do not find that the evidence that we heard sustains her conclusions.

We heard that Rwanda is a leading light in the region—east Africa—for the LGBT community. As we heard from the noble Baroness during the previous day of Report, this is a country that does not discriminate against LGBT activity and has very strong general protection against discrimination in its constitution. For those reasons, I am afraid I have the misfortune to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Cashman.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not on the visit to Rwanda with the committee, but I looked at all the notes that were taken, and I want to make it clear that, while the constitution of Rwanda provides remedies for those who have suffered discrimination, the problem is that no cases have ever been brought using that part of the constitution. To say that there are well-established principles and well-established methods to protect individuals has not been tested in the courts—and the opinion of others who were approached was that the place was not safe. Noble Lords heard that from the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, on Monday. Unfortunately, when noble Lords say that it depends on how one approaches these things, I am afraid that it does—it depends on whether one has an open mind and listens clearly or does not.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Baroness Kennedy of Shaws and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that contribution. The position, as he outlined in his speech, is that the deterrence effect takes its force from a number of sections in the Bill: the first, obviously, being the detention and removal, as he rightly identified; the second being the bans on the ability to settle or stay here, the idea being that that disincentivises people from entering illegally using dangerous routes. I do not accept that there are two Bills in the way that my noble friend identifies. The reality is that the question of registration of citizenship, which he raises, is unlikely to arise in as many cases as the naturalisation circumstance—I think we can agree on that—so it is natural that what we are talking about is probably an exceptional state of affairs, in any event. That is potentially why my noble friend perceives a dissonance between the deterrent effect and the two factors, but in fact there is no such distinction.

Amendments 98ZA and 98EA, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seek to expand the circumstances in which the bans on settlement and citizenship are to be disapplied. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, also touched on this issue. We consider that the circumstances in which a grant of settlement or citizenship would be an appropriate remedy are wholly covered by the ECHR, so our view is that the addition of other international agreements is unnecessary, hence the amendment, as we have already canvassed.

I turn now to Amendment 98I tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. This seeks to provide a broader protection for those holding British national (overseas) status. We do not believe this is necessary. The clauses which prevent people from obtaining various forms of British nationality already do not mention British national (overseas) status. This is for the simple reason that no one has been able to obtain that status since 1997 and, consequently, there is no need to ban people from obtaining it should they arrive illegally.

We already have in place a dedicated migration route for people from Hong Kong and, as the noble Baroness knows, it has been a significant priority for the Government and the department to offer this route to British national (overseas) people from Hong Kong in response to the situation there. We have done a great deal for the citizens of Hong Kong and hope to continue to do so. As cited in my response to my noble friend, Lord Moylan, a route to citizenship exists under Section 4(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. There should therefore be no reason for a person holding British national (overseas) status to arrive illegally in the manner which would mean they fall under this Bill’s provisions.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

I was just going to posit to the noble Lord that some of these people having to flee are aged 16 and 17 and were involved in demonstrations and so on and then fled by unusual routes out of Hong Kong. Some of them are making their way via Europe to join family members here in the United Kingdom. Would they automatically, under this Bill, be deprived of ever joining their families?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for raising that. In fact, I was just turning to that very issue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked a couple of specific questions about the children of BNO passport holders—the issue that the noble Baroness now raises again. These address issues which fall outside this Bill; none the less, I can advise the noble Baroness and others interested in this topic that dependants of BNO status holders who themselves do not hold BNO status do not need a valid Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport to renew their BNO visa. However, I am afraid that renewal of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passports is not something the UK Government can assist with and until they qualify for British citizenship, such children are not eligible for a British passport.

The Government’s view is that this is not relevant to this clause, but I am, however, very interested in this topic and can entirely understand the concern that has been expressed. I would be content to meet the noble Baroness and perhaps the right reverend Prelate, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and some BNOs to discuss this issue because it is obviously important. I suggest that this amendment is not the mechanism for us to discuss this, but I entirely understand that clarification and explanation is needed.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 37 provides for two types of suspensive claims, which have the effect of suspending a person’s removal—a factual suspensive claim and a serious harm suspensive claim. A factual suspensive claim is a claim that a mistake was made in deciding that a person meets the four conditions set out in Clause 2. A serious harm suspensive claim is a claim that a person would, before the end of the relevant period, face a risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed from the UK to a country other than their country of origin. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, the risk must be real, imminent and foreseeable. The serious and irreversible harm test is designed to be a high threshold, reflecting the test of the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39.

These amendments seek to change how Clause 38 defines the risk of harm, lowering the threshold for a serious harm claim to succeed. In responding to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I start by making the general observation that suspensive claims are relevant to people who have received a third-country removal notice. In this context, an asylum claim would not be relevant. Therefore, they do not impact the definition of “refugee” in the way that he suggested.

Amendments 100 and 108 would remove the requirement for the harm to occur in the period that it would take for any human rights claim or judicial review to be determined from the third country. If accepted, these amendments would enable people who receive a third-country removal notice to raise serious harm suspensive claims against their removal, based on a risk of harm that many not materialise for many months, if not years, after the person’s removal to the safe third country. This cannot be right. We cannot have a position whereby a person’s removal from this country is prevented based on a risk that does not currently exist and may not exist until a significant amount of time has elapsed after the person is removed.

Amendment 101 would remove the need for the risk of harm to be imminent and foreseeable. If accepted, this would have a similar effect to Amendments 100 and 108, enabling a person to successfully challenge their removal based on a risk that may occur a long time in the future.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

A great deal of research has gone into the risks associated with countries where the law still criminalises homosexuality. The research of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has shown that those countries permit levels of murder of gay men and women, violence towards them and discrimination against them in many different forms. The violence experienced by people who are part of the LGBT+ community in those countries is exponentially greater than anywhere else, even in countries known for high levels of violence. The idea the Minister is talking about—risk that is far down the line and many years ahead—is not what we are talking about here. For many people going to those countries, there will be risks almost immediately.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes an entirely fair point. In those cases, of course, it would be an imminent feature. As she points out, in those circumstances that is something the courts would be able to have regard to.

The inclusion of “imminent and foreseeable” is intended to prevent the courts from considering risks that are dependent on a series of hypothetical events before the harm might occur. That is the reason, as I understand it, that “imminent” features in the European Court of Human Rights practice direction on interim measures. We cannot allow illegal entrants to be able to thwart their removal based on an unknown risk that cannot be foreseen and may not even arise for many months or years, if at all.

Amendments 102, 103, 104, 109, 111 and 112 would remove the requirement for the risk of harm to be irreversible. These amendments would significantly lower the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim to succeed and undermine the purpose of the Bill to deter illegal entry to the UK. Again, I point out with the greatest of respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that

“a real risk of serious and irreversible harm”

is the test applied by the Strasbourg court when considering applications for Rule 39 interim measures, as he alluded to during his speech.

Amendments 105, 106 and 107 would remove specific examples of harm, relevant to the availability of healthcare and medical treatment in a third country—a passage that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, drew the attention of the Committee to—in circumstances that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm. There is existing case law that indicates that claims based on harm resulting from differing standards of healthcare fall short of the Article 3 threshold. It is simply unjustifiable for those who enter this country illegally to be able to remain here indefinitely and have unlimited access to our healthcare systems solely on the basis that they may not receive the same level of medical treatment in the country or territory they are rightly removed to.

For these reasons, Clause 38 makes it clear that a serious harm suspensive claim based on a risk of harm relating to differing standards of healthcare cannot succeed and, as a result, will not prevent that person’s removal to the safe third country. Clause 38 also makes it clear that a claim based on pain or distress resulting from a lack of medical treatment is unlikely to succeed. By including specific examples of harm that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm in Clause 38, it is ensured that the courts take a consistent approach in their consideration of the risk of serious and irreversible harm and go no further than intended.

The Bill provides a fast-track process for the consideration of a claim which may temporarily suspend a person’s removal from the UK. Clauses 41 and 42, as the Committee has noted, set out the procedure and timescale for making a suspensive claim and the timescale for a decision to be made on a suspensive claim.

Amendment 113 would remove the requirement for a serious harm suspensive claim to include compelling evidence of the risk of serious harm that a person would face if removed to a third country, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. Reducing the evidential burden in this way risks the process being abused through spurious and unmeritorious claims, similar to those that we have seen in other immigration applications. Evidence that is compelling is defined as that which is reliable, substantial and material to a person’s claim. I suggest that this is a reasonable requirement and necessary to ensure that the suspensive claims process is not open to abuse.

Women’s Safety

Debate between Baroness Kennedy of Shaws and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Wednesday 8th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am conscious that the case to which my noble friend alludes is a terrible one, and officials in the Home Office are very alive to it. The safer streets fund has worked with various local authorities to reduce the risk of incidents of indecent exposure. In particular, one project at the Basingstoke Canal had the effect of reducing incidents by 55%. Clearly there is much more to be done, but I assure my noble friend that that work will continue.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The ambition of the department is to ensure that women and girls have absolute confidence in the police. I appreciate the difficulties that have been caused by recent court cases. I should add that in January we launched a fund worth £36 million for police and crime commissioners to increase the availability of interventions for domestic abuse perpetrators. These aim to improve victims’ safety and to reduce the risk posed by the perpetrator. I hope all these measures will generate increased confidence among women and girls.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope that on International Women’s Day women’s voices might be given a little more prominence. I want to raise the issue of sexual harassment in public places. While it is very clear that not all men sexually harass women in public spaces, it would be hard to find a single woman who has not experienced it at some point in her life. What is being done to address that? There has been a call for misogynistic sexual harassment in public spaces to be addressed as a crime and to be more effectively dealt with. It is one of those things that blight women’s lives. Social media has disinhibited people so that, in the very way that we are seeing this happen online, we are now seeing it increasingly experienced by women offline, and it leads on to more serious crime. What is the state going to do about introducing a law to protect women in the streets, at bus stops and on public transport as they go about their lives?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I agree with almost everything that the noble Baroness has said. I am delighted to confirm that the Government will support the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Bill, advanced by the right honourable Greg Clark, which would make public sexual harassment a specific offence. It provides that if someone commits an offence under the existing Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986—that is, intentionally causing harassment, alarm or distress—and does so because of the victim’s sex then they could obtain a higher sentence of two years rather than six months.