Baroness Howe of Idlicote
Main Page: Baroness Howe of Idlicote (Crossbench - Life peer)Consumer Rights Bill
Baroness Howe of Idlicote Excerpts“Duty to provide an internet service that protects children from digital content
(1) Internet service providers must provide to subscribers an internet access service which excludes adult content unless all the conditions of subsection (3) have been fulfilled.
(2) Where mobile telephone operators provide a telephone service to subscribers which includes an internet access service, they must ensure this service excludes adult content unless all the conditions of subsection (3) have been fulfilled.
(3) The conditions are—
(a) the subscriber “opts-in” to subscribe to a service that includes adult content;(b) the subscriber is aged 18 or over; and(c) the provider of the service has an age verification policy which meets the standards set out by OFCOM in subsection (4) and which has been used to confirm that the subscriber is aged 18 or over before a user is able to access adult content.(4) It shall be the duty of OFCOM, to set, and from time to time to review and revise, standards for the—
(a) filtering of adult content in line with the standards set out in section 319 of the Communications Act 2003 (OFCOM’s standards code);(b) age verification policies to be used under subsection (3) before a user is able to access adult content; and(c) filtering of content by age or subject category by providers of internet access services and mobile phone operators.(5) The standards set out by OFCOM under subsection (4) must be contained in one or more codes.
(6) Before setting standards under subsection (5), OFCOM must publish, in such a manner as they think fit, a draft of the proposed code containing those standards.
(7) After publishing the draft code and before setting the standards, OFCOM must consult relevant persons and organisations.
(8) It shall be the duty of OFCOM to establish procedures for the handling and resolution of complaints in a timely manner about the observance of standards set under subsection (4), including complaints about incorrect filtering of content.
(9) OFCOM may designate any body corporate to carry out its duties under this section in whole or in part.
(10) OFCOM may not designate a body under subsection (9) unless, as respects that designation, they are satisfied that the body—
(a) is a fit and proper body to be designated;(b) has consented to being designated;(c) has access to financial resources that are adequate to ensure the effective performance of its functions under this section; and(d) is sufficiently independent of providers of internet access services and mobile phone operators.(11) In this section, internet service providers and mobile telephone operators shall at all times be held harmless of any claims or proceedings, whether civil or criminal, providing that at the relevant time, the internet access provider or the mobile telephone operator—
(a) was following the standards and code set out by OFCOM in subsection (4); and(b) acting in good faith. (12) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in subsections (1) and (2) prevents providers of internet access services and mobile phone operators from providing additional levels of filtering content.
(13) In this section—
“adult content” means an internet access service that contains harmful and offensive materials from which persons under the age of eighteen are protected;
“harmful and offensive materials” has the same meaning as in section 3 of the Communications Act 2003 (general duties of OFCOM);
“material from which persons under the age of eighteen are protected” means material specified in the OFCOM standards under section 319(2)(a) of the Communications Act 2003 (OFCOM’s standards code);
“opts-in” means a subscriber notifies the service provider of his or her consent to subscribe to a service that includes adult content.”
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
I am very pleased to move this amendment, which requires internet service providers and mobile phone operators to provide default adult content filtering that can be removed if the service user opts in to adult content, demonstrating, as indeed they must, that they are aged 18 years or over. I am very grateful to my cosignatories from all sides of the House—the noble Baronesses, Lady King and Lady Benjamin, and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.
The Government have taken an important step forward in negotiating the self-regulatory default-on filtering arrangement with the big four ISPs. However, while this progress is welcome it cannot be seen as anything other than a single, momentary step towards a proper solution because of the significant problems that are central to the self-regulatory arrangements, of which there are at least three. First, the self-regulatory arrangements fail to cover more than 10% of the home broadband market, leaving a significant number of children outside its scope. Logically, it makes no sense for the Government to fight for a default-on arrangement, arguing that it is very important—as the Prime Minister has done—but then to stop short of applying it generally. To say that it is very important but then settle for delivering it to only some children ultimately amounts to saying that some children are worthy of more protection than others. That is not a sustainable long-term position.
Of course, I listened carefully to what the Minister had to say about this matter when I raised it in Committee. She made the point that because the other ISPs are not party to the agreement with the big four does not mean that they are not also providing the default-on system that the Prime Minister announced in his NSPCC speech in July, 2013. I have never suggested that only the big four ISPs do this; I have said simply that I am aware of a good number that do not and at least one that boasts of not doing so. Indeed, since Committee stage some research has been conducted and of the 14 smaller ISPs that service homes rather than businesses, four were found to offer something comparable to default-on, but 10 did not. Of those 10, two made it clear that they did provide filtering, but that it had to be applied by the customer separately; it was not an unavoidable choice at the set-up. Seven ISPs could not provide any information about filtering. One boasted that it deliberately did not filter. Amendment 50D would address that problem by requiring the provision of default-on in all households for all children.
Secondly, age verification is of pivotal importance. If you introduce a default-on arrangement that is not properly age-verified, the credibility of the whole system is completely called into question at two points: the initial set-up phase and in the event of any subsequent attempt to change the settings. The truth is that often it is the more technologically literate children who handle the set-up process on behalf of their parents. Where that happens, it is children, not adults, who will make the decision whether to opt in to access adult content. However, if an adult does the set-up and decides to have adult content filters to protect their children, there is nothing to stop their children subsequently changing the settings when their parents are out and opting in to access adult content. Without age verification of the person seeking to opt in to access adult content before the removal of filters, the credibility of the whole self-regulatory system breaks down. When pressed, the Government and industry say that if someone opts in to access adult content, the ISP will send an e-mail to the account holder, who must, by definition, be an adult. Even if a parent responds quickly, reads the e-mail the same day and acts on it, the children, unavoidably, still would have some hours of accessing harmful adult content from which we should be protecting them. The truth, however, is that we do not all process e-mails from ISPs quite so expeditiously.
Polling conducted by ComRes for the charity Care demonstrates that a total of 34% of British adults—that is, 16.3 million people—say that they would not read an e-mail from their ISP immediately. Eleven people said that they probably would leave the e-mail unread for up to a week, and nine people would be likely to leave it for more than a week. A staggering 14% said that they were unlikely to read an e-mail from their ISP. That figure rises to 18% when we look at the parents of children between five and 10 years old.
At the end of the day, the question is not: is it technologically possible to age verify before allowing someone to opting to access adult content? We know that it is entirely possible. It is already required by law if you want to place a bet online. The question is: how high a priority is child protection in Britain in 2014 and are our children worth it? The amendment, crucially, provides for statutory age verification before opening the door to someone opting to access adult content.
Thirdly, there are no common standards regarding what is and what is not adult content. Moreover, the way in which the standards are set is in no way publicly accountable. Different companies make those decisions on their own, generating complete inconsistency and uncertainty. For example, BT deems gambling to constitute adult content and blocks it, while Virgin does not. Amendment 50D addresses the problem by giving the responsibility for setting standards to a single, publicly accountable body, Ofcom. In the first instance, it means that the standard selected will be common to all filtering. Parents will be able to depend on consistency. In the second instance, it means that the standard selected will be accountable. As a public body, Ofcom is accountable and will indeed be required to consult on standards.
Having considered some of the problems with self-regulation and how Amendment 50D addresses them, I want briefly to set out how I see it delivering alongside other provisions, before homing in on the reasons why it is so important. I want to be exceptionally clear that I am not saying that the amendment is the only thing we need to keep children safe online. Education, for example, is vital. It is one of the two central pillars of my Online Safety Bill. The amendment is not an alternative to education, any more than education is an alternative to the amendment. Education is vital to help children to deal with online behavioural challenges. It is also good at helping children to avoid content that they want to avoid. It is, however, not effective at protecting children from content that they may want to access but from which they should be protected, as some sad stories that we shall now consider show all too clearly.
There are now multiple examples of children committing criminal acts which act out the sadistic, hardcore pornography that they have seen online. Consider the following. In Committee, I mentioned a case in Shropshire in August where the judge recognised that the 14 year-old boy in question, who raped a 10 year-old girl, was acting out what he had seen online. However, there are many more cases. I would like to go through a list, but there is clearly not time. They all, however, comprise the same ingredients: a child watches pornography online and then commits a criminal act by acting out what he has seen on another child.
I shall mention just one other case, that of a 12 year-old boy who raped his seven year-old sister. That came before the Blackburn youth court earlier this year. District Judge James Prowse readily acknowledged that the boy had been moved to act out pornography that he had watched online via his Xbox. He said:
“Society's view on pornography covers a wide spectrum from complete condemnation on the one side to being laissez faire on the other but even the most liberal-minded share society’s profound unease that children of your age can and do access the internet and watch graphic images of sexual intercourse”.
These, then, are the facts and we must not hide from them. They require a response. As William Wilberforce famously once said:
“You may choose to look the other way but you can never again say that you did not know”.
Children are freely accessing hardcore porn online and then looking for opportunities to act it out, with disastrous consequences. They are also freely accessing other forms of adult content that are harming their development. I have not had time to consider violence: a recent Centre for Public Innovation report concluded that children are increasingly being exposed to violence online.
We cannot brush this off and seriously suggest that a flawed self-regulatory system that misses out hundreds of thousands of children and does not, in any event, bother to age-verify people before allowing them to opt in to access content is a credible arrangement. It clearly is not. I very much hope that the Government will not seek to oppose the amendment but recognise that it is vital if we are serious about helping children to stay safe online. I beg to move.
Baroness Jolly
I thank the noble and learned Lord for his question. I said earlier that there is not a silver bullet in this situation. This is a very elegant amendment and, as I say, it is really very seductive—but as soon as it has been enacted, we will find that people will develop workarounds and we will be back to square one. Parental and educational means are the best way forward.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken today. There was an amazing range of huge expertise and concern for our children. It was interesting to hear the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Shields, as a new Member of the House. She is clearly going to be involved in lots of such things.
The Minister indicated exactly why I want to put this to a vote: each time one puts pressure on the Government, it improves the situation. It is important that we have age verification; there is no doubt about that, when we think of the amount of material that is streamed into this country, not able to be accessed, theoretically, via any of the routes, but nevertheless able to enter this way carrying R18 material—live streams from outside the UK. So I am very grateful for the range of comments made, I think we will all be thinking about this for a very long time, and I would like to test the opinion of the House.