(2 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is a series of amendments in this group. My amendment does not really relate to the others in the group, but it is about an important issue.
In Committee, I raised the problem that a number of members of the public and the Relatives & Residents Association have brought to my attention: in a minority of care homes, if residents or relatives complain, the homes take retaliatory action in the form of making visits even more restrictive than they currently are and, in some cases, even evict, or threaten to evict, the person on whose behalf the complaint has been made. As I said, this is in a minority of homes— over the past few years I have been impressed by how many homes have continued to provide high-quality care in very difficult circumstances. None the less, this is an important issue.
In 2019, the Relatives & Residents Association was coming across at least one case a week of such intimidatory behaviour. We discussed this in Committee. The Minister said that she did not really think that the department had received much evidence of this, that in any case residents and their relatives and friends should complain to the home in the first instance, and that the Care Quality Commission would also pick up concerns.
This is a very confusing picture. If you go to the CQC’s website, you will see that it states:
“we do not settle individual complaints ourselves, but we still want you to tell us about your experiences of care.”
To most people, that is pretty confusing. If you are worried that a home is going to be intimidatory in its response to legitimate complaints raised, you are hardly likely to have confidence in its complaints system.
Up until about 2008, the CQC did take individual complaints but, due to a funding cut, it stopped doing so, even though, in Scotland, the equivalent body investigates specific complaints, and the predecessors of CQC investigated complaints. We know that there is huge pressure in care homes. We also know that some care homes are continuing extremely restrictive practices around relatives and friends being able to visit. This has become quite a serious problem in which, while they may not be in total lockdown, they come near to it, clearly more for the convenience of the home than for a public health reason. My amendment simply asks the CQC to go back to receiving and dealing with individual complaints in these cases. I hope that the Minister will perhaps be sympathetic to this. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is taking part remotely; I invite her to speak.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 231 and Amendment 234 in this group. I hope your Lordships will have noted the balanced symmetry of my amendments, one with the Minister for the Government and the other with my noble friend Lord Hunt, leading for the loyal Opposition, so I have one with each person in this group.
Amendment 231, which I have tabled with the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and my noble friend Lord Hunt, suggests that no serving police officer or a person who has served as a police officer in the past 10 years may stand as a commissioner. Amendment 234, tabled, I am delighted to say, with the support of the Government, will ensure that noble Members of this House may be elected as commissioners and continue to fulfil their duties within the House. It removes Clause 74 which would have barred your Lordships from being both a commissioner and an active Peer, a proposal which, as I recall, caused considerable disquiet in Committee. I am very happy that this amendment provides the Government with a way out of what I am absolutely certain would have been a defeat on this proposal and spares the Benches opposite from any further blushes on this Bill. I look forward to the possibility of noble colleagues—not myself, I hasten to add—who may consider putting themselves forward to be commissioners. If they do that I will look forward to hearing about their experiences on their probably infrequent visits back to this House. That option should be open. Under this amendment it will be open. I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to that amendment.
On serving police officers—or people who have served as a police officer in the last 10 years—then serving as a commissioner, that proposal is not intended as a slight on the noble profession of police officers in England and Wales. There may well be individual police officers whose skill sets would enable them to be very effective commissioners. The valued contributions in your Lordships’ House of noble Lords who have previously served as chief commissioners are testament to that. Yet here, we are 827 noble Lords. The expert contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Blair, Lord Condon, Lord Dear and Lord Stevens, and others are a valuable addition to debates on policing, alongside the views of a whole host of others—civil libertarians, local government experts and those with other viewpoints from outside the policing profession. Peers with a policing background bring a valuable perspective but they are not the sole arbiter of policing policy. I dare say that they would not wish to be.
The fact is that these commissioners will be a novelty introduction to British politics—a sole, directly elected arbiter of policy in one particular area, effectively unconstrained by his or her peers, or by Cabinet or other collegiate responsibility and elections every four years. It is incumbent on us to ensure that such a single individual can carry as much public trust and confidence as possible. He or she must be seen to be impartial in holding the police to account. Perhaps controversially, I am not convinced that under this system, reliant on a single individual, one person who is associated exclusively with the police service could carry the perception of impartiality from the police force that is necessary if every section of the community is to trust that their police force is being held rigorously to account.
We have an established principle in our public life whereby there are safeguards against what the public could reasonably perceive as potential conflicts of interest, or undue or improper influence, as individuals with relevant experience move between related fields. For instance, the Ministerial Code of May 2010 makes it clear that no former Minister may take up an appointment with a lobbying company for at least two years after leaving office. I am not suggesting that the parallels with policing are exact but the public has an expectation that, if an individual has been on one side of the fence and decides to swap over, there should be an appropriate break between the two to mitigate against the perception of conflicts of interest.
The noble Baroness, my noble friend and I are not wedded to 10 years but believe that there should be some separation between people serving as police officers and then standing as commissioners. Maybe 10 years is not considered appropriate but there should certainly be some period of time. That period would also enable any police officers who would be commissioner candidates to broaden their experience of fields beyond policing, perhaps trying business or community-based endeavours, not to mention developing the contacts and support that they would undoubtedly need in order to be elected.
One or two other matters are worth mentioning briefly. One that bothers me is that, without the safeguards offered by the amendment, it is possible that a disaffected police officer could choose to stand as a commissioner so that he or she might laud it over his or her chief constable or force. I hate to mention that but I have come across individuals who have had those motives. One cannot rule that out completely. It may sound fanciful but it is a real risk and one that we should take the opportunity to remove now.
Given the hour, I am trying to be as brief as possible. I encourage the House to look at this carefully. The amendment in relation to police officers would be a step towards preserving and not diminishing the recent substantial gains that the police and authorities have together made in raising public trust and confidence in the police and the impartiality of those who hold them to account.
My Lords, I welcome the two government amendments, which we are glad to support. On Amendment 218, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has done a great service by bringing this issue to your Lordships’ attention.
I am assuming that the noble Baroness will be able to say that the order-making power in the Bill is sufficient, but if not, it would be helpful if she acknowledged that. She will be equally helpful in relation to my own Amendment 231; alas, perhaps I am wildly optimistic on that.
I agree with the worries expressed by my noble friend Lady Henig about whether it is right and appropriate for former police officers to stand for election as police and crime commissioners. There are two areas we might discuss. First is the question raised by my noble friend about disaffected police officers. There are known to be disaffected police officers; they do surface from time to time. I worry about such a person being elected as a police and crime commissioner and the approach that they would then take to the chief constable and the force over which they had such influence. I also worry about any police officer elected as a police and crime commissioner.
Noble Lords will know that one of my major concerns about the legislation is that, in effect, the police and crime commissioner will act as the chief constable. We have still to hear about the Memorandum of Understanding—I assume we will come back to that on Third Reading—but even with a statutory Memorandum of Understanding, in the end all the levers are with the police and crime commissioner. I believe that it is almost inevitable that that person will seek to unduly influence the way in which the chief constable operates. It would be even worse if the police and crime commissioner is a former police officer. The temptation, the itch, to intervene in the details of that force would, I believe, be overwhelming. I know that it is unusual, when it comes to elections, for us to say there is a category of people who ought not to be able to stand, but in the case of police and crime commissioners, who are corporations sole, we have a huge responsibility. I wonder whether it would be appropriate for a former police officer to stand.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI have Amendment 47 in this group. I will be very brief. This is about partnership arrangements and improving the link between policing bodies and other partners, particularly community safety bodies. I note the Minister’s Amendment 43 on behalf of the Government specifying that the local policing body has to have regard to the priorities of the statutory partners—
I apologise. I am so relieved. I was desperately looking through my notes to see if there had been a major omission.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI support all my noble friend’s arguments. In doing so, I have to say that I struggle with all this. I have tried to understand it; I have studied extremely hard. I would hate, however, to have to be in that police authority environment and explain all this to the police and crime panel, and explain to local people exactly how all this is working out. I would find that extremely difficult. As my noble friend Lord Harris said, this has led to enormous fears among police staff, which is a problem. We should not be increasing insecurity among the people working in the policing environment.
I am almost led to make the point that while the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and I do not always agree on things, we have one thing in common; both of us, every now and again, are less than fulsome in our praise of the Home Office—rightly or wrongly. I have great concerns about this legislation and what has been drafted. That might not be the fault of the Home Office, but somewhere along the line there are problems with this.
Because of that, the Minister will know that I have written to her in conjunction with my noble friend Lord Harris and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, to try to put our concerns on the record. We are looking for a meeting with the Minister to try to thrash all this out. It is an extremely difficult and complex area, but it is an important area. If we get it wrong there will be a big impact on a lot of people who might suffer as a result. We want to avoid that. In her response, will she let us know the timescale for her reply to our letter and whether there is a possibility of talking about this in more detail? This would be a productive area to explore further.
My Lords, before the Minister responds, I want to thank my noble friend Lord Harris, who made a powerful speech, and echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, just said. Although the Government have responded to a number of concerns, which is welcome, so far there has been no real recognition of some of the risks of the governance structure that has been put in place. Whether that is because the government lack confidence in it and are therefore not prepared to engage or whether they really do not understand the legitimate concerns, I do not know, but I am puzzled by the response. I know that if I, as a government Minister, proposed something like this, the Conservative Opposition at the time would have attacked very forcefully this kind of proposal.
The corporation sole model is flawed for the reasons that my noble friend gave and in relation to the issue of staff and the bizarre process, now, of staff transfers between the PCC and PCP—with all the uncertainty that that raises. It renders me almost speechless to understand that this bizarre corporate structure is being proposed at a time when the police service is going through 20 per cent cuts. There is a reduction in the number of police officers and we know that some of the most experienced police officers were retired because that was the easiest thing for chief constables to do. We know that chief constables are being taken off the front line and put into the back office because back-office staff have been made redundant.
I pose my only question rhetorically: when will another police reform Bill have to be put before Parliament? If we cannot have pilots, I suspect that problems will arise within about nine months of elected police commissioners coming into being. The public will have serious concerns in the huge powers being given to individuals. Then the noble Baroness will bring forward a Bill to put right the problems that are being identified as we go through your Lordships’ House. If only the Government would pause for just a little time to reflect on these concerns.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI wish to add a word or two. I heard very much what the noble Lord said, and I very much sympathise with the idea of strengthening the panel. Nobody has tried harder during the Committee stage of this Bill than I have, with the assistance of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, to strengthen the function of the panel. I have put five amendments to that effect. Thus far, the Government have not been minded to strengthen the panel, for a very clear reason. They feel that the only role of the panel is to scrutinise the commissioner and that the panel should be able to scrutinise the commissioner only on very specific areas. Thus far, I have to say that I do not believe that that constitutes strict checks and balances, which is a different issue. None the less, if I was confident that at Report the Government would change their views and accept some of the amendments that I have down later for strengthening the panels, I would feel differently. But I cannot say to the Minister that I have that confidence at the moment, because of the very strong line that the Minister has taken. The issue is the relationship of the panel to the commissioner. If the Government maintain their attitude on that issue then this is the only other mechanism to accomplish what I was trying to do with the panels.
I wanted to raise one slight point with my noble friend Lord Harris, which I asked him about very early on when he was putting together his ideas. Is it an either/or situation? Is there any way in which some or all of the independents who we have been talking about, and who we all value so highly for their expertise, could also serve on the panel? Perhaps he could say in due course whether it is an either/or situation, because I am not absolutely convinced that it needs to be.
My Lords, this has been an interesting and, I believe, an important debate. My noble friend Lord Harris, in what I thought was a powerful introduction, pointed out the huge power and authority that is being given to an elected police and crime commissioner if the Commons decides to send this back to your Lordships’ House in its original construct. I noted the comments on that of the noble Lord, Lord Howard, but when he referred back to his legislation of 20 years ago, I think he also referred to a number of ping-pongs. That is a salutary reminder to your Lordships’ House that if we do not think that the House of Commons has thought sufficiently, we can send the Bill back to give it a bit more time to reflect—but we will come to that in a few months’ time, no doubt.
The issue of governance is very important. My noble friend was right to point out that we are giving huge responsibility to police and crime commissioners, if that is the final outcome of the Bill. The need for some way in which the individual can be allowed to test out their ideas and have them challenged as my noble friend describes seems an important issue. We know that when individuals are given great power, sometimes they abuse it. We are talking about a considerable number of police forces. It is inconceivable that we will not have one or two persons who are unsuitable but who are elected to those positions. Earlier, we were referred to a number of local authorities where mayors have been elected. I would say that the experience of elected mayors has been mixed. Some have been outstanding, but there have been one or two who ought not to have been elected and great problems have been caused there. I think of them when it comes to the issue of governance around police and crime commissioners.
Other noble Lords have pointed out that the Government do not seem to speak with consistency in these matters. Earlier this week, as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, pointed out, we had the change in governance relating to the MoD. My own area of knowledge is in the National Health Service: I declare an interest as chairman of the Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust and as a trainer consultant in the NHS. The NHS Bill had gone through most of its stages in the Commons when the Government instituted a pause and, only 10 days or so ago, announced the results of it. One of them was to strengthen governance within clinical commissioning groups. Originally, they were going to be GP consortia and a few GPs were going to sit round the table deciding how to spend £80 billion of public money. The result of the listening exercise has been that they are now going to be called clinical commissioning groups, because there has been recognition that you cannot just give that huge power to a few individual GPs.
We are now going to have two lay people appointed to those commissioning groups: a nurse and a consultant from outside the area. Why outside the area? It is because there is recognition that there might be a conflict of interest if a hospital consultant in the catchment area of the commissioning group were to be appointed. As a result of the listening exercise, what has happened is that a much stronger corporate governance structure is being put into place. What I do not understand is why the Home Office seems oblivious to what other departments are doing in relation to legislation or, for instance, to the changes in defence. It is difficult to see where there is any consistency of purpose.
This is a probing amendment arising from the fact that Schedule 1 includes a collection of very different bodies in terms of the Government’s intentions as to their functions, powers and duties. It is a very miscellaneous group and I think we can discern four or five categories. For example, there are some bodies that are for straight abolition, and British Shipbuilders would fall into that category. There is then a second category where the powers, functions and duties will revert back to Ministers or to departmental civil servants. Then there is a third category where the powers, functions and duties are being transferred in whole or in part to another public body. And there is yet a further category where powers, functions and duties are being transferred in whole or in part to a private body, for example Consumer Focus to Citizens Advice. Then there are some like the Security Industry Authority—I declare an interest as chairman of that body—where the powers, functions and duties are going eventually, via phased transition, to a private body but with a residual public function.
When my noble friend Lord Whitty and I were looking to try to devise an amendment, we could not allocate these different bodies to the different categories without naming each one of them, which we found impossible to do. That is why, as I say, this is a probing amendment. Does the Minster recognise that there are different consequences, not least for Parliament, of the different intentions for bodies in Schedule 1? I am asking for these to be spelt out in the Bill because they materially affect what is going to happen to these different bodies.
On Amendment 11, my noble friend Lord Whitty was looking to delete “other incorporated body” as an eligible body to transfer into on the grounds that he found it too wide and too unaccountable in terms of its range. So the gist of these amendments is to try to get some coherence and recognise that different bodies should be dealt with in different ways. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support my noble friend in her amendments. As we have already briefly debated, Clause 1(3) is very important because it specifies which bodies and functions can be transferred from the bodies listed in the schedules. My noble friend is, first, seeking clarity and then, importantly, asking the Government questions, particularly about their ability to transfer functions to an unincorporated body of persons.
I find it surprising that the noble Lord is proposing to give himself power to give such functions to a group of unincorporated persons. It would be helpful if he could explain under what circumstances this could happen and what safeguards would be in place. In a sense we are following on from our previous debate. Will the accounts of such organisations come under the auspices of the Comptroller and Auditor-General? Will freedom of information or data protection legislation apply to the same extent as when functions are delivered in the public sector? Potentially all the functions carried out by all the bodies listed in these schedules could be transferred to such bodies. My own view and that of the Opposition is that those powers are far too open-ended. The noble Lord has said that in the end accountability is to Parliament, and that is so. However, the problem we have, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, has spotted, is that it is likely that even when we have orders, they will in themselves give considerable discretion to Ministers in their dealings with the functions that are encompassed by the bodies listed in the Bill.
When it comes to the orders, we have another problem. We have the Cunningham committee’s report on conventions. We debated that in Question Time this afternoon. But the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, will know that the conclusion of the Cunningham convention in relation to this House seeking to defeat secondary legislation is now disputed by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, the Leader of the House, in correspondence between himself and the Merits Select Committee which has been published in the past few weeks. So we are not even sure at this stage whether the Government even accept that it is the right of this House to vote to seek to defeat the Government on secondary legislation.
Behind the amendment moved by my noble friend lies a real concern about the draconian powers being given to Ministers and a doubt whether the kind of parliamentary scrutiny currently envisaged in this Bill is sufficient to ensure proper discharge of ministerial accountability to Parliament.