Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill and Lord Etherton

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th July 2021 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Gale, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am speaking to Amendment 31 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, to which I have willingly and gladly added my name.

I start with a question: why has this short Bill, which elaborates on a principle with which we can all agree—that the welfare of sentient animals is important—generated so much criticism and so many amendments? To a large extent, it is obvious from what has been said so far that this is due in part to a lack of particularity in the Bill. Such matters include who and how many will be the members of the animal sentience committee, what authorisation will be required before the committee starts work on any policy, the committee’s relationship with the Animal Welfare Committee, and what options are open to the Government in response to a report and recommendation of the sentience committee.

I suggest that the proposed amendments are in large part because the Bill is entirely negative, in the sense that it seeks to impose restrictions on the way people go about their work, the way they relax and enjoy themselves, and the ways in which they can give effect to their religious values. Such restrictions go to the heart of what we regard as a diverse society in a democratic state. They go to the heart of freedom of personal conduct and belief.

This is why Article 13 of Title II of the Lisbon treaty, which recognises animal sentience and requires full regard to be paid to the welfare of animals, stipulates that member states must nevertheless respect

“the legislative or administrative provisions and customs”

of EU countries

“relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.”

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, elaborated on the history behind that provision. As he said, the UK was one of the key EU members that lobbied for Article 13, qualified in that way, so there appears to be no reason why a similar qualification is not to be found in the Bill. The provision of that minimum balance is the object of Amendment 31, which uses identical language to that in Article 13, as does Amendment 35 put forward by the noble Earl.

The need for balance in the Bill with the same or similar qualification as in Article 13 of the Lisbon treaty also has a legal aspect. I am not qualified to speak about farming practices. However, recreational activity and adherence to religious practice fall within the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights. Recreational activity, including the enjoyment of country sports, falls within the protection for private and family life in Article 8 of the convention. Limited exceptions to that right are set out in Article 8(2) but, so far as I can see, the only ones that might be relevant are

“the protection of health or morals”

and

“the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Even so, a restriction or limitation falling within Article 8.2 is valid only if, among other things, it is proportionate. That is simply a legalistic way of describing the need for balance. Many of the amendments put forward today are essentially concerned to achieve proportionality, including, for example, no retrospectivity in the work and recommendations of the sentience committee and provisions as to its composition.

On religious rites, particularly at issue in the present context is religious animal slaughter. The importance of expressly preserving in the Bill the right of citizens to adhere to their religious practices is perfectly clear. That right, which falls within Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is expressly and necessarily stated in Article 13 of the Lisbon treaty. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has highlighted in many cases the importance of the rights protected by Article 9 in a pluralist, democratic society. Our Human Rights Act 1998, which enabled disputes on convention rights to be resolved in our own courts, contains the specific provision in Section 13 that:

“If a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the importance of that right.”


It is not necessary for present purposes to go into the nature of religious animal slaughter in the form of shechita or its Muslim equivalent. There is scientific evidence on both sides of the debate about the humanity of this, but it is clear that the protection of the right to manifest religious belief is enshrined in the treaty obligations we already have and in our own domestic legislation. Therefore, there can be no good reason why, as in the case of Article 13 of the Lisbon treaty, the considerations and recommendations of the sentience committee should not be made expressly subject to respect for religious rites. This would provide balance, clarity, certainty and compliance with Article 9 and Section 13 of the Act.