Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendments that call for proper support for this new role. It should not need to be spelled out that the IPA will need a budget. I happen to think that he or she should have a budget and discretion as to how best to spend it. I am a little alarmed by Clause 31, which provides that the Secretary of State “may pay” reasonable costs and, quite separately, “may make provision” for secretarial or other support. Should the latter be distinguished from reasonable costs incurred in connection with the exercise of their functions? I think not.

I am particularly prompted to mention this because I learned the other day that the newly appointed—after a period of 22 months—independent anti-slavery commissioner is having her budget reduced on a yearly basis throughout the term of her appointment, by 5% a year over the three years. I know that the two jobs are different positions, but that indicates strongly—and it is very much accepted by people in the sector, including the new commissioner—that the Government are downgrading that role. Do the Government agree on the importance of creating champions, if I may call them that, just to give them a collective noun? They have to make the job possible.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wills, has explained, of the amendments in this group, Amendments 123A to 123D, 124B, 126A and 126B would perform a number of functions. They would inject urgency into the appointment of the standing advocate; they would give a Select Committee of the House of Commons a prominent role in the selection and appointment of the standing advocate; they would clarify the standing advocate’s role if other advocates were appointed as well; and they would provide that the appointment of additional advocates was to cover for unavailability or to provide additional assistance to the standing advocate. All those amendments would strengthen the statutory requirements and give the standing advocate role more significance and the standing advocate more personal responsibility for the performance of that role.

On Amendment 124A, I fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wills, on the need for urgency in establishing inquiries, and agree with all the observations he—and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson—made about the delays inherent in the present system. The difficulty I see with the amendment as drafted—I would appreciate some clarity on this from the Minister—is the following:

“The standing advocate may request from the Secretary of State all the relevant powers to establish a fact-finding inquiry, including those to see and report on all relevant documentation.”


That would give the standing advocate the power to establish a fact-finding inquiry. My concern is that I am not convinced that establishing a fact-finding inquiry is the role of the standing advocate as envisaged by the Bill. I invite the Minister to explain how he sees the role of the advocate in inquiries and to consider, certainly between now and Report, how the role of arbiter or inquiry establisher is compatible with the role of representing and supporting victims. Is there another route—the noble Lord, Lord Wills, might also be keen to be involved in this discussion—to establishing an independent, quicker, more effective way of producing inquiries that does not involve the standing advocate, but that also does not involve the length and delay of a full-blown public inquiry in every case?

I also invite clarity from the Minister on how he sees the standing advocate’s role of providing support at inquiries. That is plainly envisaged by Clause 33, but Clause 33(5) permits advocates to support victims’ representatives; it does not deal with acting as victims’ representatives. Clause 33(7) would prevent a person representing victims if the person concerned was under 18—that is perhaps uncontroversial—or if, in so doing, they would be carrying out a legal activity. A legal activity is as defined in Section 12(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007.

It is unclear that representing a victim at an inquiry is a legal activity. Paraphrasing, or at least truncating, the meaning of Section 12(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007, a legal activity is exercising the right of audience, which is not a phrase normally used in representation at an inquiry; the conduct of litigation, which plainly an inquiry is not; offering advice, assistance or representation in connection with the application of the law; or legal dispute resolution. I do not regard any of those activities as equivalent to representing a victim or more than one victim at a public inquiry. I would be interested to know, therefore, how the Government see that role.

I turn now to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, about the right to see all relevant documents. It seems to me that, whatever the role of the standing advocate, the right to see all relevant documents is central, as is the right to insist on calling for particular witnesses to be cross-examined.

It follows that, with the amendments as phrased, there is a right to make a request to the Secretary of State and the right to a reasoned and timely response to that request, when it concerns seeing documents and calling witnesses. This is a modest, probably overmodest, approach. It seems to me that the standing advocate ought to have an absolutely clear right to call witnesses or to have them called by the inquiry if it is independent, as I suggest it probably should be, so that they can be cross-examined by or on behalf of all parties.

Amendment 133ZA would require a review of the operation of the standing advocate scheme and the appointment of additional advocates six months after passing the Act. I quite agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, that such a review is important because this is a complex and new mechanism. I suggest that six months after passing the Act may be too soon, because it is unclear how many major incidents would be declared in the first six months, and it is certainly unclear how long it would take to see how the system was working in practice. I think we would be looking at a period of at least two years or thereabouts before we have an effective review. However, I agree that a review of what is, in essence, a new system should be incorporated into the statutory scheme.

Finally, Amendment 128A, to which I have added my name, is the amendment on which my noble friend Lady Hamwee spoke. It seeks proper secretarial support and other resourcing for the standing advocate. The first point is that appropriate support is essential to enable the advocate’s role to be performed effectively. An advocate without a proper budget quite simply cannot do the job, but there is a further, very important point about independence. It is crucial that this advocate scheme acts independently. Without statutorily guaranteed resourcing, an appointed advocate would be dependent on the Secretary of State for the resources needed to carry out the job which they are charged to perform. That is entirely unsuitable.

There are amendments about the termination of advocates’ appointments, and the spirit of independence being threatened by the present drafting of the Bill, which we will come to in a later group, whereby the Secretary of State can remove an advocate for reasons that seem appropriate to him or her. We are all for the independence of advocates, but their role needs clarification and a review would be helpful.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, opposition to clauses standing part of a Bill usually arises out of outright opposition, and in my case I said at Second Reading that I shared the view of my noble friend Lady Burt that polygraph testing on the present state of the technology has no place in our criminal justice system. The basic response of most lawyers to polygraph testing is to oppose its use in a criminal context precisely because there is no firm evidence of its reliability. We tend to the view, which I am sure the Minister understands, that a system of evaluating evidence whose reliability is not assured and produces essentially binary results—true or false—is inherently inimical to the approach of common-law lawyers used to a carefully balanced system of gathering, testing, and evaluating evidence.

However, my perception of polygraph testing has now become somewhat more nuanced. A major contributor to a shift in my view was an excellent teach-in organised by the Ministry of Justice last Thursday, very well presented by Heather Sutton, senior policy adviser on polygraphs and sexual offending, and Professor Don Grubin, emeritus professor of forensic psychiatry at Newcastle University. They gave a number of noble Lords a comprehensive outline of the way in which polygraph testing is used in the management of offenders subject to recall from licence under existing legislation. For my part, I have no experience of the use of polygraph testing, and no expertise on the subject. Opposition to its use as part of this Bill was canvassed in another place by my honourable friend Daisy Cooper MP. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Alex Chalk MP, provided a detailed and helpful response to a number of questions which she raised. As a result of his answers and what we were told on Thursday, I accept that there may be some force—subject to a number of questions—to the argument that there is a legitimate place for the use of polygraph testing in necessary cases, where its purpose is to avoid serious harm.

I add one particular proviso, among others, that evidence of polygraph testing must never be relied on as part of the evidence in a criminal case until its reliability is far more conclusively established than it is now. However, as I understood it, we were assured last Thursday—I would be grateful for confirmation of this from the Dispatch Box—that no decisions on recalls from licence can be taken as a result of a test indicating deception. If the result of a test implies that an offender is lying about a breach of a licence condition or about further offences, for example, investigators will ask the police to look further to see what the truth is before taking any positive action. There is therefore no recall, as I understand it, on the basis of a failed test, which will lead only to recall if the police find other evidence establishing that a breach has occurred.

However, I have some concerns about cases where an offender makes a disclosure in a polygraph test confessing to behaviour that is a dangerous breach and might therefore be recalled. It is important in such cases that the veracity or genuineness of the disclosure and its voluntariness can be thoroughly tested before any recall can take place. Our understanding was that such a disclosure would be followed generally by a hearing before a recall was confirmed, but again I seek confirmation of that.

This is genuinely a probing amendment. It is for that reason that our stand part opposition is coupled with Amendment 191, through which I advocate regulations to prevent Clause 69 being brought into force before such a scheme is piloted. I note that the Government propose to pilot these provisions before rolling them out. However, we ask that regulations bringing Clause 69 into force are not made permanent before Parliament has had an opportunity to consider a report from the Government on that pilot and has agreed to regulations being made permanent under that clause.

I appreciate that polygraph testing is used already in the case of high-risk sexual offenders to manage compliance with licence conditions and that it is included in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill for monitoring terrorist offenders released on licence. As I understand Clause 69 of this Bill, testing will be imposed on adult high-risk offenders who are convicted of serious offences involving domestic abuse, including coercive or controlling behaviour in the domestic context, breaches of restraining orders and of a domestic abuse protection order, who have been sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment. I understand that its application will be limited to offenders released on licence and to monitoring their compliance with licence conditions. However, I understand that it is also proposed to include on a discretionary basis offenders for whom concerns about the risk of reoffending would justify mandatory testing to manage risks posed by the offender to the community.

I pose a number of questions to the Minister in connection with that and other issues. Is there a cast-iron guarantee that the results of polygraph testing carried out under the clause could not be used to secure convictions for a criminal offence? To what extent could an offender be recalled from licence on the basis of a polygraph test in which he made disclosure of a breach of condition of his licence? What would be the procedure for such a recall? What is the effect of a breach of polygraph licensing conditions to be? Could evidence of such a breach be itself based on a failed polygraph test? What are the Government’s proposals for piloting in respect of polygraph tests in connection with monitoring compliance with licensing conditions in domestic abuse cases? Will there be a report of any such pilots back to Parliament? Will Parliament have an opportunity to consider the question of polygraph testing before the regulations make it permanent?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this is not the only Bill currently in your Lordships’ House that seeks to extend the use of polygraphs. I am not surprised that lawyers and what I have learned in another Bill to call operational partners have different starting points in their attitudes and expectations of polygraphs. My position is similar to that of my noble friend.

Given that we have more than one Bill proposing to introduce polygraph conditions, is this indicative of a policy change on the part of the Government, with wider use of polygraphs—perhaps wider than just these two Bills? If so, what consultation and evaluation has there been? I appreciate that it is intended that there will be a pilot of the use under this Bill, which my noble friend seeks to be absolutely sure about in Amendment 191.

Last week, during Committee on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, I asked about consultation with the probation service with regard to the balance between periods of custody and licence—a different point. I have now received a letter from the Advocate-General for Scotland, for which I am grateful, which, inter alia, said:

“The Probation Service is not normally consulted in respect of the creation of new custodial sentences or their licence periods.”


It is, of course, the licence period in which I am interested.

I have a similar question about consultation on the use of polygraphs during the licence period. The provisions preclude evidential use. As I understand it—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—their purpose is to discourage reoffending. I have said before that I would prefer to put effort into training probation officers in spotting small signs of what is the truth, what is editing the facts and what are porkies.

The Home Office fact sheet published in conjunction with the Bill refers to eligibility criteria as if there are criteria beyond what is in the Offender Management Act and the Bill. Another question is whether there are additional criteria. It also refers to high-risk perpetrators. Does that mean more than the custodial sentence, as provided by the Act? Does it mean more than repeat offences? Can the Minister say something about the assessment tools in arriving at the conclusion that someone is high risk?

The Home Office factsheet refers to risk as a test. The briefing last week to which my noble friend referred was very interesting and informative, and clearly those involved with the current use of polygraphs on sex offenders are enthusiastic—one would have expected that. But we were told that, in the US, historically there has been some inappropriate or, one could say, dodgy use. I was interested that the accreditation was to standards set by the American Polygraph Association. Given that our legal systems are not identical, has the Minister any comment on that?

I had understood that it was not possible actually to fail a test, because the examinations are used to point probation officers to an offender’s possible actions and behaviours, but that term is also used in the fact sheet, where it refers to “sanctions for failing”. One step available is the imposition of additional licence conditions. My noble friend mentioned DAPOs, or domestic abuse prevention orders. Can a polygraph test be used to prompt an investigation as to whether a DAPO or, indeed, a domestic abuse prevention notice, has been complied with before custody? Can a court dealing with a DAPO require a polygraph?

I suppose that one could summarise our attitude to Clause 69 as positive but remaining to be completely convinced—so possibly somewhere between yes and no.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 5th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds, I should deal with the terrible slur from the Front Bench about the narrowness of my bedtime reading. In fact, my bedtime reading at the moment consists of Caroline Shenton’s book, The Day Parliament Burned Down—a wonderful book that the Minister himself recommended to me.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, first, I am grateful to my noble friend for indicating that he will consider Amendment 16 and come back to the House on it at a later stage. I am also grateful for his assurance that he has great confidence that the Sentencing Council will indeed publish the guidelines, and I quite understand his reason for not wishing that to be included in the statute because of the danger of compromising that body’s independence.

As to the lead amendment in the group, while I completely appreciate the Minister’s position that “may” is discretionary—I have no doubt that my noble friend Lady Hamwee, notwithstanding her additional bedside reading, will confirm my view when she has considered the response—I still feel that setting a test for the use of discretion might be helpful. Perhaps the Minister will consider that also. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.