Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Judge

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord has made a very interesting point about the phrase “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence”. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord can help the Committee, but that looks like a normal phrase. I did not read it in quite the same way as having to take every possible step that might be a reasonable precaution. I wonder whether the officials might help us as to the provenance of the phrase before Report.

[Lord Judge]

If I might say so, “all” means “every”. Without “all”, you have just to take reasonable precautions and show due diligence. Once you put “all” in, you fall foul of any particular point you could have but did not look at and did not do.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Judge

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend’s curtain-raiser has covered a great deal of the ground. I will speak to Amendments 83, 84, 85, 87 and 88, which come from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and seek to ensure that, under Schedule 3 to the Bill, detainees are informed of their rights and provided with timely and confidential legal advice in all four jurisdictions. It is because there is more than one jurisdiction that there are a number of amendments.

We are concerned that the safeguard of access to a lawyer is not adequately protected under this Bill. In particular, it is not clear that an individual will even be informed of his right to request access—apparently, this is available only on request. Access to a lawyer may not be available when a person is questioned initially; it may be delayed. In our view, it is not sufficient to rely on a code of practice in this area. The legislation should be adequate in itself and, as regards access, unqualified or very close to unqualified. I will come to that in a moment.

The Government told the committee that a code of practice would make clear that permission to seek legal advice should be permitted when “reasonably practicable” and that the,

“restrictions are to mitigate against the possibility of an examination being obstructed or frustrated as a result of a detainee using his right to a solicitor”.

Leaving aside whether we should accept the second point—and I do not think I do—it is my view that the two statements are barely consistent or compatible.

My noble friend quoted the Government’s response that legal privilege might be used to pass on instructions to a third party through intimidation or a coded message. These powers, or restrictions, unjustifiably interfere with the right to timely and confidential advice and therefore, ultimately, with the right to a fair trial if there is a prosecution. I make that point because the Joint Committee approaches everything from the point of view of human rights, the right to a fair trial being one. There is not in the Bill a sufficient safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of the powers.

The last time I recall there being a question on legal privilege being regarded as a problem by the Government, I sat and listened in a Minister’s office to something like a seminar with the Minister and two very senior lawyers—both Members of this House and both of whom are here this afternoon—who articulated very effectively and authoritatively what I would describe as my own queasiness about the suggestion that access to a solicitor should be restricted. They dealt very effectively with the safeguards that exist against dodgy lawyers, if I may put it like that. After all, this issue is not peculiar to this situation. As my noble friend said, there have been suggestions such as the pre-approval of vetted panels of lawyers.

I am not quite convinced—we will hear from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—that Amendment 86, tabled by the Labour Benches, meets the Government’s points or deals with the principle, but we urge the Government to consider how a client’s fundamental human rights in this area should be protected, because there are other ways of dealing with this.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I invite the Government to think rather carefully about this. This provision enables an individual to be stopped, detained and searched—it is true that it is not an intimate search, but it is a strip search—and his or her property to be detained. It really should be elementary that he or she should be able to speak to a lawyer of some kind within the ambit of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, if only to be told, “Yes, they do have these powers. It would be rather a good idea for you to comply”.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Judge

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has said, Amendments 15 and 16 are the same. What constitutes a reasonable excuse will obviously be a matter for the jury. I accept that one cannot identify reasonable excuses in the abstract without knowing exactly in what circumstances a person undertook a particular action, but citizens should know when it is likely that they will be committing a crime. I think that that is accepted in the ECHR memorandum on this clause, where the Government say:

“There should be some degree of latitude for a person legitimately to explore political, religious or ideological matters, and the criminal law should acknowledge that, without the person actively seeking it, this may lead him to online material that crosses the line into that which is likely to be useful to a terrorist”.


Having some guidance would give a framework for the citizen to assess the matter.

At this stage, I shall not oppose Clause 3 standing part of the Bill—the intention to do so appears in a separate group—because we have covered more ground than I had anticipated. However, I will say now that it occurred to me that there might be a point of comparison between Clause 3 and legislation on child sexual exploitation. The Criminal Justice Act 1988 creates an offence of a person having an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child in his possession, and possession includes a physical and a mental element. I understand that the CPS guidance states that a person who views an image on a device which is then automatically cached on to the device’s memory would not be in possession of that image unless it could be proved that he or she knew of it. At first blush at any rate, it looks as though Clause 3 goes further than that provision, which requires possession, control or custody of images as opposed to viewing them.

Coming back to Amendment 15, I hope that the Government can give serious consideration to some way of assisting members of the public on this whole matter. Guidance will not override the provisions of the legislation but it can be what it is intended to be—that is, helpful.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I respectfully introduce a note of caution about Amendments 15 and 16. We are dealing with the creation or amplification of criminal offences. The issuing of guidance by the Secretary of State in legislation of this kind would be very unusual and it would not, in the end, add certainty to the situation. Guidance has no statutory force, and someone looking at guidance might nevertheless find himself being prosecuted. Alternatively, someone who could not bring themselves within guidance might be prosecuted.

The real point is this: guidance may be helpful but if it is not statutory, it has no legal effect. If we wish to introduce issues here, we should do as my noble friend Lord Anderson does in the next clause, where he seeks to define, in primary legislation, a number of situations in which an offence is not committed.

My final point—I find this extremely alarming—is the idea that a Secretary of State, using executive powers, should issue guidance about how the law should be implemented. Either the law is clear or it is not, and guidance does not make it any clearer. Such a measure would—I think probably for the first time in criminal justice legislation—give an enormous power to the Secretary of State to say, without any parliamentary control, “This may not come within the ambit of the offence but that may”, and so on. That should not happen.

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Judge

Monday 23rd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I rise because I have been quoted both in judgments and in evidence that I have given, and if I sit here and do not say anything, some might think that I did not agree with what I said last time. Well, I do.

I am concerned about child exploitation. I think that there are cases—and we have certainly been aware of them in court—where children have been exploited in circumstances which it would be difficult to describe as slavery or servitude or forced labour or even human trafficking. Children are exploited in many different ways and I do not think, if I may say so with respect, that the law caters adequately for those who exploit children who are not under some kind of parental or guardian responsibilities.

For that reason, I support the amendment. One problem with this area of the law seems to be that although we can often find the child who has been exploited we do not seem to be very good at hunting down through the chain of exploitation. For instance, we are very concerned, and obviously so, with children who come from abroad and are left in charge of cannabis factories. So far, we prosecute the child. We do not wait to see who is bringing the food once a week that is thrown through the prison door—because the house is no more than a prison. Where are they going? Who are they looking at? Who are they talking to? Who is making the money from the cannabis plant that the child is looking after?

The other feature that I want to draw attention to is how we relate to the provision on the protection of victims—that is, the defence under Clause 45. We provide a defence, which I strongly support, for slavery or trafficking victims who have committed an offence in circumstances that are defined, but the Bill speaks in Clause 45(1)(c) of “relevant exploitation”. Relevant exploitation in the Bill cannot address child exploitation of the kind that the amendment is designed to address. I ask the Minister to look at that, too.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, no one could possibly fault my noble friend for lack of persistence or focus, and no one would not want the best legislation for tackling—or, better, preventing—offences against children. I am afraid that I cannot support her amendment. I am sorry about that because I know her ambitions for the Bill, but I understand many of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, about practice. I would have thought that the point just made by the noble and learned Lord about cannabis farms was also one about practice and observation by the police; I would not have thought that a new offence was needed for that to be dealt with properly.

I have heard it said that a separate offence would mean that the police would take the matter seriously, but what we have heard from the criminal justice professionals, as other noble Lords have said, is that it is not a matter of an alternative but that there would be real risks to Part 1 of the Bill. They argue not just that a separate offence is not necessary—we often hear in this Chamber that something is not necessary and tend to ask, “Well, what harm would it do?”—but that in this case there would be harm. Alison Saunders and Kevin Hyland referred to the issue of determining age, which noble Lords have mentioned. This has bedevilled claims for asylum and responses to asylum seekers for a long time.

To add to the point that the noble and learned Baroness made, in relation to the letter that several of us received today from Kevin Hyland, the point about the case which he discussed with her was not just that so much time was spent on the issue of the woman’s age but that, as he writes, it was,

“distracting the jury from the real issue of her exploitation”.

I take that very seriously. I also take the point made by Alison Saunders that the clause would require evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the accused,

“believed, or had reasonable grounds for believing”,

that the person was under 18.