Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Avebury

Tuesday 6th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Avebury (LD)]

My Lords, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has pointed out that this is a meaningless amendment because a tribunal would not be able to consider a matter that was not within its jurisdiction in any case. It is disappointing that the Government have not noticeably reflected, as my noble and learned friend assured me they would, on the alternative suggestions made by my noble friend Lady Berridge, on this clause, and supported by several noble and learned Lords, to give effect to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its eighth report. Your Lordships were almost unanimous in condemning a proposal to allow one of the parties to an appeal to instruct the tribunal on what matters it can or cannot consider.

My noble and learned friend the Minister did not challenge the assertion that the tribunal had not allowed abuse of its own process in the past or had treated the Secretary of State unfairly, or that the existing process was inefficient. There was no suggestion on Report that the Government had raised any concern in the past over this alleged problem, but if we concede that there might have been cases in which a new matter—which is only to be defined in guidance, as we heard—was raised, that still does not mean that your Lordships should agree to grant this sweeping power to allow the respondent to veto the consideration of the new matter, even when the reason for its last minute appearance was the difficulty in getting hold of the presenting officer, as in one of the cogent examples given by my noble friend in introducing her amendments. In such cases the presenting officer who may have been unable to get instructions from senior counsel overnight can ask for an adjournment. My noble and learned friend did not say that he knew of any instance when such a request had been refused.

My noble friend said that she thought satellite judicial review went against what the Government were seeking to achieve, but that would still be the only way of challenging a decision by the Secretary of State to prohibit the use of a proposed new matter, after the amendment that is now before us. I asked my noble and learned friend whether the Government had made any estimate of the number of judicial review cases likely to be heard as a result of this provision and what would be the estimated reduction in the savings expected from it. I received no answer. I certainly agree with the suggestion made by my noble friend just now that a record should be kept of such cases.

The main reason why the Government insist that the Secretary of State should have this power seems to be, as we have heard, that she is the primary decision-maker of right on these applications rather than the late arrival of new matters, some of which is due to the inaccessibility of the Home Office. Nobody argues with that in principle, although my noble friend Lady Berridge pointed out that the Secretary of State had, in effect, voluntarily abdicated that role by allowing officials to make such a large number of wrongful decisions at first instance.

Even if that problem is solved, there remains a serious objection to what the Government propose. The fundamental principle of the rule of law is the right to a fair trial. In his wonderful book, The Rule of Law, the late noble and learned Lord Bingham emphasised that the right applies to,

“adjudicative procedures of a hybrid kind … proceedings in which one or more parties may suffer serious consequences if an adverse decision is made”.

He goes on to mention a recent case in the Supreme Court in Canada, where the Chief Justice, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, said that,

“a fair hearing requires that the affected person be informed of the case against him … and be permitted to respond to that case. This right is well established in immigration law”.

Thus, if the applicant is denied the right to present what may be a crucial piece of evidence, he is denied the right to a fair trial. That right trumps the Secretary of State’s right to be the primary decider. This amendment, leaving Clause 15 effectively untouched, does not cover the mischief dealt with so effectively by my noble friend Lady Berridge.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble and learned friend responded extremely speedily to my bank holiday inquiry, and I am grateful to him for that. The points about whether consent should be required for the tribunal to consider a new matter have been covered quite thoroughly, but I would like to mention the question of guidance. I was curious that this is guidance, because it must be guidance by the Home Office, and therefore the Home Secretary, to the Home Secretary. I would have understood had it been called a code of practice. The title does not really matter: it is the content. I wonder whether there is any distinction between the two.

Having seen the letter to the noble Baroness of 29 April, it seems to me that the way the guidance is described comes quite close to the exercise of discretion. I am aware that I have not put a question mark at the end of any of that, but I felt that I wanted to make those points.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Avebury

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have given notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 40 stand part of the Bill but, as I hope the Minister knows, this a way of probing the provisions in Clause 40 and of asking, simply, what the problem is with Section 18 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which the clause would amend. In the Public Bill Committee, the Minister, Mr Harper, said:

“it can be difficult to recover the penalty”.—[Official Report, Commons, Immigration Bill Committee, 12/11/13; col. 317.]

I can see that Section 18, as amended, would make it easier for the Secretary of State, but that does mean that the recipient of a penalty is not going to be able to raise a defence. This is not a straightforward, simple debt. It seems that the very fact that it is not a fixed penalty indicates that there may be a range of circumstances in which the penalty is imposed, and some of those may involve mitigating circumstances.

[Lord Avebury (LD)]

I should like to ask a couple of questions about Clause 40. The Immigration Minister’s faux pas over the “wealthy metropolitan elite”, such as his predecessor who employed a cleaner from Nepal without checking that she had leave to remain, highlighted the inconsistency of people in senior positions of the Government being happy to employ non-EEA citizens themselves while desperately hanging on to the vain objective of reducing net immigration to below 100,000. That target was never within the realms of possibility and it should be scrapped, recognising that most components of immigration and all of emigration are outside the control of government. As the UK is doing relatively well compared with other European countries, we are an attractive destination for skilled workers from the rest of the EEA, and as my right honourable friend Vince Cable pointed out, we are benefiting from their contribution to our economy and in particular to the revenue from direct and indirect taxation that they bring.

However, we are right to deal with irregular migration from outside the EEA, and in particular the 500,000 of those irregular migrants who were lost by the UKBA and are still scraping a living in low-paid jobs—a few of them as cleaners and nannies. My question about Clause 40 is whether increasing the fines on employers who fail to check the credentials of their workers is going to be the answer. Can the Minister say whether the existing powers are being used to their full extent? In November 2012, when Tesco was found to have employed 20 non-EEA students for three times the number of hours allowed, the supermarket was fined £115,000, compared with the maximum of £200,000. In August 2013, the BBC found that since the original power to impose fines on employers was enacted in 2006, two-thirds of the £80 million fines imposed remained uncollected. The Home Office said that some fines might have been reduced or cancelled on appeal, or that some employers could have gone out of business or could have been asked to pay by instalments. How does making the penalty recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court, or the equivalent in Scotland or Northern Ireland, increase the probability that the money will be recovered? Can the Minister be sure that increasing the fines will not simply reduce the proportion of money that is recovered?

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Avebury

Wednesday 12th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 66G, I will speak also to Amendments 66H, 66J, 66K and 66L. This takes us on to the provisions regarding bank accounts, which is perhaps a slightly drier issue than others we have discussed but is very important.

The Bill prohibits the opening of current accounts for disqualified persons and regulates banks’ operations in this regard. The first of my amendments in this group would provide that someone who has made a claim for asylum which has not been determined, or whose claim has been refused but an appeal is pending, would also be covered by the exclusion. The clause, as drafted, seems to exclude persons on temporary admission. It is most likely that those on temporary admission for a lengthy period are seeking asylum. I do not suggest that many of those will have a lot of free cash and want a current account, but some whose claims have been pending for a long time may be allowed to work in a shortage occupation. I imagine that this is quite rare, but some may even be able to get some money out of their country of origin. Those people ought to be able to have a bank account. How can that be permitted if the clause remains as drafted?

Amendment 66H goes to the definition of a “disqualified person”, whom we are told in Clause 35(3)(b) is,

“a person within subsection (2) for whom the Secretary of State considers that a current account should not be opened”.

I suggest that the Secretary of State should be required in the Bill to act “reasonably”. I certainly acknowledge that, as a matter of law, it may well be that she should act reasonably, but the complete discretion is concerning. We are not told of any criteria on which the decision will be based. The Explanatory Notes state:

“The Secretary of State therefore has discretion as to who should be barred … because there will be some individuals who face legitimate barriers which prevent them from leaving the UK, even though they do not have leave. The Secretary of State may enable these persons to open a current account”.

It is important to have published on the record the criteria on which the Secretary of State will base her decision and what options someone who is not able to open a bank account has to challenge her refusal.

That takes me to Amendment 66J, because I cannot see how one would challenge the decision. Provided that they do not discriminate and act lawfully, banks can refuse to open a bank account as they choose. However, if the Secretary of State can order them to refuse to open an account, I wonder whether she can require them to make a provision for a refusal to be challenged. It is a very homegrown and underdeveloped amendment, but there has to be some means of challenging because the consequences are serious. Being refused a bank account goes to one’s credit status and to an application for a mortgage at a later stage, and a number of other consequences may apply to somebody who should never have been refused in the first place. I am seriously concerned about this.

Amendment 66K is on our old friend in Clause 36(1): “The Treasury may”—or “must” it?—“make regulations to enable” the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance. Might the Government think it right to bring the scheme into force but not have these arrangements made?

Finally, Amendment 66L is on “in particular” in Clause 36(2)(b), which provides that “The regulations may” make certain provision,

“including in particular those mentioned in subsection (3), with or without modification”.

I am not clear what is added or suggested by all that and hope that the Minister can help me on it. I beg to move.

[Lord Avebury (LD)]

My Lords, at the moment it is entirely at the discretion of a bank or building society to agree to open a current account in the name of a person who requires leave to enter or remain but does not have it. The status checks that the bank would carry out would be to determine whether the applicant was financially reliable rather than what his immigration status was—although if he falls within Clause 35(2)(b), he is unlikely to be acceptable to the bank.

Clause 35 provides that a bank has to refuse to open an account for a person who does not have permitted leave to remain, and who is also labelled on a database operated by an unspecified anti-fraud organisation or data-matching organisation as a person whom the Secretary of State considers should not be able to open a current account. I should be grateful if the Minister would elaborate on the details of the organisation to which the banks will have to refer and how it will be established. It means that there will be some people on temporary admission whom the Secretary of State might consider eligible to open a bank account; the Explanatory Notes say this in fact means individuals facing legitimate barriers preventing them leaving the UK.

However, neither the Bill nor the Explanatory Notes gives any detail as to how the Secretary of State will make these decisions or what rights a person will have to challenge her refusal to let him open an account. Should not an asylum seeker who has exhausted his rights of appeal against refusal but is given further temporary leave to remain be allowed to open a bank account? One thinks of the Zimbabweans who were given temporary leave over many years, many of whom opened current accounts if they satisfied the bank’s conditions. Clause 35 prohibits a bank only from opening a current account in the name of a disqualified person, not from continuing to afford facilities to such a person who already has an account. Will this be made clear in the guidance that no doubt will be given to the banks?

Amendment 66G removes from the scope of the clause asylum seekers whose claim has not been finally determined. Most of these people, as my noble friend said, will be very poor and thus unlikely to need a current account, but even those supported by the National Asylum Support Service under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act, and who receive payments fortnightly, may not wish to carry around the money they receive. A couple with two children under 16 would receive £357 a fortnight, which is quite a large sum to have in one’s pocket or handbag.

Asylum seekers whose claims have been pending for more than a year and who can find employment in shortage occupations may be allowed to work, and my noble friend Lord Roberts will suggest in later amendments that the right to work should be further extended. These people will need accounts into which their wages can be paid. For that matter, could my noble friend say how many people it is estimated will be prevented from opening accounts under this clause who would otherwise have been able to be accepted by the banks under their own rules? What is the cost to the Government of setting up and managing the database, and what is the cost to the banks of making the checks required?

On a casual inquiry at my own bank, Santander, I was told that it would open an account only for a person who was resident in the UK—rather an incongruous condition to be imposed by a foreign-owned bank. It would mean, if the bank meant it literally, that it would not open an account for an EEA citizen who owned a holiday home in Cornwall or for a foreign student—but perhaps the bank makes exceptions.

An immigration lawyer who deals with a substantial number of immigration cases told me this morning that the banks invariably refuse to open current accounts for asylum seekers and appellants. So the result that the Government are aiming for in these clauses is already being achieved by market forces. However, Clause 37 defines the term “bank” to exclude credit unions, and the London Community Credit Union confirmed to me this morning that it would be prepared to open a current account for an asylum seeker, provided of course that his papers were in order. Will my noble friend confirm that asylum seekers and those who appeal against refusal of asylum will continue to be free to open current accounts at credit unions?

UK Borders Act 2007 (Commencement No. 7 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2011

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Avebury

Thursday 7th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the opportunity to discuss this Motion, which relates to an order that brings into effect Section 85A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, inserted by Section 19 of the UK Borders Act 2007. The title of Section 19 is “Points-based applications: no new evidence on appeal”, and that is a succinct description of its effect. The general rule that applies to immigration cases is that the immigration tribunals have power to consider any evidence relevant to the substance if the UKBA decision is under appeal, except in entry clearance cases—that is, cases relating to applications from abroad. In such cases, if there is a new development, the individuals have to make a new application to UKBA.

Section 19 makes provision for a new exception: all points-based system cases dealing with people either coming to or remaining in the UK for the purposes of work or study. A good deal was said about the substance of this section in the debate in Committee on the Bill which became the UK Border Act 2007, although there is no point in recapitulating the arguments against it that were deployed in both Houses, including in your Lordships' Grand Committee, on an amendment which I moved on 1 July 2007. If anyone is interested, it starts at col. GC 70, but I am afraid that the arguments are now only of historical interest.

In this short debate, I invite your Lordships’ attention to the specific reason for this Motion: namely, what I consider to be the unlawful retrospective effect of the commencement order. On Thursday 19 May, the immigration Minister, Damian Green, made a Written Ministerial Statement, announcing that this change would come into force the following Monday, 23 May, and advancing as an argument that around two-thirds of successful points-based system appeals were those at which further evidence had been submitted after the dismissal of the initial application. At some point on Friday 20 May, the commencement order was placed on the website www.statutelaw.gov.uk and printed copies were available in Parliament some time on that day.

There was hardly any time for your Lordships or Members of another place to consider the merits of the order or its lawfulness, let alone to consult with persons who might be affected by it or their legal representatives. On the Localism Bill, we have just had a discussion on the unwisdom of allowing discussions on the further edges of that Bill to be channelled into the Recess, the only opportunity between the last sitting day and the first day that we come back—it is a similar case. Your Lordships are not being given adequate opportunities for discussions on what may be very important details or of consulting with outside experts or lawyers on the way in which these matters are being dealt with.

This is not the way to treat Parliament and I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the reason for such unseemly haste when Section 19 has been lying unused on the statute book for the past four years, during which time six commencement orders relating to other sections of the 2007 Act have been approved by Parliament. It could not have been for the reason sometimes given for orders changing immigration law being brought in with little notice, which is to prevent a spike in applications before the change comes into effect. In this case the only persons affected were those who had already received a refusal from the UK Borders Agency and had either lodged an appeal or were within the 10-day working window for deciding whether to lodge an appeal.

The Immigration Law Practitioners Association, ILPA, wrote to UKBA protesting about the lack of notice and, in its reply, UKBA said:

“The order is not required to be laid before Parliament and it is not subject to the 21-day rule, as such no parliamentary conventions have been ignored in the introduction of this measure”.

No doubt that is true, but your Lordships still have the right to consider these orders, by tabling a Motion before they come into effect, as I have done. I respectfully suggest that, to table these Motions on a Friday when generally neither House sits in the hope that no one will notice them on Monday when they arrive for a busy week, is a sneaky way of preventing any parliamentary scrutiny. This case is not only an insult to Parliament, but it creates major problems for the affected applicants, their legal representatives and tribunals.

Looking at the order, the new provisions on evidence do not apply to appeals that were part heard on 23 May, but they apply to appeals that were pending before the tribunal on that date; in other words, when a person has lodged an appeal and is waiting for it to be heard. The gravamen of my Motion is that it is a violation of the principle of legal certainty when a person has gone to the trouble and expense of lodging an appeal on one legal basis only to find the rug pulled from under their feet by a change in the legal basis, which has come into effect without warning or notice. Indeed, they would have had every reason to believe that, as Section 19 had been dormant for the past four years, they would be very unlucky if it suddenly came to life during the interval between the refusal of their application and the hearing of their appeal. Such a person may have concluded or may have been advised that their prospects of an appeal succeeding were good because there was substantial new evidence available, but they would have those expectations dashed because that evidence was instantaneously disqualified.

We are advised by ILPA that the terms of the order are not lawful. It argues that unless the language clearly indicates a contrary parliamentary intention, a statutory provision has to be construed as not interfering with existing accrued rights. There is a presumption against retrospectivity which can be displaced only by clear statutory language and there is nothing in Section 19 or in Section 59 of the parent Act 2007 dealing with commencement that displaces the presumption in the case of Section 19. It is particularly telling that Section 59 displaces the presumption in the case of other sections of the Act, such as Section 26.

Without going through all the consequences of what Section 19 will mean in practice, there is one on which I seek an assurance from the Minister. This is the refusal of appeals on the grounds that mandatory evidence is missing or faulty. UKBA has issued a notice to its consultative forum, the employers’ task force, stating that a validation stage is being trialled in which applicants are contacted when mandatory evidence is missing and given the opportunity to provide it before the decision is made. Those with pending appeals on the date on which this order came into effect had not had the benefit of that validation stage and I ask my noble friend to check that none of them had their applications rejected solely on the ground that a mandatory document had not been produced. As we all know, when dealing with complicated applications, it is easy enough to omit accidentally some piece of information that is required and we would expect to be reminded of the omission rather than to be told that the service requested would not be granted to us because of the omission.

Entry clearance appeals have always been held under the law which applied when a negative decision was made by UKBA and before that by the Home Office on the application, going right back to the original immigration Act 1971. Not surprisingly, challenges to the lawfulness of this order are coming before the courts, a situation which could have been avoided if the Government had made transitional provisions for the small number of points-based system cases where the application had been refused but the appeal had not yet been started when the order came into effect. The wording of the order could simply have been amended so that it applied to appeals against decisions made on or after 23 May.

For the sake of this handful of cases, the Government are breaching a fundamental principle of law and it is the duty of Parliament to warn them of the enormity of what they are doing. We ask them to lay orders in proper time to allow Members to judge whether they are lawful and never again to scurry them in furtively over a weekend. We ask them never again to fail to make it clear in primary legislation where it is the intention to make the commencement of a section or sections retrospective. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will not repeat the arguments that my noble friend made so powerfully. I have one point and one question for the Minister. My noble friend mentioned the validation pilot. Before hearing about that, it struck me that the problem may lie in a lack of clarity about the evidence required, and in poor initial investigation. Can the Minister say anything about that?

I will not talk about making rods for our own back, but as a country we owe it to those who are applying for visas to be as clear as possible about what is required. We have talked in many debates about immigration and the importance of warm feelings on the part of other countries towards this country—the reputational area. I will mention that in this context.