Immigration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I wish to speak on this amendment—forgive me for being so tardy—as I just wish to place certain things on record.

I support the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and am deeply disappointed and irritated by the amendment tabled by the Minister. While the noble Lord has just set out his reasons for not accepting the original amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, the only reason given by the House of Commons was one of financial privilege. As has been said on other occasions, when the Government use financial privilege as the reason for rejecting amendments in the Lords, it too often looks as though the Government simply do not have sufficiently strong arguments to counter the just and moral reasons given by the Lords. Yes, I well understand that it is the Speaker who decides whether or not financial privilege should be applied, but the Government could have asked the House to waive financial privilege and chose not to do so.

This is frustrating for us but, more importantly, it has real implications for the small number of vulnerable children who are subjected to the evils of trafficking. These children have suffered the worst kind of traumatic experiences and they are desperately in need of a guardian, appointed on a statutory basis, to accompany them,

“throughout the entire process until a durable solution in the best interests of the child has been identified and implemented”.

On the subject of financial privilege, I ask the Minister to provide us with the Government’s computation of the predicted costs of the amendment that was rejected in the Commons.

Again I place on record my thanks for the extraordinary diligence and dogged determination of the noble and learned Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, to get justice for trafficked children. I also say to the Minister that I still do not understand why the Government have been so reluctant to act before now, why they could not have agreed to amendments in earlier Bills and why there was no provision for guardians in the draft modern slavery Bill. I know that pilots have now been announced, but if that has been the Government's intention for some time, why was there not an enabling clause in the draft Bill? I am pleased that the Government clearly now intend to introduce an enabling clause by amendment, but they could have done so much more.

In the absence of the amendment passed by this House, an enabling clause in the modern slavery Bill is welcome, but what would trigger that enabling power? Despite what the noble Lord just said, I am still slightly concerned about the statutory basis for the scheme. I want to be absolutely clear that, when a guardian feels the need to give instructions to a lawyer where a child is incapable of doing so, that lawyer will have the statutory basis to be empowered to represent the views of that child. Can the Minister give that assurance?

I also have a question about the timings. Could the Minister confirm that the trial will start on 1 July? Could he further tell the House when the pilots are due to end? As he would understand, it would be unacceptable if, when it came to the report that is in the amendment of the noble and learned Baroness, the Government were able to say that they had not had time to assess the outcomes of the pilots. I want to ensure that the timescale works.

The Minister in the other place said that the trial would cover 23 local authorities. Will all trafficked children be placed within those authorities, so that all trafficked children are covered by the trial?

I will mention one thing that may seem a bit pernickety. I was slightly concerned by some of the reasons given by the Minister in the other place for rejecting the noble and learned Baroness’s earlier amendment. He said one reason was that it dealt only with children under immigration control and that he wished in the modern slavery Bill to craft provisions covering all trafficked children. Of course, there was nothing to prevent the Government accepting the amendment and then repealing the provision if necessary when replacing it with a clause in the modern slavery Bill.

As I said, I welcome the fact that the Government are now introducing an enabling clause, but I am frustrated that it has taken such a long time. I am also rather frustrated that, in the end, the Government took the advice from the Speaker that financial privilege should be attached to this specific amendment. Sometimes, of course there are questions of money but in this case the money is negligible. Sometimes there are questions of politics but this issue has had cross-party support throughout. I am just frustrated that it has taken so long to get to where we are. Of course, I trust what the Minister said. I just seek clarification on the various questions I asked.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I note that at the last stage the noble Baroness and I both used the term “dogged” to describe the work done by those who advocated—if that is not the wrong term in this context—the guardianship provisions. I sense that the House would like to move on as there is so much agreement, so I will go straight to the one question I have left of those I had on the amendment.

There is a difference, in the normal understanding of the terms, between “advocacy” and “guardianship”. They are not the same thing. Of course, the detail of the role will be described when we come to the legislation so we will then understand just what it will cover. No doubt we will discuss that. The one question I have left for my noble friend that has not already been asked is: how will the Government assess and evaluate the trials or pilots—whatever we call them—including assessing the need for the provisions that are not included in the trial? The noble Baroness mentioned the one about being instructed and being able to carry out instructions, which I was also concerned about that because of my own professional background. If the trials do not cover a part of the role, how are we going to know whether that role was necessary? I hope my noble friend can explain what the approach to the assessment and evaluation will be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

There can be all manner of speculation about whether, if someone was born in, for example, Somalia but left at the age of three, Somalia might afford citizenship to them. Would Somalia give them citizenship in such circumstances if Britain had removed citizenship on the basis that they were a threat to national security here? Would Pakistan? Would Syria? Would Egypt? The test of reasonable grounds for believing that the person would be able to acquire another nationality does not answer that question. What if they cannot do so? That is the question that my noble friend Lady Smith raised, and at the moment it has not been answered satisfactorily. I wait with interest to hear what the Minister says.

There is a second matter: what constitutes service? It ties in with the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. What constitutes service when somebody is abroad? Is it good enough to serve notice on relatives living in Britain? Why should it be assumed that they would be able to inform adequately a person who is living somewhere else that they have had their citizenship removed? I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s response to what constitutes service. If someone is in a place such as Syria or Somalia, what is the likelihood of being able to serve notice—in the way that we understand service normally in law—on somebody in a war-torn area or a place where there is chaos and little in the way of government as we understand it?

What do we do about the issue of appeal, which was just mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope? At the moment, the normal period for appeal in the rules of citizenship is 28 days, and nothing suggests that that would change. Is someone in Somalia expected to be able to appeal within 28 days, not having been in receipt of service but having been informed days before, over a very poor telephone line, that they have the right of appeal but time is about to run out? What is the answer to the question of the appeal period?

If a person is unable to acquire another citizenship, will the withdrawal of citizenship then be negated? Will it fall away, and will the person then reacquire their British citizenship? Are we giving that as a guarantee? Will we see reinstatement if no other state is prepared to follow through?

I ask those who are international lawyers, or international lawyers advising the Government: when someone has a right to citizenship, is there not always a level of discretion in a state to say, “Yes, you are entitled because you were born here, but then you went away and you became a British citizen, but we are not going to allow you to apply and become a citizen of this country now because we believe that there is intelligence of your conducting yourself in a way that might be inimical to our national interests”? The question is much more complicated than is being suggested by the way in which the Government are seeking to appease us at this moment. That is why those of us who were concerned about this issue wanted there to be a much more considered review before the law was changed. I fall in line with others: I should like very clear answers to some of the questions raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Macdonald, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and to the questions that I have raised, before I would be satisfied that the movement by the Government has been far enough.

This is an issue of high moral import. This is an issue that affects not only us here, but which will be looked at around the world. There will be implications for people in other parts of the world, too. I ask the Government to take great care over the answers that are given because, as we have heard from others, courts will deal with applications, appeals and reviews based on some of the answers given today.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, noble Lords will be glad to know that I will be as energetic as I can in editing my remarks to exclude questions which have already been asked. However, I retain some points and concerns on the amendments, including on the principle.

Questions have been asked about what is meant by being “able”, and also about the practicalities of the matter. The Minister in the Commons said: “I am sure that”, the Secretary of State,

“would … have to consider practical issues and the other surrounding circumstances … She will, therefore, wish to consider those other practical or logistical arrangements as part of her determination”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 193].

Can my noble friend give the House assurances as to how all that will actually be reflected in statute or, if not in statute, then in guidelines? I mention here the guidelines published by the UNHCR on statelessness, which specifically refer to the application of nationality laws in practice being,

“a mixed question of fact and law”.

On the right of appeal, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said that he trusts that there will be an assurance that the issues will be dealt with as open evidence. I add to that, while having the same hope, that if there are aspects which cannot be dealt with openly, will the provisions—I do not much like them, but they are what we have got—on gisting and special advocates apply? I have seen some doubt as to whether that would be the case.

On the amendment for review, I am glad that the Government have tabled this, as I did both in Committee and on Report. However, I stressed then the importance of independence. That term is missing from the Government’s amendment. Perhaps I can put it this way to my noble friend: can he confirm unequivocally that the review will not be in the hands of somebody who is within the Home Office?

Like others, I would welcome this being a matter for the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Concern has been expressed about resources, but whoever does the job is going to need the resources to do the job. I, too, have a question about why, after the first year, it should be triennial. If we are dealing with small numbers, then the job should be correspondingly small. I also ask the Minister to give us an assurance that the Government will support the reviewer undertaking more frequent reviews if he considers that they should be undertaken.

In debate, we have barely touched on the impact on communities of whom an individual in question is a member. I would support the appointment of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, because that postholder deals with people who are in rather connected situations where other measures might be applicable—and, indeed, might apply if deprivation is not to be used. It is clear that there is a danger that the use of the state’s powers, which focus on neutralising—if that is the word—the individual without considering the negative effect on the community, is an issue, as well as the specifics for the individual and their family. I am sure that the independent reviewer would focus on that as well.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this has been an extremely good debate: a serious one, on a very serious issue. We have been fortunate to be able to hear from a large and well qualified body of the Members of this House. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, and I will do my best to provide those assurances that have been sought by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in welcoming the Government’s move in tabling their amendments in the Commons, wanted assurances. I am most grateful to him for letting me have sight of the things he was concerned about so that I was able to address them. I can say the same of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who did not raise all the issues she had intended to because they had been raised by other noble Lords. However, I think that that most noble Lords have a similar need for reassurance, and I am well aware of the responsibility to provide that assurance to Members of the House.

Perhaps most important is the whole question of the meaning of “reasonable grounds to believe” and whether those reasonable grounds of belief are appropriate for determining the ability of a person to acquire another nationality. The Home Secretary’s decision must be “reasonable” based on the evidence available to her on the nationality laws of those countries and the person’s circumstances. That will include having regard to any practical arrangements, but those will vary from case to case, and it is not possible or appropriate to speculate about what weight those issues would carry in a particular case. “Satisfied” has been interpreted to mean that SIAC decides for itself whether a person is a dual national. In some circumstances a person, after being deprived of British citizenship, may take steps which guarantee that another country will not recognise him or her as a national. The appeal should therefore review the decision at the time it was made, which is why the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” instead of “satisfied” is used.

Both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, asked what the position would be if the foreign state had some discretion in whether to approve an individual’s request for citizenship. I think that the noble Baroness went as far as to say that she thought that there were likely to be grounds for discretion in almost any case. The clause refers to whether under the laws of a country or territory a person is able to acquire the nationality of that country. The key issue will be whether the Secretary of State reasonably believes that they are able to acquire the nationality. It does not say that the person must have a right—an automatic entitlement—to that other nationality. Where there is a discretionary judgment there may be reasonable grounds to believe that the discretion will be exercised. However, reasonableness would require something more than saying that the person should apply for the exercise of a general discretion to grant citizenship to any country that has such discretion. I hope I make myself clear on that. The Home Secretary must have reasonable grounds to believe that, at the end of any application process—if one is required—the person will become a national of another country.