Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I may be quite wrong in my recollection, but I remember reading somewhere that only a single consultation with a GP would not be charged for. I hope that I am wrong in thinking that, but if that is the case, I am really worried. It builds on my noble friend’s point about diagnostic testing. I have a wonderful GP, but on the, happily, rare occasions on which I see him, he usually says, “Go to have a blood test and come back”, or “Let’s see how it goes and come back”.
Amendment 66E covers ground that has already been thoroughly covered by the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Cumberlege, about both victims of domestic abuse and persons who are believed to be victims of trafficking. The point about identifying both those groups—not all of them, but many of them, women—is very important. Often, they may not even be suspected of falling within those groups until they see a doctor. Doctors are in the best place gently to investigate how certain conditions have come about, because the patient may not be prepared to disclose the information without being encouraged to do so, and may not have disclosed it to anyone else—possibly not even to a doctor on initial consultation. Although the intention here is good, we have to be clear about how the provision will be implemented, as well as getting assurances that what we understand to be the case will be the case.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, there is little I can add to the points made eloquently by noble Lords—although, in an all-female debate, perhaps I should say noble Baronesses. Some points are not dissimilar to the principles that we raised on Monday about exemptions on housing issues and the rate of pregnancy and domestic violence. Again, the debate highlights confusion and a lack of clarity. The Government have to accept some responsibility for that confusion and lack of clarity.
The case raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and reinforced by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is that victims of domestic violence and victims of female genital mutilation are not just vulnerable but are victims of crime. That is a step further than vulnerable.
I recall that when I was a PPS at the Home Office many years ago, the Government piloted working with A&E departments to identify women who presented with injuries that were likely to be the result of domestic violence, to see whether we could get those cases through the courts and protect the women from being victims again. That was a very important part of A&E working as part of the whole criminal justice system. I worry that women who should present themselves to health services to receive treatment for violent injuries and FGM—the case presented by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was horrific—will be victims of trafficking. We have to imagine the terror of someone who has been trafficked to the UK, often for sex or slavery. They may not speak English; they may not be aware of their legal status; they will have little trust; they will be fearful and in poor health; and they will be worried about going to the authorities in the first place because of worry about their own status.
There needs to be careful thought about how that can be managed. The Minister and the Government have been helpful in saying that victims of human trafficking will be exempt from charges. They have been very clear on that, but much concern has been raised about how to identify those women and help them come forward. What the noble Lord said was helpful, but he needs to say more.
I return to the question of what this means and the complications that other noble Lords have raised. What is the Government’s definition of success here? If their policy is successful, health services will be able to check the eligibility of those who are entitled to free healthcare and, consequently, charge those who are not eligible. The second aim is to draw to the attention of the authorities those who present and do not have a legal right to stay in this country. The point about public health is particularly pertinent here, and I would like to know what the Government are thinking on this and how they identify the problems.
If identifying those who are not legal migrants and reporting them to the authorities means that those people are less likely to report for healthcare, what are the implications for public health if someone has an infectious disease that needs treatment or a condition where a lack of early intervention means more expensive, or even emergency, care? We heard about the case in Northern Ireland. Another case I have been aware of is that of a young woman who had asthma. Simple preventive treatment would have been cheap and easy, but the care later on that was necessary because she had not had that treatment was very dangerous to her health and expensive to the public purse.
The question of far greater cost comes back to the issue of mental health cases. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, on this. If someone has mental health problems, they are likely to be a danger to themselves and to others. I am sure that it is not the Government’s intention that those people should go without healthcare, but we have to recognise that there are specific obligations in those cases. I am seeking from the Minister an explanation of what thought the Government have given to these issues prior to bringing the Bill forward, and what plans are in place to deal with these kinds of issues regarding the most vulnerable—the victims of crime, those who could be a danger to themselves or to others, and those who could present at even greater cost to the public purse if they do not get the treatment that they need? I am particularly interested in the Minister’s response on this matter.
Baroness Hamwee
“( ) A person is within this subsection if he or she has made a claim for asylum which has not yet been determined by the Secretary of State or has been refused and an appeal against that refusal is pending, and—
(a) “claim for asylum” has the same meaning as in section 94 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (interpretation of Part VI);(b) an appeal is pending for the purposes of this subsection when it is pending under section 104 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (pending appeal).”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in moving Amendment 66G, I will speak also to Amendments 66H, 66J, 66K and 66L. This takes us on to the provisions regarding bank accounts, which is perhaps a slightly drier issue than others we have discussed but is very important.
The Bill prohibits the opening of current accounts for disqualified persons and regulates banks’ operations in this regard. The first of my amendments in this group would provide that someone who has made a claim for asylum which has not been determined, or whose claim has been refused but an appeal is pending, would also be covered by the exclusion. The clause, as drafted, seems to exclude persons on temporary admission. It is most likely that those on temporary admission for a lengthy period are seeking asylum. I do not suggest that many of those will have a lot of free cash and want a current account, but some whose claims have been pending for a long time may be allowed to work in a shortage occupation. I imagine that this is quite rare, but some may even be able to get some money out of their country of origin. Those people ought to be able to have a bank account. How can that be permitted if the clause remains as drafted?
Amendment 66H goes to the definition of a “disqualified person”, whom we are told in Clause 35(3)(b) is,
“a person within subsection (2) for whom the Secretary of State considers that a current account should not be opened”.
I suggest that the Secretary of State should be required in the Bill to act “reasonably”. I certainly acknowledge that, as a matter of law, it may well be that she should act reasonably, but the complete discretion is concerning. We are not told of any criteria on which the decision will be based. The Explanatory Notes state:
“The Secretary of State therefore has discretion as to who should be barred … because there will be some individuals who face legitimate barriers which prevent them from leaving the UK, even though they do not have leave. The Secretary of State may enable these persons to open a current account”.
It is important to have published on the record the criteria on which the Secretary of State will base her decision and what options someone who is not able to open a bank account has to challenge her refusal.
That takes me to Amendment 66J, because I cannot see how one would challenge the decision. Provided that they do not discriminate and act lawfully, banks can refuse to open a bank account as they choose. However, if the Secretary of State can order them to refuse to open an account, I wonder whether she can require them to make a provision for a refusal to be challenged. It is a very homegrown and underdeveloped amendment, but there has to be some means of challenging because the consequences are serious. Being refused a bank account goes to one’s credit status and to an application for a mortgage at a later stage, and a number of other consequences may apply to somebody who should never have been refused in the first place. I am seriously concerned about this.
Amendment 66K is on our old friend in Clause 36(1): “The Treasury may”—or “must” it?—“make regulations to enable” the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance. Might the Government think it right to bring the scheme into force but not have these arrangements made?
Finally, Amendment 66L is on “in particular” in Clause 36(2)(b), which provides that “The regulations may” make certain provision,
“including in particular those mentioned in subsection (3), with or without modification”.
I am not clear what is added or suggested by all that and hope that the Minister can help me on it. I beg to move.
Lord Avebury (LD)
My Lords, at the moment it is entirely at the discretion of a bank or building society to agree to open a current account in the name of a person who requires leave to enter or remain but does not have it. The status checks that the bank would carry out would be to determine whether the applicant was financially reliable rather than what his immigration status was—although if he falls within Clause 35(2)(b), he is unlikely to be acceptable to the bank.
Clause 35 provides that a bank has to refuse to open an account for a person who does not have permitted leave to remain, and who is also labelled on a database operated by an unspecified anti-fraud organisation or data-matching organisation as a person whom the Secretary of State considers should not be able to open a current account. I should be grateful if the Minister would elaborate on the details of the organisation to which the banks will have to refer and how it will be established. It means that there will be some people on temporary admission whom the Secretary of State might consider eligible to open a bank account; the Explanatory Notes say this in fact means individuals facing legitimate barriers preventing them leaving the UK.
However, neither the Bill nor the Explanatory Notes gives any detail as to how the Secretary of State will make these decisions or what rights a person will have to challenge her refusal to let him open an account. Should not an asylum seeker who has exhausted his rights of appeal against refusal but is given further temporary leave to remain be allowed to open a bank account? One thinks of the Zimbabweans who were given temporary leave over many years, many of whom opened current accounts if they satisfied the bank’s conditions. Clause 35 prohibits a bank only from opening a current account in the name of a disqualified person, not from continuing to afford facilities to such a person who already has an account. Will this be made clear in the guidance that no doubt will be given to the banks?
Amendment 66G removes from the scope of the clause asylum seekers whose claim has not been finally determined. Most of these people, as my noble friend said, will be very poor and thus unlikely to need a current account, but even those supported by the National Asylum Support Service under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act, and who receive payments fortnightly, may not wish to carry around the money they receive. A couple with two children under 16 would receive £357 a fortnight, which is quite a large sum to have in one’s pocket or handbag.
Asylum seekers whose claims have been pending for more than a year and who can find employment in shortage occupations may be allowed to work, and my noble friend Lord Roberts will suggest in later amendments that the right to work should be further extended. These people will need accounts into which their wages can be paid. For that matter, could my noble friend say how many people it is estimated will be prevented from opening accounts under this clause who would otherwise have been able to be accepted by the banks under their own rules? What is the cost to the Government of setting up and managing the database, and what is the cost to the banks of making the checks required?
On a casual inquiry at my own bank, Santander, I was told that it would open an account only for a person who was resident in the UK—rather an incongruous condition to be imposed by a foreign-owned bank. It would mean, if the bank meant it literally, that it would not open an account for an EEA citizen who owned a holiday home in Cornwall or for a foreign student—but perhaps the bank makes exceptions.
An immigration lawyer who deals with a substantial number of immigration cases told me this morning that the banks invariably refuse to open current accounts for asylum seekers and appellants. So the result that the Government are aiming for in these clauses is already being achieved by market forces. However, Clause 37 defines the term “bank” to exclude credit unions, and the London Community Credit Union confirmed to me this morning that it would be prepared to open a current account for an asylum seeker, provided of course that his papers were in order. Will my noble friend confirm that asylum seekers and those who appeal against refusal of asylum will continue to be free to open current accounts at credit unions?
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for the clear and succinct way in which she spoke to her Amendments 66G to 66L. These amendments seek to make various revisions to the bank accounts provisions. The objective of these provisions is to make it much more difficult for people to operate in the UK if they do not have the appropriate immigration status to be here.
Amendment 66G would amend Clause 35(2), which sets out the group of people who may be disqualified from opening an account. This amendment would specifically add to this group asylum applicants who have an outstanding claim. I am not convinced that that is what my noble friend intended. However, I can confirm that the policy intention is not to prevent these people opening a current account. The details of persons who are liable to removal and who have exhausted all their appeal rights will be the only ones shared with CIFAS, the specified anti-fraud organisation. By definition, this will not include persons with outstanding asylum applications and appeals.
My noble friend Lord Avebury asked about CIFAS. It is already a recognised checking agency and has been selected because we believe that it is the best organisation to perform this function. I will write to my noble friend with further details about that.
My noble friend also talked about the cost of these checks. First, I make it clear that a customer applying to open a bank account will not notice any difference, as these will just be checks that the banks do electronically with CIFAS. Because they are done electronically with an existing organisation, there will not be significant extra costs.
Amendment 66H would insert the word “reasonably” into the definition of a disqualified person. This amendment is unnecessary. As a matter of general administrative law, the Secretary of State is obliged to act reasonably, as pointed out by my noble friend. If he did not act reasonably, I am sure that he could be challenged in the courts by means of judicial review.
Amendment 66J would create a right to challenge or appeal against the refusal of a bank or building society to open a current account. The refusal of an account for a disqualified person by the bank or building society is mandatory and flows directly from an individual’s immigration status and the Secretary of State’s decision to disqualify the individual from opening an account. It remains open to individuals to apply via the immigration system to regularise their status or appeal through that route as appropriate. We do not need to create a fresh appeals mechanism here. However, I want to provide reassurance that if any details given to CIFAS are incorrect or become out of date, an individual would be able to complain directly to the Home Office. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the prohibition is on opening an account, not having an account. If I am incorrect on that, I will write to the noble Baroness.
If there is an error at CIFAS, the Home Office would then have a legal obligation under the Data Protection Act 1998 to correct it. The Home Office exercises considerable care over the quality of the data it shares with CIFAS and has systems in place to regularly update CIFAS records if someone’s status changes. From over 100,000 cases notified to CIFAS since 2012, I am aware of only one complaint being made to the Home Office.
Amendment 66K would require the Treasury to make regulations enabling the Financial Conduct Authority to make arrangements for monitoring and enforcing compliance. The amendment is not necessary, as I can assure the Committee that we will make such regulations.
Amendment 66L would leave out the words “in particular” from Clause 36(2)(b), which refers to provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to which the aforementioned regulations may apply. The words “in particular” are intended to make it clear that the list of provisions is not exhaustive, and they follow similar provisions in LASPO. The list is simply intended to give a clearer sense of the provisions that the regulations are intended to cover.
In short, my noble friend Lord Avebury expressed concerns about whether these measures were appropriate. These proposals do not breach human rights legislation; they will not impact on a person’s ability to provide themselves with the basic necessities, nor prevent them interacting with the world around them. This measure is necessary and proportionate; it supports immigration control which is a legitimate aim. My noble friend was asking broadly what would be done to ensure that the measures do not have the effect of turning the individuals concerned into vulnerable people. These individuals will still be able to conduct everyday transactions using cash, but I heard the noble Lord express concern about people’s supply of cash mounting up. In the past he has chided me about the relatively limited amounts of money supplied under Section 4 support to failed asylum seekers. The measures will make it more difficult for them to obtain loans and conduct a settled life in the UK, but it will not make it impossible for them to exist.
I hope that I have reassured the Committee that these amendments, while useful for seeking assurance, are not necessary, and I hope that my noble friend will feel free to withdraw them.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, to pick up on the phrase my noble friend has just used about cash mounting up, that is not the point that my noble friend Lord Avebury was making. He was talking about the cash that one might have in one’s pocket immediately upon collecting two weeks’ money. It is quite a lot when you receive it but it has to be eked out over two weeks.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, is the noble Baroness talking about support under Section 4 or Section 95? If it is under Section 95, the person will still have an outstanding claim and will therefore be able to open a bank account. If I am wrong on that, I will, of course, write.
Baroness Hamwee
That is helpful. I am grateful. On the issue of the Secretary of State acting reasonably, I was seeking the criteria. I am grateful for the detail of the Minister’s responses. Obviously I need to read them, as one always does, against my questions and against Clause 38, which gives the Treasury quite wide, but not unlimited, powers to amend what will be Sections 35 to 37. The practicalities and practice of this, as my noble friend will understand, concern us. However, I am grateful for the answers and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.