Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Hale of Richmond Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, this group goes to the heart of domestic, constitutional, rule-of-law concerns about the Bill. I share Amendments 39, 44, 49, 50, 52 and 53—the bulk of the group—with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is also a supporter of this group but gallantly withdrew his name because he is prevented from being here today. These amendments will restore the proper jurisdiction of our courts. In a moment, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, will explain them, but for now I beg to move.

[Baroness Hale of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I shall explain why I am proud to support this vital group of amendments to Clause 4 proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. They restore to the courts of this country the role which is properly theirs under our centuries-old constitutional arrangements, which respect the separation of powers between Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary.

I must apologise to the Committee that prior commitments prevented me speaking at Second Reading—although I was there for the all-important closing speeches—and attending the first two days of the Committee’s considerations. I have, however, followed the proceedings closely and have been hugely impressed by the quality of the debate.

I agree with so many noble Lords that reversing the very recent findings of fact in our Supreme Court with absolute and for ever conclusions as to the safety of Rwanda, ignoring international law, and disapplying the Human Rights Act are of the gravest concern. However, it is also of the gravest concern that the Bill ousts the jurisdiction of His Majesty’s courts and tribunals to consider matters which are properly theirs to consider, in a constitution which respects the rule of law. It is for the courts to decide whether the Executive have violated, or propose to violate, the rights of individuals—rights they are given, as the Supreme Court made clear, not only by international law and the Human Rights Act but by other UK statutes and by the common law of the land, of which we are so rightly proud.

Amendment 39 restores to the Executive the ability to consider the general safety of the Republic of Rwanda, not just the particular circumstances of a particular individual. This reflects the concerns already expressed in Committee, not only that the situation in any country may change very quickly but that it makes no sense to be able to examine the circumstances of a particular individual but not the evidence that hundreds or even thousands of people may be imprisoned or tortured there. This amendment would also cater for the concerns raised by the previous group of amendments about members of a particular social group.

Amendment 44 restores the same ability to evaluate such vital country information to courts and tribunals considering decisions to remove individuals to Rwanda.

Amendment 49 restores the ability of decision-makers, whether in government or in our courts and tribunals, to look at evidence that the Republic of Rwanda will or may refoule people. Refoulement, as the Committee well knows, means sending people to places where they are at risk of persecution.

Amendments 50, 52 and 53 also restore to our domestic courts and tribunals the jurisdiction to grant interim relief to claimants, preventing their removal to Rwanda until their cases have been properly considered. Amendment 48 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, also restores the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals over possible refoulement but not the possibility of granting interim relief, so, with respect, though commendable in itself, it does not go quite far enough.

I remind the Committee that Clause 5 of the Bill allows for the possibility that a Minister of the Crown may comply with interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights. As a matter of sovereignty, it would be odd indeed if an international court could grant relief to people within the United Kingdom when our own courts and tribunals have been deprived by statute of any say at all. In my experience as a judge at the highest level in this country, there is a great deal of respect between our own courts and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. If and when Rwanda were to become a safe country, our courts would find it so and the Strasbourg court would almost certainly agree. On the other hand, if our own courts are unable to consider the matter, the international court would have to scrutinise the decisions of the UK Government with great care—an outcome which many noble Lords may think regrettable.

[The Lord Bishop of Chichester]

My Lords, my noble friend the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury regrets that he cannot be in his place today to speak to the amendments in this group tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale. I wish to associate my remarks with theirs and to emphasise how important the restoration of the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is in considering also UNHRC evidence and the ability to grant interim relief. This is no mere technicality. This jurisdiction might make the difference between sending an asylum seeker to Rwanda while their claim, or an aspect of their claim, is pending or not doing so.

Many of those who have been earmarked for removal will have fled from perilous circumstances in their places of origin. What they need is the certainty of knowing that they will not be removed from the country in which they seek asylum while their cases are pending. Clause 4 includes provisions for a court or tribunal to grant interim relief if they are concerned that the person faces a,

“real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”

in Rwanda.

Through debate on this group of amendments, we are considering whether courts and tribunals may benefit from greater discretion for the express purpose of the well-being and future risk of the individuals themselves. We have seen the multiple difficulties faced by the Government in sending asylum seekers to Rwanda. Bearing that in mind, is it really plausible that, having sent an asylum seeker to Rwanda, the Government will then be able to return them to the United Kingdom on the basis of evidence that should have been considered while their case was reviewed here? This seems neither efficient nor plausible.

There is also a need to consider advice from the UN Refugee Agency in reviewing the safety of Rwanda, recognising its crucial role in administering many of the services to support more than 110 million people who are forcibly displaced around the world. That agency serves on the front line in supporting people, and it understands the particular challenges faced by those seeking safety. The agency knows of what it speaks; the courts and tribunals should be able to draw on this expertise as they make their judgments.