Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Grey-Thompson and Baroness Keeley

Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Keeley (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 420 could sit beside Amendment 419 from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, but it has not been put in this group. This group is labelled “drafting changes” but, as we have just heard, the effect they would have goes further than that. I have tabled Amendment 420, to be discussed in a later group, to address a concern that the grounds on which a co-ordinating doctor can drop out are already too wide, but I see that the amendments in this group from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer compound that problem by expanding the grounds even further. I therefore feel I must speak briefly in this debate, despite the fact that my amendment comes later, because your Lordships’ Committee needs to be aware of the concern I am seeking to raise, which the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, also has.

My Amendment 420 highlights that these provisions should be limited to cases of death or illness. Clause 14 fails to define in which situations it would be acceptable for the state not to be concerned that the doctor is unwilling. As the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, has highlighted in her Amendment 420A, the danger is that the current wording would allow the risk of changing doctors until the wanted answer is given. These probing amendments are going to be discussed later, and they will focus on the need to restrict the grounds for changing the co-ordinating doctor by excluding the word “unwilling”, which Amendments 420 and 420A both address.

It would be helpful if my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer could answer these questions on this matter. How do we distinguish between a doctor who is unwilling due to conscience and one who is unwilling due to suspicion? Without a requirement to record the specific reasons for unwillingness, is there a danger that we are creating a black box? If a doctor steps away because they are uncomfortable, for instance, with a family member’s influence, surely the system needs to capture that specific hesitation before a new doctor is appointed. Will my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer specify what circumstances cross the line where the state should be more curious about why the doctor is unwilling?

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

My Lords, I originally requested that later amendments that I have on disability language, as defined under the Equality Act, be moved into this group, but they were not. I think it is important that we have a chance to debate them as well. Language is the dress of thought, and “person with a disability” is not language that is used in the Equality Act. However, if the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seemed to misunderstand these amendments, I think I have misunderstood them as well.

I am particularly concerned about Amendments 290, 366 and 931 around domestic abuse and coercive control, which I have spoken about in other debates. I believe that these amendments go beyond mere drafting changes. The wording as it now exists waters down what the training around domestic abuse is likely to be. For example, it could be a course on physical or sexual abuse, but that does not necessarily mean that it is as comprehensive as I believe it needs to be. I am conscious of time, but I would be interested to know whether the noble and learned Lord or the sponsor in another place, the honourable Member for Spen Valley, has spoken to the honourable Member for Lowestoft, Jess Asato, about the impact of these amendments on her work. It important that we understand the context of what we thought was coming from the Commons and what these changes might mean to the Bill.