(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn. I call the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Before I comment on these amendments, I am told that there was a tweet earlier today from the Commons Minister on this Bill, James Brokenshire, saying that he has had a recurrence of a tumour in part of his lung and that he is taking leave for curative surgery. I am sure that I am not alone in wanting to extend best wishes to him for a full recovery.
I will be brief, because everything that needs to be said on Amendment 6 has already been said. It requires a person authorising a criminal conduct authorisation to reasonably believe that the tests for authorisation are met and are necessary and proportionate. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to what the Solicitor-General had said at Second Reading in the Commons, to the effect that the code of practice sets out that there does need to be a reasonable belief that an authorisation is necessary and proportionate. As we have heard, there is wording in part of the code of practice that is not—let us say—quite as strong as the words of the Solicitor-General in the Commons.
Crucially, once again, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said in Committee, the notion of reasonableness is completely absent from the Bill, which the courts would treat as the authoritative source. Like others, I see no reason why the Government are not prepared to put the word “reasonable” in the Bill. We certainly support Amendment 6.
My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I heard earlier today that my right honourable friend James Brokenshire had to go in for some more surgery; I pay tribute to him. He is one of the most decent people in politics and an extraordinarily capable Minister. He has never been far from my mind this afternoon, as not only has he mentored me but we discussed and worked closely on every aspect of the Bill. I wish him a very speedy recovery.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to add an explicit requirement for an authorising officer’s belief that the conduct is both necessary and proportionate to be a reasonable one. I have already explained why the Government cannot support this proposal. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, almost spelled out the reasons I was going to give, which are a bit of a repetition and with which I am not sure he will be entirely satisfied. However, since Committee I have updated the CHIS code of practice to make it clearer that it is expected that the belief should be a reasonable one.
I caution against an amendment seeking to include this wording in the Bill, as it would cast doubt on the test that is expected to apply to other authorisations. In particular, it could have unintended consequences for a Section 29 use and conduct authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Including the need for a reasonable belief here, creating an inconsistency in the legislation, would create uncertainty over whether the same requirement exists for the underlying Section 29 authorisation. As I mentioned earlier, as a matter of public law, a decision made subject to a discretionary power must be reasonable; that is, the decision must be rationally open to a reasonable decision-maker in possession of the facts in the case.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has also called for the length of authorisations to be reduced from 12 months to four months, with a formal requirement for a monthly review of the authorisation. As I have said, the current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities using it.
While the code of practice is clear that an authorisation must be relied on for as short a duration as possible, and in many cases an authorisation will not last longer than four months, reducing the maximum length risks unintended consequences; for example, a shorter duration could mean that activity is rushed through in a shorter period of time, to avoid renewal or to demonstrate the value of a deployment to support a renewal. This clearly may not be the most effective or safest way of carrying out that conduct. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness is sufficiently reassured to withdraw her amendment.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI call the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to move Motion A1.
In the Commons on Monday, the Government chose to describe your Lordships’ amendment calling for an independent report on the impact of the end of free movement on the social care sector as “well intentioned”, but went on to claim that it was “unnecessary”—
I did call the Minister, but she sat down, so I presumed she had finished. No? Baroness Williams of Trafford.
I thank the Minister for what she has just said about my amendment, which started off life in Committee, being moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, albeit not with exactly the same words. As I understand it from what the Minister has just said, the Government are not prepared to accept the amendment to the Bill but are giving a commitment to carry out the terms of the amendment in full, and that must, therefore, include the timescales laid down in it. If that is the case—and the Minister gave a commitment to carry out the terms of my amendment—then I will not seek pursue my Motion to a vote.
I note that the Minister said that she wished to discuss with me how we ensure—I I think that was what she said—that we get the detail right, and, of course, I am happy to do that within the context of the Government having committed to carry out the terms of my amendment in full, including the timescales laid down in it. I do not think I misheard what the Minister said: I certainly heard the phrase “give a commitment to carry out the terms of his amendment” being used with no caveats added. Therefore, on the basis that the Government are committing themselves to carry out the terms of my amendment in full, then I would be prepared to withdraw my Motion when the time comes.
However, I would like to add one further comment. Within the terms of the amendment, it is, of course, left to the Government to decide who will undertake the
“independent assessment of the impact of section 1, and Schedule 1, on the social care sector”.
These relate to the ending of free movement. From what the Minister has said, I suspect that a candidate will be the Migration Advisory Committee, whose views on even the single issue of funding social care for higher wages have been ignored “for some years”, to use the MAC’s words. That does not suggest that it is a body whose views on that issue carry much weight with the Government. It will be vital for the independent assessment to have a significant and meaningful input from people of influence who understand fully the way in which the social care sector functions and the constraints under which it operates. Although it is a matter for the Government, I hope they will ensure that that vital, significant and meaningful input occurs.
On the basis that I have understood clearly what the Minister has said on behalf of the Government—namely, that she has made a commitment to carry out the terms of my amendment, and that this must be in full because there were no caveats added—then I would be prepared not seek to pursue the matter to get it written into the Bill. I beg to move.
The following Member in the Chamber has indicated that he wishes to speak: the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the name of my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon is attached to this amendment. I certainly do not wish to speak at any length, because the arguments have already been made, but I shall reiterate one or two things. Under the tied visa system, introduced in the changes in 2012 to the Immigration Rules, overseas domestic workers who are being exploited no longer have the option of seeking other employment to get away from an employer who is exploiting them since they are tied to their employer for a non-renewable period of six months. Under the tied visa system, people who are being exploited are normally not willing to go to the relevant authorities because they fear that, if they leave their employer, the outcome will be that they will be deported as an immigration offender. If they are being paid anything at all—evidence suggests that more than 60% may not be—they will lose what may be a source of income being sent to support dependants in their own country.
One would have thought that the Government would have wanted to abolish the current tied visa system for overseas domestic workers, since tying migrant domestic workers to their employer institutionalises their abuse, as has been said already, and precludes acting decisively to protect victims of modern slavery. Of course, as also has already been said, it is unrealistic for such domestic workers to take any kind of legal action against an employer who potentially has trafficked them, exploited them and denied them their most basic rights while still living in the home of their employer.
The impact assessment that accompanied the 2012 changes stated that the ability of these workers—that is, overseas domestic workers—to change employer and access the UK labour market was,
“contrary to general Government policy on low skilled migration”.
However, the impact assessment also acknowledged the,
“vulnerability to abuse and exploitation”,
of these workers. I do not know whether the Government’s resistance to date to going down the road of this amendment is related, in the light of that comment in the 2012 impact assessment, to a view that it would lead to an increase in immigration. Perhaps the noble Baroness could say what, if any, increase in immigration the Government believe there would be if the amendment that we are debating is adopted. Reversing the 2012 changes for the overseas domestic worker visa would, at the very least, allow organisations and agencies to remove a worker from an abusive employment situation immediately. It also would enable the abuse to be reported to the police without fear that the victim would be deported as a result and that, in turn, would facilitate the prosecution of modern slavery offences, which, surely, is the purpose of the Bill we are now discussing. I hope that, in responding, the Minister will take account of what has been said far more eloquently than I can manage by so many of your Lordships in this Committee today.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, for introducing this amendment and speaking with such eloquence and acknowledge her expertise and campaigning work in this area. Holding anyone in modern slavery is totally unacceptable; I am sure that, around the Committee, we can all agree on that. Overseas domestic workers, like anyone else, deserve protection from modern slavery and support and help if abuse takes place. Noble Lords around the Committee have raised passionate concerns about some of the appalling situations that people find themselves in.
I shall set out why the main issue is not the nature of the visa that somebody has. Through both the Bill and wider policy changes, we will seek to provide protection to anyone who needs it, regardless of their employment type or any visa they may have. Obviously, we are focusing here on overseas domestic workers and seeking to strengthen their protections further.
The best way to prevent an abusive working relationship from being brought to the UK is to test its genuineness before a visa is issued. A number of noble Lords have raised these issues. Private household employers must prove to immigration officials that they have a pre-existing employment relationship of at least 12 months with their domestic worker, for example by providing pay slips or work records. All individuals applying to come to the UK on an overseas domestic worker visa must also provide evidence with their application that they have agreed in writing the core terms and conditions of their employment in the UK. That helps to establish that the worker is employed under terms that they find acceptable and allows us to ensure that these are appropriate. The evidence is to be provided in the form of a prescribed template—although, of course, I hear from around the Committee the concerns that these documents will not be adequately and legally kept to. The requirement for a written statement of key terms and conditions has been in place only since April 2012 and we believe that it could be improved to reflect international best practice. Officials have been working on a revised template to try to ensure that both employers and employees have an opportunity to see what standards are expected on both sides before workers come here and that they are aware of rights and responsibilities, including, sections on passport retention, sleeping accommodation and all the other things that noble Lords have mentioned, which so often are open to abuse.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, for tabling Amendment 83A and for asking whether Schedule 3 should stand part of the Bill, which relate to the offences excluded from the statutory defence for victims. I also thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Rosser, for their contributions.
As we have previously discussed, Clause 45 establishes a statutory defence for slavery or trafficking victims where they have been compelled to commit an offence as a direct consequence of their slavery or trafficking situation. As we discussed in the previous group, this builds on the existing use of prosecutorial discretion by the CPS backed up by bespoke guidance. Ultimately, the courts can stop an inappropriate prosecution of a victim as an abuse of process.
Noble Lords questioned how Schedule 3 was drawn up. It was drafted very carefully in consultation with the DPP and CPS. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned in his previous intervention, it is very important that we get involvement from the DPP and CPS in drafting these pieces of legislation. As I have said, it was with approval and consultation that this list was drawn up. There is a need for appropriate safeguards to ensure that a new defence is applied effectively and is not open to abuse, for example by organised criminals, even if they once have been trafficked themselves. There is a delicate balance to be struck and we want to get that balance right.
Amendment 83A, together with the suggestion that Schedule 3 should not stand part of the Bill, would mean that the defence could apply to any offence, including serious sexual and violent offences such as murder and rape. People who have been enslaved or trafficked may commit criminal offences in a wide variety of circumstances and it will not always be the case that a defence is justified. We must not create a defence so wide that it amounts to a loophole in the law. It is important that we protect not just victims but also society. As we developed the statutory defence, our approach was always to ensure that we covered the types of offences often committed by those who are enslaved or trafficked. We have taken detailed advice from the Crown Prosecution Service on this point. As I have mentioned, the offences listed in Schedule 3 reflect those discussions and discussions with the DPP.
The defence is therefore designed to provide an effective protection against prosecution in the types of circumstances that actual victims of modern slavery find themselves in—for example, cannabis cultivation. The list of excluded offences in Schedule 3 can be amended by statutory instrument if experience shows the offences listed are not right and fail to protect vulnerable victims. But, in order to avoid creating a dangerous loophole for serious criminals to escape justice, we think it is right that the defence is not available in the cases—mainly serious sexual and violent offences—as listed in Schedule 3. This does not mean that a victim who commits a Schedule 3 offence in a modern slavery context will automatically face prosecution. Where the defence does not apply because the offence is too serious, the Crown Prosecution Service will still be able to decide not to prosecute if it would not be in the public interest to do so. It is right that in very difficult cases involving very serious crimes, including rape and murder, the Crown Prosecution Service carefully considers both the victim of trafficking and the victim of a very serious crime, and seeks to act in the public interest.
I understand the concern of noble Lords that victims should not be inappropriately criminalised; we agree on that, but that is why we are strengthening protections for victims in the Bill. We must be careful, however, that we do not create a loophole for very serious criminals. In the most serious cases, it is right for the CPS to use its discretion—and I emphasise that there is always discretion in these cases—to act in the public interest, based on the specific facts of the case. We are, of course, open to further discussion before Report, but I hope that these assurances will enable the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I ask the following question seriously and not frivolously: if this has been the subject of discussion with the DPP, is it therefore the case that there are already examples of victims of trafficking having committed all those offences listed in Schedule 3?
No, I do not think for a moment that there are examples of victims having committed all those offences in Schedule 3. This is simply set out for public protection, in order to ensure that serious crimes are not automatically given a free ride as a result of the criminals being victims.
(9 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lady Lister have made reference to the views of the Joint Committee. Of course, reference has been made also to the fact that similar amendments were discussed in the other place. As we know, the response of the Minister in the other place was that, although the orders would be obtained through civil proceedings, the Government accepted that the threshold would be akin to the criminal standard of satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, in line with relevant case law. The Minister in the other place went on to express the view that since the relevant clauses in the Bill already met the evidential threshold that appeared to be being sought in the amendments that were discussed in the other place, the amendments were not needed.
Naturally, I am assuming that the reply that we are going to get from the Minister will be in line with the response that was given by the Minister in the other place, but I hope that the Minister will respond also to the point that has been made about why there is a reluctance to put this on the face of the Bill so that there is no doubt at all about it.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for speaking to this amendment and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for tabling it. It gives me the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach to safeguards in slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, and in particular the standards of proof required for the orders to be made. The purpose of these orders is to ensure that law enforcement bodies and the courts have appropriate powers to restrict the behaviour of persons who are likely to cause harm to another by committing a slavery or trafficking offence. For the prevention orders in Clause 14 and the risk orders in Clause 23, the courts must be satisfied that there is a risk that the individual may commit an offence, and that the order is necessary to protect a person or persons from the physical or psychological harm that would likely be caused by that individual committing a slavery or human trafficking offence.
These amendments seek to ensure that the court is required in each of these circumstances to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof in criminal courts, as has been mentioned. The intention of these amendments is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect the rights of individuals on whom these orders will be imposed. I recognise the importance of ensuring that these orders, breach of which would be a criminal offence, are not made lightly.
Reference has been made to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of that committee. There has been mention of the report that it has published recently. The Government are reflecting on that report carefully.
In this context, protecting the rights of the defendant is important. We have sought to draft these provisions to provide these protections and reflect the need to protect potential victims and remove the risk of harm to them, which is paramount. Although the proceedings by which these orders are obtained are civil proceedings, I put on record that the high burden of proof which applies by virtue of relevant case law in this area ensures that the threshold must in any event be akin to the criminal standard, as my noble friend said. This is the position in respect of existing orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which have been used effectively for more than 10 years, and the new sexual harm prevention order and sexual risk order, and is therefore very well established. For these reasons, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary. Courts and practitioners are familiar with the existing evidential test. Departing from the established approach for these orders could cause uncertainty among practitioners and the courts, which may well reduce their effectiveness. There could also be a perception that, by expressly including a different and more rigid test in the Bill, we want these orders to be judged by a different standard from that applicable to the other orders, which would call into question why different approaches are taken in areas notwithstanding the similarities between them.
Under the system I have described, the court has flexibility in determining the standard to be applied and can take into account and balance all the circumstances of the case—for example, the seriousness of the risk posed by the defendant, the degree of relevance of each fact which must be proved by the applicant and the effect on the defendant of making the order. In the sex offending context, the courts have been able to carry out this exercise for many years in a way which protects the rights of both defendants and those persons at risk. Prescribing the standard as the criminal standard would deprive the courts of this necessary flexibility.
My noble friend made a comparison with the anti-social behaviour regime, to which she made a similar amendment. I think your Lordships will agree that, while anti-social behaviour can cause harm to both individuals and communities, it is not as serious as the horrific abuses of modern slavery. That is why we have modelled these orders on those which tackle sex offenders. Those orders do not prescribe the criminal standard of proof in legislation and were recently approved by Parliament.
I assure the Committee that there are several further safeguards as well as the standard of proof to ensure these orders are used appropriately. The type of harm to be prevented is specified and relates to very serious offences. Statutory guidance will be issued, which will describe risk factors and categories of restriction which may be contained in an order. In determining what measures are necessary, the court must have regard to the rights of both the person at risk and the defendant under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government will also ensure that defendants have the same access to legal aid as is applicable to other civil order regimes.
Legal aid was raised on an earlier amendment. Individuals concerned will have the right to appeal the making, variation or extension of an order and apply to vary or discharge an order if circumstances change. Given that clarification, the substantial safeguards to ensure appropriate use of the orders and my assurance that we shall, of course, continue to reflect on the valuable work of the Joint Committee, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this amendment but hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw it.
My Lords, there are two amendments in this group and perhaps I may explain the purpose behind them.
Amendment 63A removes the maximum amount of the financial penalty that can be given for the breach of a slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order, as laid down in Clause 30(3)(b). Amendment 102A is in response to the Delegated Powers Committee report published last week on the power in Clause 30(5) that allows the Secretary of State to amend Clause 30(3)(b),
“to increase or remove the limit on the amount of the fine”.
Clause 30 sets out the penalties that could be imposed on an individual for breaching a slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order. The penalties are,
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years”,
on conviction or indictment, and,
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding £5,000 or both”,
where there has been a summary conviction. In the other place we questioned the need for the £5,000 limit, both in relation to the limit and how appropriate it would be and the relationship between this and the provision that is coming into force in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which would remove any upper limit on maximum fines in the magistrates’ courts.
In respect of the first amendment, while a prison sentence is adequate and serious, we are concerned that the £5,000 limit is too low. People trafficking is a profitable business where criminals make large sums of money at the expense of victims, and in order to tackle slavery and human trafficking we need to ensure that penalties act as a sufficient deterrent.
The Delegated Powers Committee was concerned about Clause 30(5) on penalties, since it confers a power on the Secretary of State,
“to increase or remove the limit on the amount of the fine”,
by regulations, subject to the negative procedure. The Government have said that this power has been included in order to allow for the removal of the limit on the fine when Section 85(1) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 comes into effect. That section removes the £5,000 upper limit for fines which may be imposed on summary conviction in respect of offences that have been enacted before the date on which that subsection is brought into force. But that subsection has not yet been brought into force and the Minister in the other place said that the subsection would come into effect before this Bill receives Royal Assent and that this is why Clause 30(5) contains the provision in question in order to bring the Bill into line with the new policy.
However, the Delegated Powers Committee considers that,
“it is only justifiable to rely on section 85(1) for the use of the negative procedure where the power is exercised within a reasonable period of the commencement of that provision. Accordingly, we consider the power under clause 30(5) to increase or remove the limit under subsection (3)(b) should only be subject to the negative procedure where it is exercised during the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which section 85(1) is brought into force. In any other case, the power should be subject to the affirmative procedure”.
Achieving that is the thrust of our Amendment 102A, which I appreciate refers to the regulations being made,
“12 months after the passing of this Act”,
rather than 12 months beginning with the day on which Section 85(1) is brought into force, which is what I think the Delegated Powers Committee was seeking. I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept either the terms of our amendment on this point or alternatively—and we would certainly be quite happy with this—the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendation, to which I have already referred. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for bringing this amendment forward.
As the noble Lord said, Amendment 63A seeks to remove the limit to the fine that can be imposed on summary conviction for not complying with a slavery and trafficking prevention or risk order. As he set out, these maximum fines have been set in line with existing limits on fines commensurate with the offence committed, and are in line with equivalent provision in relation to the sexual harm prevention order and the sexual risk order, which were passed in the previous Session of Parliament as part of what is now the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.
To ensure that the measure can respond flexibly to future changes in sentencing policy, Clause 30 also provides for the Secretary of State to amend or remove the maximum amount of the fine which may be imposed for summary conviction for breach of an order.
The Committee will be aware that, as the noble Lord has set out, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 includes a provision which, when commenced, will remove an upper limit on maximum fines in the magistrates’ courts, which are on the commencement day set at £5,000 in the type of circumstances covered by this provision. We anticipate that by the time that the Bill reaches Royal Assent, the limit on fines imposed in the magistrates’ court will have been removed under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which would make this amendment unnecessary. So I do not believe that we need to remove the £5,000 limit at this point.
Amendment 102A would make any future amendment to the level of fine by regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure if it takes place more than 12 months after Royal Assent. As the noble Lord said, this is in line with a recent recommendation of the report by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. We welcome that report and will consider it carefully ahead of Report, including the recommendation on this provision.
Given that clarification and my assurance that this matter will have further consideration, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw this amendment.
I thank the Minister for that response. I am more than happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe move now to Clause 4, which deals with the issue of financial assistance for benefit of the Armed Forces community. It sets out that the Secretary of State can give financial assistance. Subsection (5) states that financial assistance can be given subject to conditions, which are then set out in paragraphs (a) to (e). We are talking about future funds. Some of what has been given so far has come from the LIBOR fund, which, one assumes, as time goes on, will dry up completely, as it is coming from activities which financial institutions should not be undertaking. One would hope that, in future, that source will dry up for the right reasons.
However, there will still be provision for funds. The documentation that we have had refers to the Ministry of Defence developing proposals to manage the enduring £10 million per year funding for future Armed Forces covenant commitments. It also discusses the process for assessing how money under this particular clause will be distributed and how the decisions will be made. From comments that we have heard, our feeling is that there are those who think that it has not been entirely clear how LIBOR funding has been allocated and spent and therefore how any future funding would be allocated. We have picked up comments that it has not been clear whether those in receipt of LIBOR funds have had to demonstrate their performance, that the criteria for how such funding has been allocated has not been very clear, and that it has also not been clear whether the money allocated has led to some of the intended improvements. That may or may not be the case. The purpose of this amendment is simply to provide that the Secretary of State will publish an annual report on the extent to which the criteria listed in subsection (5) have been met—that is really about what financial assistance has been given and whether the conditions laid down in Clause 4(5) have been met. Those are quite important conditions. They include,
“the purposes for which the assistance may be used”—
and—
“the keeping, and making available for inspection, of accounts and other records”.
That is another important issue and important check on how the money is being used and whether there is proper control and accountability. Bearing in mind that this is going to be in the Bill and that Clause 4(5) sets out some specific conditions, it does not seem unreasonable to say that the Secretary of State should publish an annual report on the extent to which those criteria have been met. We are talking about not inconsiderable sums of money. I hope the Minister will feel able to go down that road.
My Lords, Amendment 19, which is in this group, is a probing amendment. It has largely been answered by the helpful background note circulated last week. My amendment is an additional aspect to those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
This additional funding is a most welcome contribution to the benefit of the Armed Forces community. To the initial government grant of £30 million has been added, as the noble Lord mentioned, £35 million from LIBOR fines for Armed Forces covenant projects, and a further £40 million from LIBOR fines for a veterans’ accommodation fund. From 2015, there will be the enduring Armed Forces covenant fund of £10 million per annum. Applications are considered regionally, with the funding administered centrally by the MoD. These are very significant amounts and, as with any such funding, it is important that as little resource as possible is spent on administration and as much as possible goes direct to the people or projects to be funded. It is also important to avoid unnecessary duplication.
I thank my noble friend for such a comprehensive definition of a person.
I, too, thank the Minister for her reply. As I understand it, the response to my amendment is basically that the issues I raised in it are likely to be covered in the annual report on the Armed Forces covenant.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on 14 January, my honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs gave a Statement in the House of Commons outlining the UK’s deployment of two C-17 transport aircraft to provide logistical support to France as well as a small detachment of technical personnel deployed to Bamako airport to assist with the reception of the C-17 aircraft.
Since the announcement on 14 January, we have decided to extend our support to the continued provision of one C-17 in support of France for a further three months. There are currently around 20 people deployed in Bamako supporting liaison with French forces. Following a French request for additional surveillance support, we have deployed a Sentinel R1 aircraft to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support amounting to around 70 people.
EU Foreign Ministers agreed on 17 January to establish an EU Military Training Mission to Mali (EUTM) and work is ongoing to scope that mission. Today in Brussels, representatives from EU member states, including the UK, will meet to discuss the individual member state contributions to the mission. The UK is prepared to contribute up to 40 personnel to the EUTM, either in an HQ or a training team role. We do not envisage UK personnel fulfilling a force protection role, and it is quite possible that 40 personnel will not be required, dependent on the contributions from other member states. However, we will not contribute UK personnel to any mission until we are satisfied that adequate force protection arrangements are in place.
Also, today in Addis Ababa, the African Union is hosting a donor conference to discuss how the international community can support the African-led intervention force, AFISMA. The UK will offer £5 million for two new UN funds to support the strengthening of security in Mali—£3 million of this would be directed to AFISMA, and £2 million to activity in Mali that would facilitate and support political processes for building stability. The UK is also prepared to offer up to 200 personnel to provide training to troops from Anglophone west African countries contributing to AFISMA, though the numbers required will be dependent on the requirements of the AFISMA-contributing nations.
In addition, we have deployed a small number of advisers to Anglophone west African countries who will contribute to the AFISMA mission to assess their needs and to gain situational awareness. Ministers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will provide an update to the House on the outcome of the discussions in Brussels and Addis Ababa at the appropriate moment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer given to an Urgent Question in the other place. Under what circumstances would we agree to extend further our military deployments beyond those set out in the Minister’s Statement? What is the minimum period of time we anticipate being deployed on our surveillance and training activities? Will any of our resources deployed, whether personnel, aircraft or other equipment, be resources which would otherwise be deployed in Afghanistan? What is the estimated numerical strength of the forces in Mali against whom action is being taken? Will we extend our support operations if those forces move into neighbouring countries and our continued assistance is sought? Are there any circumstances in which our military personnel deployed in the support operations could be involved in a combat role other than in self-defence? What is the Government’s definition of “success” which would lead to the end of our deployments to Mali? Finally, will there be a Statement shortly on the work presumably now being undertaken by the Department for International Development and the need to achieve stability in Mali through a political process?
The noble Lord asked a number of questions and I will try to answer them. I may not have noted all of them. As to the question on the combat role, there is no question of our troops being sent out there in a combat role. Their terms of engagement in Bamaco are in self-defence. We are there in support of a French-led operation and in the expectation that the African countries round about will be in a position to pick up any of the military activities that are needed there. There will be a Statement shortly. We have these two conferences going on today and from both of those a Statement will come. We are not anticipating extending our position there but, of course, all these things need to be under discussion. However, we have made sure that this is a finite contribution for a short period in order to ensure that the African countries and Mali have stability. It is in our interests both to support the French in this operation and to ensure that Mali does not become ungovernable. We do not want to leave space for terrorism in this. The noble Lord asked about the strength of the Mali troops in the north. Our understanding is that their numbers are relatively small at the moment. We would hope that the engagement will be short and swift and that following this the Malian community can come together to build itself up.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the purpose of Amendments 1 and 2 is to seek to explore the role of the Olympic Delivery Authority enforcement officers, and to explore a little bit further the provision in the Bill for any articles seized to be dealt with by the Olympic Delivery Authority enforcement officers rather than the police. No doubt this move has been prompted in part by the reduction in police numbers, which has led to police forces being severely stretched, as well as by the explanation that the Government have given for this move.
What exactly is it envisaged that the enforcement officers, many or most of whom will apparently be local authority trading standards officers, will be required to do inside and outside an Olympic venue if, for example, they are faced with ambush advertising of, say, a body of people displaying on their T-shirts a logo or an advertisement for a rival to one of the major sponsors? Is it the role of the enforcement officers to deal with those people either inside or outside the venue by seizing the offending T-shirts, or will the enforcement officers direct stewards to carry out this function, or will there in reality have to be some police involvement? What training, and how much, will be given to the enforcement officers, since surely activity on this scale in a high-profile situation, which could easily get out of hand, with seizure in the circumstances being involved, will not be something that the officers would encounter in the normal course of their duties?
How many enforcement officers is it envisaged that there will need to be to cover the Olympic and Paralympic Games, first, in London and, secondly, in the centres outside London? For what period of time will they be needed? Will they be needed just during the Games themselves, or will they be needed for a period prior to the Games as well?
If the intention is to draft in trading standards officers to the Olympic venues and their immediate vicinity from local authorities inside and outside London, what will happen to trading standards work in those local authorities during the period when their staff have been seconded to Olympic Games and Paralympic Games activity? Will that work still be undertaken, or will it be a good time for the makers and sellers of dodgy and dangerous goods and services, and others involved in illegal trading, to operate in those localities? If the work will still be undertaken, who will pay for it at a time when local authority budgets are constrained? Who will do the work? Will they be appropriately qualified staff and, if so, where will they come from?
Will the Minister also say something about the anticipated costs of the ODA enforcement officer force, including any additional costs of providing cover for trading standards seconded from the local authorities both within London and outside London? Who will pay those costs?
I return to the issue of exactly what role the enforcement officers will play in the seizure of goods. Clearly, the Government and the Olympic Delivery Authority attach considerable importance to protecting the interests of the sponsors of the Games and to protecting the use of the Olympic logo and brand. Indeed, doing this was presumably a condition of the acceptance of our bid for the Games.
If this is to be done effectively, it requires decisive and immediate action by enforcement officers since the Games will take place only for a relatively short period of time and happen in the gaze of the world’s media, where any incidents that lead to difficulties are likely to receive considerable publicity. There will probably not be the same amount of time for the pretty thorough and extensive investigations that trading standards officers normally make before taking action. Therefore, I want to ask again for a fairly full response to my question as to what exactly the ODA enforcement officers will be expected to do, including in connection with dealing with seized goods in the light of the change in the arrangements affecting the police that the Government are making.
On that latter point and on the role of the enforcement officers, what exactly is it that they will now be doing which originally it had been thought would require a police officer to undertake? Is it purely paperwork and administration, or does this change increase the risk or likelihood of enforcement officers being involved in confrontations with people carrying out illegal activities that have to be stopped, and stopped quickly?
In evidence to the Committee considering this Bill in the other place, the representative of the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers said that:
“Enforcement will be difficult logistically and numbers are an issue, as is funding”.—[Official Report, Commons, London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (Amendment) Bill Committee, 17/5/11; col. 23.]
The chair of the London Trading Standards Association was asked if he had any concern about not having a police presence when it needed to take action. He replied, “Yes”, and went on to say that those concerns already existed in its day-to-day role. I suggest that if they currently exist in that role, they are even more likely to arise for enforcement officers at the Olympics where, for the reasons I have mentioned, there will certainly be pressure for speedy and quick action. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide some answers to the points that I have raised.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for tabling this amendment and allowing us to debate further the issues in these provisions. The London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 provides for Ministers to make regulations about advertising and trading in the vicinity of the 2012 Games. Under the Act, those regulations are enforceable by the police and by ODA-designated enforcement officers. Both are empowered to seize articles for specified purposes connected with a contravention of the regulations, such as to stop goods being sold in a regulated area or to enable goods to be used as evidence in a criminal case. Nothing in the Bill changes that.
Under the Act, any article seized by the ODA must be delivered to a constable, with the effect that all seized articles are dealt with by the police. This imposes an unnecessary administrative burden on the police when they will have many other calls on their time. Indeed, it was at the request of the police that Clause 1 was included in the Bill. In its current form, Clause 1 would change this for England and Wales. It would provide for articles seized in England and Wales to be held by the ODA, rather than the police. In dealing with seized articles, the ODA would be required to comply with detailed rules inserted into the 2006 Act by the Bill. This change would mean that during the 2012 Games police time is not spent filing and dealing with seized property. Other police powers of enforcement are not affected.
However, at the request of the Scottish Government the position there will be slightly different because of the different legal systems and because the pressure on police time will not be as great as in England, where most Games events will occur. In Scotland, the police and ODA will agree among themselves who will deal with seized articles but where it is agreed that the ODA will deal with articles, it will be required to comply with similar handling rules as apply in England and Wales.
The effect of Amendments 1 and 2 would be to maintain the position under the Act whereby police are required to deal with all seized articles. As I have said, this would impose an administrative burden on them at a time when there will be many competing—and, arguably, higher priority—demands on their resources. In particular, in England and Wales, where most Games events will take place, police will be busy ensuring the safety and security of competitors and the hundreds of thousands of spectators. Given that context, I hope noble Lords will agree that it is preferable that the ODA, rather than the police, is tasked with undertaking a second-order administrative role.
However, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has expressed concerns about the extent of that role and it is not to say that police support would not be provided to ODA officers. The police will retain their general enforcement powers under the Act and police assistance will be provided to ODA officers, as is currently the case with trading standards officers, if there is an actual or threatened breach of the peace or where there is a risk to the safety of officers or the public. The ODA has met with the police regularly and is currently consulting the police about ODA’s enforcement capability.
I am happy, too, to provide assurances that the ODA will take care of seized articles properly. It is a public authority and is subject to the direction of the Secretary of State. Moreover, the ODA is under a statutory obligation to submit its implementation strategy to the Secretary of State for approval. In addition, as I have said, it will have to comply with detailed rules inserted into the 2006 Act by the Bill. Those rules are based on existing legislation applying to local authority trading standards officers when they seize goods. Because it is intended that the ODA will designate local authority officers to act for it at Games time, the effect is that experienced officers will manage infringing items in a similar manner as they do at present. Those officers whose job it is to enforce existing street trading legislation are used to dealing with illegal traders and, where necessary, seizing counterfeit and other goods. If they apprehend that their or the public’s safety is threatened, they will be able to call on the police to assist.
The noble Lord asked about specific training of ODA officers. That has already begun and will continue up until Games time. Officers have, for example, taken part in mock enforcement trials at London 2012 test events. He also asked how many enforcement officers it is anticipated will be needed and for how many weeks. The ODA is currently negotiating with local authorities on securing officers, so estimated numbers are still subject to those discussions. However, they are looking to have up to 250 officers covering 28 venues and events for a maximum of five weeks—not consecutive weeks. That will take account of shift patterns.
I should make it clear that, for the Games regulations, the ODA will reimburse local authorities for any personnel they provide or services they perform. As such, local authorities will, where necessary, be able to back-fill posts by extending overtime and managing annual leave patterns. The ODA’s costs for dealing with seized goods are estimated to be in the region of £22,000, with a concomitant saving to police budgets on account of them no longer having to deal with articles. The transfer of responsibilities for handling of seized articles from the police to ODA amounts to an estimate of £55,000 saving to the public purse. The overall enforcement budget is £760,000, which includes a package of enforcement provisions including storage, which the local authority would provide as part of the funding agreement. The £55,000 would have been to pay for police assistance to handle seized goods, plus an additional saving that was not estimated for the police to charge for storing. Consequently, this clause will produce a direct and substantial saving.
In essence, the detailed handling rules set out in the Bill require the ODA to return seized articles when retention is no longer justified. Fundamentally, the rules seek to protect owners’ rights while ensuring that the regulations can be enforced in a reasonable and proportionate manner.
I note that Amendments 1 and 2 would have another, possibly unintended, effect. They would remove from the Bill clarifying provisions that make it clear that animals may be seized as infringing articles. These provisions are important because, as we have seen in previous events, animals have been used to display advertisements. For example, at the Ryder Cup in 2010 a betting company trained birds of prey to swoop past golfers carrying messages of support on banners featuring their logo. In removing these provisions, the amendments could potentially create a loophole that could undermine the advertising and trading provisions in the Act.
The main purpose of Clause 1 is to ease the pressure on police resources at what will be a very busy time. The police will, of course, remain responsible for ensuring that breaches of the peace do not occur and that safety and security is maintained. What Clause 1 does is remove from them an administrative task that can properly be undertaken by the ODA. In the light of the explanation and assurances that I have given today, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for that response, and for responding to the questions that I raised. I am not quite sure what I was meant to glean from the response in relation to the position of local authorities whose trading standards officers are seconded for Olympic activity. I think that the reply was that the cost of the officers would be reimbursed, so I take it from that that if a local authority deems it necessary to get other staff in to carry out work—if it is able to do so, because it may not be possible—the cost of doing that will be paid for out of other funds than its own. I rather took it that that was the response I was being given.
That is very helpful indeed. Once again, I thank the Minister for her response and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I will of course withdraw my amendment, but I am a little disappointed with the Minister’s response. I was hoping that her response would be along the lines of saying that those who were clearly the brains behind the networks would almost certainly be charged with some other offence that would enable a custodial sentence to be imposed, if they were—to quote the assistant commissioner—people who,
“see that they are easily into seven figures and it is money that they will then use for other illegal acts”—[Official Report, Commons, London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (Amendment) Bill Committee, 17/5/11; col. 49.].
I certainly do not advocate a custodial sentence for the individual in the pub or on the street who sells a very small number of tickets and is not part of an organised network. However, when an assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police turns up at the Committee in the other place and talks in terms of “organised criminal networks”, “easily into seven figures” and money that will be used “for other illegal acts”, I stand by my view and seriously question whether a £20,000 fine is sufficient.
If the noble Lord will allow me, those activities would certainly come under other forms of crime, which could attract a larger penalty than the fine. The sorts of cases that he has mentioned would not be subject purely to the £20,000 fine.
In that case, I somewhat misunderstood the Minister’s reply, from which it appeared to me that there was some doubt as to whether someone involved in those networks would end up with a higher penalty. I think that she said that you can charge people only with the offence that they have committed. That rather suggested that she felt that it might not be possible to charge them with any offence other than the one in the Bill, under which a £20,000 fine is the limit.
However, if the Minister is saying that where someone is apprehended who has been involved in running a network—and is the kind of individual who is seeing the ability to get “easily into seven figures” with money that could then be used “for other illegal acts”—she would normally expect that such individuals would probably be charged with some other offence carrying a custodial sentence, that would certainly meet the point that I am making and the concern that I am expressing. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.