(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, while I do not support every detail of Amendment 82 and tend to prefer Amendment 85, the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Dillington makes a very important point of principle, which I support. The independence of the office for environmental protection is crucial if it is to have public confidence. As the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, said in its report on the Bill:
“It is essential that such an important public body be independent of the government.”
It is true that paragraph 17 of Schedule 1 states:
“In exercising functions in respect of the OEP, the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to protect its independence.”
The question is whether the provision in Schedule 1 is sufficient and appropriate to ensure that independence. I very much doubt that it is sufficient, which is why I said what I said at the beginning of this intervention.
The amendment, which provides for the appointment of a commissioner who is to be the chief executive of the OEP, would be well worth considering as an additional safeguard for the composition of this very important body, as indeed the alternative suggestion in Amendment 85 would be.
The provisions of Clause 24 about guidance by the Secretary of State to which the OEP must have regard in
“preparing its enforcement policy, and … exercising its enforcement functions”
are worth bearing in mind, because they show how important it is that it should be seen to be independent when, as will so often happen, a government proposal raises environmental concerns. The words “have regard to” are not the same as “must follow”. They leave room for independent thought and judgment. It is that aspect of independence which is so important, and why the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Cameron is so well worth considering carefully in this debate.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone has withdrawn, as she is listed twice on this list and will not be speaking in either place, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I fully endorse the wise comments of the noble Lords, Lord Collins, Lord Alton and Lord Blencathra, and the remarks made just now by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. I fully support these amendments and will reserve my comments for the debate on Amendment 9 in the next group.
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 8; I also support Amendment 10 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. In response to his kind invitation, I say to him that I do not think that the reference in his proposed new schedule to other human rights weakens the argument in any way. I hope that he rests assured that that is the position, and that his amendment stands as a good amendment that should be carefully considered.
I do not believe that this country has been at all at fault in its support for the international treaties and obligations with reference to human rights to which the amendment refers. Indeed, we have led the way from the very start in the international campaign for the protection of human rights that began more than seven decades ago. Legislation has been brought forward with the minimum of delay on each occasion to incorporate each of the protections and rights into our domestic law. Nevertheless, there are gaps in the mechanisms for giving effect to our international obligations. With the exception of the UN Convention against Torture, which enables the contracting parties to bring proceedings against any persons within their jurisdiction for acts of torture, wherever they were committed, and some extensions of the reach of the European Convention on Human Rights that have resulted from decisions of the European Court in Strasbourg, the contracting parties can deal only with offending acts that are committed within their own territories. They can deal only with persons who have infringed their provisions; they cannot deal with acts, however egregious, committed by states. The fact is, however, that some of the most horrific infringements have been committed by state actors, to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred, with the encouragement and support of the states themselves. The prospect of those states bringing the perpetrators to justice is remote. The result is that there are places across the world where those who are crying out for the benefit of internationally recognised human rights are without any effective protection whatever.
Quite how to meet this problem has puzzled many minds: it is not easy to find a workable solution, but we cannot stand idly by. We have to do the best we can. The amendment that follows, Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, offers one way in the case of the international crime of genocide. This amendment, which reaches out more widely across a whole range of violations affecting our international human rights and obligations and, happily, has the support of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, too, offers another. It fits in neatly with the aims and purposes of this Bill. Furthermore, the way it seeks to give effect to our international obligations should serve as an example to other state parties that have joined with us in the endeavour to extend the protection of fundamental human rights throughout the world. The amendment would show leadership in an area of human affairs where this is much needed. I hope very much, therefore, that the Minister will feel able to accept it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and his very moving speech. I wish to support this amendment. It presents your Lordships with an alternative way of dealing with the international crime of genocide from that which was considered under Amendment 8. I have noted the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about handing the matter over to the courts. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has just pointed out, there is a legal issue here that needs to be determined. There are complicated issues of fact as well that need to be carefully assessed, so any idea that this is not a matter for the courts really is misplaced. We need to consider this alternative.
As I said when noble Lords considered this amendment in Committee, the campaign to root out genocide and bring its perpetrators to justice is a hard struggle. The problem is that the weakness of the enforcement mechanisms in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide means that the convention is simply not up to the job. Of course, we must be grateful for the declaration in Article 1 that genocide is a crime under international law and for the width of the definition of this crime in Article 2. We can also be sure that the United Kingdom, as one of the contracting parties, will play its full part in bringing to justice any individual who can be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts so that they can be punished for their part in this crime. But there are gaps which the UN convention leaves open. Its object remains largely unfulfilled and we have to face the fact that the international institutions are falling short too.
Of course, the vast majority of countries around the world do not practise genocide. They needed no persuasion when the convention was open for signature that they must refrain from it. The problem is with the minority, those states which have no conscience in this matter and which still engage in this horrific crime with impunity. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, who is such a steadfast advocate in this field, has reminded us once again that the struggle to fill those gaps cannot be allowed to fail.
The procedure that the noble Lord has chosen had my full support in Committee and it has my full support here, too. I remind your Lordships that it seems to have two very important advantages, which deserve to be emphasised once again. The first is that it meets the requirement that there must be a person, or a group of persons, with a relevant interest to bring the matter before the court. The persons described in the amendment will almost certainly satisfy that requirement. The second is that the procedure it seeks to introduce must allow for due process, with a hearing in open court, in full accordance with the rule of law.
I believe that this object will be achieved. It means that notice of the proceedings will be served on the Secretary of State and on a representative of the other signatory of the bilateral agreement, both of whom must have the right of reply. That will ensure that they can present their cases to the court, thus enabling the court to scrutinise and test all the competing arguments. If the argument of the interested persons is upheld, the “preliminary determination” that the amendment refers to will amount to a direction to the Secretary of State that the United Kingdom must withdraw from the agreement; in the case of a bilateral agreement that will mean, in effect, that the agreement will be revoked.
Withdrawing from an international agreement in circumstances which the agreement itself does not provide for is a sensitive and difficult matter. That is especially so where it is not being suggested that any provisions of the agreement itself have been breached, but I believe that the noble Lord and his cosignatories are right not to have been deflected by these and other similar problems from persevering with this amendment. The strength of their position lies in the—if your Lordships will forgive me for using Latin—jus cogens erga omnes nature of the obligation under international law to prevent and punish acts of genocide.
That expression was used by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in the Appellate Committee of this House in A v Secretary of State (No 2) in 2005, when he was examining the obligation relating to torture under international law. What this means in our context is that the obligation to prevent and punish genocide is a peremptory obligation under international law. Not only that—as Lord Bingham said, it requires us to do more. It requires states to do all they can within lawful means to bring genocide to an end. As it binds all states, it is an obligation which lies at the heart of the relationships that states undertake with each other. It is the kind of obligation that goes without saying. The fact that an agreement does not refer to it does not mean that it does not exist or that it can be forgotten about.
The conclusion that has been drawn from the propositions that I have just summarised involves difficult and overlapping areas of law. The question of whether they provide an answer to an objection that the course which the amendment seeks to follow has no place in a trade agreement is an open question and it needs to be addressed. I believe that it is not capable of sound resolution simply by a debate in this House. It is best resolved by a court after hearing full and carefully reasoned argument from all sides. If that happens, the judgment—the determination—that is issued will carry with it great authority which will resonate throughout the world in a way that we need to be sure is done in order to further the cause of eliminating genocide. That is what this amendment provides for and it is why it has my full support.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, have both withdrawn from speaking to this amendment, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Curry of Kirkharle.