Syria and the Middle East

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Monday 1st July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for giving us the opportunity to debate this important issue today. In his book A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East, Professor Lawrence Freedman comes to a bleak conclusion:

“The continuity in many of the problems facing the Middle East suggests that they must be managed or endured; they are too rooted in the institutional structures, power balances, and cultures of the region to be solved”.

Freedman is a historian who can see the weariness of US policymakers over a span of half a century when power, politics and events conspired to defeat well intentioned forays into the Middle East. It is not surprising that we in the United Kingdom see events in a similar light; after all, it is nearly 100 years since the Balfour Declaration and the suffering of the Palestinian people still sits alongside the insecurity of the Jews. Ironically, both still look to the West for a solution, to a greater or lesser degree.

It is our responsibility to the people of Syria that I want to concentrate on today, as this is our most urgent priority. In so doing, I put on record my gratitude to Professor Nigel Biggar, Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford, who has proved a most thoughtful sounding board. However, before I set out my own personal position, it is important to acknowledge two things. First, the brutality of the civil war and the suffering that endures today are of concern to those on all sides of the House. We on these Benches have regular and constant discussions about the way forward. Today, I suspect that we will be coming from different perspectives on the way to proceed. Secondly, our different perspectives on how best to bring an end to the suffering of the Syrian people do not diminish from our common goal, which is for a negotiated and speedy end to the civil war and an outcome that brings an end to the armed conflict so that solutions to the coexistence of the different sides can be explored and developed. Whether that is though an international conference or through the UN Security Council finding the unity and the will to stop the carnage, we are united in believing that our country must do what it can to end the suffering.

My own views are coloured by my long engagement with and affection for Syria. I first went there in 1973 and, 40 years later, I can only be grateful that I saw again and again the history, culture and dignity of the people in better times. Were I to adapt John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” to this kind of conflict situation—that is not what he intended it for but nevertheless I think it applies—I do not believe my views on where we are today and what we should be doing would be any different had I never set foot in Syria. With 93,000 dead and many millions displaced internally and externally, living in the most appalling conditions, it is only right that here in the United Kingdom the Government have sought to prepare for a future arming of the Free Syrian Army through the lifting of the EU arms embargo on Syria. This decision has, rightly, been debated extensively within government and, indeed, in both Houses—“rightly” because, if arms are supplied, it presages an intervention by our country that many will doubt can lead to any good.

There are those across this House who will argue that adding more arms into an armed conflict cannot possibly reduce the killing; indeed, we have heard that case from the noble Lord, Lord Wood of Anfield. I can only envy him his certainty. There are also those who feel that in arming the opposition we cannot know with whom we are dealing, who these people are and where our weapons will end up. Then there are those who might believe that we have no business taking sides—that it is a sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunni, and we are best out of it. Finally, there are those who believe that the mere act of arming one side will suck us into a full-scale intervention, with our own troops in the line of fire. All are perfectly reasonable questions, but I would seek to answer them differently.

I shall start with the view that where there is killing, providing more arms cannot reduce the killing. If this view was a morally held one which applied to all times and all eventualities, it could not stand the scrutiny of our own history. Leaving aside for now the First and Second World Wars, again and again, the United Kingdom has intervened in other conflicts after killing has commenced in order to stop the killing. We have done so in recent times in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Libya.

Specifically with regard to lifting the arms embargo, we have the example of the Spanish civil war. In the 1930s, Britain and France maintained an arms embargo, while the USSR gave support to the republicans, and fascist Italy and Germany supported the nationalists. Russian support enabled the communists to dominate the divided republicans and fascist support enabled the nationalists to defeat the divided republicans and win the war, with the fate of the Spanish people under Franco all too well known and still, to some extent, unatoned for in modern Spain.

It is also true that we can have no cast-iron guarantee that the arms we deliver to the Free Syrian Army will remain in its control through the exigencies of running combat day to day. There is no guarantee that were we to give weapons they would not end up in the hands of Assad’s forces, or indeed with Jabhat al-Nusra and its al-Qaeda fighters. However, the test that one should apply here is whether by arming the forces of the Free Syrian Army to the point that Assad is brought to the negotiating table, we are likely to succeed. If the answer—after assessing the risks properly as to what arms we should supply, to whom and with what level of training—is a likely yes, we should take the risk that some of our weapons might fall into the wrong hands. At the moment, we have a situation whereby the Free Syrian Army is suffering from shortfalls even of rounds of ammunition. If we can bring more symmetry into the equation, alongside the assurance from General Idris of the Free Syrian Army that his men will account for the weapons delivered and will seek to return them to us when all is said and done, then when we feel more secure in those assurances, we should move to arm it.

It may also be true that we do not know the different factions well enough or understand their motives to be able to make judgments as to who we might befriend. If that is the case, I am all for holding back, but as this war progresses, we know more and more who we do not trust. It is clear to me that Assad cannot any longer be part of the solution. I suspect that there would be consensus in this House that al-Qaeda in the form of Jabhat al-Nusra will not be a force for good in Syria, her neighbours or indeed the West. Our engagement must be based on our assessment of which side best reflects our interests.

Since our interests are reflected in freedom, the defence of minorities and their rights and upholding human rights in a future stable, peaceful and pluralist Syria, I feel that we are capable of working though which of the different factions can best deliver those values. Ultimately, this has to be an assessment that is laden with risks, but there are risks equally in turning our backs. There is a strong view, and has been for nearly a century in the Middle East, that the West engages with the region only in its own interests. What good then will western passivity have in this situation? What will we have demonstrated other than cold moral relativism? To the young Arab, it will simply prove the jihadi/al-Qaeda narrative that we do not give a damn about the suffering of Muslims because they are the other.

I am equally clear that a Government who use biological and chemical weapons against their opponents and are as ruthless as we have witnessed in the past two years cast themselves open to international action under the norm of responsibility to protect. If we have not arrived at that situation today, we may nevertheless have to prepare to do that in the future. Existing international law may impose that obligation upon us, through the Geneva conventions, if not the responsibility to protect. Given that the Labour Party has so clearly sets its face in opposition today, what would it do then, I wonder?

In conclusion, I reflect that we need to be clear about what the doctrine of non-intervention holds for us today. We cannot argue for multilateralism on the one hand, when the forces of globalisation, climate change or international terrorism call for us to work with others to solve problems, yet turn away when the most fundamental crisis arises: that of significant human death and destruction. In saying this, I am not saying that we must intervene. It is possible that our intervention, limited as it might be to supplying arms, might not succeed in our objective to bring Assad to the negotiating table. If we are clear that intervention at this stage will not achieve that objective, we should not do it. Whether we intervene or not, there will be consequences for us. Today affords us an opportunity to reflect on what those might be, although we do not have sufficient clarity. The Government are right to prepare for what might have to come.

Syria

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 27th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

Our position has always been that it is for the people of Syria to decide who should govern Syria. Hearing the views of the Syrian people and seeing the conduct of Assad, we find it difficult to see a solution whereby Assad would remain in power. However, I am clear, and the Government are clear, that this has to be a decision of the Syrian people.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, given that the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have assured the House of Commons that there will be a vote prior to any decision to give arms to the Syrian opposition, what are the arrangements to consult the House of Lords, particularly if the Commons is recalled in a recess?

[Baroness Warsi]

Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have been clear that the House of Commons will have the opportunity to discuss the issue, should any decision be taken in the future on providing arms to moderate elements of the opposition in Syria. It would very much depend on whether the House was sitting, but I can certainly speak to the Foreign Secretary and ask the necessary House authorities what would happen in that situation, if it were to arise, and possibly write to my noble friend and put a copy in the Library.

Turkey

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 20th June 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the political situation in Turkey.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, Turkey is a democracy with multiparty elections and a democratically elected Government. We are following events in Turkey closely. There have been disturbances in Ankara and Istanbul. The Foreign Secretary and the Minister for Europe have spoken to their Turkish counterparts about the protests. As friends of Turkey we hope to see the issues raised by the protesters resolved peacefully through dialogue. A stable, democratic and prosperous Turkey is important for regional stability. Turkey remains an important foreign policy partner and a NATO ally, and the UK will continue to support its reform agenda.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the resilience of a democracy is tested through how it responds to internal dissent? The clampdown in the past three weeks on not just protesters but also on medics, hoteliers and simple bystanders who were only helping the wounded as well as on the media demonstrates an authoritarian strand. Does she agree that this can assist only those who argue against Turkey’s entry into the EU on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria? Is she working with European partners, as well as Turkish authorities, to help solve this?

[Baroness Warsi]

My noble friend raises important points and we have raised our concerns exactly in the way that she has described. Of course, she will accept that Turkey is on a positive path to reform. A huge amount of economic and constitutional reform has been effected. As regards Europe, we are concerned about countries that are raising concerns about not opening up further chapters on accession; however, we must also remember that before these protests there were many countries which for the past three years have objected to opening up any chapters on further accession.

Gaza

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Tuesday 18th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

Her Majesty’s Government’s position on this matter is very clear. We of course continue to support a negotiated settlement, leading to a safe and secure Israel living alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state based on 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, with Jerusalem as the shared capital of both states and a just, fair and agreed settlement for refugees. That is HMG’s position.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

Can the House look forward to a statement on the G8 that addresses the issue of Israel/Palestine, given that my noble friend says that the peace process is a priority for the Government in 2013? Can she tell the House what discussions the Government are having within the EU, as we heard in media reports of the EU wishing to support Palestinian statehood in UN agencies, should there be no progress in 2013?

[Baroness Warsi]

My noble friend always comes at these matters with a huge amount of knowledge. I think that it would be inappropriate for me to pre-empt what may be in a G8 statement but I understand that discussions are ongoing. I think my noble friend would agree that, although of course the EU has a position on this matter, ultimately it will be the United States that is able to move this forward. With a President in a second term, the US is presented with just such an opportunity, and we are seeing positive signs from it.

Burma

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Wednesday 5th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

I think the noble Baroness will be aware from her own experience as a Minister at the Foreign Office that it would be inappropriate for me to give a simple yes or no answer to a report that clearly needs to be supported by further independent investigative work. I am, of course, hugely concerned about the concerns raised in that report, and our ambassador has already raised them with the Burmese.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, does my noble friend accept that the broader problem in the transition to democracy in Burma is that the legal, security and police forces have not come to terms with the idea that Burma is now a multilingual, multireligious and multiethnic state? In advance of the 2015 elections, what are the British Government doing to assist in bringing about reforms in those areas, particularly if that involves training and practical assistance?

[Baroness Warsi]

I can inform my noble friend that we are doing specific work on police reform. There have been a number of visits both ways to try to progress that work. We are also working on reconciliation after conflict. Burmese Ministers have visited Northern Ireland, colleagues from Northern Ireland have visited Burma, and officials on both sides have been in touch. We are clearly focused on this area.

Afghanistan

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I begin by thanking my noble friend Lady Warsi for introducing this debate in a thoroughly rounded and comprehensive manner, well illustrating the challenges that this subject raises.

A British Prime Minister declares that now is the time for everyone to participate in a peaceful political process in Afghanistan. One might legitimately ask whether this is the late 18th century, the 1920s, or perhaps last month at Chequers. It could easily be any of all three. That Afghanistan has the capacity to destabilise its neighbourhood is uncontested, but it is also a country that finds itself in a particularly unsavoury neighbourhood, surrounded by, in the north, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, et al, acknowledged to be some of the most authoritarian, poorly governed and dysfunctional states of the former Soviet Union. Iran, its western neighbour, has continued on its post-1979 project to be the guardian of Shia interests around the world, irrespective of the force of international law, as we have seen demonstrated in the Middle East but also in western Afghanistan itself. Here, apart from a short window of co-operation in 2002, Iran has seen its role as a spoiler, resisting US-Afghan strategic co-operation, profiting, it is alleged, from the narcotics trade, funding armed shipments and training the Taliban. That is hardly a recipe for neighbourly relations.

The most difficult relationship between Afghanistan and its neighbours is that with Pakistan, and it is primarily on that relationship that I shall focus my remarks today. There was a time of cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it was a relatively brief window and is easily forgotten: the period between the 1950s and the late 1970s, when trade was undertaken, people-to-people contact was strong, and both Kabul and Peshawar were interdependent. The intervening 35 years from then to today have resulted first in Afghanistan becoming a near failed state, and now Pakistan, mainly due to its own internal dynamics, is also deeply unstable.

While the trajectory of decline in Afghanistan from the time of the Soviet invasion is well known, it is difficult to see how we can, in the words of the Prime Minister at Chequers last month,

“see a strong relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan built on greater trust”.

Let me turn to the aims of the Chequers six-month push for peace, as it is described, the principle of which is a peace and reconciliation programme. There are three fundamental issues at stake. The first is the Karzai Government’s ability to attain peace with their Taliban, given that the Taliban office intended for Qatar nearly two years ago has still not arrived, although, as the noble Baroness has told us, the new initiative will be a Doha-based political office, and talks are likely to go ahead shortly. However, the history of peace initiatives with the Taliban is not likely to deliver results, particularly when the US is not actively involved—and to my mind, six months is not nearly long enough to see delivery.

If the Chequers summit had been more broadly based to include at least the United States as financial guarantor, we might have given this a greater push. But without wishing for a replication of the Bonn II meeting, which was very wide indeed, it would be illuminating to assess what discussions might have been conducted with the Saudi Government about their support for the most radical elements in the Taliban, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have been historical and, some say, ongoing.

My noble friend said that Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan have a deep and lasting friendship, but given the history of its destabilisation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, I wonder whether players on either side would subscribe unanimously to that remark. Moreover, the role of the UAE as the principal recipient of the proceeds of corruption, as the destination of choice for Afghans depositing their ill gotten gains, is also to be scrutinised. What attempts in this six-month period are Her Majesty's Government likely to make with the United States in seeking to assess how much terrorist funding is channelled through the UAE, and what steps will be taken to curb that?

The second fundamental in bringing about peace is the role of Pakistan, which may not actively seek to destabilise Afghanistan any longer but certainly does not play as constructive a role as it might, given the shared challenges of the terrorist factions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and their activities on both sides of the border. The role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency’s operations in Afghanistan is probably the best documented record of a deep and concerted policy of destabilisation by one state on another. This is down to Pakistan’s long sought doctrine of strategic depth, discussed earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, which is based on the idea that its influence over Afghanistan—some might even say its control of Afghanistan—represents some sort of strategic depth against India. The perversity of this thinking in Pakistan is that if your attempts at control do not work, you end up with enemies on both your eastern and western flanks. I am aware that the US and the United Kingdom are hopeful that the rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad will work this time, but I have to say I have my doubts.

I was told by an Afghan Minister only last week that the agreement from the Chequers summit that the Pakistan army would be involved in training the Afghan National Security Forces is now under threat. His explanation was that since Chequers, Islamabad has sought to exert greater pressure on Kabul for Afghan foreign policy to be somehow approved by Pakistan. This is clearly unacceptable to Kabul, and I understand that talks have now recommenced with India to see if India can fill the gap in that training for the Afghan National Security Forces. It undoubtedly can, and since it has a strategic partnership agreement with Pakistan, which gives it a formal role in guaranteeing Afghan security, it would be entirely in keeping with India’s strategic goal of denying Pakistan any strategic advantage in that country. I have to say that I cannot see the extremely benign role that the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, ascribes to India. It has historically always worked to manipulate Pakistan-Afghanistan discord. If my Afghan interlocutor was correct, this is another illustration of how very challenging the task of maintaining regional security will be.

However, the final fundamental that was not addressed at Chequers was the ability and inclination of Pakistan to bring its own house in order. I refer to the various Taliban and other terrorist groups operating across the border. It has long been acknowledged that the main elements of al-Qaeda’s leadership reside in Pakistan. Since the capture of Osama bin Laden, it is also widely believed that Ayman al-Zawahiri is not in the tribal areas but resides in the so-called “settled” areas of Pakistan; in other words, he lives in comfort in some city. We know that the Haqqani network continues to launch attacks and control myriad insurgency groups. Its interests in the drugs trade, arms trade, kidnappings, murders and terrorist bombings make it the most difficult of the terrorist groups with a stake in this conflict. Given that its interests are so deeply entrenched, and that it is so financially dependent on this ongoing conflict and on keeping it going, I cannot see how it will be demobilised. Its listing in the US as a terrorist organisation is long overdue, but I do not see Pakistan bringing it to any kind of negotiation. It simply does not have that in its power.

Finally, there is the influence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella group of the various Salafi, Deobandi and Wahhabi groups, which were created by ISI initially to counter the Soviet invasion as well as the Shia threat after the Iranian revolution of 1979. They are distinct from the anti-Indian terrorist grouping so well established in Pakistan, too. The Pakistanis have discovered that while the main aim of these groups was to “repulse the invader”, as it is called, be he an Indian, Iranian, Soviet or American, their ideology has now evolved.

With levels of violence in all parts of Pakistan up—by some 300% in Karachi to some 40% in Lahore—the Pakistani public justifiably ask what these groups now want. With the restoration of a civilian Government for some years, it is instructive that they are themselves subject to attacks from these groups. Their aim seems to be to build a fully theocratic state within Pakistan, subscribing to their vision of a true Islam. One of their means of doing this is to form electoral pacts with the mainstream political parties in order to be able to enter the Pakistani parliament, and to wield the influence and power that that brings. As this process of Islamisation of Pakistan continues through the use of violence, and now political entryism, I cannot see much progress in a stable Pakistan emerging as a strong and constructive partner for Afghanistan.

However, in order to support Pakistan in its attempts to recalibrate its policy towards Afghanistan, I know that Her Majesty’s Government seek an orderly transition to a new civilian Government in Pakistan. Indeed, my noble friend has spoken of the UK’s engagement in bringing about a robust and transparent electoral process. I wonder whether she will be able to tell the House what steps we are taking to monitor the elections in Pakistan. A stable Afghanistan will be a prize that will reinvigorate the region and enhance development, trade and the overall economies of the entire region. We know that development is a factor in reducing conflict, and the absence of conflict is a precondition for freedom. Achieving that across Afghanistan, Pakistan and India would be a prize indeed.

Burma

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 28th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord makes an important point. I will be meeting the UN special rapporteur on religious freedom in the next two months. This is certainly a matter that I can raise with him. Ethnic reconciliation is a central part of all discussions that we have with the Burmese Government.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, going back to Kachin and the conflict there, does the Minister accept that the use of fighter jets to bomb civilian populations is a significant escalation by the Burmese army? While we welcome attempts at a ceasefire again, will the Government urge both the Chinese and Burmese Governments to, first, allow the UNHCR to look at the refugee situation and give humanitarian assistance and, secondly, press for an overall peace settlement for all three ethnic groups? This is a long overdue matter and the civil war has been going on for 60 years. It is time now for a comprehensive peace, rather than just ceasefires that break down.

[Baroness Warsi]

We are, of course, concerned about the acts of the Burmese Government in Kachin. I can assure my noble friend that we have played our part: we have had experts who were involved in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland visit Burma on a number of occasions to assist with the peacebuilding in Kachin. We are also one of the three members of the peace donor support group, which also assists with peacebuilding. Moreover, we allocated a further £1.5 million in December of last year, bringing our total spending on humanitarian aid in Kachin to £3.5 million. We will continue to press them, and of course, the Chinese Government.

EU: Membership

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Monday 11th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

The Government certainly feel that the challenges in Europe at the moment are too serious to ignore. As the noble Baroness herself says, there is a need for reform. There are some serious challenges in relation to competitiveness, the changes that have come about because of the eurozone and the most serious issue of improving democratic legitimacy. There is a real disconnect between the citizens of the European Union and what they feel that the European Union is doing for them. It is right, therefore, that Britain is leading that debate.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, with banking union on the table, the financial transaction tax, fiscal union and eventually political union within the 17 euro-ins, now is probably not the time to be defining parameters and deciding where we want to go; and that we need to see how those things evolve before we decide what representations we are to make about the EU?

[Baroness Warsi]

My noble friend always comes at these matters with real experience, but on this occasion I have to disagree with her. It is precisely because of the real challenges to which she refers that this is the time to ensure that we are at the forefront of forming the debate and reforming the EU to being in the best interests of this country, but also of the wider European Union.

Syria

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 31st January 2013 Lords Chamber

Tabled by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the potential escalation of regional conflict in the Middle East in the light of reported Israeli air strikes near the Lebanese-Syrian border.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, we are aware of the reports of a possible Israeli air strike in the vicinity of the Lebanese-Syrian border on the evening of 29 January. We are looking into these reports, but it would be unhelpful to speculate at this stage on the implications of this reported incident.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I wonder if my noble friend will agree with the two following propositions: first, that that pre-emptive strikes breach international law and will undoubtedly heighten tensions in the region; and, secondly, that while the benefit to Israel’s security is likely to be short-lived, the likelihood of pushing the beleaguered regime into even more ruthless actions against its opponents is increased, and risks drawing chemical weapons into the equation. In light of that, will my noble friend tell the House why the United Kingdom Government seek to request a further relaxation of the EU arms embargo tomorrow against this backdrop? Do they believe that putting further arms into the equation will actually help the situation?

[Baroness Warsi]

As noble Lords will be aware, I try whenever I come to the Dispatch Box to provide as much detail as I can in relation to any Question that is asked. It is important to be as open and frank as possible with your Lordships’ House. Unfortunately, in relation to this matter, we are still looking at these reports. It would be wrong for me to speculate about the implications of what may have taken place and of what has in fact taken place.

However, I note the point that my noble friend makes in relation to the arms embargo. We have taken the position that there should be flexibility in the arms embargo both in relation to the period of time that it operates and to its specifics. That does two things. It sends out a clear message to Assad that we intend to keep the pressure on him to try to resolve this crisis. It also gives us flexibility, as part of the wider EU, to ensure that we can respond appropriately to the situation as it changes on the ground.

EU: Prime Minister’s Speech

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 31st January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for this opportunity to reflect on Mr Cameron’s speech last week. The Prime Minister was on that occasion speaking as leader of the Conservative Party, and, on that basis, it was indeed one of the best speeches on the EU delivered by a Conservative leader. It enabled the country to hear from him where he stood on the EU, where he expects to lead his party, and, if the voters give him the opportunity, where he expects to take this country should he get a mandate in 2015.

That is all well and good, one might say, except for the consequences. Broadly, there are three. The first is that by “coming out” so clearly, he has created considerable uncertainty for business, investment and jobs in terms of investment decisions and planning. Only today the London School of Economics has published a report on UK economic growth which points to the UK political process as being the greatest barrier to a virtuous circle of investment. It describes the PM’s decision to seek an in-out referendum as “misguided” because it creates the,

“very uncertainty that will damage investment and productivity right now”.

It points out that we need a more stable environment for investment. This is not improved by adding to policy risk which deters investors worried that the rules might change before their payback begins. This will not only affect the services and manufacturing sectors but adversely impact on financial services too, particularly at a time when the uncertainty of regulation around banking union is still so unclear.

The second consequence is that we have a firm commitment accompanied by a date. The Prime Minister might have done better both by his party and the country to have left things more open. Nailing the date of 2017 to a mast is perhaps unwise when he is not clear as to what exactly is to be renegotiated, with whom and in what manner. We are delighted that he has prioritised multilateral negotiations, working with other, like-minded countries to bring about the kind of changes that we all want in order to make the EU more competitive and fleeter of foot in meeting global challenges. Reform of the EU is not simply a UK priority but is shared across most of the Union. It may have been wiser to accept that the process needed time—conceivably more time than he has allowed himself.

Finally, while we greatly welcome the Prime Minister’s robust rejection of the Norway and Switzerland model, he risks creating greater confusion by not spelling out exactly what we would negotiate for. This Government have gone further than any other in ensuring that significant powers cannot be transferred to the EU by putting in place the European Union Act 2011. This is surely the right way forward, both for the UK and the European Union.

In concluding, I want to answer clearly the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on the Liberal Democrat position. We proposed an “in or out” referendum in the previous Parliament against a backdrop of relative stability in both the eurozone and the European Union. It was right for the time. The situation has changed dramatically since then. A new architecture for the eurozone, and consequently for the European Union, is unknown, hence our view that this is not the right time to be putting up these lines.