Diplomacy

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 11th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, for initiating this debate. It is now nearly 50 years since Dean Acheson said that Britain had lost an empire but had not yet found a role. In many ways, this is still true today. We continue to have tremendous reach. Senior membership of the United Nations Security Council, the EU, NATO, the Commonwealth and a host of other multilateral institutions are all admirable roles. However, alongside our desire to sit at the top table, there seems to be a lack of vision about how this middle-sized country on the edge of Europe can project its capabilities in a fashion commensurate with its ambitions.

The record of the recent past is poor in vision. Mr Blair's Chicago speech of 1998 on liberal interventionism seems as anachronistic as Britain's rhetoric at the time of Suez. Through our use of force, we have lurched from the positive power projection of the 1990s to international criticism and domestic cleavage. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that if we have a “little England”, it is partly due to his Government's extravagances rather than to anything that was planned or preordained. This Government have moved with admirable speed to come to grips with what a national security strategy should look like. However, a security strategy inevitably does not cover the central question of how the Diplomatic Service should serve our national interest.

Despite the Foreign Secretary's excellent speeches in recent months, we are not yet clear about the shape and form of our Diplomatic Service in this period of austerity. While financial savings can and must be found, they will be least damaging if we have a clearer sense of our priorities. Building Britain's prosperity and safeguarding her security are not always compatible or obtainable in equal measure. The two require very different skill sets and capabilities in policy and diplomacy. The balance between them becomes ever more important in a democracy in which every citizen, through the internet and news media, becomes a freestanding and engaged foreign policy expert. On the high street, the exigencies of national interest are not always understood or supported. A recent YouGov poll, in advance of the Prime Minister's visit to China, showed that nearly 64 per cent of people were less concerned about our security, trade and economic interests there than in the plight of Tibet.

The national security strategy highlights how we find ourselves in a world that is more uncertain than it has ever been. Globalisation is in a “long crisis”, according to a recent Chatham House paper. This extended period of volatility, where demographic, economic and security challenges extend across the globe and where nationalism and interdependence are rising together, opens up a fresh set of challenges. Our values and outward-looking posture mean that we are better suited than most to confront these new trends, yet the comprehensive spending review has left our foreign policy capabilities rather weaker. In these circumstances, perhaps we need to define our power and those capabilities rather more narrowly than our ambitions would suggest.

Alongside the national security strategy, we need a more pragmatic view of our foreign policy priorities. Principal among these must be a realistic assessment of our global reach. I suggest that it should be somewhat more limited than the fully adaptive posture that the strategic defence and security review suggests. In these austere yet unpredictable times, we may well have to make a case for defining our international mission more accurately as managing global risks on behalf of British citizens. In practical terms, this should result in our lending more support to the EU's External Action Service than we have given to date to allow it to do more representational work for us while our own independent presence is reduced.

While there may be some specific differences in foreign policy among our EU partners, overall our values and priorities are surely more aligned than divergent, and we should consider how we might use the External Action Service as an opportunity rather than view it as an inconvenience. The vision of our strategic reach must nevertheless not be constrained merely to our commercial or national security imperatives. DfID’s budget and objectives should rightly be more closely aligned with our Foreign and Commonwealth Office-led interests, and indeed with the MoD’s capabilities, particularly in conflict-afflicted states, and I welcome the direction of travel in that regard.

The projection of our soft power is the reason why we are still well regarded in the world. Our language is spoken across the Commonwealth and beyond, our universities are worldwide centres of excellence, and the BBC and the British Council are almost as important for projecting influence as our military is for projecting power. Although the CSR has been “creative” in spreading the costs of these institutions across other bodies, they have all undoubtedly been rendered more vulnerable with the cuts. The danger is that years of success will be lost over a short period, with a cost to the nation over the longer term.

Therefore, we now find ourselves with these substantial reductions in budgets, which necessarily will have been arrived at without forethought. What is now needed is a hard-headed judgment of what we can achieve and, where these goals are more limited than those we have aspired to in the past, we need to set out and prepare for them in a more considered and coherent manner. That should be the basis of an active diplomacy that has risen to the new challenges, and I hope the Minister will be able to give us an indication of how he intends to achieve that.