Occupational Pension Schemes (Funding and Investment Strategy and Amendment) Regulations 2024

Debate between Baroness Drake and Lord Davies of Brixton

Tuesday 26th March 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the clarity of his presentation—this is a complex set of regulations—and for the briefing session that he arranged for Peers, where I was able to ask quite a lot of questions. I support these regulations but I want to take this opportunity to ask three questions.

The regulations were preceded by a government consultation on an original draft, which was amended post the LDI crisis and in the wake of the Mansion House productive finance proposals. Importantly, these regulations remove an uncertainty as to whether the DWP would qualify a trustee’s independence to make investment decisions as they make it clear that trustees will retain the power to decide how to invest the scheme’s assets. That is welcome; otherwise, it would have significantly weakened the trustee’s powers to protect scheme members. Is not intervening on a trustee’s independence to make investment decisions now settled policy? Also, is any consideration being given to granting additional powers to the Pensions Regulator to override investment decisions when it is oversighting a scheme’s funding and investment strategy?

Secondly, the regulations now allow greater flexibility in investments and risk-taking than was originally proposed in the first draft, were it supportable. The DWP has made amendments to avoid, to use the Government’s own phrase, things that “inadvertently drive reckless prudence” —that sounds like an oxymoron—“and inappropriate risk aversion”. As the Minister said, it is now explicit that open schemes can take account of new entrants and future accrual when determining when the scheme will reach significant maturity; this gives them greater scope for scheme-specific flexibility.

However, I note that these regulations also no longer require schemes of significant maturity that are making low-dependency investment allocation broadly to match cash flow from investment with schemes’ liabilities. The Government have made it clear that schemes can invest a reasonable amount in a wide range of assets beyond government and corporate bonds, even after significant maturity has been reached—for example, when the scheme’s years to duration of liabilities is around only five to 15. The DWP has explicitly removed the original draft Regulation 5(2)(a), which required in schemes of significant maturity that assets be invested in such a way that cash flow from investments broadly matched the payment of pensions under the scheme.

Why, when a scheme has reached significant maturity, would retaining the requirement that assets be invested in such a way that cash flow from the investments broadly matches the payment of pensions be considered “reckless prudence” or “inappropriate risk aversion”—the premise on which the original draft Regulation 5(2)(a) was withdrawn? When a scheme is in significant maturity, you need prudence and risk aversion because of the need for cash flow. In fact, in many closed DC schemes, the alignment of employers’ desire to remove DB liabilities and volatility from their balance sheets with trustees’ desire to protect benefits over the long term is increasingly leading to investments held broadly matching liabilities, as well as to consideration of a path to buy- out and buy-in for many schemes. It is rather rowing against what is happening in many instances. I fear that greater flexibility of access to surplus may not provide a sufficient incentive for schemes to change their course.

This is my third and final point. The requirement to assess the current and future development and resilience of the employer covenant is now on a legal basis and has to be embedded in the funding and investment strategy agreed by employers and trustees, which is welcome. It reflects the increasing importance given to covenants by trustees but the assessment of an employer covenant can be contested ground between employer and trustee, particularly where there is a question of whether there has been a material change to the strength of the employer covenant. Given this novel legal territory, which is of itself welcome, what powers does the regulator have to address such disagreements of view between the trustee and employer on the covenant, given that they have to agree them in order to proceed with a funding and investment strategy? How, if there are disagreements—and there could well be—will the regulator address those?

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I need to tell the Committee that I have an interest to declare: I am a fellow of the Institute of Actuaries. However, I should add—with some emphasis—that nothing of what I will say subsequently must be regarded as actuarial advice. It might sound like actuarial advice but I assure noble Lords that it is not. I speak from my experience as a scheme actuary having undertaken scheme valuations, including those under the TPR or previous iterations of where we are.

Unfortunately, I was unable to attend the briefing session due to other business in the House. It might have been better if I had attended because I have reservations about these regulations. They are going to go through and be implemented but, in expressing some doubts, I trust that it will affect the environment in which they are implemented.

In this context, we have to acknowledge the report published today by the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee—Defined Benefit Pension Scheme, its third report of the 2023-24 Session—which comments in some detail on the role and functioning of the TPR. I want to take this opportunity to highlight some of the report, in which doubts are expressed about the way the TPR operates. For example, Mary Starks undertook an independent review of the TPR and said:

“TPR’s statutory objective to minimise calls on the PPF may drive it to be overly risk averse, particularly given the PPF’s strong funding position”.


I will return to that.

Other comments are that the TPR’s objectives have not changed to reflect the significant changes that there have been in the defined benefit landscape. The concept of excessive prudence is widely held within the pensions industry. The PLSA, the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association, says that

“it would be helpful to give TPR a greater focus on member outcomes as a whole”,

while the Railways Pension Scheme trustee corporation suggested that an objective should be made explicitly to

“protect and promote the provision of past and future service benefits under occupational pension schemes of, or in respect of, members of such schemes”.

So there is a significant train of thought coming from the industry that the TPR has failed to acknowledge its role in pension provision.

A particular problem highlighted in the first comment is the position of the PPF, the Pension Protection Fund. In giving evidence to the Select Committee, its chief executive, Oliver Morley, said that the objective of the TPR to protect the PPF was

“looking a bit anachronistic now, given the scale of the reserves and the funding level”.

I am not asking the Committee to accept or endorse these comments at the moment but, at the very least, they emphasise that the role of the TPR is a matter of detailed discussion. The regulations before us are firmly within a concept of its role, which many commentators now say is outdated. I have held this view for some time; it is good to see that it is now accepted more widely.

This was the conclusion of the Select Committee:

“TPR’s approach to scheme funding has been driven by its objective to protect the PPF. We agree with those who told us that the objective now looks redundant, given the PPF has £12 billion in reserves”.


As I said, this is at the very least an issue that should be confronted, but it is not confronted by the regulations before us. The regulations are patently too prescriptive. The details that they require are not directed at the objective of protecting members’ benefits but are about establishing a system where box-ticking will take priority over the longer term and broader interests of scheme members.

I have also argued for some time that the TPR misunderstands its role. There is a sort of assumption in its thinking that the calculation of technical provisions represents the best valuation basis. New readers may well find that this is getting into deep water but the point is that the actuary who undertakes the valuation at the request of the trustees must comply with the appropriate professional standard: Technical Actuarial Standard 300. This is the latest version, coming into effect in April.

It is notable that these requirements, which any actuary valuing the solvency of a pension fund should follow, do not mention technical provisions. In essence, the technical provisions are there to trigger action by the regulator; they are not there to substitute for the scheme actuary’s solvency valuation. We have what is in effect a dual basis. The scheme actuary working for the trustees will advise what they believe to be the appropriate contribution rate. Parallel to that, there is the system of technical provisions that, if triggered, require a separate valuation to be undertaken to calculate the recovery plan.

They are quite separate operations but the TPR consistently confuses the two. The end result is that, by overemphasising the role of technical provisions, schemes are being forced into this problem of excessive care, or excessive protection, of the members. It is not at all clear to me that this bureaucratic overweight on the operation of pension schemes ultimately favours the members in any way. In effect, it forces schemes—LPI is just one example—to invest in gilts, which is bad for members; there is no question about that. It is good for the Pension Protection Fund, and good for a Government who are concerned about being held up as not caring about the protection of members, but members’ benefits are drawn from the scheme so the scheme should be funded in accordance with the actuarial solvency standards, as set out by the Financial Reporting Council.

Pension Protection Fund and Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy Ceiling) (No. 2) Order 2023

Debate between Baroness Drake and Lord Davies of Brixton

Wednesday 26th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, this order is routine and has little practical impact on the PPF. The levy that is currently payable is only 16% of the cap set by the order. However, having it before us provides an opportunity to discuss the operation of what is becoming—a bit under the radar—one of the country’s biggest financial institutions.

I have a particular interest as I like to think that the PPF, or at least the name, was my idea. Back in 1995, following the Maxwell scandal, I drafted a paper for the TUC that proposed, among other things, that there should be a central discontinuance fund that should be called—wait for it—the Pensions Protection Fund, or PPF. Of course, the proposal was not accepted at that time, but it was introduced subsequently in the Pensions Act 2004.

Before getting to the focus of my speech, I have a couple of questions. First, the Minister should provide the Committee with some explanation of the error that was made with this order. I am not trying to embarrass anyone, but it surely suggests excessive pressure on DWP staff, so the question is: has the situation been rectified?

Secondly, as was raised in the 30th report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, can the Minister tell us where we have got to in following the recommendations in the departmental review? I will highlight two recommendations from the review. First, recommendation 2 is that

“the DWP and the PPF work together to understand the implications of the PPF’s funding position in light of expected future developments in the population of Defined Benefit (DB) pension schemes and plan well ahead for any legislative changes that might be needed; for example, to address what happens to any funding which is surplus to requirements”.

It is worth noting that the current legislation says nothing about what should happen to any assets that, in the event, are not needed to pay members’ benefits. Given the PPF’s policy of building up a substantial buffer that, even on its own figures, is unlikely to be needed, the question needs to be addressed.

Any money that is left over cannot go back to the employers, because things will have moved on and employers will have moved on. It also seems wrong that it should go to the Government. The only just solution is for it to be used, as far as possible, to provide benefits for members. In practice, this means that the buffer should not be excessive. In these circumstances, where there is no residual legatee, bigger is not necessarily better. It might be unjust, and its level therefore becomes not just a technical issue but an issue of fairness to members.

Recommendation 6 states:

“The PPF should consider how the Board could hear more directly about the member perspective to inform its deliberations”.


It should be a matter of concern that currently there is no formal procedure to reflect the interests of members. So what thought are the Government giving specifically to these two recommendations in the context of the review?

These two recommendations also bring me to focus on the central issue of my remarks: the impact of high rates of inflation on pensions in payment from the PPF and the scope for the fund’s assets to be used to protect their real value. The problem is that the limits on annual pension increases are severe in current circumstances: none at all for benefits accrued before 1997 and only 2.5% per annum for benefits accrued thereafter. Until recently, the PPF operated in a period of relatively low inflation. The problem of inflation has always been there, but it has become more salient now we have moved into a period of materially higher rates of inflation—most obviously in the current year, but the issue is not going to go away.

The net effect of these limits is that the real value of members’ pensions has been cut significantly. Pre-1997 benefits have already been cut by up to one-third, while benefits accrued after that date have fallen by up to one-sixth. It is important to understand that these are reductions so far; they are going to continue. There is bound to be another cut next January, which will be based on the level of inflation this coming May. It is potentially another 7% if we believe the OBR’s forecasts. In the longer term, I am a relative pessimist about inflation —but even optimists do not expect a return to CPI increases of 0% or even 2.5%. So the need to protect the real value of members’ benefits will only increase.

The reductions in the real value of members’ benefits must be seen in context: the funding position of the PPF, in its own words, is “strong”. As a result, the PPF levy has, quite rightly, been reduced and there are plans to reduce it further. I have no problem with that. According to the PPF’s latest annual report and accounts, the scheme held £39 billion in assets as at 31 March 2022. At that point, the PPF estimated that, of that figure, £11.7 billion—almost £12 billion—was in excess of what it needed to pay every current member and their dependants their compensation for life. This represented a funding ratio of 137.9%. I think that would be broadly recognised as going a bit beyond “strong”.

Given the experience of the last 12 months, it is likely that the position this March will be materially stronger. It also needs to be understood that these figures are already being calculated—I presume—on a prudent basis. The general practice is to undertake these valuations on a prudent basis. Unless the PPF advises me otherwise, I assume that this is the case here, so we have prudence placed on top of prudence.

The problem with all this is that PPF members have not shared the benefits of this strong funding position. Indeed, it is the reduction in the real value of their benefits that has been one of the contributing factors to the strong position. This situation is wrong and should be remedied as soon as possible. This will probably require legislation because the board of the PPF has limited ability to pay compensation over the levels set in the Pensions Act. The lack of increases for compensation in respect of pre-1997 service is devastating for the members who are affected, especially during the current cost of living crisis.

As well as the size of the impact, it is also important to appreciate the differential effect on various groups of members. Information released to the trade union Prospect through a freedom of information request shows that the lack of inflation protection for pre-1997 service disproportionately impacts women and older members. There is no rational justification for this discriminatory treatment. Ministers have sought to justify the discrimination by saying that there was no statutory right to increases before 1997—true, but there was no statutory right to have an occupational pension at all. The idea that the initial pension is the real benefit and the increases are an optional extra is fundamentally wrong.

In practice, the majority of pre-1997 scheme members were either accruing benefits to which they were entitled through RPI increases, typically capped at 5%, or were in the many schemes funded on the basis that such increases were going to be provided and members had a reasonable expectation of receiving them. In other words, such increases were part and parcel of the package of scheme benefits, and their effective exclusion from protection must be open to legal challenge. Such a challenge becomes more likely as higher rates of inflation persist. So we should, first, provide higher rates of protection to better reflect modern rates of inflation and, secondly, eliminate the arbitrary and unfair difference in treatment for compensation in respect of pre-1997 and post-1997 service.

On a Brexit note, it is a matter of much regret that the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill does not provide for the retention of the minimum levels of compensation established in the Hampshire and Bauer cases. When that Bill was debated in the Commons, a Minister even went so far as to state that the Hampshire case

“is a clear example of where an EU judgment conflicts with the United Kingdom Government’s policies”.—[Official Report, Commons, Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill Committee, 22/11/22; col. 169.]

To conclude, is it the Government’s intention to cut the potential benefits that members might receive from the PPF to below the level to which they are entitled at present? I beg to move.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the PPF provides real support to some 295,000 pension scheme members who have entered it, including through the £1.1 billion paid out in compensation each year. It provides security to those in current DB schemes who may need to call on it in future. Add to those figures the Financial Assistance Scheme, which covers a further 150,000 members and, following the Pensions Act 2004, is administered by but not funded through the PPF, and we are providing a blanket of considerable security to heading for half a million people.

It is very important to remember that, before the 2004 Act, members could lose all or much of their pension savings when employers became insolvent or simply walked away from their liabilities. When the Labour Government created the PPF, there were many doomsayers who predicted that it would not be sustainable. In fact, the PPF has defied those doubters: it is financially resilient, has been well run, and has weathered the various economic storms that have occurred over the past 15 years.

Occupational Pension Schemes (Governance and Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Debate between Baroness Drake and Lord Davies of Brixton

Tuesday 12th July 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a pension scheme trustee, as set out in the register. I thank the Minister for her helpful and clear explanation of the intent of these regulations. I support them, because they integrate into pensions legislation an order produced by the Competition and Markets Authority to address the weaknesses it found in the investment consultancy and fiduciary management markets.

This instrument integrates two of the CMA’s seven proposed remedies for addressing the weaknesses in those markets by placing duties on the trustees of relevant occupational pension schemes: remedy 1 is the mandatory competitive tendering requirement for pension schemes to follow when it comes to fiduciary management services; and remedy 7 places a duty on trustees to set their investment consultants clear strategic objectives. These regulations also put the regulatory responsibility for the oversight of those trustee duties within the remit of the Pensions Regulator.

The case for the order being integrated into pensions regulation was set out very clearly by the CMA in its report on these markets:

“we find there are weaknesses in the demand side based on a low level of engagement by some pension scheme trustees. In addition to this, for those who engage with the market, the information that trustees need to assess the value for money (by which we mean both fee levels and quality) of these services is difficult to access. These two factors reduce the competitive pressure on investment consultants and fiduciary managers.”

Sadly, the CMA’s report and recommendations, which followed a referral from the FCA, which also identified problems, provide yet another example of a necessary intervention to address instances of poor competitiveness in the pension industry market. Poor practices on the supply side by providers and demand-side weaknesses driven by the well-known drivers of asymmetry of knowledge and understanding, customer inertia and low levels of active engagement lead to customer detriment.

In this instance, the demand-side weakness is the low level of engagement by some pension trustees, most likely in smaller and DC schemes. On a read-through of the detail in the CMA report, its very real concern about how these markets are operating becomes apparent. Lack of information and transparency on fees and performance, incumbency advantage and barriers to switching fiduciary manager rank high among those concerns. It is very depressing that we are still seeing examples of those behaviours in the pensions market.

Investment consultants and fiduciary managers have a very influential role through the advice they give and in the exercising of delegated authority to manage investments on behalf of the trustee—I say, as a trustee, that this is why this is so important. If their performance or value is poor, the result is detriment to the pension savers. The nature of the investment advice and fiduciary management markets means that any negative impact on scheme outcomes because of their performance or value is significant and will accumulate and compound because of the long time horizon over which pension assets are invested.

Addressing market weaknesses is not without its challenge. A very perceptive observation in the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s 6th Report of Session 2022–23 in reference to these regulations provides me with an opportunity to articulate something that has been worrying me but which the committee has been very perceptive in identifying. It welcomes the additional protections, but adds:

“This is the thirteenth SI relating to the governance of occupational pensions that we have seen in the last 12 months and the Government need to be mindful of the cumulative impact of the costs and administrative burdens on both pension schemes and trustees.”


It is not only in the last 12 months. Over the last few years, there have been several pension scheme Bills and a plethora of regulations. I completely recognise that some of those regulations are very necessary to address weaknesses in the private pensions market, which are well documented in numerous FCA and CMA reports and other reputable sources of data. But in other instances, regulations are needed to correct the impact of public policy decisions and their implementation in the first instance. Suboptimal policy, or suboptimal implementation of policy, is itself now beginning to generate excessive regulations and is increasing that volume.

There are many more examples, but I will take just a few. The Government failed to anticipate the exponential growth in scammer activity that followed the introduction of pension freedoms. It was pretty obvious to most people in this field that, once you tell people that they can take all of their money very easily out of all their pension savings, scammer activity would grow exponentially. Even with the new regulations to address the scam problem, there is ambiguity between the intention of the primary legislation, the regulations and regulatory guidance.

The supposition of active engagement by savers and the requirement to take advice in certain circumstances has not provided the sufficiency of protection for pension savers. As the FCA reported, a significant amount of the advice given was not fit for purpose. It culminated in the steelworkers’ problems. The FCA confirms that consumers often take the line of least resistance in choosing draw-down products. Lack of transparency, complexity and consumer inertia all lead to poor decisions. We then have markets that did not respond with the degree of product innovation that was forecast. The introduction of value for member assessments, although conceptually the right thing to do, did not make for easy comparison between schemes.

All these issues and others have increased or will increase the volume of regulation. They add complexity and less efficiency in consumer and public policy outcomes. This is genuinely worrying me a great deal. Regulatory overloads that miss the primary target take us back to that very perceptive comment by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. If the fundamental issue is not correctly analysed, the policy appropriate and the implementation right it will just lead to layer on layer of regulation to try to correct some of these problems in this market, which will never be a very efficient and functioning competitive market for all the reasons we know.

I wanted to take advantage of the comment in the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s report, because I suddenly felt not alone. Here was a group of people who probably know nothing about pensions at all but asked, “How many of these things can you lay on people before you create a greater problem than the one you are trying to fix?”

To end on a more positive note—it is not that I do not think that there are positives—I recognise the work of the Minister and officials in increasing the number of eligible poor pensioners applying for pension credit. I understand that the results are very significant, so my compliments on that, having given a list of things that I am unhappy about. I look forward to seeing the figures.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction to the regulations. I always prefer to speak after my noble friend Lady Drake and to say that I agree strongly. It can leave the impression that I might have made the same points as forcibly, so I get the credit without any of the hard work that has been put in.

However, on this occasion, I will reinforce this issue of regulations. Just read the regulations as presented to us: this is not a sensible way to tell people how to run their pension schemes. However, it is too late; we have adopted this pattern and we just have to pile regulations upon regulations. We have the report from the committee, and I hope its views will be borne in mind. There is so much to do, and to do it with regulations requires this continual production of additional regulations, but who really understands them? We require the guidance from the Pensions Regulator, so in fact we have two sets: you can look at the regulations and at the guidance. I wish we had not gone down this road of setting out how pension funds should run.

I can claim some experience here because I was a pensions regulator. I was a member of the Occupational Pensions Board, and we introduced contracting out—you can tell it was a long time ago. We made a much better job of telling people what they could, should and should not do. We introduced this extremely complicated process of contracting out over a relatively short period and we did it through issuing guidance. The guidance was what ruled. Clearly, we had very strong enforcement powers, because if people did not follow our guidance they did not get their certificate, so they had to follow our guidance—I suspect it is not quite the same here. In that sense it was a much simpler task. I really feel that some deep thought needs to be given as to how the requirements on schemes should be set out. Doing it by regulations is manifestly not the way to do it but it is the way we have adopted. We are there now, and it would be very difficult to pull back. However, this has some impact on how the regulations are drafted, presented and handled.

Of course, one problem is that the industry will always be one step ahead, so it is not as if we will ever reach a final steady state of regulations—there will be continued processes. All I am asking for, in support of my noble friend, is that an overall view is taken of the way regulations are introduced and incorporated in the structure of pensions law. There is a much better way of doing it. Thirteen SIs in one year strikes one as absurd.

I conclude with a trivial point. I have always been fascinated by this—I have seen these things for many years, not only since becoming a Member of this noble House. What is the strict distinction between Explanatory Notes and Explanatory Memoranda? I told your Lordships that this is extremely trivial, but I note that “the Pensions Regulator” gets a small “t” in the Explanatory Note and a capital “T” in the Explanatory Memorandum.