Queen’s Speech

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the Queen’s Speech contained no emergency measures to address the cost of living crisis that households are experiencing. Rather, the Prime Minister said that

“for every pound of taxpayer’s money we spend on reducing bills now, it is a pound we are not investing in bringing down bills and prices over the longer term … this moment makes clear our best remedy lies in urgently delivering on our mission to turbo charge the economy … and spread opportunity across the country.”

But the challenge to that trade-off—less bread today but more bread and jam tomorrow—is rising inflation. It weakens plans to reduce regional inequalities, every pound of government spending is worth less and it is deepening inequality. Is there a point at which the Government would accept that families’ current struggle with the cost of living was too great and they would have to introduce emergency measures? If so, exactly what is that point?

Reversing the UK’s economic inequalities requires large-scale measures that are well directed and backed by substantial levels of funding over a prolonged period. We heard little about future funding in the Queen’s Speech. We know from Germany that closing regional inequalities takes time and huge sums of public investment. Germany has transferred around €70 billion a year for 30 consecutive years to level up its country.

So I ask the Minister: given that rising inflation means that departmental spending plans set by the Treasury in October are increasingly worth less in real terms, what steps will the Government take to ensure that they meet their new national missions? Will they increase the budgets or lower their aspirations for what can be achieved by 2030?

The UK has one of the most centralised decision-making systems in the OECD, contributing inefficiencies to the imbalances in our country. National decisions are made without a full understanding of their impact on different geographies. The Government accept that a fundamental rewiring of the system of decision-making, locally and nationally, is required to address geographical disparities in England. We wait to see whether those leading the process have the will to deliver it, and whether the Treasury will actually relinquish powers. To quote from the Constitution Committee’s report on respect and co-operation,

“the West Midlands Mayor, Andy Street, said the future of English devolution should involve a sustainable financial settlement that ends the ‘begging bowl culture’ to Whitehall.”

A risk to achieving government aspirations on climate change and levelling up is the financial services Bill; I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. The current aims of the PRA and FCA include protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system and promoting competition. The Bill introduces a new delegated power to promote “international competitiveness”—a chilling sense of déjà vu. Previously, the FCA had a duty to promote international competitiveness. In 2012, the Treasury and Parliament both found that that approach to regulation contributed to the 2008 crisis. In 2019, the Governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, observed that, previously, the regulator

“was required to consider the UK’s competitiveness, and it didn’t end well, for anyone”.

That is true. The pursuit of the profitability of large international firms trumps public interest. Austerity and rising inequalities followed. The Government now risk making the same mistakes, and, with that, the levelling-up and net-zero aspirations faltering.

Advances in ICT and fintech have been hugely beneficial. Our economy would not have been able to adapt so quickly to mitigate the impact of the pandemic if it had occurred 20 years previously. But such advances bring new risks: communities grapple with access to cash, they face exclusion from data-driven services, and card or online transactions are the new norm.

In 2021 the UK cybersecurity agency took down a record number of online scams—four times as many as in 2020. TSB revealed that impersonation frauds are up 300%. Consumer protections in the Bill are needed, but absent is an FCA duty to have regard to financial inclusion, which is a growing risk in our economy.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

Could the noble Baroness bring her comments to a close, please?

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

Sorry. Okay, well, the FCA’s new consumer duty and consumer vulnerability guidance concentrates on vulnerable consumers with access to retail products; it does not deal with those who do not have access to those products.

Finally, I look forward to hearing the maiden speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich. I am newly discovering Suffolk as my daughter and granddaughters have gone there, so I shall listen intently to his contribution.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I am also minded to support Amendment 1, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, because it should not be too difficult a task for the directors to undertake and would be likely to save time afterwards, once the monitor starts his work. However, given that the noble and learned Lord has expressed satisfaction with what the Minister wrote to him, far be it from me to doubt his learned judgment on that matter.

I speak in support of Amendment 2 and the other amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh, to which I have added my name. I declare my interests as listed in the register. I know a little about corporate restructurings, having worked in corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions for some 40 years. I thought that the amendments proposed in Committee by my noble friend made obviously good sense, and I have heard nothing from the Minister that causes me to change my mind—at least, so far.

As I mentioned in Committee last week, this question was discussed during the debates on the Enterprise Act 2002. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral said in the debate in Committee that

“the greatest asset of a company is the people whom it employs … I believe that rescuing the company on its own is a pointless objective … the objective of preserving all or part of the company’s business would be beneficial to the employees of the business, creditors of the company who may be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the business or from future profits, and of course it would be beneficial to the economy as a whole”.—[Official Report, 29/7/02; cols. 764-65.]

My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts said on Report that

“by inserting … ‘and the whole or part of its business’… an administrative receiver or administrator”

would be empowered

“to deal even-handedly with the whole or part of the company’s business.”—[Official Report, 21/10/02; col. 1102.]

Of course, the views of my noble friends in 2002 related to a different Bill from the one before your Lordships’ House today, but I nevertheless believe that their comments are equally relevant to the points we are considering now. New Section A6(1)(e) requires a monitor to say that in his view it is likely that a moratorium would result in the rescue of the company as a going concern. Even if the monitor thinks that the company’s business, or some part of it, would be rescued if the company could obtain a moratorium, this would not provide sufficient grounds for the court to grant a moratorium.

Under the Enterprise Act 2002, obtaining a moratorium through administration is not as restrictive as proposed under the provisions of the Bill. It is necessary for an administrator to show that there is a reasonable likelihood of achieving one of three statutory objectives: rescuing the company as a going concern; achieving a better result for the creditors as a whole than would be likely on a winding up; and realising property in order to make a distribution to secured or preferential creditors. The second of those objectives is the one most often relied on as it includes the rescue of a business or one or more of several businesses when, as is often the case, it is impossible to show that the company as a whole can be rescued.

Prior to 2002, the position was the same, although the purposes of administration were not precisely the same. They were: the survival of the company and the whole or part of its undertaking as a going concern; the entering into of a creditors’ voluntary arrangement; the sanctioning of a scheme under Part 26 of the Companies Act; and a more advantageous realisation of the company’s assets than would be effected on a winding-up. Again, the last of those four options was the one relied on where, even though a company was doomed because of the burden of debt, its business or a part of its business could be rescued.

Under the new moratorium procedure, the only type of restructuring proposal that can be advanced is one that involves a company rescue. This means that the options available in a moratorium are significantly more limited than they would be in an administration. Perhaps the Minister can tell the House whether the Government are deliberately trying to restrict the use of moratoriums and do not want to give the directors that degree of freedom if they are trying to save the business but not the company.

However, very often when a business is successfully rescued the company may also be rescued, although that category of company would not be able to use this new procedure. I understand that the Government believe that if rescuing a company’s business were sufficient grounds for a moratorium to be granted, the company would be tempted to use the moratorium to prepare for a pre-pack administration. If this is the case, perhaps my noble friend the Minister could explain to the House why the Government think so.

As my noble friend Lord Leigh has already explained, companies as legal entities are hardly ever saved in an insolvency situation and the connection between widening the grounds for entering a moratorium and the possible abuse of the pre-pack mechanism is, I believe, tenuous at best. Pre-packs have developed as a mechanism for selling a company’s business immediately after it goes into administration, so that the administrator—not the directors—is responsible for breach of duty if the business or assets are sold for less than fair value. The moratorium is surely intended to prevent creditor action, but creditor action has never been a check on an abusive pre-pack. It would be a pity if the moratorium were to be limited to cases in which a debt restructuring is the only way forward, rather than other forms of business rescue.

In conclusion, I think that the Minister has shown great wisdom in introducing so many amendments to dispense with Henry VIII powers, which the Government had thought they might wish to include—although I share my noble friend Lord Leigh’s reservations about some of them in the event that they may restrict the Minister from providing enough comfort on the points that he and I have raised.

[Baroness Drake (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests and shall speak to Amendment 13 in my name. In this group the Government have brought forward helpful amendments to seek to prevent bank debts and other financial lendings that are accelerated during the moratorium from gaining super-priority status. This is a welcome change. However, serious risks remain of gaming to give current or future lenders access to super-priority, avoid pension liabilities and incentivise insolvency over rescue for certain creditors.

Amendment 13 would remove the exemption which payments in respect of pre-moratorium debts arising under a contract or instrument of financial services have from the payment holiday and from super-priority in the event of an insolvency process. Notwithstanding the Government’s amendments, real concerns remain that lenders may be able to circumvent their intent by the drafting of their lending agreements; the definition of accelerated debt could be sidestepped so that lenders can continue to bring forward debt and benefit from super-priority. It is unclear, for example, whether on-demand debt that is called during the moratorium would be caught by the definition of accelerated debt and debts accelerated prior to the moratorium would continue to be granted super-priority.

Adding to these concerns is the width of the definition of financial institution debt which would qualify for super-priority, covering intra-company loans, for example. In addition, finance debts due prior to or in the moratorium continue to be exempt from the payment holiday. Debts due to the pension scheme are not, would not be payable and would be outranked in subsequent insolvency. That exemption and the super-priority given to that financial debt, which are permanent provisions within the Bill, will inevitably lead to novel forms of moral hazard when it comes to pension liabilities.

This is a fast-track Bill containing permanent, major changes and scrutiny has consequently been fettered, but government Amendment 80 in this group gives a power enabling the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the definition of moratorium debt and priority pre-moratorium debt. This is a welcome concession by the Government, because it implicitly recognises the arguments that many noble Lords have made that it allows the Government to respond to actual experience of gaming and perverse behaviours. Will the Minister confirm that the intention of Amendment 80 is to allow the Government to quickly address the risks other noble Lords and I have identified when they emerge and to change the definition of moratorium debt and priority pre-moratorium debt in response? Will the Government commit to monitor closely the impact of the provisions on moratorium debt and priority pre-moratorium debt, and to consult relevant bodies on the real concerns around super-priority status, the definition of accelerated debt and the implications for pension scheme debt?

[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab) [V]]

I added my name to Amendment 13 and I set out in Committee my concerns about the Bill. As I said then, I fully support the intention behind it—that the disruption caused by Covid-19 should not be allowed to trigger the failure of otherwise financially viable companies—but I was anxious, and I remain anxious, that some of the permanent and far-reaching proposals would be damaging to pension funds and to their members in the longer term. I assumed that this damage was unintended and was caused by the speed with which this package of protective measures had had to be introduced, and I am pleased that the Government have gone some way to acknowledging this in the amendments they have brought forward.

Other noble Lords have set out in detail the problems that the Bill would cause as currently drafted. I emphasise just one point in relation to defined benefit pension schemes. The stability and effectiveness of the current system in dealing with insolvency has depended on unsecured pension debts ranking side by side with debts owed to other unsecured lenders. This has underpinned all valuation funding and covenant discussions. The super-priority status granted by the Bill to finance debts in an insolvency following a moratorium undermines that stability and endangers members of affected pension schemes, while preventing the PPF acting effectively as creditor. As I said in Committee, it also undermines the role of the regulator. However, the Government have clearly made efforts to address these concerns and go some way to addressing the issues raised by me and other noble Lords. I have been convinced that the Government want to make this work and will ensure that the PPF has access to and influence on discussions about recovery plans.

The Secretary of State will have access to considerable Henry VIII powers in the Bill and will be able to intervene swiftly if it seems that restructuring plans and insolvency procedures are being abused, to the detriment of pension scheme members. So in thanking the Minister for the way he has responded to the concerns we in this House have expressed about the Bill, I urge him to stay alert to any attempts to undermine the assurances he has given that the position of pension scheme members will not be weakened, and that their lifeboat—the protective umbrella of the PPF—will not be undermined in any restructuring and insolvency discussions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Balfe [V]]

My Lords, I am concerned at the way in which the Pension Protection Fund is currently heading. It has been burdened with more and more liabilities. This is a direct attack on it. We need to remember that the idea of pledged assets came as an alternative to companies having to put real cash into their pension fund deficits. The PPF was prepared to accept pledged assets on the basis that they were literally a pledge that could be redeemed against the deficit. If that is going to be removed, it will mean that any responsible trustee in any company in this country—whether the company has financial problems or not—must, as soon as this legislation comes into being, review those pledges. It does not matter whether the company has any financial problems. The pension trustees will have to say to the company, “Look, this is not worth the paper it is written on. I am sorry, but you have got to turn these pledges into financial support.” The Pension Protection Fund—if it is to do its job—will have to back those trustees, because this Bill is saying that the benefit of a pledge is worthless. That is the real problem. It is not about the handful of companies that will go under; it is about the large number of companies that will float, but with trustees who will have a duty to their pensioners to secure the pension no longer being able to place any trust in a pledged asset.

I urge the Minister to accept this. There is, anyway, a grave danger that the pensions’ lifeboat is going to sink. You cannot keep on putting the costs of failure on to an ever-decreasing number of schemes. The levy itself is in somewhat of a crisis. I hope that the Minister will step back and look not just at the individual company in trouble but at the impact on the pension scheme itself and on the position of any responsible trustee and of any pensioner who will be saying to their trustees, “If you are to fulfil your legal obligation to us to secure the pension, you must renounce these assets which have been pledged on the basis on which they have been pledged and turn them into real, hard, secure money”. If we do not accept this amendment, we are in grave danger of causing ourselves yet more problems. The law of unintended consequences will sweep through the trustee world. Certainly, if I am advising or taking part in any trustee meeting, I shall be saying to trustees, “Do not accept a pledged benefit”.

[Baroness Drake [V]]

My Lords, the Government have tabled a number of helpful amendments in this group to address concerns raised about the impact of this Bill on the position of pension schemes, PPF and the Pensions Regulator, including access to the table, the court and the deployment of creditor rights during any moratorium or subsequent restructuring process. I thank the Minister for that.

However, I remain concerned that a PPF assessment period and a pension scheme Section 75 debt are not triggered during a moratorium or a restructuring plan. In a company voluntary arrangement, they would have been triggered when the proposal was filed with the court. This means that the PPF access to the share of the vote, exercised on behalf of the pension scheme, relates to the scheme’s full debt, giving it greater influence. In a restructuring plan, the voting rights to be exercised by the PPF would be set by the court. The Bill makes no provision as to what these should be. Given that the scheme’s full debt will not have been triggered, the most likely outcome will be reduced voting rights, reflecting a much smaller allowance for the defining of the debt. This will unquestionably put the PPF as a scheme at a disadvantage compared with other creditors such as loan providers, where the full value of their debt will be recognised, or landlords who will likely have voting rights based on the valuation of their full contract.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Drake]

20: Clause 1, page 11, leave out lines 21 and 22

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Drake (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests. I shall speak also to Amendments 39, 63 and 64.

I fully support the Government’s desire to assist companies in bouncing back from Covid-19, but it is neither necessary nor desirable that such a policy should seriously weaken the position of defined benefit pension schemes and the Pension Protection Fund in the event of an insolvency or restructuring. The Bill does this in several ways: by granting super-priority status to unsecured banking and finance debt, ranking it above pension scheme debt if a company is not rescued, which introduces material detriment to the level of recoveries the PPF, acting as creditor for a scheme, can achieve through insolvency proceedings; by finance debts getting preferential treatment over pension scheme liabilities by continuing to be payable during a moratorium; and by the new moratorium and restructuring plan processes not triggering a PPF assessment period or a pension scheme’s Section 75 debt, weakening the position of the scheme and the Pension Protection Fund, which would not have a seat at the table for key creditor and restructuring plan discussions and would be denied a meaningful voice on employer liability to the scheme.

The Minister wrote yesterday and indicated that the Government will bring forward amendments on a number of matters, for which I thank him. We have yet to see the text of those amendments, but I will seek to reference the Minister’s letter in what I say.

Amendment 20 removes amounts payable in respect of pre-moratorium debts and other liabilities

“arising under a contract or … instrument involving financial services”

from the exemption from the payment holiday during a moratorium and the super-priority provisions in the event of an insolvency process. Amendment 39 does the same in Northern Ireland.

There is nothing in the Minister’s letter that indicates the Government’s intention to give further attention to their decision to give such a wide range of finance debts elevated status and preferential treatment over pension scheme liabilities. We have today heard his statement on accelerated finance debt, but I will continue to press my amendment.

It is difficult to comprehend the Government’s reasoning for liabilities under financial services contracts, extremely widely drafted in the Bill. It would include unsecured lending such as shareholder loans and intercompany loans, including from a director or parent company, as well as arm’s-length regulated activities and bank debts, all getting preferential treatment over pension scheme liabilities. Others have asked similar questions in respect of SMEs and workers.

As drafted, it would allow finance parties to accelerate all debt so that the entirety of the lending would be payable under these provisions and benefit from super-priority on insolvency. There is a real risk of gaming. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, articulated such examples so brilliantly in the first group debated. From what I heard during that debate, I welcome the Minister’s statement that accelerated debt will not now have super-priority status, which addresses in part—but certainly not in whole—the purpose of my amendment.

During a moratorium, these financial debts would continue to be payable, pension scheme deficit contributions would not and the trustees could not call on any contingent assets that would otherwise be triggered by non-payment of deficit contributions. Priority for finance debts would remain. The Law Society has said:

“the Bill would create an incentive for lenders without effective security to allow the rescue of a company through a moratorium to fail, so as to force it into administration or liquidation and achieve super-priority.”

I say this without sight of the Government’s amendments, but there may remain a perverse incentive that undermines any preference the trustee or PPF may have to rescue the company.

Worryingly, liabilities imposed by the Pensions Regulator on the company for breach of moral hazard rules, such as contribution notices and financial support directives, also rank behind these financial debts. This is not addressed in the Minister’s letter. Will the government amendments address this concern?

Amendment 63, through an amendment to the Pensions Act 2004, provides that both the start of a moratorium and an application for a meeting of creditors to consider a restructuring plan would trigger a PPF assessment period and a scheme’s Section 75 debt. Amendment 64 applies similar provisions to Northern Ireland. This would enable the PPF to act as the creditor of the scheme, which would have an improved standing and vote. These are key protections that currently exist.

In his letter yesterday, the Minister advised that the Government will bring forward amendments that will: during a moratorium, give the PPF rights to information and the right to challenge the actions of the directors and/or the monitor; on a restructuring plan, provide that both the PPF and the Pensions Regulator will be entitled to receive copies of all the information sent out to creditors; and, on both procedures, grant the ability to provide creditor rights to the PPF, subject to appropriate constraints.

I welcome that the Government have recognised that the pension trustees, the PPF and regulator need the rights and authority to engage effectively during the moratorium and restructuring plan discussions, but it is unclear how meaningful those engagement powers will be without seeing the actual amendments and to what extent they will be broadly comparable with or weaker than the current safeguards available.

It will also be important to understand how any government amendments address the serious risk that the new restructuring process could give rise to the systemic dumping of DB pension schemes by companies that are financially underperforming. The restructuring plan procedure can compromise creditors’ claims and standing. It allows for a cross-class cram down and there is much speculation that this could be used to cram down the pension scheme. I ask the Minister how the government amendment would address that concern.

The relevant legislation, which gives the PPF creditor rights, is chiefly the Pensions Act 2004, which puts in place a careful framework that supports action to rescue distressed companies, while protecting the interests of pension scheme members. It does this by triggering a PPF assessment period at the start of the insolvency proceedings that aim to rescue an employer. The PPF steps into the shoes of the trustees by acting as creditor for the debt owed to the scheme. This legislation has proven effective and has delivered better outcomes.

As drafted, the Bill directly undermines that carefully structured framework. It will be important to understand how and to what extent the Government’s amendment rows back from that consequence. The 2004 Act provisions were a product of the failure of successive Governments to protect pension scheme members under UK insolvency laws. It would be regrettable if, through this Bill, history repeated itself.

The Minister’s letter sent yesterday and his statement on accelerated finance today are a significant step forward, but they do not eradicate all the key risks that many noble Lords are so deeply concerned about. I ask the Minister if, before Report, he will reflect further on the concerns that I, and no doubt others, will express today. I beg to move.

[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, until recently, I was a member of the board of the Pension Protection Fund. I will speak to Amendments 20 and 63. Like my noble friend Lady Drake, I have yet to digest the contents of the Minister’s letter from yesterday evening and we have yet to see the actual amendments, but I want to set out my concerns, so that they can be tested against the concessions he has made.

I fully support the policy intention behind the Bill: to help otherwise financially viable companies avoid the prospect of failure, as a result of the unprecedented disruption that Covid-19 has caused. However, alongside its temporary measures, the Bill includes permanent measures—the moratorium, the restructuring plan and changes to creditor status—that will be far-reaching. On the current drafting, there will be consequences that have the effect of reducing the protection and rights of underfunded pension schemes and the Pension Protection Fund when companies are in financial distress—protections that have been carefully built up and developed over 16 to 17 years.

Amendment 20 removes financial debts being exempt from the moratorium payment holiday and the granting of super-priority to those debts in the event of a company entering into an insolvency process. Amendment 63 provides for the triggering of PPF creditor rights and a scheme Section 75 deficit at the start of a moratorium and of restructuring plan discussions.

We cannot overestimate just how serious this is. For many years, the covenant position of defined benefit pension schemes has been based on unsecured pension debt ranking side by side with debts owed to other unsecured lenders. This has underpinned all valuation, funding and covenant discussions. The super-priority status granted to finance debts in an insolvency following a moratorium removes that base. It weakens valuations and funding arrangements and is detrimental to members of pension schemes and to the role of the PPF acting as creditor. It also affects the scheme trustees. The liabilities of the scheme—the pension promise—are usually significant and payable over a significant number of years. Unlike other unsecured creditors, trustees are not in a position to manage the exposure to the scheme’s debt by ceasing to deal with their employer. Therefore the Bill dramatically enhances the interests of the finance lenders and weakens the interests of the pensioners and future pensioners in an insolvency situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

Without giving a specific commitment about Thursday, because I have a number of things in my diary, not least because I am answering further Questions in this House, I will attempt to ensure that the forum mentioned by the noble Baroness takes place before Report. Noble Lords who take an interest in this matter will get the opportunity to talk to me and the various Bill officials who are handling what is, I am sure she will accept, a complicated area of law.

[Baroness Drake [V]]

I thank the Minister for his reply and I am grateful for the advance notice from him yesterday evening, which I took in the spirit in which he gave it. It allowed us to make our contributions more relevant, so I thank him for that.

As my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton observed in the previous debate, the fast-tracking of emergency measures in the light of Covid is combined in the Bill with radical, permanent changes to the status and rights of creditors and stakeholders. This House and indeed Parliament have not had time to address the consequences of that and their significance, and we are beginning to see quite serious consequences—maybe unintended consequences—being revealed.

The moratorium is not an insolvency event, but it is the start of a process that moves towards insolvency or restructuring and it does trigger a change of creditor status. While I completely accept that a strong UK economy needs a strong, functioning financial market, there is also a question of balance. The definition of finance debt in the Bill, which is given superior status, is drafted very widely, way beyond being a simple issue of banks. On the arguments that noble Lords have put today, that balance between protecting the pensioners, on which the insolvency laws were changed back in 2004, as opposed to the interests of the financial markets, is tilted in the Bill against the pensioner and risks us going back to the position that existed in 2004 where pensioners were not protected sufficiently—or in that case, not at all—under UK insolvency laws.

I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Throughout Second Reading and Committee, we have put our concerns very clearly about how this Bill impacts the framework of protection for pensioners that has been finely crafted and built up over 60 years. I welcome the Minister’s statements because they are a recognition of the concerns that we have all been expressing.

I look forward to seeing the government amendments but hope that the Minister will reflect on the seriously held views expressed today across the House on protecting pension schemes, their members and the lifeboat scheme. If it is possible to have any discussion so that these could be considered further, that would be helpful. In view of the significance of this matter, I may wish to return to it on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 20.

Amendment 20 withdrawn.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I draw attention to my registered interests. The Government’s desire to allow distressed companies a breathing space while exploring a potential rescue is fully understandable, but fast-tracking cannot ignore an unintended consequence. The Bill weakens the position of DB pension schemes and the Pension Protection Fund in the event of insolvency or restructuring. It grants super-priority status for unsecured banking and finance debt if the moratorium is followed by an insolvency or restructuring, ranking it above pension scheme debt. Importantly, trustees might not be able to enforce a security that they have in place with an employer, such as a floating charge or a security over property. That is a big issue if the scheme’s covenant and valuation had been tied in with that security.

If the company does not emerge from the moratorium intact, elevating this class of unsecured creditors could be materially detrimental to the level of recoveries that the PPF, acting as creditor for a scheme, can achieve through insolvency proceedings. The moratorium and restructuring plan process will not, as it stands, trigger a PPF assessment period or a scheme’s Section 75 debt. This means, and here is the rub, that the Pension Protection Fund is not engaged as a creditor for the scheme. It will not have a voice in the restructuring plan discussions and new arrangements intended to shape the future of a company, which is the scheme’s sponsoring employer. Without a trigger to engage as a creditor, the PPF’s ability to secure better outcomes for the scheme is damaged, yet some finance parties could accelerate all debt and loan payments during a moratorium, so the entire finance debt benefits from the super-priority.

The case of Arcadia brings these concerns to life. There, the original CVA proposed a cut in deficit reduction contributions by half. It was the PPF, exercising creditor rights and working with the regulator in the absence of the new super-priority, which influenced a significantly better mitigation outcome, including security over group assets, £100 million in cash and increases in deficit contributions after three years.

Again, 12% of the Pension Protection Fund’s assets, around £4 billion, come from recoveries from insolvent employers. It is a critical income stream reducing the strain on other employer levy payers. I do not believe the Government intended that the PPF would not have a seat at the table for key creditor discussions or would be denied a meaningful voice on employers’ liability to the scheme. That could not have been intended when the restructuring plan procedure can compromise creditors’ claims and standing and a cross-class claim can impose it on creditors. The restructuring plan involves court oversight and approval, but it is unclear what rights of challenge the PPF would have, what standing the regulator would have and how a pension scheme claim would be valued for voting purposes.

Changes to the Bill are needed to ensure that the moratorium and restructuring plan discussions trigger a PPF assessment period or a passing of creditor rights to the PPF giving it a seat at the table and influence to address some of the implications of unsecured finance debt being granted super-priority over the pension scheme. In the helpful briefing session the other day, the Minister advised us that the department is having discussions with the DWP and the PPF. I hope they turn out to be positive, but in Committee appropriate amendments will need to be considered.

Covid-19: Business

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

I thank my noble friend for her question. We have announced a package of support to help businesses with their ongoing business costs in recognition of the disruption caused. This package includes the small business grant fund, specifically for hereditaments in England that were eligible for relief on 11 March under the small business rates relief fund. The funding is to support small and rural businesses which are ratepayers on a property, as these businesses are more likely to have ongoing fixed costs during this period. Unfortunately, businesses that were not eligible for percentage SBRR relief on 11 March are excluded.

Nevertheless, there are other new measures to provide support to those businesses, including CBILS, deferral of the next quarter of back-payments for firms until the end of June, representing a £30 billion injection into the economy, and a new fast-track finance scheme providing loans with a 100% government guarantee. In addition, there is also the bounce-back loan scheme, which will ensure that the smallest businesses can access loans in a matter of days. We are working currently with local authorities to try to make sure that this support is delivered as fast as possible.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government have to transition out of lockdown through a precarious route that protects people’s health, rebuilds the economy and phases down the exceptional measures. The manner of that journey and the impact on different communities is of huge national interest and requires consensus within Parliament and across the devolved and local governments, which in turn will drive greater public and business confidence. The transition out of the job retention scheme, for example, could, depending on how it is handled, trigger widespread redundancies and business closures. What further initiatives will the Government take to build and to hold a consensus with Parliament and the devolved and local governments on how these national interests can best be met? Because at points they are currently not. Can we have greater clarity on how and when they will share their plans going forward on the phasing down of current emergency financial measures and their replacement with the second-wave support package so that people can understand the consequences and plan?

Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Tuesday 12th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

The noble Lord is right that only a relatively small proportion of the total number of SMEs have applied for or received loans. However, it is important to remember that not all businesses want loans, and of course other government support schemes are also available to help them through the crisis.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government have to ease people back to work safely, increase the flow of funding to SMEs and avoid scarring unemployment. SMEs employ 60% of private sector workers, and many are now critically dependent on both government-backed loans and job retention schemes. Withdrawing these measures too soon when their very purpose is to keep jobs and businesses going will undermine them. When will the Government publish their road map for phasing out the CBILS and job retention schemes, and what impact will that have on structural employment and the longer-term stimulus package for SMEs?

[Lord Callanan]

The Government will continue to monitor and review all their business support schemes and make changes where necessary. I am sure that the noble Baroness has noticed that this afternoon the Chancellor will be making a Statement in the House of Commons on the job retention scheme and the Government’s wider economic coronavirus support package. I am sure that she will get more information then.